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#121
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ArtKramr wrote:
Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944 From: Guy Alcala hat's a lot more than "a few pounds" of bombs, and you've made every a/c far more vulnerable to fighters and flak, because you're slower A B-17 would do about 140 IAS Normal B-17 formation cruise was150-160 IAS. and an ME 109 would do about 350 IAS. And you are worried about slowing the B-17 down so it can't outrun an ME 109???? Nope, I'm worried about slowing down and decreasing the cruise ceiling of a B-17, B-24, Lancaster or Halifax operating singly at night (we are talking about night bombing, after all) so that it's easy meat for an Me-110G loaded with 3 crew, multiple heavy cannon, black boxes for radar and very draggy external radar antennas, and which has a much smaller performance advantage over a bomber than a single-engined day fighter does. BTW, no Me-109 in sustained level flight at heavy bomber operational altitudes is doing 350IAS: @ 20,000 feet and ISA that's about 480mph. I sat in a B-26 doing 180 IAS and the FW-190's could pass us like we were sitting still. Sure could, at 10-15,000 feet. .But since the thread's clearly about night rather than day missions, it's irrelevant. However, bomber speed and altitude could also be a factor by day. The FW-190A's best performance was at or below 21,000 feet, with performance falling off considerably above there. One of the first attempted interceptions by FW-190As of B-17s (E or F models), the FW-190 unit commander described tail-chasing the B-17s outbound from the target for what seemed like forever with his throttle to the wall, closing only very slowly. He got very frustrated by this, and even more so when his engine blew up from the prolonged running at max. power, and he had to bial out. He (and his unit) never did catch them on that mission. The less speed advantage the fighter has over the bomber, the more limited the chance to achieve an intercept (you've got to have a better set-up), and the less chance of making multiple passes on the same formation. By day against single-engined fighters, I agree that the speed generally made little difference for the heavies compared to heavier armament, at least as long as fighters were the primary threat. However, higher bomber speed and altitude can give heavily armed multi-engined fighters real problems. OTOH, B-24 units, when flying separately from the B-17s instead of in the same stream, often had total mission times 30 minutes or so shorter than the B-17s because the B-24s were that much faster, and nobody wanted to spend any more time over enemy territory than they had to. Since they also generally flew lower than the B-17s and attracted most of the flak and fighters, the speed advantage in that case was at best a wash. You think if we were a bit slower it would cause a problem? Not as far as the FW was concerned. Again, we were talking about night ops, but would you have preferred to fly your missions at 160 IAS, 180 IAS, or 200 IAS? Which is likely to make the fighter's job hardest? Which will allow you to spend the least amount of time in flak envelopes, and decrease the accuracy of same the most? Was the A-26's higher speed an advantage compared to the B-26? Guy |
#122
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Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: (ArtKramr) A B-17 would do about 140 IAS and an ME 109 would do about 350 IAS. For max range about 125. Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
#123
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Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: Guy Alcala Normal B-17 formation cruise was150-160 IAS. For max rtange about 125. Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
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WalterM140 wrote in message ...
firstly my deleted text, and I note the dropping of the Maxi Hastings data. "There is a slight problem with this, the combat record of the P-38 over North Africa in 1942/43 and then again over Europe on 1943/44. Then add the long range P-38 versions came about when the cooling system was redesigned and the J-15 version allowed 410 gallons of internal fuel versus the 300 gallons in previous models. The first J models were built in August 1943 without the wing tanks, with 10 J-1, 210 J-5 and 790 J-10 models built before the J-15 model was introduced, then add the time to ramp up the line and send the aircraft overseas. In September 1943 the P-38s in the Mediterranean were classified as having a combat radius of 350 miles, well short of that needed to escort bombers deep into Germany." It would have been quite easy to stop P-38 escorts in 1943, just attack them early, and force them to jettison their external tanks, they were carrying about as much or more fuel externally than internally. It was -shown- that even a few dozen P-38's had a very delerious effect on the tactics of the German day fighters. Is this using the same sort of methodology used to "prove" the B-17 could do well against the average German fighter, total all B-17 sorties for the day, when most were not intercepted, and use the totals rather than the results from the formations actually attacked? Do we have one or two examples of this "few dozen P-38" phenomena? Followed by the assumption the USAAF could do it once or twice then they could do it at will? The P-38 was the most distinctive fighter going around in 1944 over Europe. The Luftwaffe was quite able to work out counter tactics of "hit the couple of P-38 formations to leave the bombers unescorted". They Luftwaffe did quite well in Tunisia. There's no "it would have been quite easy to..." to it. What you suggest was not a factor. A few dozen means one or two escort formations, tell JG26 to intercept them just back from the coast. The Luftwaffe actually tried this for a short while in 1943, hence the RAF Spitfires flying the "insert cover". The extra fighters meant extra Luftwaffe losses and less chance of picking the real long range escort formations, since the P-47 was not all that different to the Spitfire when the other type being compared was the P-38. Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF deployed against Germany and include reserves etc. Thanks for the minutia. If you are going to accuse someone of not using something make sure the something was available for use first. Simply put assuming the Mediterranean war was shut down the above figures are what was available. And the Mediterranean war was not going to be shut down, it was needed, at least until the end of 1943. So there were no P-38s for the England based units, the P-38s were, after a trying start, proving useful in the Mediterranean, mainly their superior range compared with the P-40 and Spitfire. The point is that Eaker and Hunter, 8th BC and 8th FC CGs respectively could have stressed long range escorts and pushed P-38 enhancements, stressed solving the technical problems, and so forth in 1942. P-38's were available in England in 1942. Eaker and Hunter didn't do that. So the theatre had control over where the scare P-38 resources went to, given how much the Pacific wanted them, plus the requirements of Tunisia? Furthermore, given the number of USAAF missions to Germany in say the first few months of 1943 the results would be so compelling that the P-38 production line, the only high performance fighter the USAAF had in combat, should be disrupted to add in the improvements. Not only that but the specifications could be drawn up in say April 1943, sent back to the US, turned into reliable engineering solutions in say May 1943, with the first types built in say June 1943 with the arrival in theatre in say July 1943. As opposed to the reality it took many months to accumulate the information and turn it into numbers of improved aircraft deployed in theatre. The first J models appeared in August 1943, and as a rough guess it looks like the first J-15s were in December 1943 or January 1944. In 1942 and early 1943 the P-38 was the fighter the Pacific forces wanted, it had the better overall performance versus the P-39 and P-40 and was doing really well. The experience in Tunisia indicated the P-38 needed work to tackle the Luftwaffe. With nearly 1,700 built by the end of 1942, versus 532 P-47s, it was not available in quantity, and it would take until mid 1943 to debug the P-47 over Europe, to prove it was a worthwhile fighter. So the secondary theatre, at least in early 1943, was given the task of proving the new fighter in combat. What I really like is Walter likes to run the line about how good the B-17 was against enemy fighters, then turns around and accuses the Generals of not providing enough escorts. Eaker was not the only one and he did ask for long range tanks on his fighters. It is not a simple good guy/bad guy situation. Eaker dawdled on it. It wasn't important to him. The 8th Air Force placed large orders for drop tanks in June 1943, placing it fourth on the list of priorities, the USAAF command back in Washington apparently thought British production would be sufficient. Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air to push for a long range fighter. Eaker thought the B-17's could defend themselves until very late in the game. He -was- sacked, after all. I know this has been pointed out many times but General Eaker was not sacked, he was transferred to the Mediterranean in what was a swap of commands with Spaatz and Dolittle. He was in command of the USAAF in the Mediterranean and he was then transferred in early 1945 to Washington as deputy Air Force chief under General Arnold. Eaker even suggested that the first Mustang groups go to the 9th AF. He didn't understand the problem. He didn't allow for improvements and reinforcments of the German AF. P-38's of longer range and better reliability could have been provided well before they were. An all P-38 force could have done what a mixed P-47, P-51 and P-38 force DID do-- wreck the German day fighter force. -- if it had been stressed earlier. But it was not. Of course give the 8th Air Force, say 1,000 P-38Js in early 1943 and watch them rip into an outnumbered western defences. Just ignore the lack of bombers to take advantage of this wonder gift. Just ignore the Luftwaffe doing something like new tactics or speeding up the deployment of the fighter types historically delivered in 1944. Just ignore the combat record of the P-38 over Europe in 1943/44. Now, you'll dispute this of course. But the problems the long range escorts gave the Germans rested on this: The Germans had to up-armor and up-arm their single engine fighters and add twin engine bomber destroyers to the mix, in order to kill B-17's in large numbers. -Any- of the three main US fighters on the scene (P-38, P-47, P-51)could have made that up-armoring and use of the twin engine bomber destroyers impractical. Let us start with the fact in 1943 the twin engined day fighter force had been run down, mainly by the conversion of the units to night fighters, plus the realisation the Bf110 was not a day fighter and the Me210 was a failure. The twin engined day fighters did not start appearing in any numbers to defend Germany until the USAAF fighters had drop tanks. Hitler wanted his attack at Kursk and defence of Sicily first. Hence the use of some nightfighters in daylight in the west. The first use of rockets was actually also the same day as the first use of P-47 drop tanks. When things like rockets proved useful the fighters to use them were deployed. Instead of giving the USAAF more earlier but saying the Luftwaffe stays on the historical deployments consider the early appearance of the P-38 moves the Luftwaffe more quickly onto the line of the Fw190 bomber destroyer. Add for extra spice the Fw190D-9 appearing earlier, the engine it needed was in production in 1943. The P-38 was the least effective of the USAAF fighters over Germany, thanks to a combination of factors. Once the USAAF could deploy escorts in numbers to the required targets then yes the Luftwaffe day fighter force was in trouble. The engineering to provide the escorts in numbers took most of 1943. Then the long range escorts appeared. Geoffrey Sinclair Remove the nb for email. |
#125
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WalterM140 wrote in message ...
The Battle of Berlin was indeed a defeat, that was not the entirety of the air war over Germany however and its provably untrue to claim that ai operations over Germany were suspended. Harris said he could knock Germany out of the war by attacking Berlin. And yet he stopped attacking Berlin. Why? I think the opening line makes that clear, the Battle of Berlin was a defeat. I think the way Walter ducks the rest of the paragraph makes it clear he is not interested in history. If you say that Harris qualified his statement by suggesting that the Americans must help, then he was just butchering his own men because he knew that help wasn't coming.. Right? Walter likes to run this line, Harris wrote a letter to his superiors indicating the Battle of Berlin would go better if the USAAF could help, Walter like to turn this into Harris killing his men. If you say that Harris thought that Bomber Command could do the job alone, well then he was wrong. And until it was tried no one knew it was wrong. Just like all the other tactics tried. You don't become a great captain by being wrong. So there are no great captains then, given all commanders are wrong at times. Harris was not a great captain. The evidence shows that he was incompetent, if not criminally incompetent. Walter starts from his preferred conclusion and works backward, fitting the preferred evidence in with the deletion of inconvenient facts. Geoffrey Sinclair Remove the nb for email. |
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Bernardz wrote in message ...
In article 40f8ceaa$0$1306$5a62ac22@per-qv1-newsreader- 01.iinet.net.au, says... This sort of ignores the fact the RAF had been steadily building up the bomber support system, and the loss rates had peaked in earlier times, with new tactics helping to drop the losses back into the acceptable category. For example late 1941, and mid 1943. What sort of tactics were used? It depends on the era, intruder sorties were flown almost from the start but initially by bombers, then non radar equipped fighters, then radar equipped fighters were added to the mix. The most obvious addition in 1941/42 was the bomber stream, rather than allowing individual aircraft to make their own decisions on timings and courses. The stream evolved, becoming more compact as the war went on. As the war went on the radio war hotted up, more radio aids used, more methods and devices to jam them used. It comes down to whatever Hastings defines as the Trenchard doctrine, the unescorted bomber devastating the target had long been disproved before March 1944. What do these escort fighters do? Not sure of the question, but overall the idea is two fold, prevent bomber losses and shoot down the interceptors. At night this meant flying around the bomber stream, known Luftwaffe night fighter airfields and known radio beacons. Geoffrey Sinclair Remove the nb for email. |
#127
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WalterM140 wrote in message ...
Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF deployed against Germany and include reserves etc. Thanks for the minutia. Not minutia in this case, but very germane, as the lack of P-38 numbers was a factor. Gee, that is -my- point. And the reason they were not there is because Eaker and Hunter didn't stress it. Yes folks, Eaker and Hunter are the designated Black Hat wearers of the moment, all evil comes from them. The Pacific theatre really wanted more P-38s, they were by far the biggest fans, the problems of mass producing the P-38 cannot be ignored, plus the changes made in 1943 to make the type more combat worthy helping to limit production. How about raging against the decision to convert 500 P-38s to unarmed photo reconnaissance types in 1942 and 1943, versus the 3,684 completed as fighters by the end of 1943, including the prototype. There is your "few dozen" extra P-38s. Note by the way the first 433 or so fighters were not really combat worthy, that is everything before the P-38F, and the reconnaissance versions were model F and G conversions so some 25% of the available F and G airframe ended up unarmed. Presumably Arnold will now be considered a bad captain. The USAAF wanted more P-38s in 1943, there was little the ETO could do to speed up the process. It also realised the need for high performance reconnaissance types. Only the defence of England, of all the theatres of war, had enough allied fighters at the start of 1943. So the P-47 went to Europe and even New Guinea. Was it beyond normal human kin in 1942 to devine the fact that the self defending bomber was not going to work, even with the heavy armament, high altitudes, tight formations and toughness of the B-17's and their crews? The straight answer was it was not beyond human predictions, the RAF told the USAAF so, but like so many bad ideas the people of the time need to do the work to prove it was a bad idea, and this took the first half of 1943 for most and October 1943 for all. So we now know it was a bad idea, and it is up to us to learn from it, not take cheap shots at those who tried it. Maybe so. I am not necessarily blaming Eaker and Hunter, just pointing out the fact that a strong force of P-38's (provided that the technical problems were addressed aggressively) could have been available a year before the pioneer Mustang group arrived. Simply put once again Walter is wishing for his preferred solution and ignoring any problems with it. It takes time to ramp up production, even more time when it is clear modifications are needed to make the aircraft perform better. Things like better engine cooling but more cockpit heating, more internal fuel, better dive recovery, even better roll rate, problems with the engines at high altitudes was a big limit. It's also true that some of the B-17 group commanders didn't care much about escorts in the early part of the campaign. All that rendesvouzing made things more complicated, don't you know. But as the Germans realized the threat and acted to meet that threat, the B-17 bomber boxes met their match and were overborne. Production was very limited at the time. Yes, I am providing a what-if. If the guys in England had been screaming for P-38's the production could have been ramped up. In 1943 the answer is probably not, things like the supply of engines, two needed, meaning the equation became was 1 P-38 worth 2 P-40s? Given the world wide shortage of fighters and the feedback about the P-38 performance versus the Luftwaffe in Tunisia there is no definite answer. England was a secondary theatre in the first half of 1943, thanks to Torch. Then there's the extra training time for multi-engine, which would add some additional delay to getting units operational/providing replacement pilots. That doesn't seem that big an issue to me. Yes we know wish mode will be deployed once the preferred solution has been decided on. (snip) The point is that Eaker and Hunter, 8th BC and 8th FC CGs respectively could have stressed long range escorts and pushed P-38 enhancements, stressed solving the technical problems, and so forth in 1942. P-38's were available in England in 1942. Eaker and Hunter didn't do that. While Eaker and Hunter were doctrinally blind to the need for far too long, Thats all I am saying, my friend. No Walter, you are also saying they could have had a direct influence on the production of P-38s in 1943. You are assigning them the black hat with the predetermined criminal conviction cluster. the need for a long-range fighter in the ETO in 1942 was hardly obvious given the shallow penetrations we were making at the time. It wasn't obvious perhaps. That's why kudos go to those who see beyond the obvious. Meantime Walter will shoot people for not spotting the not obvious. Arnold ordered Giles to increase the internal fuel of the fighters around June '43 IIRR (don't have the reference, "To Command The Sky" by McFarland and Newton, handy), giving him six months to achieve it. Besides the P-38 was only in the ETO for a couple of months before they were all sent to the Med. Yes, Eaker could have been screaming bloody murder -- "hey, don't take my long range escorts!" But he didn't, for whatever reason. Yes, it might to pure hindsight to blame him for this in 1942. Definitely. But Eaker persisted in supporting the self-defending bomber after 17 August, '43 and even after 14 Oct. '43. In 1942 the P-38 was not a long range escort, the external fuel was for ferry operations, large tanks with plenty of drag and no ability to draw fuel from them above around 20,000 feet. By the way if Eaker was still an unescorted heavy bomber fan you can show all those sorts of missions run by the15th Air Force in 1944 when he commanded it, correct? Geoffrey Sinclair Remove the nb for email. |
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#129
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ArtKramr wrote:
Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944 From: Guy Alcala Normal B-17 formation cruise was150-160 IAS. For max rtange about 125. That seems a bit low but still believable, given that best rate of climb is 135 IAS (per the pilot's manual). In any case, formation combat cruise was 150-160 IAS, tending towards the lower end. B-24s were at 160-180 IAS, or 155 if they had to fly with B-17s (which they hated, because the Fort was comfortable in formation down to 140 or even a bit less, where the B-24 was hanging on its props). Guy |
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He -was- sacked, after all.
I know this has been pointed out many times but General Eaker was not sacked, he was transferred to the Mediterranean in what was a swap of commands with Spaatz and Dolittle. That is typical of the crap you try and pull. Eaker fought this transfer tooth and nail and you surely know that. Of course give the 8th Air Force, say 1,000 P-38Js in early 1943 and watch them rip into an outnumbered western defences. Just ignore the lack of bombers to take advantage of this wonder gift. Just ignore the Luftwaffe doing something like new tactics or speeding up the deployment of the fighter types historically delivered in 1944. Just ignore the combat record of the P-38 over Europe in 1943/44. Someone posted over on the WWII board that Galland, I believe, said that the P-38 was the best allied fighter. If it would have been so easy for the Germans to force the American fighters to drop tanks, why didn't they rigorously enforce that against the P-51s? And the P-38's in my hypothetical don't have to dogfight the Germans. They only have to break up their massed attacks and make things too hot for the ME-110's. Now, you'll dispute this of course. But the problems the long range escorts gave the Germans rested on this: The Germans had to up-armor and up-arm their single engine fighters and add twin engine bomber destroyers to the mix, in order to kill B-17's in large numbers. -Any- of the three main US fighters on the scene (P-38, P-47, P-51)could have made that up-armoring and use of the twin engine bomber destroyers impractical. Let us start with the fact in 1943 the twin engined day fighter force had been run down, mainly by the conversion of the units to night fighters, plus the realisation the Bf110 was not a day fighter and the Me210 was a failure. The twin engined day fighters did not start appearing in any numbers to defend Germany until the USAAF fighters had drop tanks. That is just false. The ME-110s played a heavy role in second Schweinfurt on 10/14/43 and earlier. Hitler wanted his attack at Kursk and defence of Sicily first. Hence the use of some nightfighters in daylight in the west. The first use of rockets was actually also the same day as the first use of P-47 drop tanks. Yes, and even with drop tanks, the P-47's could get no further than the German border in that time frame. When things like rockets proved useful the fighters to use them were deployed. Instead of giving the USAAF more earlier but saying the Luftwaffe stays on the historical deployments consider the early appearance of the P-38 moves the Luftwaffe more quickly onto the line of the Fw190 bomber destroyer. Which P-38's could more easily disrupt or destroy. Add for extra spice the Fw190D-9 appearing earlier, the engine it needed was in production in 1943. What on earth are you talking about? The P-38 was the least effective of the USAAF fighters over Germany, thanks to a combination of factors. P-38's were very capable of breaking up the German fighter formations as they tried to do mass attacks on the bombers and they were also very capable of engaging the ME-110s. It's not a matter of pure dogfighting ability, just as the US Navy developed team tactics for the F-4-F's to use to fight the IJN fighters. Once the USAAF could deploy escorts in numbers to the required targets then yes the Luftwaffe day fighter force was in trouble. That day -could- have come a full year sooner. First flight of the P-38 prototype was in 1939. First P-51B prototype was in November, 1942. I don't see any reason why, as a hypothetical, that the problems the P-38's encountered over Europe couldn't have been worked out in plenty of time to match the increase in the B-17 force in the spring of 1943. They did have Kelley Johnson working on the P-38 after all. It's hard to imagine he couldn't have solved about anything. Eaker didn't stress it, and Hunter (the 8th FC CG) didn't stress it. I don't see any reason why the number of P-38's in Europe couldn't have been dramatically increased, and much earlier, if it had been stressed. The strategic bombing campaign operating out of England was, after all, the top drawer element upon which the Army Air Force officers planned to use to make their case for a separate air force. And the Mediterranean war was not going to be shut down, it was needed, at least until the end of 1943. The most impotant theater to Arnold was clearly in England, and it involved daylight precision bombing of German targets. So there were no P-38s for the England based units, There could easily have been. That's my point. So the theatre had control over where the scare P-38 resources went to, given how much the Pacific wanted them, plus the requirements of Tunisia? The most important air force was clearly in England. At least as far as Arnold was concerned. Furthermore, given the number of USAAF missions to Germany in say the first few months of 1943 the results would be so compelling that the P-38 production line, the only high performance fighter the USAAF had in combat, should be disrupted to add in the improvements. That's why it is a hypothetical. Not only that but the specifications could be drawn up in say April 1943, sent back to the US, turned into reliable engineering solutions in say May 1943, with the first types built in say June 1943 with the arrival in theatre in say July 1943. Hypothectically, that could all have been done a year earlier. In 1942 and early 1943 the P-38 was the fighter the Pacific forces wanted, it had the better overall performance versus the P-39 and P-40 and was doing really well. The experience in Tunisia indicated the P-38 needed work to tackle the Luftwaffe. The P-38 could have been very effective ensuring that the Germans couldn't mass the way they wanted to against the B-17's. It was working -with- the B-17's that the P-38 could have done well. Of course the P-51's and P-47's could and did do that too, but P-38's could have been doing it a lot sooner. Another hypothetical would be that the Allies could have mated the Merlin to the Mustang a lot earlier. Sure. Then you would have had the same equation. But no one, certainly not Eaker or Hunter, was pushing for that. What I really like is Walter likes to run the line about how good the B-17 was against enemy fighters, then turns around and accuses the Generals of not providing enough escorts. That would just be a flat lie. The B-17 groups could not deal with fighters after the Germans reinforced and re-armed beginning in the Spring of 1943. With escorts to break up the German formations, and make it too dangerous for the heavily armed German fighters (both single and twin engine) to be proximate to the American formations, that changed. You've seen me exposit that many, many times. Meantime Eaker convinced Robert Lovett, the Assistant Secretary of War for Air to push for a long range fighter. Source? I find no corroboration for such a supposed statement. "Eaker as late as October 1943 still believed the key was in the size of the bomber formations... Eaker stuck to this belief while high-ranking officers such as Chief of the Air Staff Barney Giles and commander of the VIII Bomber Command Fred Anderson had determined that escort was the key to victory." -- "To Command the Sky, p. 112, by McFarland and Newton "During June 1943 Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert Lovett visited England to observe Eighth Air Force operations. He spent considerable time inspecting the VIII Fighter Command and especially the problems of escort. At an Eighth Air Force comanders' mmeeting immediately after Lovett's visit, Hunter told Eaker that he feared Lovett would insist on the use of P-38's for escort. Hunter identified the P-38 as a "wonderful ship," but preferrred to give the P-47 a "complete trial." In doing so Hunter revealed his misunderstanding of the basic issue confronting the Eighth Air Force in the summer and fall of 1943. The bombers needed escorts with range, bot superior fighters. The P-47 was a better dogfighter, but it did not have the legs to fly long escort missions." ibid, p. 114 I find no evidence that Eaker thought it imperitive to provide escort or that he communicated such with Lovett. Lovett DID take that idea back to Washington with him, but he didn't get it from Eaker. Walt |
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