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#251
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"Scott M. Kozel" wrote:
You allege I "resort to schoolgirl hysterical abuse", and then you post strings of personal abuse. You started the name calling. Now let's stop it - ok ? Hypocrite! Quite ! Graham |
#252
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JL Grasso wrote:
On Mon, 01 Mar 2004 06:44:12 +0000, Pooh Bear wrote: "Scott M. Kozel" wrote: Pooh Bear wrote: "Scott M. Kozel" wrote: Not surprising for Puke Bear. Who the h**l rattled *your* cage Kozel ? I once thought you were an intelligent person. Your resort to schoolgirl hysterical abuse shows otherwise. Caught a case of Berteimania ? YOU sound hysterical. Please calm down and take the pills. There's a good lad. So ? You're prepared to resort to the verbal abuse school of debate ? I suppose you'll be suggesting I stick rodents up my bottom next ? You do yourself a disservice by lowering yourself to the troll-level currently shown by most a.d.a contributors. I have no problem with debating an arguable case. To resort to verbal abuse ( as Scott did - and you are close to ) to make your point pretty much voids you of any credibility. I assume you may have been addressing me here in your reply to Scott. In part. I apologize for any slight(s) that you may deem personally insulting. Thank you kindly. Understand that it's a bit tedious and somewhat frustrating to debate with someone who ignores points that should be understood of certain technologies which are called into question. I will grant you that your technical knowledge is likely greater than that of the average planespotter, and I'll try and keep the debate on an accordingly professional level. Much appreciated. Your comments have been very interesting actually. Regds, Graham |
#253
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JL Grasso wrote:
On Mon, 01 Mar 2004 17:58:20 +0000, Pooh Bear wrote: You would dismiss photographic evidence ? I can see I'll have to ferret out that tape if it still exists. All that I've seen is the photographs (stills) on the airdisaster.com site, and I don't feel that there is any signicance whatsoever in what is shown there. Still, I'm open to whatever arises, and will gladly admit that I'm wrong should I be shown compelling evidence which supports your assertion. I'd also be more than interested in viewing the documentary(s) that you reference. If you know how / where I could purchase one, please let me know. I found a link that gave a number to order a copy of the Channel 4 Equinox programme - need to backtrack and find again. Actually, I have a feeling they did more than one programme on this - but no matter. It's likely to be UK PAL though - can you view that ? We need to get this resolved before you start trying to tell me that a 757 did not hit the Pentagon! LOL, Graham |
#254
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#255
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Pooh Bear wrote in message ...
JL Grasso wrote: On Sun, 29 Feb 2004 21:40:20 +0000, Pooh Bear wrote: So the radio altimeter was accurate ? I think not. And that was known to be one of the weak spots in the A320's systems at that time IIRC. I'm guessing that Capt Asseline realised that the radar altimeter was malfunctioning and reverted to baro readings. Regds, Graham You need to know that at 12:45:11, the aircraft was still well off the airport area by several thousand yards. They were over a hilly, partially-forested area (Hardt Forest) to the right of the approach end of runway 02 (which was the actual runway they were supposed to parallel during the flyover). Ahh - the problem with the briefing ! You should also know that radar altimeters report the distance between the transceiver antennas and any objects below. Yes indeed - I do. So, if the topography of the area below varies, or the altitude varies, the readings change nearly immediately. Agreed. So let's check the topography then ? The flight path etc. From my own experience, that general area is pretty flat but I'm interested in seeing any info. Changes in the attitude of the aircraft can sometimes have effects on the readings also. I can see that too - indeed you could possibly call it a deficiency of rad alts. This is something that an experienced Captain would know, and something a planespotter would not. Can't resist being Bertei's pal ? If only I had the time to go spot planes ! Last time I had a look-around I saw some nice kit at Panshanger. I'd rather spend my time 'spotting' attractive women - and getting to know them actually. If you would actually read something comprehensive concerning this accident, you could see that the RadAlt was consistent while over the relatively level terrain of the airfield - just as one would expect. Indeed it is. I also assume that if the radar altimeter was broken, it would have been deferred MMEL and cited as such in the investigation. I never asserted it was broken. Simply that the implementation at that time in the A320 had given rise to concerns about its accuracy. Actually - you succeeded in diverting my attention from what I consider to be one of the more intruiging aspects of this crash - notably a suggested compressor stall. Graham nope no comressor stall. according to tarver, airbus's crash at the end of the runway because its unknown and unmapped. |
#256
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"Woody Beal" wrote in message ... On 2/29/04 8:58, in article , "Kevin Brooks" wrote: "Doug "Woody" and Erin Beal" wrote in message ... Not at all; your argument was so lacking in logic that I saw little reason to bother. But if you are so interested in improving yourself, here goes: Quite the condescending gentleman aren't you? Not really. I was willing to let that particular passage go unanswered, but you are so all fired up to debate it that you wanted to make a big point of it, so you got your answer. "CAS is available immediately because it is capping nearby--not because it SNIP What you ignore is that the "capping" (by which you actually menat "stacking", I presume) is utterly dependent upon a number of external factors that don't necessarily impact the operations of a STOVL aircraft. 'Round and 'round. First of all, stack is not a verb. It's a noun. Better check the ol' dictionary again. It is indeed also a verb; my handy-dandy Webster's defines it as "to pile up in a stack". If I'm in the CAS stack, I'm capping. Whatever you say, pal. I had assumed you were referring to some verb-transformed version of CAP, as in "combat air patrol". If so you might want to clue DoD in on your change to the definition of CAP, which is, "An aircraft patrol provided over an objective area, the force protected, the critical area of a combat zone, or in an air defense area, for the purpose of intercepting and destroying hostile aircraft before they reach their targets. Also called CAP. See also airborne alert; barrier combat air patrol; patrol; rescue combat air patrol." Don't see any reference to CAS usage there. ( http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/dod...a/c/01033.html ) Of course, to be completely honest, there is no reference to the term CAS stack in that publication, either. So why don't we just both claim victory regarding this particularly weighty matter and be done with it? You have to have tankers to support the CAS stack--tankers are a commodity SNIP the ground commander's needs. He wants some CBU-105's in the mix? SNIP You make a correct argument. The nearer an airfield/CV is to the battle, the more sorties you can generate. Afghanistan is a good example of a place that was hard to get to by both CV and the USAF. And it was also one where the inability to provide specific weapons loadout requests in a timely manner was problematic, as witnessed by the Anaconda fight, where the aircraft were not always optimally loaded out to handle the requirments of the ground force at that given moment--this is another advantage of the STOVL platform, which can hit a FARP to load out the required munitions. I'm saying it's not worth the risk/extra cost, and I disagree with your assessment of how many scenarios make the concept worth the cost. The decision has been made. I disagree with it. Fine. Disagreement within our military is, IMO, what makes it great. As Patton once said, "If everybody is in agreement, then somebody is not thinking" (or something similarly worded--been a few years since I read that quote). I'll take the opposite stance, in that I view increasing our versatility as a key requirement for our future military needs, especially in view of the environment that we find ourselves in and facing for the foreseeable future, where a lack of specific threat characterization until that threat is immediately immenent is the norm. SNIP It was actually YOU that suggested that the USAF was trying to make nice with the USMC. No, it was not. I was being quite facetious with that query. That you found it palusible is rather telling of your grasp of this situation. I've got a darned good grasp of it. Perhaps you have a problem communicating your point. Leave the sarcasm out, and we can conduct an intelligent discussion. Apologies if you were offended. The sarcasm introduced in my original comment regarding whether you thought the USAF was merely making nice to the USMC was IMO rather mild--hang around Usenet long enough and you will experience much worse, I promise you. Suffice it to say that the USAF is not pursuing the purchase of the STVL version of the F-35 as a minor portion of their overall F-35 buy due to any desire to make things easy for the USMC, OK? Firstly, if the STOVL version were axed, the USMC would most SNIP They are already onboard. They just seem to grasp the importance of being more versatile a bit better than you do. I grasp what's useful and what's not. If you can't grasp the "usefulness" of versatility in the modern and future military picture, then I beleive you need to reconsider. Had I told you in August of 2001 that we needed to be able and ready to go into Afghanistan with a combination of airpower and landpower, you'd have laughed at me. The plain fact of the matter is that we don't *know* where, when, how, or what the next threat will be or its nature. That requires versatility on the part of the military forces. The USAF has probably been one of the more energetic proponents of improving the versatility of its units and platforms; the USMC another. The Army and Navy have been IMO relative late bloomers in this regard, but now we are seeing some real movement in their camps as well. The flip-side of this versatility card is that those forces that *don't* become versatile, or can't become more versatile, become prime fodder for elimination by being labled as "non-transformational" (the Army, for example, is *finally* moving towards the concept of the brigade combat team being its primary unit of action, as opposed to the Cold War mentality-inspired division; this helps a bit in making their heavy formations a bit more versatile in terms of how we will use them). A USAF tactical fighter force that includes some STOVL F-35B's along with the CTOL F-35A's is by definition going to be a more versatile force than one which is solely A model equipped. Any evidence that STOVL kills more pilots than other fast jets? Or any SNIP that last one shouldn't count... Not unique to the STOVL discussion. I was on a roll.) Meaningless. Compare the accident rates per hours flown and get back to me. Then tell us how that applies to the F-35B, a different aircraft with a different lift system. You asked. I answered. The data for more experienced pilots stacks up the same. I included the 500 hrs or less data because it's what I had at my fingertips. Most military pilots will tell you that the AV-8B's mishap rates are above other military aircraft--and it's a maintenance hog. OK, here are a couple of numbers I ran over: AV-8 accident rate per 100K hours was 12 (admittedly an "ouch!", but I am not sure they were not lumping together *all* AV-8 records, to include the early AV-8A)...and the accident rate for the old CTOL F-8 Crusader through its lifetime? 16. That does not equate to a definite case of being able to claim that STOVL is inherently more risky than CTOL. According to a brief by the Navy's Aviation Safety School given a few SNIP So flying the AV-8B is more demanding of new pilots. Hardly an indictment of the STOVL concept itself. That is simply burying your head in the sand. A more complex airplane will fail more often than a less complex airplane. Historically, the AV-8B has meted this out. And the F-8 Crusader? The F-104, which peaked at an astounding 139 per 100K hours back in the 1960's? The Century Series fighters generally all had accident rates that exceeded those for the AV-8. If increased complexity resulted in a direct and irreversable increase in the accident rate, then why are today's more complex aircraft exhibiting a much lower accident rate than their earlier ancestors? Finally, how does the AV-8 accident rate imply a direct connection with that which can be expected for the F-35B, which will use a radically different lift system (partly because of the past problems with the AV-8?)? SNIP Unless you can't support the operation adequately with the CTOL aircraft. Brooks Which you can. You can't guarantee that. Imagine a scenario where the fight in Afghanistan had not been able to rely as heavily as it did upon the Northern Alliance in the ground combat role. When US lives are on the line in that ground environment, the demand for CAS will inevitably increase. The demand for tanker support to keep the C-17's flowing into the intermediate staging base, or even directly into the area of operations' aerial port of debarkation (APOD), will increase, meaning less available to support the use of CTOL fighters in the loooong range CAS effort. Or, imagine a scenario where we are forced to (gasp!) take on two different simulataneous combat operations in different theaters, one being a more major conflict that consumes the lions share of the available tanking and bomber (read as "really long range and high capacity CAS platform, in addition to its BAI and "strategic" roles") assets. You don't have the option of just saying, "Sorry, no CAS for you guys in theater B due to the range restrictions." Versatility rules. Brooks --Woody Now ask me if I think it's a good idea that the F-35 is a single engine aircraft or whether I think it's a good idea that the Navy guys have decided not to put an internal gun on their version. --Woody |
#257
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#258
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"Woody Beal" wrote in message ... On 3/1/04 21:44, in article , "Kevin Brooks" wrote: "Woody Beal" wrote in message ... snip OK. Now we're ebbing and flowing. Any offense taken on my part was certainly minor. I hope that I haven't given you the impression that I'm the thin-skinned type. I've been dealing with critique and criticism for years (not just since I started conversing on RAMN in about 1995 either). Frankly, the more I learn about aviation and tactics, the more I realize I don't know. Shoot, I don't know diddly about actual air tactics beyond what I have read, so you are light years ahead of me. I have had some experience with the CAS planning cycle from the groundpounder's perspective, and one of the biggest gripes we had was the lack of responsiveness and that 72-48-24 hour timeline. To give the USAF credit where it is due, it sounds like that situation has improved mightily over the past couple of years. Honestly, any speculation on my part about why the USAF is buying STOVL F-35's is just that. SNIP formations a bit more versatile in terms of how we will use them). A USAF tactical fighter force that includes some STOVL F-35B's along with the CTOL F-35A's is by definition going to be a more versatile force than one which is solely A model equipped. Yes it is. It also provides them a shot at expansion and secures a foothold in what they probably consider to be a growth area in tactical aviation. The blue-suited brethren are fairly savvy folk. That is true too. Though my take is that the term "joint" now has a significantly more concrete meaning in all of the services than it did even five or six years ago. Any evidence that STOVL kills more pilots than other fast jets? Or any SNIP OK, here are a couple of numbers I ran over: AV-8 accident rate per 100K hours was 12 (admittedly an "ouch!", but I am not sure they were not lumping together *all* AV-8 records, to include the early AV-8A)...and the accident rate for the old CTOL F-8 Crusader through its lifetime? 16. That does not equate to a definite case of being able to claim that STOVL is inherently more risky than CTOL. F-8 and AV-8B are apples and oranges (old apples, young oranges?) due to their operating in mostly different eras. During a portion of the F-8's life span, many of the safety programs that were input in later years (e.g. the NATOPS program IIRC) were not in effect. Compare the F/A-18 or F-14 rates with the AV-8B. Twin engined aircraft with single engine aircraft? I don't think so. Take the F-16, which does indeed have a significantly lower accident rate (a bit under three per 100K hours IIRC). I can see your point, and acknowledge that the AV-8 is indeed more accident prone than its contemporaries--but that does noy IMO yield a concrete conclusion versus the F-35B. The microcosm I mentioned at China Lake (while certainly anecdotal), speaks to the larger issue. On the way to dinner tonight, I polled a couple of (Hornet) pilots as to how they thought the AV-8B stacked up to the F/A-18 from a safety standpoint. Death trap was the general consensus. Granted, they think neanderthal, like me. Yeah, I once attended a joint course with a polyglot of participants, including both an F-18 pilot and a P-3 bus driver. The Hornet driver was ceaseless in his hammering of the Orion guy--I think he was mainly ****ed because to him "deployment" meant six months on a CVN halfway around the world, while the VP folks were pulling up to 179-day (in order to keep it under that TDY pay maximum) rotations to Iceland, where the fishing is outstanding (I don't recall him decrying the VP folks also having to do those tours during the winter months...). Definitely neanderthal... :-) According to a brief by the Navy's Aviation Safety School given a few SNIP So flying the AV-8B is more demanding of new pilots. Hardly an indictment of the STOVL concept itself. That is simply burying your head in the sand. A more complex airplane will fail more often than a less complex airplane. Historically, the AV-8B has meted this out. And the F-8 Crusader? The F-104, which peaked at an astounding 139 per 100K hours back in the 1960's? The Century Series fighters generally all had accident rates that exceeded those for the AV-8. If increased complexity resulted in a direct and irreversable increase in the accident rate, then why are today's more complex aircraft exhibiting a much lower accident rate than their earlier ancestors? Time period is important in this discussion as alluded to above because of safety programs (currency requirements, NATOPS, annual check rides, etc. that were put into effect). I have no doubt that those factors are important. But when all is said and done, the fact is that as aircraft complexity has increased, the accident rate has generally decreased. This is true even *since* such safety programs were initiated--witness the low rate for the F-16, which has within its own career grown increasingly complex (compare a F-16A Block 10 to the F-16C Block 52). I do believe that its accident rate is abit lower than that of the F-4, which had that whole extra engine included... Finally, how does the AV-8 accident rate imply a direct connection with that which can be expected for the F-35B, which will use a radically different lift system (partly because of the past problems with the AV-8?)? Honestly, no one knows for sure. Most likely better because we've learned some important lessons from the AV-8A/B and are applying a different solution to the problem of STOVL. My guess is that because it still relies on more moving parts than it's CTOL counterparts in a critical phase of flight, it'll have a higher mishap rate. Maybe. But then again, maybe not. For all we know the typically "increased risk" associated with operatins from a CVN may lead to the C model having a worse accident record. I don't think there is enough information that *could* be available at this point to postively conclude either way. Again, unofficial dinner poll: Opinion of the STOVL F-35? Not worth it. OK. But go back to those folks and ask them to earnestly try to put themselves in the boots of the brigade commander on the ground who has troops in contact, is outnumbered (as we can expect to be in many cases), and needs to shift his air support quickly from one target set to a whole new class of targets, while also needing/desperately wanting an increase of maybe 30% in the CAS sortie count--and oh, by the way, the nearest CTOL fighter airstrip is 1000 miles away, since they have yet to reconstruct the airfield in his AO that is supporting him via C-130 shuttle. Do you think that *he* might value having a squadron (USAF type, with 24 birds) of SOVL assets capable of hitting a FARP ten or twelve klicks to the rear of his CP? Or alternatively, when the CVN's are all clustered in (choose body of water) handling the major contingency going down with (choose potential foe), and your USMC BLT is forced to devite from its transit to that area while enroute and FRAGO'd to execute operations independently elsewhere, would you want the services of some F-35B's operating as part of your parent amphib strike group? SNIP "Sorry, no CAS for you guys in theater B due to the range restrictions." Versatility rules. Brooks Ironically, I also find myself arguing from the same perspective when I talk to USAF dudes who say that CV's are washed up and not cost effective, so believe me when I say, I see your points. OK. I personally find the CVN to be of immense import--in specific circumstances and conditions. Much like the F-35B--it ain't the best all-around strike/CAS platform available, but it does have its niches. Neither is necessarily the best tool for *all* potentialities. Are you still at China Lake? Wonderful place (note my sarcasm)...right next to that other gardenspot I used to frequent on occasion, FT Irwin (even more sarcasm). Last time I went through that area I spent the night in that little town near the main entrance to China Lake, enroute to Lone Pine for a few days fishing in the higher elevations. Brooks --Woody |
#259
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#260
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"Woody Beal" wrote in message ... Concur that it does not yield a concrete conclusion, but it does yield a tendency based on several possible single point failures. If lift fan doors don't open, if lift rotor fails to engage properly, if engine fails during transition to STOVL life gets tough at a very critical and low altitude moment. These problems (though not identical) are similar to those experienced in the AV-8B. Actually, conversion is done at an altitude and speed that, if it fails, you're still wing-borne. The airplane fails back to a regular engine. Just pop the TVL forward and continue to fly conventional. THe diciest moment for the lift-fan system is during clutch engagement, but you don't perform that in a high-exposure kind of situation. Doors and all that aren't really a problem, cuz you'll know there's a problem before you expose yourself. Mechanical failures in the STOVL regime are unforgiving because of their low altitude locale. Yup. But a lot of stuff in the engine/lift-fan system is monitored. Health checking on the B model propulsion system is way beyond anything that has been put into service to-date. THe problem here is that health monitoring tech is really only good for known failure modes. It's the "gee we never considered that" kind of problems that can get scary. Infant mortality. WIth the lift-fan system, you'll typically know if you have a mechanical problem before you go jet-borne. Once transitioning to jet-borne, you just gotta watch all the critical temps (turbine inlet, exhaust gas....yadda yadda). Also, much of the unforgiving nature of jet-borne flight has been addressed through the inceptor mapping. Switching from rates to attitude commands makes overcontrol type slip-ups much less likely. The F-35B will be much more forgiving to exhausted pilots. makes the jet more stable. The complexity of the F-35B when compared to the C or the A only gives it an additional option for landing--a complexity with several possible single point failures in a critical flight regime. Keep in mind that the operational environment envisioned for the F-35B is much more varied than what has been done with the Harrier. So, exposure to hazards (thinking mainly weather) will be much greater. Pete (worked on the X-35B for a couple of years designing the yaw-axis control laws). |
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