Federal Aviation Administration to cut more air traffic controllers

"TheNPC" wrote in message
.. .

The FAA violated their ATCT staffing orders
They will be cutting a big check after all the Civil suits
You can take that too the bank


Violation of the staffing order had no impact on the accident.

"Mxsmanic" wrote in message
...

Normally any lawsuit would have to demonstrate that the FAA's actions
directly caused or contributed to the accident. That won't be
possible here, although a simple emotional appeal to the jury might
work.


These cases tend to be based solely on emotional appeals to juries.

"Sam Spade" wrote in message
...

That is not my logic at all. Note my words, "The controller had no
obligation to continue to watch...once takeoff clearance had been issued."
Doesn't that imply there was an obligation to watch to some point? That
hardly could be done if the controller were not in the tower.

What if the weather had been thick ground fog with RVR at takeoff
minimums? Would the controller deny takeoff clearance in that case since
he couldn't see the aircraft at any time?


Not on that day, but based on the odd turn this case has taken that may
become the procedure. After all, if the making sure the airplane is on the
assigned runway is deemed to be the controller's responsibility the
controller must have the authority to deny takeoff clearance if he cannot
see the runway.

Newps wrote:
You're trying to make an argument that the controller has no
responsibility to monitor what goes on on the airfield. He must to the
extent possible.

No, I am not saying that at all. If the controller in this case checked
that the runway lights on 22 were on and the runway was clear, he had
done what he had to do. Did you expect him to watch the guy roll down
the runway when he was the only traffic around?

"John Mazor" wrote in message
...

And in order to do that, they have to watch the airplanes on the taxiways
and runways, don't they? Which was my point.


They don't have to keep watching them after they've determined them to be
clear. There was no need for the controller to keep watching the Comair
after the clearance was issued, that's the point you're missing.



What I wwas doing here was responding to the narrow-minded views expressed
here, to the effect that since the pilot has the primary responsibility
for everything that happens, then runway, taxiway, and controller
responsibilities had nothing to do with the accident in KY. I wasn't
drawing a direct, exact connection regarding the conditions at the two
airports.


Based on what has been reported the controller met all of his
responsibilities.



He would have been watching the accident aircraft.


Watching it for what purpose? Was separation an issue here or not?



If those
"administrative tasks" normally should have been performed by the
controller at the other position, then the working controller was
prevented from sticking to his position. I don't know what those tasks
were, so we'll have to wait and see.


No tasks prevented the controller from sticking to his position. All of the
duties and responsibilities of his position were successfully completed.

The tasks that were not successfully completed were those of pilot. If
there had been just one person aboard Comair performing the duties of pilot
this accident would not have happened. What tasks were the crew doing that
prevented either one of them from performing the duties of pilot?



So yes, the working controller may not have noticed the aircraft even if
there were a second contoller. OTOH, he might have done so, just as the
controller (and crew) noticed the exact same error, same airport, same
runways, 13 years ago, and warned the crew..


That crew didn't need warning, they caught the error themselves. That's the
question here, why did this crew attempt a takeoff when there were so many
indicators that they were on the wrong runway?



And redundancy has prevented many accidents where the crew "missed MANY
indicators." Try reading some ASRS reports.


I have. Many.

TheNPC writes:

Read the NTSB report on the Guam accident by Korean Air.
Direct Cause is not required.

Lawsuits are decided in the courts, not by the NTSB. Two very
different places.

Since they violated their AT staffing orders at LEX and
failed to adequately manage the NAS that tragic Sunday
morning the FAA is liable at LEX.

Hardly. Cause and effect has to be shown.

A good lawyer will eat the FAA and the City of Lexington
alive. Most Government lawyers suck anyway.

The government must consent to be sued.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

"John Mazor" wrote in message
...

I'm not a controller, but I suspect that monitoring the progress of ground
traffic is one of those "do as workload permits" chores.


Here's a link to FAA Order 7110.65, feel free to relieve your suspicion:

http://www.faa.gov/atpubs/ATC/index.htm



As I have
repeatedly stated here, if there had been a second controller, that
doesn't guarantee that the error would have been caught - but no one can
show that it wouldn't have been caught, either.


That's true, there could have been a dozen other controllers in the tower
cab, and that still wouldn't have guaranteed that the error would have been
caught, but no one can show that it wouldn't have been caught, either. But
what anyone can show is that if there had been just one person aboard that
airplane performing the duties of pilot this crash would not have happened.
Why wasn't there a functioning pilot aboard that airplane? What was the
crew doing that took them away from their assigned tasks and
responsibilities?



We know from an incident
report that 13 years ago a controller did catch exactly the same error at
the same airport with the same two runways. Why did that not happen this
time?


We know from that report that the pilot caught the error at the same time
the controller did. Why did that not happen this time?



Comments to the effect that once you could see that the crew screwed up by
using the wrong runway, nothing else matters.


What matters is determining why the crew screwed up, if possible. Has a CVR
transcript been made available yet?

"Judah" wrote in message
. ..

A million other things could have happened that might have helped catch
the
error and didn't. It's inconclusive speculation about circumstances that
aren't regulated. Even if there were a second controller, unless the
regulations require that the controller monitor each and every airplane
from taxi through departure handoff, a second controller would have had no
impact on the situation. Unless you can prove that the reason the first
controller turned away was specifically to perform a task that the second
controller would have been doing, or prove that the second controller
would
have been staring out the window instead of doing his own job, you simply
have no case.
Conjecture like this does nothing to improve the safety of the air traffic
system. It only distracts from determining the things that really were
causal in this accident to try to prevent them from happening in the
future.


The mystery here is why this crew could have made the error given that there
were so many indications that it was the wrong runway.




The media wants to sensationalize the apparent lack of safety in the Air
Traffic system because it sells papers and improves TV ratings.

What's your mission?


He's a front for the pilot's union. He's just trying to deflect some of the
responsibility for the crash from a couple of dues-paying members.

Judah wrote:
TheNPC wrote in
:


The FAA violated their ATCT staffing orders
They will be cutting a big check after all the Civil suits
You can take that too the bank


The failures of the US Court System have no bearing on the cause of the
accident.

They have everything to do with who will pay.

"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote:
"John Mazor" wrote in message
...

I'm not a controller, but I suspect that monitoring the progress of
ground traffic is one of those "do as workload permits" chores.


Here's a link to FAA Order 7110.65, feel free to relieve your
suspicion:

http://www.faa.gov/atpubs/ATC/index.htm

That's a useful link! If my understanding is correct, the following
extractions _may_ be relevant to this discussion:

"2-1-2. DUTY PRIORITY

a. Give first priority to separating aircraft and issuing safety alerts
as required in this order. Good judgment shall be used in prioritizing
all other provisions of this order based on the requirements of the
situation at hand."

"2-1-6. SAFETY ALERT

Issue a safety alert to an aircraft if you are aware the aircraft is in a
position/altitude which, in your judgment, places it in unsafe proximity
to terrain, obstructions, or other aircraft. Once the pilot informs you
action is being taken to resolve the situation, you may discontinue the
issuance of further alerts. Do not assume that because someone else has
responsibility for the aircraft that the unsafe situation has been
observed and the safety alert issued; inform the appropriate controller.

NOTE-
1. The issuance of a safety alert is a first priority (see para 2-1-2,
Duty Priority) once the controller observes and recognizes a situation of
unsafe aircraft proximity to terrain, obstacles, or other aircraft.
Conditions, such as workload, traffic volume, the quality/limitations of
the radar system, and the available lead time to react are factors in
determining whether it is reasonable for the controller to observe and
recognize such situations. While a controller cannot see immediately the
development of every situation where a safety alert must be issued, the
controller must remain vigilant for such situations and issue a safety
alert when the situation is recognized."

"3-1-3. USE OF ACTIVE RUNWAYS

The local controller has primary responsibility for operations conducted
on the active runway and must control the use of those runways."

"3-1-5. VEHICLES/EQUIPMENT/PERSONNEL ON RUNWAYS

a. Ensure that the runway to be used is free of all known ground
vehicles, equipment, and personnel before a departing aircraft starts
takeoff or a landing aircraft crosses the runway threshold."

"3-1-7. POSITION DETERMINATION

Determine the position of an aircraft before issuing taxi instructions or
takeoff clearance.

NOTE-
The aircraft's position may be determined visually by the controller, by
pilots, or through the use of the ASDE."

"3-1-12. VISUALLY SCANNING RUNWAYS

a. Local controllers shall visually scan runways to the maximum extent
possible.

b. Ground control shall assist local control in visually scanning
runways, especially when runways are in close proximity to other movement
areas."

"3-7-2. TAXI AND GROUND MOVEMENT OPERATIONS

Issue, as required or requested, the route for the aircraft/vehicle to
follow on the movement area in concise and easy to understand terms. When
a taxi clearance to a runway is issued to an aircraft, confirm the
aircraft has the correct runway assignment.

NOTE-
1. A pilot's read back of taxi instructions with the runway assignment
can be considered confirmation of runway assignment."