B Nice war - here's the bill

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ...
In message , Kevin
Brooks writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
Resolution 660 was passed on August 2 1990, demanding an immediate Iraqi
withdrawal. Resolution 661, imposing a trade and financial embargo in
Iraq, passed on 6th August.

You call that "action"?

They were used to cover US actions thereafter.

Be careful. You want to claim that we really used the UN umbrella in
this case by citing dates of UN "actions"? How about the fact that
Bush Sr authorized further US deployments on 8 Nov to allow for
"offensive action", while the UN did not get around to sanctioning
such action until 29 Nov? Or the fact that while your previously noted
resolutions did indeed pass on 2 and 6 Aug, it was not until 25 August
that the UN "authorized" military interdiction to enforce what the USN
(and RN, IIRC) were already doing (in the case of the USN, as of 12
August)?


The UN, lacking troops, can't put boots on the ground.

Nor apparently can it (collectively) pour pee out of same boots with
the proverbial instructions printed on the heels... g


How many resolutions did the UN subsequently
pass over the next twelve years in regards to Iraq, and what was the
sum result of all of that "action"?

Well, they were used to justify an invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Not by your illustrious UN they weren't. Face it, we were going in
with or without UN "authorization" or "action". We would have done the
same in 91 had we had to (as evidenced by the fact that our
deployments and enforcement actions predated UN "action").


How many times has the UN passed
its resolutions only to see no real "action" to enforce them?

Frequently. That's the nature of the beast, and why it's acceptable.
(Including to the US).

It is increasingly irrelevant.


The US announced the imminent arrival of leading elements of the 82nd
Airborne in Saudi Arabia on the 8th August.

Actually, my source (Brasseys) indicates 7 August, but whatever--if
they were "immenent" even on 8 August, it is obvious that movement
began even earlier than 6 August, right?

Airlift, and this is first arrivals.

Uhmmm...you do realize that they just don't shuffle over to the Green
Ramp at Pope and hop on the aircraft, right? This was not a deployment
of the ready company of the ready battalion of the ready brigade--it
was a full division deployment. Two squadrons of the 1st TFW made the
deployment trip on the 7th as well (not something you just go out and
kick the tires, hop in, and fly off for).


And the UN did not declare
Saddam's "annexation" invalid until 9 August.

They demanded Iraqi withdrawal a week before that.

Ooooh! Another toothless demand from the UN; I note that Saddam did
not comply. Fact is, the UN would not get around to even authorizing
use of force until the end of November, after first having declared
that embargo without bothering to authorize any interception of Iraqi
traffic. In each case, US action predates UN action--we began the
deployment cycle before the UN ever began to think in that direction,
we began stopping shipping before the UN got around to authorizing
that, and we began beefing up the force for offensive operations
before the UN even got around to authorizing the use of force to
secure Kuwait. I don't think any of this bodes well for your "the UN
worked well in 90-91" theory.


If driving to Baghdad was such a good idea in 1991, why was it not done?

It wasn't a good idea in 91. METT-T.

We agree, but many others do not.

(With hindsight, 1998 was perhaps the best time for such action)

By then we had a severe leadership problem--the only actions that were
undertaken were those that afforded zero-percent chance of friendly
casualties, and which afforded maximum *appearance* of "doing
something" (witness the laughable SLCM attacks against OBL in
Afghanistan and against that asprin factory in Sudan). It was not a
particularly proud period of time for a lot of us who were serving.

I can't help wondering how much of it is chicken-and-egg. Clinton was
not a great friend of the military; but the military gave the impression
of being actively hostile to their commander at the same time. (Or at
least the members posting to Usenet, writing to Proceedings and AFJI,
and so on) This tends to lead to paralysis.

OFCS, when McCafferty showed up at the White House he got the cold
shoulder from a "senior advisor" in a none too respectful manner; not
a good start. Respect generally has to be a two way street; we had
none from Clinton and his crowd, and we knew it. That we accorded him
the respect due to a C-in-C was just an example of the professionalism
of the US military; it may have been grudging, but he got it. His
fandango in Smalia, where he took a humanitarian mission that had gone
rather smoothly from Bush Sr and succeeded in turning it into a
ridiculous "Get Aidid" mission (at the behest of the UN Sec General,
IIRC) from which he divorced himself and turned tail when things got a
bit nasty, was merely icing on the cake.


If he felt that he couldn't trust his military in any action that might
involve cost, he'd opt for safe standoff tactics. (What would the
reaction be to "Failed Raid Costs US Troops Their Lives" if Clinton had
used manned platforms or ground forces to go after bin-Laden? Would you
have respected him for using the best tool for the job, or despised him
for considering his troops expendable assets to be spent for political
gain? I'm thinking Desert One as an example here)

That is utter bull**** Paul, and you know it. "Couldn't trust his
military"?! For gosh sakes, the US military did everything he ever
asked of them. The only lack of trust was in the other direction--he
said we had to go after Aidid and stabilize Somalia, and we did; then
he cut and ran and threw a nasty temper tantrum when things went to
hell in a handbasket during the Mog raid (for which his own cabinet,
and his closest advisor at the time, Shrimpboy Stephanopolous, was
responsible for not providing the very modest support in the form of
armor and AC-130's that the military chain had asked for) and ran away
like a scalded dog.

As to OBL, I seem to recall that there was a *real* opportunity to
nail him, and Clinton's NS advisor, Berger, refused to authorize
it--wonder how history would have turned out if that had not been the
case? No, much better to pop SLCMs at empty Afghani tents and a
Sudanese aspirin factory.


Which doesn't answer the question - if they were so much trouble, why
bother? Tell them that they can go back to France and the Coalition will
get the job done without them.

Political appearances, apparently. In hindsight, we probably should
have told them to shove off.

So why were political appearances so important?

You'd have to ask a politician. Bush Sr apparently had some of the old
school diplomat in him, and was trying to husband a coalition effort.
Even then, the French proved to be difficult allies, with their last
minute "maybe we should give him more time" crap.


Sounds like there was a perceived need to keep the French on-side.

But the fact is that the French were not exactly a key part of ODS,

Never said they were. (They were more use than many realise in OIF too,
mind you; French ships were among those covering the several risky
chokepoints on the way to the top of the Persian Gulf, as shipping laden
with military supplies trudged to their destinations. Not a point that
got much publicity then or notice now.)

Maybe because the USN also covered that same area? I doubt many US
commanders would have trusted the French last spring to actually stop
any attack against that shipping; they would just as likely have sat
aside and waited to rush to the survivors' aid. If you are getting the
impression that a fair number of Americans have not forgiven the
French for their pro-Saddam stance (and the protection of those oil
and gas contracts they had recently secured--gee, wonder what happened
to them?), then you would be correct, and I imagine it will be some
time before these sentiments recede.

Brooks

In message , Kevin
Brooks writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
They were used to cover US actions thereafter.

Be careful. You want to claim that we really used the UN umbrella in
this case by citing dates of UN "actions"?

It made it a *lot* easier to build a coalition, collect some allies, and
get basing rights. (And get more consensus postwar)

How about the fact that
Bush Sr authorized further US deployments on 8 Nov to allow for
"offensive action", while the UN did not get around to sanctioning
such action until 29 Nov?

What offensive action did they take?

The UN, lacking troops, can't put boots on the ground.

Nor apparently can it (collectively) pour pee out of same boots with
the proverbial instructions printed on the heels... g

Does the US really *want* an organised, powerful and effective UN? (Does
anyone?)

Well, they were used to justify an invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Not by your illustrious UN they weren't.

Who cares about the UN? You're the one (elsewhere) citing UN resolutions
as justification for action, while simultaneously decrying the UN as
useless. Interesting dichotomy, no?

Face it, we were going in
with or without UN "authorization" or "action". We would have done the
same in 91 had we had to (as evidenced by the fact that our
deployments and enforcement actions predated UN "action").

With considerably more difficulty - where were you planning to base and
stage from?

Frequently. That's the nature of the beast, and why it's acceptable.
(Including to the US).

It is increasingly irrelevant.

Quite. Why, you can now invade who you like, when you like, without
sanction. I'm not sure this is a good general principle.

Airlift, and this is first arrivals.

Uhmmm...you do realize that they just don't shuffle over to the Green
Ramp at Pope and hop on the aircraft, right?

Absolutely, but this is where the difference between announcing
departures and declaring arrivals becomes significant. Airborne units
are able to be fast-response - it's in their job description. IIRC we
keep a Spearhead battalion at 48hrs NTM.

This was not a deployment
of the ready company of the ready battalion of the ready brigade--it
was a full division deployment.

The whole division went on the 7th?

They demanded Iraqi withdrawal a week before that.

Ooooh! Another toothless demand from the UN;

Who's running Kuwait today?

Ah, what the heck. Okay, the UN is useless and all that matters is "do
these guys have friends who'll fight for them"?

I don't think any of this bodes well for your "the UN
worked well in 90-91" theory.

Okay, it was unilateral US force; the UN is irrelevant: and might makes
right. This might be convenient for the US in the short term, but it's
not going to do much for stability in the medium.

Trouble is, the UN is a bad solution but nobody has thought through any
better options.

I can't help wondering how much of it is chicken-and-egg. Clinton was
not a great friend of the military; but the military gave the impression
of being actively hostile to their commander at the same time. (Or at
least the members posting to Usenet, writing to Proceedings and AFJI,
and so on) This tends to lead to paralysis.

OFCS, when McCafferty showed up at the White House he got the cold
shoulder from a "senior advisor" in a none too respectful manner; not
a good start.

So that's the basis for an entire military organisation's mindset?

Respect generally has to be a two way street; we had
none from Clinton and his crowd, and we knew it.

Knew it personally, or just believed it?

That we accorded him
the respect due to a C-in-C was just an example of the professionalism
of the US military; it may have been grudging, but he got it.

Wasn't it Newt Gingrich who warned Clinton that he risked assassination
if he visited military bases?

His
fandango in Smalia, where he took a humanitarian mission that had gone
rather smoothly from Bush Sr and succeeded in turning it into a
ridiculous "Get Aidid" mission (at the behest of the UN Sec General,
IIRC) from which he divorced himself and turned tail when things got a
bit nasty, was merely icing on the cake.

Hey, I don't recall Reagan getting the same sort of criticism ten years
after his Lebanon intervention (which was also a feelgood job at UN
behest, which got ten times as many US servicemen killed, but was no
more effective for it)

If he felt that he couldn't trust his military in any action that might
involve cost, he'd opt for safe standoff tactics. (What would the
reaction be to "Failed Raid Costs US Troops Their Lives" if Clinton had
used manned platforms or ground forces to go after bin-Laden? Would you
have respected him for using the best tool for the job, or despised him
for considering his troops expendable assets to be spent for political
gain? I'm thinking Desert One as an example here)

That is utter bull**** Paul, and you know it. "Couldn't trust his
military"?!

Listen to your own words. Name a mission that the military undertook
under Clinton's direction that _was_ a success.

For gosh sakes, the US military did everything he ever
asked of them.

And derided every mission as a politically-inspired failure. How many
times would *you* keep asking?

As to OBL, I seem to recall that there was a *real* opportunity to
nail him, and Clinton's NS advisor, Berger, refused to authorize
it--wonder how history would have turned out if that had not been the
case?

Hey, the US _definitely_ had the perfect chance to eliminate Saddam
Hussein while he was a "useful regional ally" in the 1980s - wonder how
history would have worked that way? (Ain't hindsight great?)

No, much better to pop SLCMs at empty Afghani tents and a
Sudanese aspirin factory.

Reagan again: loft some airborne ordnance at Libyan tents, miss Gadaffi,
and come home calling it a success.


I find the difference in perception very interesting, when you have very
similar actions and results.


So why were political appearances so important?

You'd have to ask a politician.

I'm asking you.

Never said they were. (They were more use than many realise in OIF too,
mind you; French ships were among those covering the several risky
chokepoints on the way to the top of the Persian Gulf, as shipping laden
with military supplies trudged to their destinations. Not a point that
got much publicity then or notice now.)

Maybe because the USN also covered that same area?

No, the USN were up in the northern Gulf. (and it was four areas, not
one: easy to tell from a map. Gibraltar, Suez, Babr el-Mendab, Hormuz)

I doubt many US
commanders would have trusted the French last spring to actually stop
any attack against that shipping;

RN commanders did.

they would just as likely have sat
aside and waited to rush to the survivors' aid. If you are getting the
impression that a fair number of Americans have not forgiven the
French for their pro-Saddam stance (and the protection of those oil
and gas contracts they had recently secured--gee, wonder what happened
to them?), then you would be correct, and I imagine it will be some
time before these sentiments recede.

Trouble is, when you make policy based on sentiment rather than fact,
you run into trouble. You have to deal with the world as it exists, not
as you find it convenient to believe it.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message ...
In message , Kevin
Brooks writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
They were used to cover US actions thereafter.

Be careful. You want to claim that we really used the UN umbrella in
this case by citing dates of UN "actions"?

It made it a *lot* easier to build a coalition, collect some allies, and
get basing rights. (And get more consensus postwar)

Consensus on what? Passing resolutions that they had no intent of
enforcing?


How about the fact that
Bush Sr authorized further US deployments on 8 Nov to allow for
"offensive action", while the UN did not get around to sanctioning
such action until 29 Nov?

What offensive action did they take?

None. But note that (again) US action, in this case setting up for the
offensive military operation, predated UN action.


The UN, lacking troops, can't put boots on the ground.

Nor apparently can it (collectively) pour pee out of same boots with
the proverbial instructions printed on the heels... g

Does the US really *want* an organised, powerful and effective UN? (Does
anyone?)

I doubt that the possibility is realistic enough to worry about. But
if you are going to argue that the UN should have the veto over US
actions, then you better be supporting the concept of a UN that can
act and enforce its pronouncements--something it has proven to be
utterly incapable of. Therefore, it is functionally irrelevant.


Well, they were used to justify an invasion of Iraq in 2003.

Not by your illustrious UN they weren't.

Who cares about the UN? You're the one (elsewhere) citing UN resolutions
as justification for action, while simultaneously decrying the UN as
useless. Interesting dichotomy, no?

Uhmmm... I believe I pointed out that in the case of Iraq, the US
actions (i.e., decision to send US troops, decision to prepare for
offensive military action, and decision to enforce restrictions on
Iraqi trade) predated UN resolutions. No dichotomy required; we just
took UN resolutions and enforced them in the end. After the US set the
course in 90, the UN followed. As to the latest conflict, I did note
to you that the ceasefire agreement requirements predated later UN
resolutions regarding NFZ's, WMD's, etc?


Face it, we were going in
with or without UN "authorization" or "action". We would have done the
same in 91 had we had to (as evidenced by the fact that our
deployments and enforcement actions predated UN "action").

With considerably more difficulty - where were you planning to base and
stage from?

Saudi Arabia agreed to US troops entering their territory long before
the UN ever started muttering about possible military authorization
(some three plus months before, to be more accurate).


Frequently. That's the nature of the beast, and why it's acceptable.
(Including to the US).

It is increasingly irrelevant.

Quite. Why, you can now invade who you like, when you like, without
sanction. I'm not sure this is a good general principle.

There you go again with your desire to generalize everything...doesn't
work too well in real life.


Airlift, and this is first arrivals.

Uhmmm...you do realize that they just don't shuffle over to the Green
Ramp at Pope and hop on the aircraft, right?

Absolutely, but this is where the difference between announcing
departures and declaring arrivals becomes significant. Airborne units
are able to be fast-response - it's in their job description. IIRC we
keep a Spearhead battalion at 48hrs NTM.

This was no BN, or even BDE, RRF mission.


This was not a deployment
of the ready company of the ready battalion of the ready brigade--it
was a full division deployment.

The whole division went on the 7th?

It started to (they all have to start somewhere--nature of the beast).
And the decision to make that deployment happen no doubt came before
your vaunted UN action on what, the sixth?


They demanded Iraqi withdrawal a week before that.

Ooooh! Another toothless demand from the UN;

Who's running Kuwait today?

But gee, they did not get around to authorizing military action to
make that withdrawl happen until late November...do you *really* think
ol' Saddam took their toothless earlier "demand" very seriously? How
about those trade actions that the UN imposed...but did not get around
to authorizing enforcement of until about three weeks after the USN
had already begun doing so?


Ah, what the heck. Okay, the UN is useless and all that matters is "do
these guys have friends who'll fight for them"?

No, not useless. UNICEF and some of the UN world health initiatives
have been rather successful--it is just their willingness to pass
resolutions without being willing to enforce them that makes them
"irrelevant" in the conflict arena.


I don't think any of this bodes well for your "the UN
worked well in 90-91" theory.

Okay, it was unilateral US force; the UN is irrelevant: and might makes
right. This might be convenient for the US in the short term, but it's
not going to do much for stability in the medium.

You do have a tendancy to try to oversimplify things, don't you?


Trouble is, the UN is a bad solution but nobody has thought through any
better options.

I don't know, looks like the option we carried out this spring was
better; at least all of those UN goals regarding Saddam have been met
now, and he is out of command to boot. I personally think that is a
*good* thing.


I can't help wondering how much of it is chicken-and-egg. Clinton was
not a great friend of the military; but the military gave the impression
of being actively hostile to their commander at the same time. (Or at
least the members posting to Usenet, writing to Proceedings and AFJI,
and so on) This tends to lead to paralysis.

OFCS, when McCafferty showed up at the White House he got the cold
shoulder from a "senior advisor" in a none too respectful manner; not
a good start.

So that's the basis for an entire military organisation's mindset?

LOL! Not hardly. His little letter he sent to his former ROTC PMS did
not help his case with the military much. The Mogadishu dance occured
rather early in his presidency, and that one hurt him too in this
regard. Madeline Albbrights facetious comments to Powell during the
debate over what to do in the Balkans did not help him either. Are you
beginning to see how this all adds up?


Respect generally has to be a two way street; we had
none from Clinton and his crowd, and we knew it.

Knew it personally, or just believed it?

See above.


That we accorded him
the respect due to a C-in-C was just an example of the professionalism
of the US military; it may have been grudging, but he got it.

Wasn't it Newt Gingrich who warned Clinton that he risked assassination
if he visited military bases?

I don't know. Not that I am a big fan of Gingrich, who is now trying
to style himself a military expert in fighting against the Army's
Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. At least with Clinton we *knew* what he
thought of us; Gingrich jumped on the military bandwagon for his own
gain, IMO (and never served a day in uniform himself, just like
Clinton).


His
fandango in Smalia, where he took a humanitarian mission that had gone
rather smoothly from Bush Sr and succeeded in turning it into a
ridiculous "Get Aidid" mission (at the behest of the UN Sec General,
IIRC) from which he divorced himself and turned tail when things got a
bit nasty, was merely icing on the cake.

Hey, I don't recall Reagan getting the same sort of criticism ten years
after his Lebanon intervention (which was also a feelgood job at UN
behest, which got ten times as many US servicemen killed, but was no
more effective for it)

Are we discussing Reagan here? I thought we were discussing Clinton...


If he felt that he couldn't trust his military in any action that might
involve cost, he'd opt for safe standoff tactics. (What would the
reaction be to "Failed Raid Costs US Troops Their Lives" if Clinton had
used manned platforms or ground forces to go after bin-Laden? Would you
have respected him for using the best tool for the job, or despised him
for considering his troops expendable assets to be spent for political
gain? I'm thinking Desert One as an example here)

That is utter bull**** Paul, and you know it. "Couldn't trust his
military"?!

Listen to your own words. Name a mission that the military undertook
under Clinton's direction that _was_ a success.

"Breathe in, breathe out..." This seems a bit beyond you, Paul. Look
at Mogadishu--HIS decision put those guys between a rock and a
hardplace, and then he refused to give them the modest tools they
requested to support the mission. Last I heard, we did eventually make
things a success in both Bosnia and Kosovo (at least militarily).
Which leaves you Clinton's other big military operations, the Desert
Fox operation (which he manf=dated was to occur when we were least
likely to get the folks we supposedly wanted to take out), and his
Afghani/Sudanes SLCM parties. Now where did the Military let HIM down?
And where was it vice versa?


For gosh sakes, the US military did everything he ever
asked of them.

And derided every mission as a politically-inspired failure. How many
times would *you* keep asking?

Any good examples of the military using those terms at the time?


As to OBL, I seem to recall that there was a *real* opportunity to
nail him, and Clinton's NS advisor, Berger, refused to authorize
it--wonder how history would have turned out if that had not been the
case?

Hey, the US _definitely_ had the perfect chance to eliminate Saddam
Hussein while he was a "useful regional ally" in the 1980s - wonder how
history would have worked that way? (Ain't hindsight great?)

Big difference. For better or worse, we were not after Saddam in the
early eighties; but we most definitely *were* going after OBL, or we
supposedly were, when Berger pulled his SNAFU.


No, much better to pop SLCMs at empty Afghani tents and a
Sudanese aspirin factory.

Reagan again: loft some airborne ordnance at Libyan tents, miss Gadaffi,
and come home calling it a success.

Uhmmm...do you have a keyboard problem that results in your computer
inexplicably typing "Reagan" when the topic is Clinton?



I find the difference in perception very interesting, when you have very
similar actions and results.

How do you know *what* my perceptions of Reagan are? I'd be careful in
this vein...



So why were political appearances so important?

You'd have to ask a politician.

I'm asking you.

I am not a politician.


Never said they were. (They were more use than many realise in OIF too,
mind you; French ships were among those covering the several risky
chokepoints on the way to the top of the Persian Gulf, as shipping laden
with military supplies trudged to their destinations. Not a point that
got much publicity then or notice now.)

Maybe because the USN also covered that same area?

No, the USN were up in the northern Gulf. (and it was four areas, not
one: easy to tell from a map. Gibraltar, Suez, Babr el-Mendab, Hormuz)

I think you should write an article and tell the world about the
valiant French contributions to OIF--it is gonna be a rather short
one, I fear...


I doubt many US
commanders would have trusted the French last spring to actually stop
any attack against that shipping;

RN commanders did.

Since when are "RN commanders" known as "US commanders"?


they would just as likely have sat
aside and waited to rush to the survivors' aid. If you are getting the
impression that a fair number of Americans have not forgiven the
French for their pro-Saddam stance (and the protection of those oil
and gas contracts they had recently secured--gee, wonder what happened
to them?), then you would be correct, and I imagine it will be some
time before these sentiments recede.

Trouble is, when you make policy based on sentiment rather than fact,
you run into trouble. You have to deal with the world as it exists, not
as you find it convenient to believe it.

Which says what about your whole, "We have to go into the DPRK because
we went into Iraq" rant?

I'd like to say more, but I spent the day cleaning up the
after-effects of Isobel and lack the drive right now...

Brooks