F-35's Costs Climb Along With Concerns

"Shmaryahu b. Chanoch" wrote in message
...
F-35's Costs Climb Along With Concerns
Fort Worth Star-Telegram | April 26, 2006

The maiden flight of the first F-35 joint strike fighter prototype is
still
months away, and Lockheed Martin's giant development program is already
generating budget-busting headlines.

Pentagon officials, in their most recent estimate of major weapons system
costs,
projected a $276.5 billion cost for developing the F-35 and purchasing
2,500 of
the planes for the U.S. and British armed forces.

That's $20 billion more than the last estimate, in January 2004, and about
a $75
billion increase since the program was launched in October 2001.

Skeptics in and out of government fear that it may not be the last big
cost
increase because the F-35 is still in its infancy and much remains to be
done to
develop and perfect the warplane's high-tech systems.

The question that continues to loom over the F-35 program and prime
contractor
Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Co. is whether, unlike so many other programs
including Lockheed's F-22, the JSF can be delivered without encountering
major
technical problems, long delays and huge cost overruns.

Defense acquisition experts with the watchdog Government Accountability
Office
recently urged Congress to keep a tight rein on F-35 spending until
Lockheed and
the other contractors show that they can design and build the airplane and
meet
performance and cost goals.

Michael Sullivan, the GAO's acquisition analyst, is concerned that the
program
is attempting to do too much too fast. Congress has already appropriated
funding
to begin work on the first seven "production" airplanes even though basic
flight
testing of a "production representative" airplane won't occur until 2008
at the
earliest.

"Our message is they still have a lot of risks in these things until they
fly
the airplane," Sullivan said in an interview last week. "There are
technologies
they're counting on that have not been tested yet."

Lockheed spokesman John Smith said some of the assumptions behind the
recent
cost estimate and pessimistic forecasts do not "recognize lessons that the
F-35
has learned from the problems of those other programs" and assumes that
the same
mistakes and problems will arise again.

Program and Lockheed officials say the first flight of the first test
aircraft
will likely take place in west Fort Worth sometime between late August and
early
October.

"I've told everyone we'll work to August [flight date], but we'll fly when
we're
ready," said Rear Adm. Steven Enewold, the top military official
overseeing the
program. "We don't want to rush to make a first flight and then have
something
bad happen."

Enewold acknowledged in a telephone interview last week that there are
many
questions yet to be answered and probably some questions that aren't even
known
yet. But he said he is reasonably confident that the F-35 program is on
track to
deliver mission-capable fighters beginning in 2011.

How confident?

"I'm fairly comfortable through first flight and through the end of this
year,"
Enewold said. "After that, the risks [of encountering major technical
obstacles]
get bigger."

After recently conducted design reviews, Enewold said indications are that
the
contractors can successfully manufacture the critical parts and components
needed for the test planes and early production aircraft, and "we're not
going
to have to do a bunch of scrap and rework." He said there has been
"demonstrable
progress in the delivery of hardware and systems" to laboratories for
testing
and certification.

The recent Pentagon estimates attributed most of the expected cost
increases to
rising costs of metals and other materials and higher inflation
predictions.

"We're seeing 200 percent increases in aluminum, 500 percent in titanium,"
Enewold said. "That's a big issue."

But the GAO, in reports and testimony before Congress, says the real
danger of
huge cost increases lies in the program's plans to begin building
production
airplanes before most of the flight testing is done on all three versions
of the
F-35.

Being forced to stop production midstream to make design changes, as
Sullivan
says has happened in many other programs, "is a huge driver of costs."

The program should wait at least another year, preferably two, Sullivan
said,
and complete plenty of flight tests before beginning to build the first
production aircraft.

"To us, it's measure twice, cut once," Sullivan said.

Program and Lockheed officials as well as other experts say that would
take too
long and also drive up costs.

"The problem with that reasoning is we don't have a half-century to field
a
next-generation fighter," said Loren Thompson of the Lexington Institute,
a
defense think tank. "Slowing down is just another way of spending money."

Smith, the Lockheed spokesman, said the F-35 "possesses very high levels
of
technical maturity and extremely low levels of technical risk for a
fighter at
this stage of its development," as shown by the recent successful design
review.
"Much of the F-35's technical risk will be reduced before flight testing
begins."

Every step taken in the F-35 program, Smith said, is done with the goal of
maintaining the airplane at a price U.S. and other armed forces can
afford.

The F-35 program, Enewold insists, is proceeding on a deliberate basis
with
plenty of opportunity for government officials to slow the process down
and make
corrections if major problems arise.

"We're going to go to an acquisition review to get permission to spend
production money every year until 2013," Enewold said.

http://www.military.com/features/0,1...ESRC=dod-bz.nl

How were they able to design and bring the P-51 into production within one
year
back during WW2? Why is it so expensive and take so long now?

You didn't really just ask that question, did you?






"If you beat your swords into plowshares, you'll be plowing for those who
didn't."

http://www.military.com/features/0,1...ESRC=dod-bz.nl

How were they able to design and bring the P-51 into production within one
year
back during WW2? Why is it so expensive and take so long now?

You didn't really just ask that question, did you?
Ah maybe b/c they did not deal with highly complex technology that has
thousands of ways of failing and a few critical failures of very tiny
parts that don't even move can cause the plane to crash into the
ground. With WWII era planes about the most complex things were the big
ol' piston engines, retractable landing gear, bomb sights...etc...today
a few whiz kids could probably develop a WWII era technology fighter
plane better than any seen in WWII. All you need is metal workers,
engine mechanics/builders, and some pretty solid aerodynamic students.
If it was so easy now then the U.S. would not make everyone else's air
force into target practice.







"If you beat your swords into plowshares, you'll be plowing for those who
didn't."

On Thu, 27 Apr 2006 04:32:10 GMT, Seawolf wrote:

You didn't really just ask that question, did you?

You didn't really just quote that entire post only to add one line, did
you?

--

-Jeff B.
zoomie at fastmail dot fm

buff82driver wrote:
http://www.military.com/features/0,1...ESRC=dod-bz.nl

How were they able to design and bring the P-51 into production within one
year
back during WW2? Why is it so expensive and take so long now?

You didn't really just ask that question, did you?

Ah maybe b/c they did not deal with highly complex technology that has
thousands of ways of failing and a few critical failures of very tiny
parts that don't even move can cause the plane to crash into the
ground. With WWII era planes about the most complex things were the big
ol' piston engines, retractable landing gear, bomb sights...etc...today
a few whiz kids could probably develop a WWII era technology fighter
plane better than any seen in WWII. All you need is metal workers,
engine mechanics/builders, and some pretty solid aerodynamic students.
If it was so easy now then the U.S. would not make everyone else's air
force into target practice.

And having a very reliable and tested British designed engine made one
hell of a contribution...





"If you beat your swords into plowshares, you'll be plowing for those who
didn't."

Ricardo wrote in
.uk:



buff82driver wrote:
http://www.military.com/features/0,1...ESRC=dod-bz.nl

How were they able to design and bring the P-51 into production
within one year
back during WW2? Why is it so expensive and take so long now?

You didn't really just ask that question, did you?

Ah maybe b/c they did not deal with highly complex technology that
has thousands of ways of failing and a few critical failures of very
tiny parts that don't even move can cause the plane to crash into the
ground. With WWII era planes about the most complex things were the
big ol' piston engines, retractable landing gear, bomb
sights...etc...today a few whiz kids could probably develop a WWII
era technology fighter plane better than any seen in WWII. All you
need is metal workers, engine mechanics/builders, and some pretty
solid aerodynamic students. If it was so easy now then the U.S. would
not make everyone else's air force into target practice.

And having a very reliable and tested British designed engine made one
hell of a contribution...


IIRC, the British engine had nothing to do with the design/inception of the
P-51. As designed and originally produced, the P51 was a rather
lackluster, VERY average fighter for its day. It wasn't until the later
addition of the British engine and a couple of (supporting) airframe
modifications that made it great.

DS

DeepSea wrote:
Ricardo wrote in
.uk:



buff82driver wrote:

http://www.military.com/features/0,1...ESRC=dod-bz.nl

How were they able to design and bring the P-51 into production
within one year
back during WW2? Why is it so expensive and take so long now?

You didn't really just ask that question, did you?

Ah maybe b/c they did not deal with highly complex technology that
has thousands of ways of failing and a few critical failures of very
tiny parts that don't even move can cause the plane to crash into the
ground. With WWII era planes about the most complex things were the
big ol' piston engines, retractable landing gear, bomb
sights...etc...today a few whiz kids could probably develop a WWII
era technology fighter plane better than any seen in WWII. All you
need is metal workers, engine mechanics/builders, and some pretty
solid aerodynamic students. If it was so easy now then the U.S. would
not make everyone else's air force into target practice.


And having a very reliable and tested British designed engine made one
hell of a contribution...



IIRC, the British engine had nothing to do with the design/inception of the
P-51. As designed and originally produced, the P51 was a rather
lackluster, VERY average fighter for its day. It wasn't until the later
addition of the British engine and a couple of (supporting) airframe
modifications that made it great.

DS

Agreed, but it is interesting to note that the original Mustang, with
its Allison F3R engine, only came into being as a result of the British
Purchasing Commission's earlier contact with NAA and the purchase of the
Harvard trainer. NAA's wish to 'break into' the fighter market was
frustrated by the US Army Air Corps lack of interest in NAA's ideas on
the subject and the offer of the NA-73 fitted a British need at that
time. In the event, as you point out, this original design was VERY
average, the main concern from the British point of view being
performance above 15,000 feet - decidedly poor, although the aircraft
had considerable merit at low altitude.

And the rest, as we say, is history...

Ricardo

In article , Ricardo
wrote:

buff82driver wrote:
http://www.military.com/features/0,1...ESRC=dod-bz.nl

How were they able to design and bring the P-51 into production within one
year
back during WW2? Why is it so expensive and take so long now?

You didn't really just ask that question, did you?

Ah maybe b/c they did not deal with highly complex technology that has
thousands of ways of failing and a few critical failures of very tiny
parts that don't even move can cause the plane to crash into the
ground. With WWII era planes about the most complex things were the big
ol' piston engines, retractable landing gear, bomb sights...etc...today
a few whiz kids could probably develop a WWII era technology fighter
plane better than any seen in WWII. All you need is metal workers,
engine mechanics/builders, and some pretty solid aerodynamic students.
If it was so easy now then the U.S. would not make everyone else's air
force into target practice.

And having a very reliable and tested British designed engine made one
hell of a contribution...

Complex technology, etc. are not the issue here.

The real issue, the point of the debate and the article is project management
philosophy.

On one side is the old guard: "Defense acquisition experts with the watchdog
Government Accountability Office" who want the aircraft to roll off the
line fully developed. What they want, in the WWII context, is a P-51H coming
off the production line from the get-go.

On the other side is the "new" project management philosophy (actually
very old) , now called spiral development, where you get a production version
flying asap and sequentially modify it as necessary based on continuing
flight test plus service experience.

There are costs associated with both philosophies. Costs to make changes
versus costs of keeping a large engineering team twiddling their thumbs
during flight test .

Politically, spiral development is much safer. You have the aircraft flying and
you can point to your successes: much less chance of having the program
cancelled since there are aircraft in the fleet.

Sprial development was out of favor for awhile because some programs
screwed the pooch and thought they could push some critical testing off
to later production versions. It ended up biting them in the ass.

F-22 did not ustilise spiral development, and look how long it took them to
go through flight test, how much it cost the program and the taxpayers, how
many aircraft were deleted as a result, and how many times the program
was almost axed.
Overspec'ing the initial development of a product gives every nitwit an
opportunity to point fingers if things do not go perfectly. And professional
politicians are not aerospace engineers, and most don't have any technical
background at all.

Omega's P-51 question is thus answered: they did it by getting the basic
aircraft flying and in service, then making literally dozens of model and sub-
model configuration changes over the next 4 years until the war was over.

I.e. Spiral Development.

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur

Harry Andreas wrote:
On one side is the old guard: "Defense acquisition experts with the watchdog
Government Accountability Office" who want the aircraft to roll off the
line fully developed. What they want, in the WWII context, is a P-51H coming
off the production line from the get-go.

Humm, I recall seeing a GAO report (link was in this newsgroup some
time ago think) where the point was exactly the opposite. GAO wanted to
have spiral development and cited F-16 as a succesful example of it,
while project management was pressing for a finished product.

The reasons stated were in addition to reducing development risks that
a large number of aircraft in US inventory are getting old, and even a
minor delay in tight F-35 schedule has grave consequences for both
fighter availability and maintenance costs.

Mvh,
Jon K

Humm, I recall seeing a GAO report (link was in this newsgroup some
time ago think) where the point was exactly the opposite. GAO wanted to
have spiral development and cited F-16 as a succesful example of it,
while project management was pressing for a finished product.

The reasons stated were in addition to reducing development risks that
a large number of aircraft in US inventory are getting old, and even a
minor delay in tight F-35 schedule has grave consequences for both
fighter availability and maintenance costs.
So if spiral development was used we would be a few versions into the
F-22 already being it would have entered service back in the early to
mid 90's and in the end the overall cost per plane would be much lower
as production scaled up. I'm sure the end of the Cold War had a lot to
do with the delaying of the F-22 project being a lot of the prelim work
had been done in the 80's when the AF voiced the need for a post F-15
air superiority fighter. Think about how glad Russia and China most be
that we delayed the F-22 so long they would not have to deal with the
F-22 threat for about an extra decade. In the meantime we have given
Russia a lot of time to come up with their own stealth aircraft and
counter-stealth technology whatever that may mean. We would also
already have a large lead towards an even more advanced fighter/UCAV to
enter service in the 2015-2020 time-frame. Now for the F-22 to be cost
effective its going to have to be around till 2025 and later being
production has jsut started and would be spread out over several years.
Talk about ****ing away a grand opportunity to truly leave Russia in
the dust with regard to generations ahead of them in fighter tech vs.
Cold War B.S. about how much better we were. We were better but a lot
of that was training being we were not flying against trained Russian
pilots but shotty 3rd world air forces with a few Ruskies in the mix to
add some flavor to the engagements.

In article .com,
wrote:

Harry Andreas wrote:
On one side is the old guard: "Defense acquisition experts with the watchdog
Government Accountability Office" who want the aircraft to roll off the
line fully developed. What they want, in the WWII context, is a P-51H coming
off the production line from the get-go.

Humm, I recall seeing a GAO report (link was in this newsgroup some
time ago think) where the point was exactly the opposite. GAO wanted to
have spiral development and cited F-16 as a succesful example of it,
while project management was pressing for a finished product.

Just goes to show that there are factions within USG just as there are
factions everywhere.


The reasons stated were in addition to reducing development risks that
a large number of aircraft in US inventory are getting old, and even a
minor delay in tight F-35 schedule has grave consequences for both
fighter availability and maintenance costs.

And yet the article makes a case for waiting...

--
Harry Andreas
Engineering raconteur