Iraqi Generals Meet Iranian Tomcats -Read it ...

Iraqi Generals Meet Iranian Tomcats

During the war with Iran, for Iraqi generals the life depended on two
factors, both of which had to do with their superiors: a) not taking
too much action and make themselves too dangerous for the dictator in
Baghdad as to become his target, and b) not taking too little action as
to appear incompetent as a military leader - and become a target for
that reason too. In general, Iraqi high-ranking officers would seldom
appear very close near the front: instead they preferred to control the
battle from the safety of "field headquarters," rarely less than 30
or more kilometres in the rear. Sometimes, however, tours on the front
had to be done, or the "situation b" could develop: this was
especially important because several cases were known in which Iraqi
field commander deliberately distorted intelligence information to
their superiors, and they had to visit the front every time they wanted
to see what was happening on the ground.

Exactly one such case provided the source of the next well known - at
least in Iran and Iraq, but also within specific circles of the US
military - and highly contentious claim from this period of the war:
the one about IRIAF interceptors downing five or six Iraqi fighters
during a 17-minute engagement, followed by two IRIAA Cobras downing a
helicopter carrying an Iraqi general, and the escorting MiG. This story
is still being perpetuated on the internet even now.

Over time the actual story has been altered, corrupted and misused so
many times by both sides, that even the memories of former Iranian and
Iraqi fliers can not be wholly relied upon. The following account has
been compiled during a series of interviews with several participants,
as well as by using reports from both sides, and could therefore be
considered as the most complete and accurate version published so far.

By 20 November 1982, the Iraqi troops in the MOHARRAM TO, on the front
between Eyn-e Khosh and Musiyan, were in a critical condition. The
Iranians had managed to capture several important oilfields, and cut
the main communication lines into the area; the IrAF was prevented from
intervening by the IRIAF interceptors and SAMs; and the intervention
efforts of the IrAAC ended with its helicopters either being shot down
by Iranian fighters and Cobras, or being hampered in their operations
by strong winds and bad weather. Also, the Iraqi Army suffered heavy
casualties, including 3,500 soldiers killed, and the whole sector of
the front was in danger of collapsing. Iraqi generals could already
hear the first allegations from the dictator in Baghdad. Fearing that
losses might be approaching those suffered during the spring Iranian
offensives of 1982, Maj. Gen. Maher Abdul Rashid of the Iraqi Army
General Staff and commander of the III Army Corps, and Lt. Gen. Abdul
Jabbar Mohsen, deputy commander of the IV Corps and Army spokesman,
decided to tour the front and meet with their local field commanders.

On the morning of 21 November, both generals boarded an armed Mi-8
helicopter, piloted by Capt. S. Mousa, which was escorted by two other
Mi-8s and one Mi-25 acting as a pathfinder. Overhead, flights of four
MiG-21s and four MiG-23s were providing top cover, and these were
continuously relieved by other flights as they ran out of fuel during
the formation's slow progress towards Mandali.


At around 10:40hrs, at 12.200m (40,000ft) and only eight kilometres
from the Iranian border, two IRIAF F-4Es underway to attack targets in
Iraq, were approaching a Boeing 707-3J9C-tanker escorted by two F-14As,
led by Capt. M. Khosrodad. The Tomcats were flying a race-track pattern
around the tanker, with one of them continuously scanning the airspace
over the front by its AWG-9 radar. Around 10:45hrs, just as the first
Phantom started receiving fuel from the tanker, the radar onboard Capt.
Khosrodad's F-14A acquired several Iraqi fighters apparently closing
from the west and well within the range of the AIM-54 missiles of his
Tomcat.

Despite the standing order not to fly into the Iraqi airspace or leave
the tanker unprotected, Capt. Khosrodad decided to attack: he ordered
his wingman, whose aircraft was only armed with Sparrows and
Sidewinders, to remain with the Boeing and the two Phantoms; then Capt.
Khosrodad headed off west.

Working swiftly, he and his RIO fired two AIM-54As and two AIM-7E-4s in
rapid succession, and both were most pleased when they noticed that at
least two of their radar contacts disappeared within seconds of each
other: apparently, so they thought, they had just spoiled 'another
Iraqi air raid'....or so they thought.

Meanwhile, although their radar net was supposedly able to track
aircraft up to 200km deep inside the Iranian airspace, the Iraqis were
completely unaware of the two Iranian Tomcats nearby. The first sign of
something going wrong for Capt. Mousa was when the pilot of one of the
escorting Mi-8s - which was flying a couple of kilometres ahead -
shouted out a warning that no less than three of escorting fighters (or
what was left of them) were falling out of the skies in flame to their
left and right, and that the helicopter carrying generals should make a
hard right turn in order to evade the debris.

Seconds later, also one of the MiG-pilots started shouting warnings,
saying that they had no clue what had attacked them, but "strongly"
suggested the Mi-8 with the generals onboard to leave the area and
immediately turn west! Seeing the wreckage of the downed MiGs falling
towards him, Capt. Mousa was in a complete agreement with his
colleagues, so he turned around, and the trip to the front by Maj. Gen.
Rashid and Lt. Gen. Mohsen was over before it really started.

Meanwhile, after spending all his medium- and long-range missiles to
shoot down one MiG-21 and two MiG-23s within a couple of seconds,
Khosrodad returned to the tanker and advised several other F-4s in the
area about the Iraqi fighters: his AWG-9 apparently never detected
Iraqi helicopters which flew slow and low between the hills, and
several kilometres behind the escorting fighters. The Phantoms indeed
tried to intervene, but before finding the helicopters - about which
they did not know any way - they ran into a formation of IrAF Su-22s en
route for an attack against Iranian ground troops. A wild dogfight
developed, and as pilots from both sides tried to jettison their
air-to-ground weapons, one of the Sukhois was shot down, while the rest
of the Iraqi formation fled to the west.

The battle continued without the Iraqi generals....

"...the Iraqi Army suffered heavy casualties, including 3,500 soldiers
killed...."

Was this the battle where the Iranian mullahs took children out of
orphanages to make them run ahead blowing up Iraqi mines for the Iranian
soldiers?

WDA

end


"Amir - Iranian F-4 pilot" wrote in message
oups.com...
Iraqi Generals Meet Iranian Tomcats

During the war with Iran, for Iraqi generals the life depended on two
factors, both of which had to do with their superiors: a) not taking
too much action and make themselves too dangerous for the dictator in
Baghdad as to become his target, and b) not taking too little action as
to appear incompetent as a military leader - and become a target for
that reason too. In general, Iraqi high-ranking officers would seldom
appear very close near the front: instead they preferred to control the
battle from the safety of "field headquarters," rarely less than 30
or more kilometres in the rear. Sometimes, however, tours on the front
had to be done, or the "situation b" could develop: this was
especially important because several cases were known in which Iraqi
field commander deliberately distorted intelligence information to
their superiors, and they had to visit the front every time they wanted
to see what was happening on the ground.

Exactly one such case provided the source of the next well known - at
least in Iran and Iraq, but also within specific circles of the US
military - and highly contentious claim from this period of the war:
the one about IRIAF interceptors downing five or six Iraqi fighters
during a 17-minute engagement, followed by two IRIAA Cobras downing a
helicopter carrying an Iraqi general, and the escorting MiG. This story
is still being perpetuated on the internet even now.

Over time the actual story has been altered, corrupted and misused so
many times by both sides, that even the memories of former Iranian and
Iraqi fliers can not be wholly relied upon. The following account has
been compiled during a series of interviews with several participants,
as well as by using reports from both sides, and could therefore be
considered as the most complete and accurate version published so far.

By 20 November 1982, the Iraqi troops in the MOHARRAM TO, on the front
between Eyn-e Khosh and Musiyan, were in a critical condition. The
Iranians had managed to capture several important oilfields, and cut
the main communication lines into the area; the IrAF was prevented from
intervening by the IRIAF interceptors and SAMs; and the intervention
efforts of the IrAAC ended with its helicopters either being shot down
by Iranian fighters and Cobras, or being hampered in their operations
by strong winds and bad weather. Also, the Iraqi Army suffered heavy
casualties, including 3,500 soldiers killed, and the whole sector of
the front was in danger of collapsing. Iraqi generals could already
hear the first allegations from the dictator in Baghdad. Fearing that
losses might be approaching those suffered during the spring Iranian
offensives of 1982, Maj. Gen. Maher Abdul Rashid of the Iraqi Army
General Staff and commander of the III Army Corps, and Lt. Gen. Abdul
Jabbar Mohsen, deputy commander of the IV Corps and Army spokesman,
decided to tour the front and meet with their local field commanders.

On the morning of 21 November, both generals boarded an armed Mi-8
helicopter, piloted by Capt. S. Mousa, which was escorted by two other
Mi-8s and one Mi-25 acting as a pathfinder. Overhead, flights of four
MiG-21s and four MiG-23s were providing top cover, and these were
continuously relieved by other flights as they ran out of fuel during
the formation's slow progress towards Mandali.


At around 10:40hrs, at 12.200m (40,000ft) and only eight kilometres
from the Iranian border, two IRIAF F-4Es underway to attack targets in
Iraq, were approaching a Boeing 707-3J9C-tanker escorted by two F-14As,
led by Capt. M. Khosrodad. The Tomcats were flying a race-track pattern
around the tanker, with one of them continuously scanning the airspace
over the front by its AWG-9 radar. Around 10:45hrs, just as the first
Phantom started receiving fuel from the tanker, the radar onboard Capt.
Khosrodad's F-14A acquired several Iraqi fighters apparently closing
from the west and well within the range of the AIM-54 missiles of his
Tomcat.

Despite the standing order not to fly into the Iraqi airspace or leave
the tanker unprotected, Capt. Khosrodad decided to attack: he ordered
his wingman, whose aircraft was only armed with Sparrows and
Sidewinders, to remain with the Boeing and the two Phantoms; then Capt.
Khosrodad headed off west.

Working swiftly, he and his RIO fired two AIM-54As and two AIM-7E-4s in
rapid succession, and both were most pleased when they noticed that at
least two of their radar contacts disappeared within seconds of each
other: apparently, so they thought, they had just spoiled 'another
Iraqi air raid'....or so they thought.

Meanwhile, although their radar net was supposedly able to track
aircraft up to 200km deep inside the Iranian airspace, the Iraqis were
completely unaware of the two Iranian Tomcats nearby. The first sign of
something going wrong for Capt. Mousa was when the pilot of one of the
escorting Mi-8s - which was flying a couple of kilometres ahead -
shouted out a warning that no less than three of escorting fighters (or
what was left of them) were falling out of the skies in flame to their
left and right, and that the helicopter carrying generals should make a
hard right turn in order to evade the debris.

Seconds later, also one of the MiG-pilots started shouting warnings,
saying that they had no clue what had attacked them, but "strongly"
suggested the Mi-8 with the generals onboard to leave the area and
immediately turn west! Seeing the wreckage of the downed MiGs falling
towards him, Capt. Mousa was in a complete agreement with his
colleagues, so he turned around, and the trip to the front by Maj. Gen.
Rashid and Lt. Gen. Mohsen was over before it really started.

Meanwhile, after spending all his medium- and long-range missiles to
shoot down one MiG-21 and two MiG-23s within a couple of seconds,
Khosrodad returned to the tanker and advised several other F-4s in the
area about the Iraqi fighters: his AWG-9 apparently never detected
Iraqi helicopters which flew slow and low between the hills, and
several kilometres behind the escorting fighters. The Phantoms indeed
tried to intervene, but before finding the helicopters - about which
they did not know any way - they ran into a formation of IrAF Su-22s en
route for an attack against Iranian ground troops. A wild dogfight
developed, and as pilots from both sides tried to jettison their
air-to-ground weapons, one of the Sukhois was shot down, while the rest
of the Iraqi formation fled to the west.

The battle continued without the Iraqi generals....


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