Washington DC airspace closing for good?

On Fri, 5 Aug 2005 03:37:45 -0400, "Happy Dog"
wrote in : :

"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
.. .
On Thu, 4 Aug 2005 16:48:10 -0400, "Happy Dog"
wrote in ::

Do you really believe that this is being considered to reduce
clutter?

I'm talking about radar screen clutter. Yes. I see no other rational
reason for the DC ADIZ.

Why do you think it was implemented?

Political pressure. Absolute irrelevant bull****.

Are you able to provide any supporting evidence for that assumption?

As for clutter, have you visited a radar facility?

Does the SoCal TRACON count?

It's a computer game.

No. It's real time tracking of aircraft in the NAS.

There is a huge amount of filtering that goes on specifically
to reduce clutter.

Are you referring to the clutter caused by ground based targets? I'm
referring to making it easier to spot primary targets in congested
airspace.

On 5 Aug 2005 02:53:23 -0700, "PPT33R" wrote in
. com::

"It appears the government is protecting itself and could care less
about the public."

The extent of the existing ADIZ/ NDA will provide no time for intercept
if the TOI is a fast-mover, or a commercial flight out of IAD...

Agreed. But perhaps the purpose of the DC ADIZ is not to stop such
flights. Perhaps its purpose is to protect innocent flights from
accidental shoot-down.

This is purely an issue of the oligarchy trying to protect itself, and
the USSS and Capitol Police completely out of their domain trying to
figure it out with incremental elimination of freedom of movement. DoD
got what it wanted last month with direct 'shoot-down' authority.

There is that issue also. Those charged with implementing security
measures are doing their best. While it may not be good, it's
difficult to fault them for attempting to do their jobs. What is
lacking is a cooler head with intellect to see the flaws in their
proposals, and veto their implantation.

Bear in mind as well that this Administration has an Iron Fist policy
over the Executive Branch. I would be EXTREMELY surprised if Karl Rove
and Fran Townsend did not personally approve. They know exactly what
FAA has been ordered to do, and they hold the leash, so put the blame
where it is deserved.

Agreed. Thank you.

The ONLY way the "Land of the Free and the Brave" will once again
become Free and Brave is if this becomes an election issue in 2008.
Cast aside any sad devotions to "political parties", having lived in
the Beltway for many years I have concluded neither party represents
the national interest anymore. Study the issues, figure out who is
LIKELY to inact policies and laws commensurate with your beliefs, and
THEN pull the handle...

Given that 60%of our nation's citizens believe that creationism should
be taught along side Darwinism in our public schools, your hope has
little chance of happening even if a suitable candidate could be run
and find sufficient exposure to win. :-(

Given today's political arena, the opposition to the iron fist of the
GOP is going to have to be fought with the assistance of a rovesque
strategy. Perhaps it's time the FCC mandated the networks provide
free air time to qualified candidates, so that the candidate with the
most resonate rhetoric is elected instead of the party stooge with the
most funding and dirtiest tricks.

Larry Dighera wrote:

I disagree. The DC ADIZ provides an opportunity for the military to
intercept flights that violate it before they might enter the FRZ
within which lethal force may be exercised. If the DC ADIZ (or
something similar) did not exist, there would be no opportunity to
determine how much of a threat those flights might be, and the
military would have no other option but to shoot them down. So
while
the DC ADIZ does nothing, in my opinion, to make DC more secure, it
may provide some measure of mitigating erroneous shoot downs of
fellow airmen.

You give our enemies far too little credit if you really believe
this.

I fail to understand you inferred that from what I wrote. You will
note that I made no mention whatsoever of enemies in that statement.
My point was that the DC ADIZ's purpose most probably is to protect
the innocent from lethal force.

You snipped the part where I explain that:
quote
Every single violation of the DC ADIZ to date has been erroneous - some
grossly so (see "Hayden Shaeffer") while most were not. The ADIZ does
nothing but separate those following the rules from those not following
them. Assuming for the moment that Al Qaeda (or some similar outfit) were
to use airplanes to cause mischief here in DC, I'd exect them to follow the
rules right up to the last minute.

Really, how hard do you think it would be to locate a vetted pilot, kidnap
them and extract the information needed to penetrate the FRZ?
/quote

The point being, it's all to easy to appear as a legitimate flight so the
ADIZ doesn't even do what you suggest it is intended to do: Help ID the bad
guys.

Surely you must agree, that the attempt to identify flights violating
the DC ADIZ as friend or foe preferable to downing all such flights.

Identifying targets before shooting is good. However, the ADIZ offers
nothing to help this. See my point above.

--
John T
http://tknowlogy.com/TknoFlyer
http://www.pocketgear.com/products_s...veloperid=4415
Reduce spam. Use Sender Policy Framework: http://spf.pobox.com
____________________

Bill Maher recently expressed the opinion, that crashing airliners
laden with hundreds of people was a faith based initiative.

.... and faith is not restricted to Islamics. Your statement
specifically implicated Islamic terrorists, and to do so is a mistake -
both strategic, tactical, and moral. I'm not familiar with Bill Maher's
statement, but just because he said it doesn't mean I agree with it.

So if it's not possible to stop ideas, what action is appropriate?

Acceptance.

Accept the fact that freedom cuts both ways. Support freedom of speech,
freedom of association, and freedom of flight - for enemies as well as
for friends. The measure of a man is not how he treats his friends, but
how he treats his enemies. A great nation leads by example. Now don't
misconstrue my words as if I were saying that we should let terrorists
get away with their actions - no, those who commit vile acts ought to be
hunted down and taken to task. But we should MOST EMPHATICALLY NOT go
treating everyone as a potential terrorist, subject to being shot down
unless they can prove they are good.

You talk about the ADIZ as being a way to prevent innocents from being
shot down. There's another way. Just don't shoot.

I'm just talking about Muslims coming forward of their own volition
and exposing those in their ranks they believe to be terrorists.

That would be nice. It would also be nice if Christians did the same
for those who bomb abortion clinics, and if the pilot community reported
those they believe to be dangerous aviators to the FAA, and if
taxpayers did the same for tax cheats and the IRS. If every neighbor is
looking over the shoulder of every other neighbor, we'll have a much
safer society, no? It's also really great way to "get even" with
somebody who did you wrong... just report them as a suspected
{whatever}, and let the justice system sort it all out.

So... neither you nor I get to decide where it stops. The police and
your neighbors do. But if you're doing nothing wrong, there's nothing
to worry about.

When you lump "people who fly little airplanes" and terrorists in the
same group, it becomes difficult to take your words seriously.

But that is =exactly= what the premise of the ADIZ is.

Jose
--
Quantum Mechanics is like this: God =does= play dice with the universe,
except there's no God, and there's no dice. And maybe there's no universe.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

Bill Maher recently expressed the opinion, that crashing airliners
laden with hundreds of people was a faith based initiative.

I was a little slow on the irony detector.

Jose
--
Quantum Mechanics is like this: God =does= play dice with the universe,
except there's no God, and there's no dice. And maybe there's no universe.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

It seems that the issue of the FAA closing the 2,000 square mile
airspace around DC is capable of generating a lot of heat among the
pilot community. Let's try to see if we can use this forum to
generate some light, and mount an effective opposition to the FAA's
NPRM: http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsite...4adiz-nprm.pdf
(Full Text included below.)

Perhaps if we airmen each contribute rational opposing arguments to
the NPRM, and the more intelligent among us distills that raw data
into a coherent rebuttal, we may prevail in defeating the closure of
DC airspace by an overwhelming show of opposition voiced on the DOT
Docket Web Site: http://dms.dot.gov and Government-wide Rulemaking Web
Site: http://www.regulations.gov

Unless we are able to provide rational arguments against this NPRM and
defeat it, it will set an onerous anti-GA precedent for future
closures.



--------------------------------------------------------
45250 Federal Register / Vol. 70, No. 149 / Thursday, August 4, 2005 /
Proposed Rules
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 93
[Docket No. FAA–2003–17005; Notice No.
05–07]
RIN 2120–AI17
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules Area
AGENCY: Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).
SUMMARY: The FAA proposes to codify
current flight restrictions for certain
aircraft operations in the Washington,
DC Metropolitan Area. This action is
necessary because of the ongoing threat
of terrorist attacks. The FAA intends by
this action to help the Department of
Homeland Security and the Department
of Defense protect national assets in the
National Capital region.

DATES: Send your comments on or
before November 2, 2005.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments
that do not include national security or
sensitive security information identified
by Docket Number FAA–2003–17005
using any of the following methods:
• DOT Docket Web Site: Go to
http://dms.dot.gov and follow the
instructions for sending your comments
electronically.
• Government-wide Rulemaking Web
Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov
and follow the instructions for sending
your comments electronically.
• Mail: Docket Management Facility;
U.S. Department of Transportation, 400
Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building,
Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590–
001.
• Fax: 1–202–493–2251.
• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on
the plaza level of the Nassif Building,
400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
For more information on the
rulemaking process or instructions on
submitting comments that include
national security or sensitive security
information, see the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION section of this document.
Privacy: Subject to review for national
security or sensitive security
information, we will post all comments
we receive, without change, to http://
dms.dot.gov, including any personal
information you provide. For more
information, see the Privacy Act
discussion in the SUPPLEMENTARY
INFORMATION section of this document.

Docket: To read background
documents or comments received, go to
http://dms.dot.gov at any time or to
Room PL–401 on the plaza level of the
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street,
SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Ellen Crum, Airspace and Rules, Office
of System Operations and Safety,
Federal Aviation Administration, 800
Independence Avenue, SW.,
Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202)
267–8783.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
The FAA invites interested persons to
participate in this rulemaking by
submitting written comments, data, or
views. (See also ‘‘Sensitive Security
Information’’ below.) We also invite
comments relating to the economic,
environmental, energy, or federalism
impacts that might result from adopting
the proposals in this document. The
most helpful comments reference a
specific portion of the proposal, explain
the reason for any recommended
change, and include supporting data.
We ask that you send us two copies of
written comments.

We will file in the docket all
comments we receive, subject to review
for national security or sensitive
security information as indicated above,
as well as a report summarizing each
substantive public contact with FAA
personnel concerning this proposed
rulemaking. The docket is available for
public inspection before and after the
comment closing date. If you wish to
review the docket in person, go to the
address in the ADDRESSES section of this
preamble between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. You may also review the
docket using the Internet at the Web
address in the ADDRESSES section.
Privacy Act: Using the search function
of our docket Web site, anyone can find
and read the comments received into
any of our dockets, including the name
of the individual sending the comment
(or signing the comment on behalf of an
association, business, labor union, etc.).
You may review DOT’s complete
Privacy Act Statement in the Federal
Register published on April 11, 2000
(65 FR 19477–78) or you may visit
http://dms.dot.gov.

Before acting on this proposal, we
will consider all comments we receive
on or before the closing date for
comments. We will consider comments
filed late if it is possible to do so
without incurring expense or delay. We
may change this proposal in light of the
comments we receive.

If you want the FAA to acknowledge
receipt of your comments on this
proposal, include with your comments
a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on
which the docket number appears. We
will stamp the date on the postcard and
mail it to you.

Sensitive Security Information
Do not file in the docket information
that you consider to be sensitive
security information. Send or deliver
this information (identified as docket
number FAA–2003–17005) directly to
Edith V. Parish, Acting Manager,
Airspace and Rules, Office of System
Operations and Safety, Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591,
telephone (202) 267–8783. You must
mark information that you consider
security-sensitive.

Under 14 CFR 11.35 (a), we will
review comments as we receive them,
before they are placed in the docket. If
a comment contains sensitive security
information, we remove it before
placing the comment in the general
docket.

Availability of This Action
You can get an electronic copy using
the Internet by:
(1) Searching the Department of
Transportation’s electronic Docket
Management System (DMS) Web page
(http://dms.dot.gov/search);
(2) Visiting the FAA’s Web page at
http://www.faa.gov; or
(3) Accessing the Government
Printing Office’s Web page at http://
www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index/html.
You can also get a copy by submitting
a request to the Federal Aviation
Administration, Office of Rulemaking,
ARM–1, 800 Independence Avenue
SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by
calling (202) 267–9680. Be sure to
identify the docket number, notice
number, or amendment number of this
rulemaking.

Statutory Authority
The FAA Administrator has broad
authority to regulate the safe and
efficient use of the navigable airspace
(49 U.S.C. 40103). The Administrator is
also authorized to issue air traffic rules
and regulations to govern the flight of
aircraft, the navigation, protection, and
identification of aircraft for the
protection of persons and property on
the ground, and for the efficient use of
the navigable airspace. Additionally,
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(3) the
Administrator has the authority, in
consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, to ‘‘establish security
provisions that will encourage and
allow maximum use of the navigable
airspace by civil aircraft consistent with
national security.’’ Such provisions may
include establishing airspace areas the
Administrator decides are necessary in
the interest of national defense; and by
regulation or order, restricting or
prohibiting flight of civil aircraft that
the Administrator cannot identify,
locate and control with available
facilities in those areas. See 49 U.S.C.
40103(b). The Administrator also has
broad statutory authority to issue
regulations to promote safe flight of civil
aircraft in air commerce, when the
Administrator finds that such
regulations are necessary for safety in
air commerce and national security. See
49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5). The FAA must
consider, as a matter of policy,
maintaining and enhancing safety and
security in air commerce as its highest
priorities (49 U.S.C. 40101(d)).

Background
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks, which resulted in the loss of
human life at the World Trade Center,
the Pentagon, and in southwestern
Pennsylvania, the FAA immediately
curtailed all aircraft operations within
the National Airspace System (NAS),
except certain military, law
enforcement, and emergency related
aircraft operations.

On September 13, 2001, the FAA took
action to allow additional aircraft
operations in some areas of the NAS.
However, the FAA maintained flight
restrictions over certain cities and
sensitive sites. Even after specific
temporary flight restrictions over a
particular city or site were rescinded,
some flight restrictions were
occasionally reinstated in response to
specific and general intelligence
information regarding terrorist threats.
Most of these flight restrictions were
issued pursuant to the Code of Federal
Regulations in 14 CFR 91.139,
Emergency Air Traffic Rules; 14 CFR
91.137, Temporary Flight Restrictions in
the Vicinity of Disaster/Hazard Areas; or
14 CFR part 99, Security Control of Air
Traffic. These flight restrictions were
issued via the U.S. Notice to Airmen
(NOTAM) System.

While many aspects of the initial
flight restrictions were cancelled, in the
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area the
FAA continued to impose several
temporary flight restrictions at the
request of the Departments of Homeland
Security (DHS) and Defense (DoD) to
assist them in their newly assigned
counter-terrorism mission.

On February 19, 2002, the FAA issued
Special Federal Aviation Regulation
(SFAR) No. 94, Enhanced Security
Procedures for Operations at Certain
Airports in the Washington, DC
Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules
Area (67 FR 7538; Feb. 19, 2002). SFAR
94, which expired on February 13, 2005,
required any person operating an
aircraft to or from College Park Airport,
Potomac Airfield, or Washington
Executive/Hyde Field to conduct those
operations in accordance with security
procedures approved by the
Administrator. The SFAR was a general
operating rule containing both flight
communication requirements and
airport security requirements. It applied
to any person operating an aircraft to or
from one of the specified airports and
affected all aircraft operations at these
airports, including those conducted
under 14 CFR part 91, those for which
an air carrier or an operating certificate
may be issued under 14 CFR part 119
(for operations conducted under 14 CFR
part 121 or 135), and those which may
be conducted under part 125, 129, 133,
or 137.

Procedures addressing airport security
previously contained in SFAR 94 are
now included in a regulation
promulgated on February 10, 2005 by
the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), which is now
responsible for airport security
procedures (70 FR 7150; Feb. 10, 2005).
The flight communication requirements
are included in this NPRM. They
include flight plan filing, two-way radio
communication, and transponder
requirements.

Request To Permanently Codify
Temporary Flight Restrictions Over the
Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area
Because of its status as home to all
three branches of the Federal
government, as well as numerous
Federal buildings, foreign embassies,
multi-national institutions, and national
monuments, the Washington, DC
Metropolitan Area continues to be an
obvious high value target for terrorists.
Despite recent successes in the war on
terrorism, the DHS believes that the
threat of extremists launching an attack
using aircraft remains high. Although
there is no information suggesting an
imminent plan by terrorists to use
airplanes to attack targets in the
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area, the
success of the September 11, 2001 attack
on the Pentagon and reports
demonstrating terrorist groups’ enduring
interest in aviation-related attacks
indicate the need for continued
vigilance in aviation security.

For example, the April 2003 arrest of
Waleed bin Attash and the subsequent
discovery of a plot to crash an
explosive-laden small aircraft into the
U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan
illustrates terrorist groups’ continued
interest in using aircraft to attack U.S.
interests. Other information—such as
documents found in Zacarias
Moussaoui’s possession, which outlined
crop duster operations—suggests that
terrorist groups may have been
considering other domestic aviation
attack plans in addition to the
September 11, 2001 attacks. As of mid-
June 2003, Islamic extremists may have
been planning suicide hijackings against
government, military, and/or economic
targets along the east coast of the United
States.

In addition, press reports on the
debriefings of detained terrorist leader
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad not only
hint at the complexity of planning
involved in the September 11, 2001
attacks, but also suggest the group was
likely planning follow-on operations
inside the United States, possibly
including inside the Washington, DC
Metropolitan Area.

While the DHS has no specific
information that terrorist groups are
currently planning to use general
aviation (GA) aircraft to perpetrate
attacks against the U.S., it remains
concerned that (in light of completed
and ongoing security enhancements for
commercial aircraft and airports)
terrorists may turn to GA as an
alternative method for conducting
operations.

The DHS believes that Al-Qa’ida is
the group most likely to use GA to
attack targets in the U.S. Several of its
operatives—including some of the
September 11 hijackers—have trained
on small aircraft. Indeed, according to
the testimony before Congress of the
then-Director of Central Intelligence,
George Tenet, September 11 mastermind
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad originally
proposed using multiple small aircraft
packed with explosives to conduct the
attacks. Usama Bin Laden reportedly
suggested the use of larger aircraft
instead. Even earlier, Muhammad and
Ramzi Yousef—both involved in the
1995 Manila Air plot—considered the
notion of crashing an airplane into CIA
Headquarters.

• Based on this and other
information, the DHS believes that GA
aircraft may be vulnerable to targeting
by terrorists for misuse.

In February 2003, FAA, in
consultation with DHS and other
Federal agencies, implemented a system
of airspace control measures to protect
against a potential threat to the
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area. The
dimensions of this protected airspace
were determined after considering such
factors as the speed of likely suspect
aircraft, minimum launch time and the
speed of intercept aircraft. After
extensive coordination among Federal
agencies, two airspace areas were
implemented. The outer area, which
closely mimics the current Washington
Tri-area Class B airspace, is called an
Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)
and requires identification of all flight
operations within the airspace in order
to ensure the security of protected
ground assets. The inner area, called a
Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ), is
approximately a 15 NM radius around
the Washington VHF omni-directional
range/distance measuring equipment
(DCA VOR/DME) where more stringent
access procedures are applied. Most
kinds of flight operations are prohibited
in this area, and under this proposal
such operations would continue to be
prohibited in this area. Part 121
operations are presently permitted in
this airspace and, under this proposal,
would continue to be permitted in the
FRZ airspace. DoD, law enforcement
and aeromedical flights are permitted in
this airspace and would continue to be
permitted in this airspace as long as the
flight crew remains in contact with air
traffic control (ATC) and operates the
aircraft transponder on an air traffic
control-assigned beacon code. If
adopted, the airspace presently known
as the DC ‘‘ADIZ’’ would be
redesignated as the Washington, DC
Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules
Area (DC SFRA). The DC SFRA would
encompass the same airspace as the
ADIZ and include the area known as the
FRZ.

This airspace structure and associated
procedures associated with the ADIZ
and FRZ have been in place for about
2 years. The agencies responsible for
intercepting intruders within the
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area (the
DoD and agencies of the DHS) believe
that the existing airspace dimensions
and procedures are the minimum
acceptable to successfully accomplish
their missions and should be retained
on a permanent basis.

This airspace structure is also an
essential component of the DoD and
DHS air security plan. The DoD and
DHS believe that by establishing a
National Defense airspace area over the
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area,
they would have sufficient time to
successfully conduct countermeasures
to ensure the safety of protectees in the
event that a potentially hostile aircraft
enters the airspace area.

It is with this in mind that the
Departments of Defense and Homeland
Security requested that the FAA
Administrator take action to codify
permanently current aviation flight
restrictions over the Washington, DC
Metropolitan Area to support their
continuing mission to protect national
assets in the National Capital Region.
General Discussion of the Proposal
After the events of September 11,
2001, Congress and the President tasked
government agencies to increase the
protection of the United States and its
interests. Congress established the TSA
and tasked it with protecting the
security of our nation’s transportation
infrastructure. Additionally, Congress
established the Department of
Homeland Security, in order to
centralize the administration of the
country’s security efforts.

For the past two years, the FAA has
been working closely with the DoD and
DHS to draft security contingency plans
to protect the American public, national
assets, and operations in the National
Airspace System. Some of the measures
taken by the FAA include additional
cockpit security for certain air carrier
aircraft and temporary flight restrictions
over special events (often at stadiums)
that attract large numbers of people and
may be seen as potential targets by
terrorists.

Since the seat of our nation’s
government is in Washington, DC, flight
restrictions were established
immediately after September 11, 2001,
and most remain in place. Establishing
specific airspace for security reasons in
the Washington, DC area is not a new
practice. In 1938, by Executive Order
7910, the President reserved and set
apart airspace for national defense, the
public safety and other governmental
purposes. Those airspace reservations
were subsequently codified in 14 CFR
part 73 as ‘‘prohibited areas.’’ Over the
years, the size and dimensions of one of
these areas, Prohibited Area 56 (P–56),
which is the airspace over and near the
White House, has changed in response
to world events. In accordance with 14
CFR 73.83, no person may operate an
aircraft within a prohibited area unless
authorization has been granted by the
using agency. The action proposed in
this notice does not modify P–56.

The FAA is aware that the flight
restrictions imposed over the
Washington DC Metropolitan Area have
impacted, and will continue to impact
some pilots in the area. However,
government security officials believe
that the proposed DC SFRA would
enhance and strengthen the ability of
DoD and DHS to protect the President,
Cabinet members, the Congress and
other assets in the capital region.

According to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the threat of
extremists launching an attack using
aircraft still exists. Numerous reports
continue to be received that
demonstrate Al-Qa’ida’s enduring
interest in aviation-related attacks.
Thus, there is a continued need for
aviation security vigilance. Intelligence
reports indicate that terrorists continue
to be interested in using general aviation
aircraft as part of another attack on the
U.S. or facilitation of activities since
general aviation aircraft are readily
available and relatively inexpensive.
Also, though security measures at
general aviation airports have improved,
they are less stringent than those in
place at many commercial airports.

Overall and even though general
aviation aircraft are generally smaller
than those used in the 9/11 attack, the
destructive potential of a small aircraft
loaded with explosives may be
significant. It should be noted that
almost 70% of U.S. general aviation is
comprised of aircraft that are relatively
small. Aircraft in this segment of the
industry range from homebuilt craft to
large airliners. In addition, there are
thousands of general aviation airports in
the United States with varying degrees
of security procedures implemented.

We believe that as part of ensuring the
security of the people, property and
institutions in the Nation’s capital, and
surrounding area, it is essential to know
the intended route of flight of the
aircraft, to have the aircraft squawk a
discrete transponder code, and to have
automatic altitude reporting equipment
on board the aircraft that transmits to
ATC. Government officials believe that
some types of aircraft operations (i.e.,
those conducted under parts 91, 101,
103, 105, 125, 133, 135 and 137) should
continue to be prohibited within 15
miles of the DCA VOR/DME, unless
specifically authorized by the FAA in
consultation with the DoD and DHS.
Generally speaking, pre-departure
security procedures and onboard
security equipment for such operations
are substantially less demanding than
those security procedures and
safeguards currently in place for part
121 aircraft operations. Therefore, the
FAA is proposing the following action
which, in part, restricts flight in certain
areas and requires pilots operating in
designated areas to file flight plans,
communicate with appropriate air
traffic control facilities, and display an
ATC-assigned transponder code. This
proposed action is one of many being
undertaken by government agencies that

1 Section 46307. Violation of national defense
airspace. A person that knowingly or willfully
violates section 40103(b)(3) of this title or a
regulation prescribed or order issued under section
40103(b)(3) shall be fined under title 18,
imprisoned for not more than one year, or both.
are intended to enhance security in the
Washington DC Metropolitan area.
By this proposed action the Federal
Government would more explicitly
classify the airspace over the
Washington DC Metropolitan Area (the
DC SFRA) as ‘‘National Defense
Airspace.’’ Any person who knowingly
or willfully violates the rules
concerning operations in National
Defense Airspace is subject to certain
criminal penalties. See 49 U.S.C. 46307.

It is hoped that codification of these
airspace restrictions and the
classification of this airspace as
‘‘National Defense Airspace’’ will
reduce, through pilot education, the
number of careless and inadvertent
encroachments of the airspace by some
pilots. Reducing the number of
unauthorized airspace penetrations will
reduce the number of times that the U.S.
Government aircraft have to intercept
unauthorized aircraft. The government
also believes this rule will reduce the
risks that the Government might have to
fire on an aircraft that proceeds
dangerously close to certain locations in
the Washington DC Metropolitan Area.
In addition, in response to
Congressional mandate, the
Transportation Security Administration
issued an interim final rule on July 19,
2005 to restore access to Reagan
National Airport for certain aircraft
operations (70 FR 41586; July 19, 2005).
The rule will become effective on
August 18, 2005. The final rule will
reflect changes to the airspace
restrictions based on that rule, as well
as other changes that might result from
other unforeseen security concerns.
Section-by-Section Discussion of the
Proposed 14 CFR Part 93 Subpart B
Section 93.31—What Is the Purpose of
This Subpart and Who Would Be
Affected?

This section, if adopted, would
inform the public that this subpart was
issued to enhance security efforts in the
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area and
deter anyone who might use an aircraft
for terrorist activity. It would further
inform readers that it establishes a
National Defense Airspace Area over the
Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area.
This area would be known as the
Washington DC Metropolitan Area
Special Flight Rules Area, which would
be defined in proposed § 93.35. This
would include flights in the
Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area
Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ), which is
also defined in proposed § 93.35. This
subpart would affect anyone who
operates an aircraft in the DC SFRA.
Section 93.33—What Could Happen if
You Fail To Comply With the Rules of
This Subpart?

This proposed section informs readers
that if they do not comply with this rule
or any special security instruction
announced by a Notice to Airmen
(NOTAM) that affects this rule, then the
government may do any or all of the
following:

(1) Direct deadly force toward their
aircraft. This could happen if it is
determined that the aircraft poses an
imminent security threat.

(2) Pursue criminal charges. Criminal
prosecutions could be pursued, in the
right case with the appropriate
evidence, because this airspace is being
established, in part, pursuant to 49
U.S.C. 40103(b) as National Defense
Airspace.1 This would not be the first
time that the Administrator, in
consultation with the Secretary of
Defense, has acted pursuant to the
authority under 49 U.S.C. 40103(b). For
example, the FAA considers certain
Prohibited Areas to be National Defense
Airspace and certain temporary flight
restrictions (TFRs) sites in the same
vein, because those prohibited areas and
those TFRs were established, in part,
pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40103 in
consultation with the Secretary of
Defense.

(3) Take administrative action,
including imposing civil penalties and
suspend or revoke airmen certificates.
Paragraph (c) simply summarizes the
FAA’s long-standing and longrecognized
statutory authority to take
administrative enforcement action
against those who violate FAA
regulations (See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. 44709
and 49 U.S.C. Chapter 463 (Penalties)).

Section 93.35—Definitions
This proposed section contains
definitions applicable to this rule.
Specifically, this section provides the
definition for the proposed airspace
known as the Washington, DC,
Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules
Area (SFRA) and the airspace contained
within the Washington DC Metropolitan
Area Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ). The
SFRA is currently defined by a NOTAM,
and known as the Washington DC ADIZ.
Both the SFRA airspace and the FRZ
airspace (which is part of SFRA
airspace) are categorized as ‘‘National
Defense Airspace.’’ This proposed
section also defines the term ‘‘fringe
airports’’ to identify certain airports
located near the outer boundary of the
SFRA where specific egress-only
procedures may be applied.

Section 93.37—General Requirements
for Operating in the Washington, DC,
Metropolitan Area SFRA
This proposed section establishes that
if you conduct any type of flight in the
Washington, DC, SFRA, you will be
subject to:

(1) All of the requirements in this
part;
(2) All special instructions issued by
the FAA in the interest of national
security; and
(3) All other FAA requirements in 14
CFR.

Generally, any special instructions
would be issued as NOTAMs pursuant
to § 99.7 and would be temporary, but
could be issued in any manner the FAA
considers appropriate.

Section 93.39—Specific Requirements
for Operating in the Washington, DC,
Metropolitan Area SFRA, Including the
FRZ

On February 10, 2003, the FAA issued
NOTAM 3/2126 that established the
Washington DC Metropolitan Area
ADIZ. NOTAM 3/2126 contains flight
restrictions and procedures for aircraft
operations within the area, including
transponder equipment, two-way radio
communication and filing a flight plan.
In this action we propose to establish an
area (Washington DC SFRA) with
specific procedures and pilot and
equipment requirements. The proposed
procedures reflect those currently in
place via NOTAM for that airspace
currently known as the Washington DC
Metropolitan Area Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ).

Section 93.41—Aircraft Operations
Prohibited in the Washington, DC,
Metropolitan Area Flight Restricted
Zone (FRZ)

This section proposes to codify
prohibitions on certain kinds of aircraft
operations in the Washington DC
Metropolitan Area FRZ. The FRZ
evolved from flight restrictions
originally imposed by NOTAM on
December 19, 2001. On February 10,
2003, the FRZ (which covers
approximately a 15 nautical mile radius
of the Washington DC VOR/DME) was
introduced to describe an area wherein
all flight operations conducted under
parts 91, 101, 103, 105, 125, 133, 135,
and 137 are prohibited unless
specifically authorized by the FAA, in
consultation with DHS.

Section 93.43—Requirements for
Aircraft Operations to or From College
Park Airport; Potomac Airfield; or
Washington Executive/Hyde Field
Airports

This proposed section contains
portions of the procedures previously
found in SFAR No. 94, and it also
contains air traffic procedures that are
in place via NOTAM.

SFAR 94 contained both flight
communication requirements and
airport security requirements. The flight
communication requirements are
included in this NPRM. They include
flight plan filing, two-way radio
communication, and transponder
requirements. Procedures addressing
airport security previously contained in
SFAR 94 are now regulated by the TSA.
See ‘‘Background’’ above.

Section 93.45—Special Ingress/Egress
Procedures for Bay Bridge and Kentmorr
Airports

This section proposes to permanently
codify ingress/egress procedures for
certain airports within the Washington,
DC Metropolitan Area Special Flight
Rules Area but not in the FRZ. This
proposed section details ingress/egress
procedures for pilots operating to/from
the Bay Bridge and Kentmorr Airports.
Specifically, the procedures would
allow aircraft arriving at or departing
from either of these airports to operate
directly to or from the airport, along a
specified route, at a specified altitude,
without filing a flight plan or contacting
air traffic control, provided they are
displaying the appropriate ATCassigned
transponder code (1227 for Bay
Bridge Airport and 1233 for Kentmorr
Airport).

Section 93.47—Special Egress
Procedures for Fringe Airports
This section proposes egress-only
procedures for those pilots departing the
Airlie, Albrecht, Harris, Martin, Martin
State, Meadows, Mylander, Stewart, St.
John, Tilghman Whipp, Upperville, and
Wolf airports. Pilots departing from
these airports would display ATC
transponder code 1205 and monitor the
appropriate ATC frequency for the area.
They would be expected to exit the
SFRA by the most direct route. Also,
these pilots would not have to establish
two-way communications with ATC
unless requested, and would not have to
file a flight plan.

It should be noted that these
procedures are being proposed to
provide relief to certain pilot operations
in the SFRA. Any pilot deviating from
these procedures will trigger a U.S.
government response.

Section 93.49—Airport Security
Procedures
This section proposes to prohibit any
person from operating an aircraft at the
three subject Maryland airports unless
those airports have a TSA-approved
airport security program.

Paperwork Reduction Act
This proposal contains the following
new information collection
requirements. As required by the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44
U.S.C. 3507(d)), the FAA has submitted
the information requirements associated
with this proposal to the Office of
Management and Budget for its review.
This information is currently being
collected under the NOTAM issued
pursuant to 14 CFR 99.7.

Estimated Burden: The FAA expects
that this proposed rule would impose
additional reporting and recordkeeping
requirements on airports and pilots. It
would have the following impacts:
• For the airports impacted by SFAR
94, the FAA estimates that it would take
1,497.50 hours to process flight plans,
costing $47,111 annually.

• For the other airports affected by
this rulemaking, the FAA estimates that
it would take 6,466.28 hours to process
the additional flight plans, costing
$203,429 annually.

The total impact to file these flight plans
averages $250,540, taking 7,963.78
hours annually.

The regulation would increase
paperwork for the Federal government,
as there would be an additional air
traffic burden dealing with pilot
deviations, tracks of interest, and
litigation, taking an average of
129,197.33 hours, costing $10,913,253
annually. In addition, FAA employees
would have to process the additional
flight plans; for the airports impacted by
SFAR 94, this would take 1,497.50
hours, costing $70,847, and for all other
airports in the SFRA, this would take
6,466.28 hours, costing $203,429
annually. The total impact on the
Federal government would be
137,161.10 hours, costing $11,187,529
annually.

The agency is soliciting comments
to—
(1) Evaluate whether the proposed
information requirement is necessary for
the proper performance of the functions
of the agency, including whether the
information will have practical utility;
(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden;
(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
(4) Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are to respond, including through the
use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology.
Individuals and organizations may
submit comments on the information
collection requirement by October 3,
2005, and should direct them to the
address listed in the ADDRESSES section
of this document. Comments also
should be submitted to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs,
OMB, New Executive Building, Room
10202, 725 17th Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20053, Attention: Desk
Officer for FAA.

According to the 1995 amendments to
the Paperwork Reduction Act (5 CFR
1320.8(b)(2)(vi)), an agency may not
collect or sponsor the collection of
information, nor may it impose an
information collection requirement
unless it displays a currently valid OMB
control number. The OMB control
number for this information collection
will be published in the Federal
Register, after the Office of Management
and Budget approves it.

International Compatibility
In keeping with U.S. obligations
under the Convention on International
Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to
comply with International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards
and Recommended Practices to the
maximum extent practicable. The FAA
has determined that there are no ICAO
Standards and Recommended Practices
that correspond to these proposed
regulations.

Regulatory Evaluation Summary
Changes to Federal regulations must
undergo several economic analyses.
First, Executive Order 12866 directs that
each Federal agency shall propose or
adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned
determination that the benefits of the
intended regulation justify its costs.

Second, the Regulatory Flexibility Act
of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the
economic impact of regulatory changes
on small entities. Third, the Trade
Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 2531–2533)
prohibits agencies from setting
standards that create unnecessary
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the
United States. In developing U.S.
standards, this Trade Act requires
agencies to consider international
standards and, where appropriate, to be
the basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
(Public Law 104–4) requires agencies to
prepare a written assessment of the
costs, benefits, and other effects of
proposed or final rules that include a
Federal mandate likely to result in the
expenditure by State, local, or tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of $120.7 million or more
annually (adjusted for inflation).

In conducting these analyses, the FAA
has determined this proposed rule: (1)
Would have benefits that justify its
costs, is a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’
as defined in section 3(f) of Executive
Order 12866, and is ‘‘significant’’ as
defined in DOT’s Regulatory Policies
and Procedures; (2) may have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities; (3)
would have no affect on international
trade; and does not impose an unfunded
mandate on state, local, or tribal
governments, or on the private sector.
These analyses, available in the docket,
are summarized below.

Who Is Potentially Affected by This
Rulemaking

Private Sector
All aircraft would have to be
transponder equipped when entering
the proposed DC SFRA and maintain
two-way communications while flying
in the proposed area. Pilots operating in
accordance with visual flight rules
(VFR) would have to file flight plans to
fly within the proposed DC SFRA.
There are approximately 150 airports
in the proposed DC ADIZ. Given the
additional requirements that general
aviation pilots face, the FAA is
concerned that many of these airports
would have fewer operations. In some
cases, some of these pilots may elect to
use alternate nearby airports outside of
the proposed DC SFRA.
Government

The FAA has experienced additional
burdens in maintaining the requested
security requirements within the DC
ADIZ/FRZ since September 11, 2001. In
particular, this includes additional work
for the air traffic control facilities of
Potomac Consolidated Terminal Radar
Approach Control (TRACON) and
Leesburg Automated Flight Service
Station (AFSS) as well as adjacent air
traffic control towers and AFSS’s.
One of the airports affected by the
flight restrictions imposed since
September 11, 2001 is the College Park
Airport. This airport is owned and
partially funded by two Maryland
Counties, Montgomery and Prince
George’s.

Our Cost Assumptions and Sources of
Information

In this analysis, the FAA estimated
future costs for a 10-year period, from
2004 through 2013. As required by the
Office of Management and Budget, the
present value of this stream of costs was
calculated using a discount factor of 7
percent. All costs in this analysis are in
2002 dollars.

The analysis examined costs
associated with the proposed DC SFRA.
Impact to Air Traffic
The FAA calculated the number of
additional air traffic staff by looking at
air traffic controller availability during
the average workweek and during the
year. Staffing demands in the future are
calculated by using annual growth rates
of 1.2% for the TRACONs and 0.5% for
the AFSSs. In addition, personnel
compensation and benefits for a
certified professional controller are
estimated at $140,000 and for an
automated flight service station
specialist are estimated at $90,000.
Airports Impacted by the Former SFAR
94—College Park, Potomac, and
Washington Executive/Hyde
For the three airports impacted by the
former SFAR 94, the FAA also used the
following assumptions:

• The cost of either a pilot’s or an
aircraft occupant’s time is $31.46 per
hour.
• The per hour cost of operating a
piston driven, four seat aircraft is
$64.75.
• The average load factor for a four
seat aircraft is 43.7 percent or 1.75
occupants.
• An airport manager’s hourly wage,
based on each airport’s actual cost and
revenue streams, is $45 per hour at
College Park, $42 per hour at Potomac,
and $40 per hour at Washington
Executive/Hyde.
• To account for financial losses not
explicitly captured by the analysis,
twenty percent of lost revenue is added
to the estimated cost of operational
restrictions for all three airports.
• To compensate for the lack of
financial data for Washington Executive
Airport/Hyde Field, the average
estimated cost of certain operational
restrictions for the two other airports
(College Park and Potomac) is used to
estimate the revenue losses.
• The data for the days that each
airport was open and operating in 2002
was annualized to help estimate total
operations and revenues. This data
summed to about 61/2 months for the
College Park and Potomac airports and
4 months for Washington Executive
Airport/Hyde Field.
• Hourly costs to the Federal
Government include airport inspector
(FG–14, $56.48) and flight service
station specialist ($47.37) and to the
state government law enforcement
agency employee ($47.80).
• Revenue is used as the financial
indicator of economic costs in lieu of
unavailable data on lost profits.
• Local purchases include
procurements made by the airport and
its tenants and airport sales to tenants,
visitors, and local organizations.
• For ground delays, the hourly value
of passenger time per operation is
$55.06. The average ground delay varied
per airport.
• For in-flight delays, the hourly cost
of an in-flight delay is $119.81. The
average flight delay varied per airport.
In addition, the FAA made the
following assumptions concerning the
number of operations and revenue at
these three airports:
• The number of operations, which
was annualized from 2002 data, would
remain constant at all three airports for
the ten years examined by this analysis.

In a recent Interim Final Rule, the TSA
has allowed transient operations into
these airports. However, FAA does not
know how many additional aircraft will
fly into or out of these airports. Unless
a pilot plans on using one of these
airports on a regular basis, they
probably would not want to go through
the vetting process. Thus, the FAA
believes that the number of additional
new operations would be minimal.

• Given the additional security
vetting required by TSA, the FAA
believes that these pilots who fly into
any of these three airports would do so
only if they believe that it is to their
advantage to do so. In other words, the
FAA recognizes that these pilots would
enjoy an unquantifiable benefit.
• The FAA does not believe that the
recent TSA rule would increase the total
number of flights within the SFRA. So
while the actual number of flights to the
Maryland-3 and to the other airports
within the SFRA may change, the total
number of flights within the SFRA
would not. While the costs estimated
and projected for the Maryland-3 and
the other airports may change, the total
costs related to these operations within
the SFRA (in-flight delays, on-theground
delays, and flight plan
processing) would not change.
• Annual revenue, which was also
annualized from 2002 data, would
remain constant at all three airports for
the ten years examined by this analysis.
The FAA recognizes that additional
transient flights have the potential to
boost revenue to each airport, but
believes that any potential increase
would be small.

Other Costs Associated With the
Proposed DC SFRA
• The FAA assumes that the
additional number of flight plans filed
in 2004 would be 123,800, growing to
135,000 in 2013; these numbers are net
of those needed to be filed for the three
airports impacted by the former SFAR
94.
• As above, for ground delays, the
hourly value of passenger time per
operation is $55.06, while for in-flight
delays; the hourly cost per operation is
$119.81.

Benefits of This Rulemaking
This proposed rule is intended to
enhance DoD/DHS security measures to
deter airborne terrorist attacks. The
primary benefit of the proposal would
be enhanced protection for a significant
number of government assets and
infrastructure in the National Capital
Region. The security provisions and
flight restrictions contained in this rule
are an integral part of the effort to
identify and defeat the threat posed by
terrorists.

Given the myriad of possible
scenarios, the cost of an act of terrorism
against a nationally prominent target or
critical government infrastructure is
extremely difficult to quantify. They can
include areas such as the direct and
indirect costs of the September 11
attacks as well as a reduction in D.C.
tourism. Due to the sensitive nature of
this information, many of the specifics
of these effects will not be discussed in
this document. However, the FAA
acknowledges that these costs would be
very high.

The FAA acknowledges that there
would be non-quantifiable benefits. The
separation of air traffic is predicated on
knowing the intentions of aircraft
operating within the controller’s
airspace. The proposed DC SFRA would
require two way communication, flight
plans and operable transponders for
pilots to operate in the area. This would
allow the government to know the
pilots’ intentions, to monitor the aircraft
altitude, and to communicate with each
pilot. Knowing this information would
enhance safety and security.

In addition, the FAA believes that this
rule will reduce the number of times
that the U.S. Government might have to
intercept unauthorized aircraft. The
current restrictions are contained in
NOTAMs, which are not as widely
disseminated or understood as Federal
regulations. As the public becomes more
aware of these airspace restrictions, the
FAA believes the number of careless
and inadvertent encroachments of the
airspace will be reduced. The FAA does
not have any data on the possible
reduction in the number of times that
the U.S. Government might have to
intercept unauthorized aircraft, but
believes that a better educated flying
public would make fewer critical flying
errors.

Costs of This Rulemaking
The analysis examined costs
associated with the proposed DC SFRA.
The Impact to Air Traffic
The FAA has borne additional
burdens in maintaining the requested
airspace restrictions within the existing
Washington, DC ADIZ/FRZ. To
calculate the costs associated with the
proposed DC SFRA, the FAA made a
comparison using the baseline months
of July 2001, 2002, and 2003. Based on
the additional workload for 2003,
controller staffing has been increased;
total increased staffing costs, over ten
years, sum to $62.12 million ($43.83
million, discounted). The total number
of controllers would increase from 39 in
2004 to 43 in 2013.

There are other costs due to
additional activities, all centered at the
Potomac TRACON. These other costs
include additional pilot deviations,
additional tracks of interest, increased
litigation, and costs associated with
creating and operating a National
Security Special Operations Unit. This
increased workload sums to $122.15
million ($71.28 million, discounted)
over ten years.

Total ten-year costs, to handle the
additional air traffic burden, sum to
$184.27 million ($128.70 million,
discounted).

Costs to the Airports Impacted by the
Former SFAR 94—College Park,
Potomac, and Washington Executive/
Hyde

SFAR 94, enacted February 13, 2002,
authorized general aviation operations
at College Park Airport, Potomac
Airfield, and Washington Hyde Field,
provided that stringent requirements
were met. In February 2003, the FAA, in
concert with TSA, extended the SFAR
94 for an additional two years. In
February 2005, TSA extended the
security aspects of these procedures
under 49 CFR part 1562; the airspace
restrictions and communications
provisions in NOTAM 3/0853 remain
under FAA authority. This rulemaking
would codify these airspace restrictions
and communications provisions.

The FAA was able to obtain limited
historical financial and operational data
for College Park and Potomac Field
Airports for part of their first year under
the SFAR. Additional data restrictions,
however, limited the analysis of the
rule’s impact on the Washington
Executive Airport/Hyde Field. Thus, the
FAA was required to make additional
assumptions in doing the analysis for
this airport.

College Park Airport
The College Park Airport opened in
1909 and is the oldest continuously
operating airport in the world. With the
exception of about 100 annual air taxi
operations, the College Park Airport
serves private pilots who use their
aircraft for pleasure and business. The
estimate of annual losses to College Park
Airport associated with complying with
the current DC ADIZ/FRZ operational
restrictions is $1.62 million. This
annualized revenue loss has been
increased by a factor of 20% to account
for revenue losses not included in the
analysis. The annual airspace restriction
costs to the pilots using the College Park
Airport sum to $171,900 and are based
on the ground and in-flight delays as
well as the time to file flight plans.
Complying with the airspace and
communication requirements in the
proposed DC SFRA would cost the
College Park Airport an estimated $1.80
million annually.

Potomac Airfield
The Potomac Airfield is a small
privately owned airport located in Fort
Washington, Maryland. Based on
information from the first 8 months of
2002, and assuming that these revenues
derived during the period stay the same,
the FAA estimates the revenue loss to be
$1.36 million. This annualized revenue
loss has been increased by a factor of
20% to account for revenue losses not
included in the analysis. Thus the FAA
estimates annual losses of $1.63 million
for the time examined by this analysis.
The annual airspace restriction costs to
the pilots using the Potomac Airfield
Airport sum to $368,500 and are based
on the ground and in-flight delays as
well as the time to file flight plans.
Complying with the requirements in the
proposed DC SFRA would cost the
Potomac Airfield Airport an estimated
$2.00 million annually.

Washington Executive/Hyde Field
Airport
Washington Executive/Hyde Field
Airport is a small privately owned
airport located in Clinton, Maryland.
The airport largely serves the needs of
private pilots who occasionally fly for
business reasons. This airport was
closed longer than the other two;
operations resumed at Hyde Field on
March 2, 2002. However, on May 17,
2002, the airport was closed again
because of a security violation. The
airport reopened on September 28,
2002. This annualized revenue loss has
been increased by a factor of 20% to
account for revenue losses not included
in the analysis. This resulted in the
estimate of annual losses associated
with complying with the operational
restrictions in the former SFAR 94 for
this airport to be $1.60 million.

The annual airspace restriction costs
to the pilots using the Washington
Executive Airport/Hyde Field sum to
$596,500 and are based on the ground
and in-flight delays as well as the time
to file flight plans. Complying with the
requirements in the proposed DC SFRA
would cost the Washington Executive/
Hyde Field Airport an estimated $2.19
million annually.

Other Costs Related to the Above Three
Airports

Flight service station specialists
would need to process the flight plans;
annual costs sum to approximately
$70,800. Annual costs for the ten-year
extension of the provisions of the
proposed DC SFRA sum to $6.06
million. Over ten years, these costs sum
to $60.64 million ($42.59, discounted).

Other Costs Related to the Proposed DC
SFRA

There are approximately 150 airports/
heliports within the proposed DC SFRA.
The costs for three of these airports
(College Park, Potomac, and Washington
Executive/Hyde) have already been
discussed above. However, there are
additional costs, both for pilots and
airports within the proposed DC SFRA.
Costs for pilots—The proposal would
implement new requirements for all
pilots. The proposal would require all
operators to file flight plans. Pilots
operating VFR would have to file flight
plans to operate within the proposed DC
SFRA; these are new costs. The FAA
estimates an additional 123,800 flight
plans would need to be filed annually
in 2004, growing to 135,000 in 2013.
Ten year costs due to flight delays and
the time to file flight plans sum to
$48.63 million. In addition, flight
service station specialists would need to
process the flight plans; ten-year costs
sum to approximately $3.06 million.
Total costs for these additional flight
plans sum to $51.70 million ($36.12
million, discounted) over ten years.

The FAA invites comments on:
• The total number of additional
flight plans,
• The filing time due to ground and
in-flight delays and related costs, and
• The net results of pilots
circumventing the DC SFRA.
The FAA requests that all comments
be accompanied by documentation.
Costs for small airports—There are
approximately 150 airports/heliports in
the proposed DC SFRA, most of which
do not keep operations records. Given
the additional requirements that general
aviation pilots face, the FAA notes that
many of these airports would have
fewer operations, resulting in a loss of
revenue. In some cases, some of these
pilots would fly to alternate airports
outside the proposed DC SFRA,
resulting in an increase in operations
and revenue for these alternate airports.
The FAA does not have data as to the
change in operations and revenue in the
airports both within and just outside the
proposed DC SFRA since February
2001. Accordingly, the FAA invites
comments from both small airports and
general aviation pilots on the effect of
the DC SFRA on these airports. The
FAA requests that all comments be
accompanied by documentation.

Total Costs
Total quantifiable costs sum to
$296.60 million ($207.41 million,
discounted) over ten years.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination
For this proposed rule, the small
entity group is considered to be small
general aviation airports (North
American Industry Classification
System [NAICS] 488119—Airport
Operations and Terminal Services). The
small entity size standards criteria
involving airports defines a small
airport as one that is independently
owned with annual revenues of less
than $5 million or owned by a small
governmental jurisdiction with a
population less than 50,000. In addition,
all privately owned, public-use airports
are considered small. All the small
airports, both public-use and privateuse,
in the proposed Washington, DC
SFRA need to be examined in this
regulatory flexibility analysis.
The FAA only has revenue (both preand
post-DC ADIZ) and compliance cost
data for the three airports within the
FRZ, and so can only do a regulatory
flexibility analysis on these airports,
based on the effects of the SFRA.

Because the proposal would have a
significant impact on two of the three
airports impacted by the former SFAR
94 that would trigger the need for a
regulatory flexibility analysis if the
proposed rule were only dealing with
the former SFAR 94 and the current
combination of TSA’s 49 CFR part 1562
and FAA’s NOTAM 3/0853. However,
there are approximately 150 airports
within the SFRA that are affected by
other provisions of the proposed rule,
and the FAA does not know if these
other provisions would have a
significant impact on a substantial
number of all those airports.
Accordingly, the FAA prepared a
regulatory flexibility analysis, as it
believes it important to show the
potential impact on these entities for the
sake of completeness and to engender
comments.

Hence, the focus of the following
analysis will not be the proposed rule,
but rather, a subsection of the proposed
rule—the impact of the former SFAR 94.
The FAA requests comments containing
revenue (both pre- and post-DC ADIZ)
and compliance cost data for these other
airports within the existing Washington,
DC SFRA/FRZ as well as any other
pertinent information of the potential
burden of this proposal on small
airports. The FAA requests that such
data be accompanied with full
documentation.

As discussed above, three airports are
directly affected. The College Park
Airport is owned and partially funded
by two Maryland Counties, Montgomery
and Prince George’s. The 2000 census
discloses that the combined population
of the two counties is approximately 1.7
million. As such, the College Park
Airport is not a small entity. Both the
Potomac Airfield Airport and
Washington Executive Airport/Hyde
Field are privately owned and
considered small in this analysis.

Small general aviation airports are not
required to have security programs; only
those airports that have scheduled
service are required to have such a
program. Air carrier airports are funded
from tax revenues and generally have
greater aviation traffic activity than
general aviation airports and airports
without scheduled service. By and large,
Potomac Airfield and Hyde Field are not
supported from tax revenues, as the
revenues that sustain the two airports
are derived solely from the pilots who
use the airports; however, these airports
received Airport Improvement Project
(AIP) funds for the costs of operating
and for security enhancements due to
the special provisions in the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA). The provision lasted for one
year, in 2002. Potomac Airfield Airport
received about $150,100, while
Washington Executive Airport/Hyde
Field received $342,300. Neither airport
can count on these AIP funds to sustain
them in the future.

The estimated annual cost of
compliance, based on known costs and
revenues for the Washington Executive
Airport is $291,600 and the burden on
the Potomac Airfield Airport is
$221,400; they increase to $334,000 and
$252,900 when the anticipated airport
revenue losses are increased by 20%, as
discussed above. These costs are
considered burdensome because they
are well in excess of one percent of the
median annual revenue of small airport
operators (one percent of the annual
median revenue for small operators is
$28,000). If these were the only small
airports within the proposed DC SFRA,
the FAA would determine that the rule
would have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small
entities. Without similar information
from the other small airports, the FAA
is unable to make such a determination,
but, as mentioned above, the FAA
believes it is important to show the
potential impact on these entities for the
sake of completeness. Accordingly, it
conducted a regulatory flexibility
analysis only on a subsection of the
proposed rule—those airports impacted
by the former SFAR 94.

Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
Under section 603 (b) of the RFA (as
amended), each regulatory flexibility
analysis is required to address the
following points: (1) Reasons the FAA
considered the rule, (2) the objectives
and legal basis of the rule, (3) the kind
and number of small entities to which
the rule will apply, (4) the reporting,
record keeping, and other compliance
requirements of the rule, and (5) all
Federal rules that may duplicate,
overlap, or conflict with the rule. The
FAA will perform an analysis for the
two small airports impacted by this rule,
because the rule will make SFAR 94
permanent.

Reasons the FAA considered the rule:
The catastrophic events of September
11, 2001 introduced the awareness that
terrorists will use civil aviation aircraft
as a missile or, potentially, as carriers of
biological, chemical, radioactive and/or
conventional weaponry against civilian
targets. This proposed rule recognizes
that the terrorist threat is changing and
growing and that extraordinary steps
must be taken to safeguard the
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area.

The objectives and legal basis for the
rule: The objective of the rule is to
combine all the airspace restrictions
within the Washington, DC
Metropolitan Area into one regulation.
This effort is to assist DHS and DoD in
their efforts to enhance security
protection of vital national assets
located within the National Capital
Region. The statutory authority for these
rules can be found in 49 U.S.C. 40103
and 44701(a)(5). The FAA must
consider, as a matter of policy,
maintaining and enhancing safety and
security in air commerce as its highest
priorities (49 U.S.C. 40101 (d)).

The kind and number of small entities
to which the rule will apply: As noted
above, the FAA only has enough data on
two small airports, Potomac and
Washington Executive/Hyde to perform
this analysis; however, the proposed
rule potentially applies to all pilots,
regardless of where they are based, if
they operate within the proposed DC
SFRA. Private pilots operate their
aircraft for business and pleasure at
these airports.

All Federal rules that may duplicate,
overlap, or conflict with the rule: The
FAA is unaware of any Federal rules
that duplicate, overlap, or conflict with
this rule.

Other Considerations
Affordability analysis: The extent to
which a small airport can ‘‘afford’’ the
cost of compliance is directly related to
the availability of income and earnings.
The small airports subject to this rule
generate income to sustain their
operations from landing fees, tie-down
charges, rent and other compensation
paid by airport tenants, fuel sales, flight
school instruction, sightseeing rides,
aircraft rentals, and miscellaneous local
sales. All of these sources of income are
influenced directly by the number of
operations at the airport. The reduction
in operations experienced by the
airports as a consequence of the flight
restrictions in place before and after the
former SFAR 94 became effective is
significant. Even if there is an increase
in operations as a result of the recent
TSA rule, the FAA believes that this
increase would be minimal, leading to
the same conclusion that the overall
reduction in operations is significant.

The decrease in operations
corresponds directly to the decline in
working capital at the airports. Working
capital is defined as the excess of
current assets over current liabilities.
The financial strength and viability of a
business entity is substantially
influenced by its working capital
position and its ability to meet its shortterm
liabilities. As fixed-base operators
and pilots have relocated to other
airfields, revenues have continued to
decline. Besides laying off staff, without
other sources of revenue, the airports
are unable to implement offsetting costsaving
efficiencies that could ameliorate
the loss of income.
At this time, there is no
comprehensive source of information
available that would account for a total
financial picture of these airports. There
is also no information about the
airports’ ability to obtain credit. The
only evidence is limited to the fact that
the airport and its tenants generated
revenues in previous years and were
able to pay their taxes. As such, it can
be assumed that these small entities
were generating sufficient revenues to
meet tax and other obligations; however,
the costs of complying with the former
SFAR 94 are very high relative to the
current revenues reported by the
airports. As discussed for both airports,
the security costs alone are more than
20% of the projected revenues, $63,800
out of total airport revenue of $259,000
at Potomac and $79,500 out of total
airport revenue of $291,300 at
Washington Executive Airport/Hyde
Field.

The financial impact of the flight
restrictions in place before the effective
date of the former SFAR 94 is significant
relative to the size of these airports. The
reopening of the airports has not
improved the financial posture of the
airports. The May 17, 2002, temporary
closing again of Washington Executive
Airport/Hyde Field imperiled the
survival of this airport. The complex
and burdensome flight restrictions now
in place have caused private pilots to
relocate to other airports. On the basis
of the above, the FAA considers that the
rule impacts the viability of the affected
airports. Even with the potential for an
increase in revenue as a result of
transient operations, the FAA still
considers that the rule would impact the
viability of the affected airports.

Competitiveness analysis: Airports
located farther away from the DCA
VOR/DME are not subject to the security
provisions and air traffic restrictions
now in effect for Potomac Airfield
Airport and Washington Executive
Airport/Hyde Field. These airports offer
a convenient alternative location for
pilots seeking to avoid costly
operational restrictions and security
requirements. The availability of these
airports has contributed to reducing the
competitiveness of the affected airports.
Pilots flying into the airports covered by
this proposed action face additional
costs in filing flight plans which they
would not have at alternative airport;
these costs sum to $368,500 annually at
Potomac and $596,500 annually at
Washington Executive Airport/Hyde
Field, both averaging $35.10 per
operation. The advent of transient
flights has the potential to increase
these total costs to pilots.

Business Closu The FAA is unable
to determine with certainty whether the
two small airports significantly
impacted by this rule would remain
open. On the basis of the Affordability
Analysis provided above, the FAA
considers that the rule would impact the
viability of these affected airports. Even
with the addition of transient
operations, the FAA still reaches the
same conclusion.

Alternatives
The objective of the rule is to combine
all the airspace restrictions within the
Washington, DC Metropolitan Area into
one regulation. This effort is to assist
DHS and DoD in their efforts to enhance
security protection of vital national
assets located within the National
Capital Region. The fact that the
provisions of former SFAR 94 are still
in effect (in TSA’s interim final rule and
the FAA’s NOTAM 3/0853), and that the
existing Washington, DC Metropolitan
Area ADIZ/FRZ is also in effect, reduces
the number of options to be examined
in this analysis. The government
believes that substantial changes to the
security requirements or air traffic
restrictions would be the equivalent of
revoking the rule and increasing the
vulnerability of the National Capital
Region. Thus, the FAA has examined
the following three alternatives.

Alternative 1: Rescind the TSA’s 49
CFR part 1562, FAA’s NOTAM 3/0853,
and the DC ADIZ/FRZ immediately—
This alternative would provide
immediate relief to these airports by
removing security provisions and
restoring former air traffic control
procedures and air space configurations.
Implementation of this alternative
would facilitate the return of pilots who,
for the sake of operating simplicity and
reduced flying costs, relocated to other
airports. This would be the least costly
option. The FAA believes that the threat
of terrorists using aircraft as missiles
must be guarded against, and this option
would not adequately achieve that goal.

Conclusion: Rescinding these actions
would increase the vulnerability and
diminish the level of protection now in
place to safeguard vital national assets
located within the National Capital
Region. This alternative is rejected
because it would compromise the
security of vital national assets and
increase their vulnerability.

Alternative 2: Codify existing flight
restrictions over the Washington, DC
Metropolitan Area—Under this
alternative, the government would
maintain the present security and air
traffic operational restrictions. The
annual cost of compliance for the
affected airports totals $513,000; they
increase to $585,400 when the
anticipated airport revenue losses are
increased by 20%. These costs could
change marginally with the advent of
transient operations. The proposed rule
enhances security measures in place
that would require any aircraft operating
to and from the affected airports and
transiting the proposed SFRA to be
properly identified and cleared.

Conclusion: This alternative is
preferred because it balances the
government’s security concerns about a
terrorist attack in this area against the
costs that would be imposed by more
draconian measures.

Alternative 3—Close all airports
within the proposed DC SFRA
permanently—Under this alternative,
the government would completely close
these airports to all aviation operations.
This would effectively close all
aviation-related businesses in the area.
They would be forced to move to other
airports or close their businesses
permanently. All pilots who have
aircraft permanently based at the
airports would also be forced to move
their aircraft to other locations, thereby
imposing moving costs, including new
hangar, tie-down, storage fees, etc.
Workers at the airports would be forced
to seek employment at one of the other
general aviation airports in the
Washington Metro area. This is the most
costly option.

Conclusion: This alternative is not
preferred because it causes the greatest
financial burden on the airports, their
tenants and aviation-related businesses,
and individuals who work or store
aircraft at those airports.
Alternative 4—Retain the FRZ,
eliminate the ADIZ—Under this
proposal, airspace in the Washington
DC Metropolitan area with flight
restrictions would be reduced
considerably. The only flight
restrictions remaining would be within
approximately 15 miles of the DCA
VOR, restricting all aircraft operations
except part 121 operators, DOD
operations, law enforcement operations
and authorized Emergency Medical
Services operations. This removes the
requirement for filing flight plans for
aircraft operators in airspace outside the
FRZ, resulting in reduced pilot and
controller workload. This alternative
would provide relief to some general
aviation operators that would operate in
the ADIZ area and not into the FRZ. It
would restore former air traffic control
procedures and air space configurations
for some of the area. Implementation of
this alternative may reduce costs for
some general aviation operators in that
they would not have to comply with
many of the current ADIZ restrictions.

Conclusion: This alternative is not
preferred because it does not meet the
requirements of those security agencies
responsible for the safety of the
Washington DC Metropolitan area.

Trade Impact Assessment
The Trade Agreement Act of 1979
prohibits Federal agencies from
establishing any standards or engaging
in related activities that create
unnecessary obstacles to the foreign
commerce of the United States.
Legitimate domestic objectives, such as
safety, are not considered unnecessary
obstacles. The statute also requires
consideration of international standards
and, where appropriate, that they be the
basis for U.S. standards. The FAA has
assessed the potential effect of this
NPRM and has determined that it would
have only a domestic impact and
therefore no effect on any tradesensitive
activity.

Unfunded Mandates Assessment
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
of 1995 (the Act) is intended, among
other things, to curb the practice of
imposing unfunded Federal mandates
on State, local, and tribal governments.
Title II of the Act requires each Federal
agency, to the extent permitted by law,
to prepare a written statement assessing
the effects of any Federal mandate in a
proposed or final agency rule that may
result in an expenditure of $100 million
or more (adjusted annually for inflation)
in any one year by State, local, and
tribal governments, in the aggregate, or
by the private sector. Such a mandate is
deemed to be a ‘‘significant regulatory
action.’’ The FAA currently uses an
inflation-adjusted value of $120.7
million in lieu of $100 million.

This proposed rule does not contain
such a mandate. Therefore, the
requirements of Title II do not apply.
Executive Order 13132, Federalism
The FAA has analyzed this proposed
rule under the principles and criteria of
Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We
have determined that this action would
not have a substantial direct effect on
the States, on the relationship between
the national Government and the States,
or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government, and therefore
would not have federalism implications.

Plain Language
Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735,
Oct. 4, 1993) requires each agency to
write regulations that are simple and
easy to understand. We invite your
comments on how to make these
proposed regulations easier to
understand, including answers to
questions such as the following:
• Are the requirements in the
proposed regulations clearly stated?
• Do the proposed regulations contain
unnecessary technical language or
jargon that interferes with their clarity?
• Would the regulations be easier to
understand if they were divided into
more (but shorter) sections?
• Is the description in the preamble
helpful in understanding the proposed
regulations?

Please send your comments to the
address specified in the ADDRESSES
section.

Environmental Analysis
FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA
actions that are categorically excluded
from preparation of an environmental
assessment or environmental impact
statement under the National
Environmental Policy Act in the
absence of extraordinary circumstances.
The FAA has determined that this
proposed rulemaking action qualifies for
the categorical exclusion identified in
paragraph 312f and involves no
extraordinary circumstances.

Regulations That Significantly Affect
Energy Supply, Distribution, or Use
The FAA has analyzed this NPRM
under Executive Order 13211, Actions
Concerning Regulations that
Significantly Affect Energy Supply,
Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). We
have determined that it is not a
‘‘significant energy action’’ under the
executive order because it is not likely
to have a significant adverse effect on
the supply, distribution, or use of
energy.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 93
Aircraft flight, Airspace, Aviation
safety, Air traffic control, Aircraft,
Airmen, Airports.

The Proposed Amendment
In consideration of the foregoing, the
Federal Aviation Administration
proposes to amend part 93 of title 14
Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR
part 93) as follows:

PART 93—SPECIAL AIR TRAFFIC
RULES
1. The authority citation for 14 CFR
part 93 continues to read as follows;
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40103, 40106,
40109, 40113, 44502, 44514, 44701, 44719,
46301, 46307.
2. Amend part 93 by adding subpart
B, consisting of §§ 93.31 through 93.49,
to read as follows:
Subpart B—Washington, DC,
Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules
Area

Sec. 93.31 What is the purpose of this subpart
and who would be affected?

93.33 What could happen if you fail to
comply with the rules of this subpart?

93.35 Definitions.

93.37 General requirements for operating in
the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area
SFRA.

93.39 Specific requirements for operating in
the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area
SFRA, including the FRZ.

93.41 Aircraft operations prohibited in the
Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area
Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ).

93.43 Requirements for aircraft operations
to or from College Park; Potomac
Airfield; or Washington Executive/Hyde
Field Airports.

93.45 Special ingress/egress procedures for
Bay Bridge and Kentmorr airports.
93.47 Special egress procedures for fringe
airports.

93.49 Airport security procedures.

§ 93.31 What is the purpose of this subpart
and who would be affected?

The purpose for this subpart is to
enhance security efforts in the
Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area by
creating national defense airspace to
deter persons who would use an aircraft
as a weapon, or as the means of
delivering weapons, to conduct an
attack on persons, property, or an
institution in the area. This subpart
applies to you if you conduct any type
of flight operations in the airspace
designated as the Washington, DC,
Metropolitan Area Special Flight Rules
Area (as defined in § 93.35), which
includes the airspace designated as the
Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area
Flight Restricted Zone (as defined in
§ 93.35).

§ 93.33 What could happen if you fail to
comply with the rules of this subpart?

If you do not comply with any rule in
this subpart or any special security
instruction announced by NOTAM that
modifies, amends or adds to any rule of
this subpart, it could result in any of the
following:

(a) The United States Government
directing deadly force against the
airborne aircraft you are operating, if it
is determined that the aircraft poses an
imminent security threat;
(b) The United States Government
pursuing criminal charges against you,
including charges under Title 49 of the
United States Code, section 46307; and
(c) The FAA taking administrative
action against you, including imposing
civil penalties and the suspension or
revocation of airmen certificates.

§ 93.35 Definitions.

Fringe Airports. For the purposes of
this subpart, the following airports
located near the outer boundary of the
Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area
Special Flight Rules Area are considered
to be Fringe airports: Airlie, VA;
Albrecht, MD; Harris, VA; Martin, MD;
Martin State, MD; Meadows, VA;
Mylander, MD; Stewart, MD; St. John,
MD; Tilghman Whipp, MD; Upperville,
VA; and Wolf, MD, Airports.

Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area
Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ) is National
Defense Airspace. It is within the SFRA
airspace and consists of that airspace
within an area from the surface up to,
but not including, FL180 bounded by a
line beginning at the Washington (DCA)
VOR/DME 311° radial at 15 nautical
miles (nm) (lat. 38°59'31. N., long.
77°18'30. W.); then clockwise along the
DCA 15 nautical mile arc to the DCA
022° radial at 15 nm (lat. 39°06'11. N.,
long 76°57'51. W.); then southeast along
a line drawn to the DCA 049° radial at
14 nm (lat. 39°02'18. N., long. 76°50'38.
W.); then south along a line drawn to
the DCA 064° radial at 13 nm (lat.
38°59'01. N., long. 76°48'32. W.); then
clockwise along the DCA 13 nm arc to
the DCA 276° radial at 13 nm
(lat.38°50'53. N., long 77°18'48. W.);
then north along a line to the point of
beginning. The FRZ does not include
the airspace within a one nautical mile
radius of the Freeway Airport,
Mitchellville, MD Airport Reference
Point.

Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area
Special Flight Rules Area (SFRA) is
National Defense Airspace. It consists of
that airspace, from the surface up to, but
not including, Flight Level (FL) 180,
within the outer boundary of the
Washington, DC, Tri-Area Class B
Airspace Area; and that additional
airspace bounded by a line beginning at
lat. 38°37'12. N., long. 77°36'00. W.;
then counterclockwise along the 30-mile
arc of the DCA VOR/DME to lat.
38°41'24. N., long. 76°25'48. W; then
west along the southern boundary of the
Washington, DC, Tri-Area Class B
Airspace Area to the point of beginning.
The SFRA airspace includes the
Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area
Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ).

§ 93.37 General requirements for operating
in the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area
SFRA.

If you conduct any type of flight
operation in the Washington, DC, SFRA,
in addition to the restrictions listed in
this subpart, you must comply with all
special instructions issued by the FAA
in the interest of national security.

Those special instructions may be
issued in any manner the FAA
considers appropriate, including a
NOTAM. Additionally, complying with
the rules of this subpart does not relieve
you from complying with the other FAA
requirements listed in 14 CFR.

§ 93.39 Specific requirements for
operating in the Washington, DC,
Metropolitan Area SFRA, including the FRZ.

(a) Except as provided in paragraphs
(b) and (c) of this section and in §§ 93.45
and 93.47, or unless authorized by Air
Traffic Control, no person may operate
an aircraft, including an ultralight or
any civil aircraft or public aircraft, in
the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area
SFRA, including the FRZ, unless:
(1) The aircraft is equipped with an
operable two-way radio capable of
communicating with Air Traffic Control
on appropriate radio frequencies;
(2) Before operating the aircraft in the
SFRA airspace, including the FRZ
airspace, the flight crew establishes twoway
radio communications with the
appropriate Air Traffic Control facility
and maintains such communications
while operating the aircraft in the SFRA
airspace, including the FRZ airspace;
(3) The aircraft is equipped with an
operating automatic altitude reporting
transponder;
(4) Before operating an aircraft in the
SFRA airspace, including the FRZ
airspace, the flight crew obtains and
displays a discrete transponder code
from ATC, and the aircraft’s transponder
continues to transmit the assigned code
while operating within the SFRA
airspace;
(5) The flight crew files and activates
a flight plan with an AFSS before
entering the SFRA and closes the flight
plan upon landing or departing the
SFRA;
(6) Before operating the aircraft into,
out of, or through the Washington, DC
Tri-Area Class B airspace area, the flight
crew receives a specific ATC clearance
to operate in the Class B airspace area;
and
(7) Before operating the aircraft into,
out of, or through Class C or D airspace
area that is within the SFRA airspace,
the flight crew complies with § 91.130
or § 91.129 of this chapter, respectively.
(b) Paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(5) of
this section do not apply to Department
of Defense, law enforcement, or
aeromedical flight operations if the
flight crew is in contact with Air Traffic
Control and is displaying an Air Traffic
Control assigned discrete transponder
code.
(c) You may, without filing a flight
plan, operate an aircraft in the VFR
traffic pattern at an airport that is within
the SFRA airspace (but not in FRZ
airspace) if:
(1) At an airport that does not have an
Airport Traffic Control tower:
(i) Before moving the aircraft to taxi
or take off, you notify Air Traffic
Control of the time and location of the
VFR traffic pattern operation you will
conduct;
(ii) You monitor the airport’s
Common Traffic Advisory Frequency
continuously while operating the
aircraft;
(iii) The aircraft’s transponder
continuously transmits Code 1234
(Department of Defense aircraft,
operating in a VFR traffic pattern at a
military airport may be assigned a
beacon code other than 1234); and
(iv) When exiting the VFR traffic
pattern, you comply with paragraphs
(a)(1) through (a)(5) of this section.
(2) At an airport that has an operating
Airport Traffic Control Tower you must:
(i) Request to remain in the traffic
pattern before taxiing, or before entering
the traffic pattern;
(ii) Remain in two-way radio
communications with the tower;
(iii) Continuously operate the aircraft
transponder on code 1234 unless Air
Traffic Control assigns you a different
code; and
(iv) Before exiting the traffic pattern,
comply with paragraphs (a)(1) through
(a)(5) of this section.

§ 93.41 Aircraft operations prohibited in
the Washington, DC, Metropolitan Area
Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ).

(a) Except as provided in paragraph
(b) of this section, no person may
conduct any flight operation under part
91, 101, 103, 105, 125, 133, 135, or 137
of this chapter in the Washington DC,
Metropolitan Area FRZ, unless the
specific flight is authorized by the FAA,
in consultation with the United States
Secret Service and the Transportation
Security Administration.
(b) Department of Defense, law
enforcement, and aeromedical flight
operations are excepted from the
prohibition in paragraph (a) of this
section if the flight crew is in contact
with Air Traffic Control and operates
the aircraft transponder on an Air
Traffic Control assigned beacon code.
§ 93.43 Requirements for aircraft
operations to or from College Park;
Potomac Airfield; or Washington Executive/
Hyde Field Airports.
(a) You may not operate an aircraft to
or from College Park, MD Airport;
Potomac, MD Airfield; or Washington
Executive/Hyde Field, MD Airport
unless the following requirements are
met:

(1) The aircraft and its crew and
passengers comply with security rules
issued by the Transportation Security
Administration in 49 U.S.C. 1562
subpart A;
(2) Before departing, the pilot files an
IFR or VFR flight plan with Leesburg
AFSS for each departure and arrival at
College Park, Potomac Airfield, and
Washington Executive/Hyde Field
airports, whether or not the aircraft
makes an intermediate stop;
(3) When you file a flight plan with
Leesburg AFSS, you identify yourself
using the pilot identification code
assigned to you. Leesburg AFSS will
accept the flight plan only after
verifying the code;
(4) You do not close a VFR flight plan
with Leesburg AFSS until the aircraft is
on the ground. You may request ATC to
cancel an IFR flight plan while airborne;
however, if you are landing at the
College Park, Potomac Airfield, and
Washington Executive/Hyde Field
airports you must remain on your
assigned beacon code until on the
ground and close your flight plan with
Leesburg AFSS after you are on the
ground; and
(5) You must comply with the
applicable IFR or VFR departure
procedures in paragraph (c), (d) or (e) of
this section.
(b) You may operate a Department of
Defense, law enforcement, or
aeromedical services aircraft if you
comply with paragraph (a) of this
section and any additional procedures
specified by the FAA.
(c) If using IFR departure procedures,
you must comply with the following:
(1) You must obtain an Air Traffic
Control clearance from Potomac
Approach by calling 540–349–7597; and
(2) Departures from Washington
Executive/Hyde Field or Potomac
Airport, receive eastbound radar vectors
from Air Traffic Control to exit the FRZ.
You must then proceed on course and
remain clear of the FRZ; or
(3) Departures from College Park
Airport may receive radar vectors
eastbound or northbound from Air
Traffic Control to exit the FRZ. You
must then proceed on the Air Traffic
Control assigned course and remain
clear of the FRZ.
(d) If using VFR departure procedures,
you must comply with the following:
(1) Depart as instructed by Air Traffic
Control, and expect a heading directly
away from the FRZ airspace until you
establish two-way radio communication
with Potomac Approach; and
(2) Operate as assigned by Air Traffic
Control until clear of the FRZ and Class
B airspace area.
(e) If using VFR arrival procedures,
the aircraft must remain outside the
SFRA until you establish
communications with Air Traffic
Control and receive authorization for
the aircraft to enter the SFRA.
(f) VFR arrivals:
(1) If arriving College Park Airport
you may expect routing via the vicinity
of Freeway Airport; or
(2) If arriving Washington Executive/
Hyde Field and Potomac Airport you
may expect routing via the vicinity of
Maryland Airport or the Nottingham
VORTAC.

§ 93.45 Special ingress/egress procedures
for Bay Bridge and Kentmorr Airports.

(a) Ingress/egress procedures area for
Bay Bridge and Kentmorr Airports. The
Bay Bridge/Kentmorr airports ingress/
egress procedures area consists of that
airspace inside an area beginning at
39°03'27. N., 076°22'23. W., or the BAL
128015.1, to 39°00'45. N., 076°24'16.
W., or the BAL 139015.3, to 38°50'12.
N., 076°25'48. W., or the BAL 163022.7,
to 38°50'10. N., 076°14'20. W., or the
BAL 146028.2, to 39°00'49. N.,
076°11'03. W., or the BAL 124024.2,
thence to the point of beginning.

(b) You may operate an aircraft to or
from the Bay Bridge Airport or
Kentmorr Airport without filing a flight
plan or communicating with ATC, as
long as you comply with the following:
(1) You ensure that the aircraft
remains in the ingress/egress area
described in paragraph (a) of this
section, proceeding no further west than
the western-most point of the
Chesapeake Bay Bridge;
(2) You ensure that the aircraft
remains below the floor of Class B
airspace; and
(3) If you are operating arriving
aircraft, you must fly the aircraft along
the shortest and most direct route from
the eastern SFRA boundary to the Bay
Bridge or Kentmorr airports.
(4) If you are operating departing
aircraft, you must fly the aircraft along
the shortest and most direct route from
Bay Bridge Airport or Kentmorr Airport
to the eastern SFRA boundary.
(5) If you are operating an arriving or
departing aircraft from or to Bay Bridge
Airport, the aircraft’s transponder must
transmit code 1227.
(6) If you are operating an arriving or
departing aircraft from or to Kentmorr
Airport, the aircraft’s transponder must
transmit code 1233.
(7) If your planned flight will not
conform to the procedures in paragraphs
(b) (1) through (b)(6) of this section, you
must follow the DC SFRA procedures in
§ 93.39.

§ 93.47 Special egress procedures for
fringe airports.

(a) SFRA egress-only procedures for
fringe airports. You may depart from a
fringe airport as defined in § 93.35
without filing a flight plan or
communicating with Air Traffic Control,
unless requested, as long as:
(1) The aircraft’s transponder
transmits code 1205;
(2) You monitor CTAF frequency until
leaving traffic pattern altitude, then
monitor the appropriate Potomac
TRACON frequency until clear of the
DC SFRA;
(3) You exit the SFRA by the shortest
route before proceeding on course.
(b) You do not operate an aircraft
arriving at a fringe airport or transit the
SFRA unless you comply with the SFRA
procedures in § 93.39.
§ 93.49 Airport security procedures.
You may not operate an aircraft from
College Park, Potomac Airfield, or
Washington Executive/Hyde Field
Airports unless the airport has an
established airport security program
approved by the TSA.
Issued in Washington, DC, on July 29,
2005.
Nancy B. Kalinowski,
Director, System Operations and Safety.
[FR Doc. 05–15375 Filed 8–3–05; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
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Fmt 4701 Sfmt 4702 E:\FR\FM\04AUP3.SGM 04AUP3

Excuse me for being pessimistic, but I think I saw a note on another thread
here that there are about 600,000 pilots in the USA.

Forgive my math, but isn't that less than 1% of the population?

If that is the case, and politicians are great at figuring out who matters,
why should anyone in Washington listen to us?

Look at the problems faced by the NRA (and I am neither for or against them,
nor am I a member) when it comes to gun control. That organization certainly
has more clout than we do.

Sadly, I have come to the conclusion that it is hopeless to fight battles
like the Washington area ADIZ.

The folks that live there feel safe surrounded by millions of people living
elbow to elbow and most probably haven't and never will fly in a small plane
and experience the joy that we do.

Terry


"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...

It seems that the issue of the FAA closing the 2,000 square mile
airspace around DC is capable of generating a lot of heat among the
pilot community. Let's try to see if we can use this forum to
generate some light, and mount an effective opposition to the FAA's
NPRM:

snipped ...

If that is the case, and politicians are great at figuring out who matters,
why should anyone in Washington listen to us?

Suppose pilots boycotted DC? Not us spam cans, but bizjet pilots,
airline pilots and such... the ones that carry the Important People.

Jose
--
Quantum Mechanics is like this: God =does= play dice with the universe,
except there's no God, and there's no dice. And maybe there's no universe.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

Terry Briggs wrote:

Excuse me for being pessimistic, but I think I saw a note on another
thread here that there are about 600,000 pilots in the USA.

Forgive my math, but isn't that less than 1% of the population?

600k / 290M = ~0.2%

If that is the case, and politicians are great at figuring out who
matters, why should anyone in Washington listen to us?

They may not, but that's not a reason to keep quiet.

--
John T
http://tknowlogy.com/TknoFlyer
http://www.pocketgear.com/products_s...veloperid=4415
Reduce spam. Use Sender Policy Framework: http://spf.pobox.com
____________________

"Jose" wrote in message
...
Suppose pilots boycotted DC? Not us spam cans, but bizjet pilots, airline
pilots and such... the ones that carry the Important People.

Jose
--

They would be fired within ten minutes of refusing to fly there.

Mike
MU-2