Best dogfight gun?

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 22:36:54 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:

If your chosen tactic hauls sixty aircraft in rigid formation along a
predictable course and is vulnerable to a slashing attack by one or two
MiGs on a vulnerable element, then that's bad... unless it gets two
dozen strikers on-target and stops you losing half-a-dozen aircraft to
SAMs.

Break the image of B-17 "box" out of Linebacker stories. Pod roll-ins
were a tactic in late '67, but totally abandoned in Linebacker. Bomb
droppers flew in flights of four with independent target area tactics
and roll-ins.

Trouble is, all the guns you like won't stop #4 of one of the escort
sections getting an unseen Atoll up the tailpipe and won't help you
chase that MiG-21 down and kill him.

Think integrated force (albeit first modern generation). Escort
sections are supposed to be counter-air. We didn't have AWACS, but we
got situation update from a lot of outside-the-flight sources.


One other note: of the 21 MiG kills by the F-4E during Vietnam, five
were gun kills... pretty good for something so useless.

This aircraft has Sparrow and Sidewinder, and by the time the F-4E is
flying they're demonstrating performance (the Sidewinder was up to 50%
Pk in its AIM-9G form). Yet it's making a quarter of its kills with
guns? Where did that battery of AAMs go in those engagements?

In Linebacker the USAF was carrying AIM-9E and J. Never encountered a
"G". The F-4E only carried heaters when specifically tasked A/A. (We
did not yet have the shoulder mount for AIM-9 on inboard pylons.)
Given an A/A load in an E, the first weapon employed for most of us
would be AIM-9.

"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

Okay, so let's get to the bottom line: how many F-4 sorties were *not*
intended to kill the enemy and break his stuff or directly support that
aim?

Very few, which is why they needed weapons of different types. Like
missiles and guns.

Trouble is, all the guns you like won't stop #4 of one of the escort
sections getting an unseen Atoll up the tailpipe

And all the missiles won't help much in this case, either.

and won't help you chase that MiG-21 down and kill him.

Actually, that's *exactly* what it would do, if you're out of missiles.

For example, the Navy planes flew sorties against coastal areas, which
meant that they were flying over relatively undefended airspace on the
run in, as compared to the large number of SAMs that the Air Force
fighters and bombers went over.

So produce some numbers. Relative SAM losses per sortie, for instance?
I'm open to data, I just get wary about assertion and anecdote.

If you want to find that out, find it yourself. *You're* the one who
wants that data. Let us know how it goes. Until you do, that other
comparison is still pretty useless.

One other note: of the 21 MiG kills by the F-4E during Vietnam, five
were gun kills... pretty good for something so useless.

This aircraft has Sparrow and Sidewinder, and by the time the F-4E is
flying they're demonstrating performance (the Sidewinder was up to 50%
Pk in its AIM-9G form). Yet it's making a quarter of its kills with
guns? Where did that battery of AAMs go in those engagements?

They got used up. You see, there's no magic formula that makes a
missile magically 100% reliable or accurate. And if the other guy
discovers a weakness in your missile systems, you're screwed.

Even carrying four and four (on the Phantom), that gives you only four
long range shots and four short range shots. In Vietnam, it was a
fairly sharp distinction, since the Sparrow kinda sucked at short range.

Once those are gone, you're done. No more shots, go home or fly around
and hope nobody shows up.

And what do you do if something goes wrong with your radar, or if you're
in the middle of a dogfight with a bunch of your guys and a bunch of
other guys (we still lose fighters to fratricide from radar and IR
missiles, you know)?

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

In article ,
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

If "lack of guns" is the real problem, surely gun-armed fighters are
a complete and satisfactory answer?

It's not a simple question of "lack of guns."

It's "relying on missiles 100% and not having guns when they're really
bloody useful."

We learned that lesson over 30 years ago, and a whole new generation of
bean counters are trying to resurrect the kind of silliness that the
McNamara school brought us in Vietnam...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

Ed Rasimus wrote:

If anyone was hampered by lack of guns in their fighters, it should
have been the USN, but the initial stats offered in this discussion,
indicate that the USN had better ratios in LB when they had no guns.

During the Linebacker time period, the Navy aircraft spent a lot of time
dropping mines and hitting coastal targets, which reduced their exposure
to the serious SAM defenses.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

Tony Williams wrote:

Now let's look at the opposition. The 'European standard' 27mm Mauser
BK 27, selected over any US gun by the JSF contenders, weighs 100 kg
and uses much less space (only one barrel).

Of course, the BK27 was then abandoned by Lockheed Martin after the JSF
source selection and replaced by a 25mm GAU-12/U Gatling gun.

--
Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail
"If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing
special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed)

This aircraft has Sparrow and Sidewinder, and by the time the F-4E is
flying they're demonstrating performance (the Sidewinder was up to 50%
Pk in its AIM-9G form). Yet it's making a quarter of its kills with
guns? Where did that battery of AAMs go in those engagements?

They got used up. You see, there's no magic formula that makes a
missile magically 100% reliable or accurate. And if the other guy
discovers a weakness in your missile systems, you're screwed.

Especially when over 50 sparrows in a row once did not achieve a hit during
Vietnam..

Granted probably some of those shots were not in the right parameters....but
still...


Ron
Pilot/Wildland Firefighter

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Kevin
Brooks writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
Sure, but insisting on keeping kit because it used to be essential and
still might be useful is equally risky: especially when it can't be
jettisoned.

And I suppose designing that feature in and then doing away with it
because
of its (relatively slight) increase in unit cost, as was done with the
RAF
Typhoon, is not risky?

Risky, perhaps. Indicative of serious pressure on the EP budget,
certainly. Personally I'd be a little less inclined to abandon a
capability that was actually built in, but it is more expensive than it
seems to maintain (it's not just guns, or even ammunition, but the
training burden)

The training burden? For gosh sakes, you already have to have armorers, and
I doubt that including a periodic requirement for the pilots to do some
range work would be that great a burden--it is after all what they do during
peacetime.


Are there no gun pods? This has always been a capability that can be
bolted onto aircraft as necessary.

Let's see, which would I rather have orbiting about in the CAS stack,

How much of a CAS stack existed that far from the nearest airbase?

Apparently a pretty decent one including F-15E's, F-16's, and A-10's as
well, from what I have read of the reports on Anaconda.


aircraft that are capable of both without requiring special ordinance
request, or a requirement for the FSE and ALO to put their heads together
and route a request for such specialized ordnance to be fitted...? I
believe
the former wins.

How effective were the anecdotal strafing runs? It's a tough problem to
judge. For sure nobody's going to stand up and say "the CAS birds came
in and strafed, but it didn't seem to do much good against the scattered
and dispersed enemy we were fighting" - when someone takes a risk to
help you, you _don't_ go public saying they endangered themsevles for
little result.

Actually, one senior US Army commander *did* sort of hammer the CAS effort
after-the-fact, though not specifically directed at the strafe operations.
Some of his comments were valid, and some were likely as not an attempt to
shovel off blame that he should have borne on his own shoulders. As to
effect, the reports I read varied, with some indicating that in some
instances they ended up having to resort to using PGM's a lot closer than
they originally cared to in order to finally destroy the target (and in at
least one case that almost literally "blew up in their face", so to speak,
yielding a quick, "you almost got us with that last bomb" from the CCT). I
recall two reports indicated that the strafes were on target and at least
suppressed the bad guys (and sometimes suppression is the best you can hope
for).


More like issuing lances to tankers so they can run down enemy
soldiers...

No, you were arguing that use of the gun is dumb because it brings the
CAS
platform down lower into the MANPADS envelope.

As well as getting into ricochet hazard, bringing up problems of target
fixation, all to employ a very limited weapon system. (Actual
effectiveness data is hard to come by for strafing, except that many
aircraft doing it seem to have shot themselves dry... suggests they ran
out of ammunition before their guns killed all the targets)

Well, if you don't even *have* a gun, that is not going to be a problem, is
it? Of course, neither will the CCT (or its supported ground combat element)
get the CAS effort they want either... As to the value of the guns, it is
interesting to note that one of the comments that came out of the Anaconda
participants was, "Every light division needs a supporting *squadron* of
AC-130's." Pie in the sky statement that may be, it points out the value
those ground folks placed upon aerial gunfire support. Imagine a scenario
where the bad guy has a better MANPADS capability and you are stuck in a
similar (daytime) situation--which would you rather commit to making
strafing runs to suppress the bad guys, fast-movers or that AC-130? If you
are as concerned about risk as you claim, you know what the answer to that
one is.


Where's the evidence of serious effectiveness to compensate? "This was
available, it was used, therefore it must be hugely lethal and vitally
necessary" is a shaky proposition.

Better than, "This was not available, so it could not be used, and we lost a
lot of guys", IMO.


That is not something we
would prefer to have happen, but when the situation requires it, the risk
may have to be accepted.

Alternatively, you may want to investigate more capable options for
"really close support", with particular attention to target acquisition
and IFF (it's awkward to accidentally strafe your own side, or to make a
low pass but not be able to find the dust-coloured dust-covered targets
on the dusty mountainside) rather than insist that a given weapon system
is now and forever a fixture.

OFCS, the separation range mentioned in a couple of the reports (one from a
participating Viper pilot and one from a CCT guy on the ground) was
*seventy-five meters*. Do you want any kind of bomb going off that close to
*your* patrol if there is another method entailing less risk of fratricide
available to be tried first? I wouldn't.


What is the real requirement, what is the real target, and is a M61
Gatling really the best solution? How about a different gun? How about a
different type of munition? Is air-launched weaponry really the best
option for danger-close or should some other option be pursued?

For gosh sakes, Paul, we are talking a real world example where the M61 was
their best hope, at least initially. They did not have arty tubes in place
to support them, they had *very* limited mortar support (and too many
simultaneous targets to engage even had they had more available), a very
difficult ammo resupply situation, and lots of bad guys very much
up-close-and-personal to deal with. Now hopefully this was the exception to
the rule, but we all know that plans start going south *before* you cross
the LD and the LC is at best a prediction in many operations, so having that
air-to-ground gunnery asset in the toolbag is a way of ensuring maximum
flexibility.


Remember, we (or at least I) am not talking about ripping guns out of
existing aircraft and plating over the ports; the issue is what to
procure in the future.

So if we have (God forbid) another Anaconda situation (and you know as well
as I do that there *will* be someday another force inserted somewhere that
will find the enemy in an unexpected place, in unexpected strength, and find
itself fighting for survival), and our CAS stack is made up of Typhoons and
STOVL F-35's sans guns, you think that is OK?



If you are going to argue the necessity of CAS
*always* staying outside the bad guys response envelope, then the "can't
issue rifles to grunts because they will have to get within the bad guy's
engagement range" is the groundpounder's equivalent solution. Neither of
them makes much sense to me.

What happens when the Bad Guys have a SA-11 parked out of sight? That's
serious trouble for anything flying within ten miles... bye-bye CAS
unless someone's willing to take some risks.

Taking risks is inherent to military operations. METT-T rules, and the
commanders get paid to weigh those risks versus gains. If you are claiming
otherwise, then thank goodness our fathers who fought in WWII did not take
that view.


The idea is to stay out of as much avoidable predictable grief as
possible, and MANPADs and light AAA are known and hugely proliferated.
They're also most effective against an opponent flying a predictable
straight-line path... like a strafing run.

No, they are even more lethal to that guy flying the AC-130, or to those
guys flying the cargo helos in to haul all those mortar and arty rounds that
you would prefer we use exclusively.


Keeping a capability to strafe is worthwhile, but permanently giving up
a half-ton of useful payload while wearing a "Shoot Me!" sign is perhaps
not the best solution to the problem.

I'd imagine had you been with those guys from the 10th LID who were so happy
to get those strafing runs you'd have a slightly different view of the value
of retaining that capability, as distasteful as having to resort to its use
may be.


But the knife bayonet is a small, light, handy item that can replace
what a soldier would carry anyway (not many of us carried knives to
fight with, certainly not in peacetime, nd I'd certainly not have
bothered with both bayonet and K-bar-clone). The analogy for air combat
is nearer to a full-size sword, lance or pike: a large, hefty item that
weighs as much as several magazines for your rifle or a day or two's
rations, even if it's more lethal in hand-to-hand combat.

And can you _guarantee_ that soldiers will never find themselves in
close-quarter battle? Would you have them carry puny knives, or would
you give them mighty swords, spears and/or axes to smite their foes
with
as a permanent addition to their CEFO? Okay, they don't fight like that
too often... and it's more weight for them to carry... but there will
always be cases where soldiers find themselves fighting at arm's
length,
so wouldn't issuing everyone a sword or axe be useful then?

Well, you always have that nifty wire-cutting feature for the latest US
bayonet in combination with its scabbard (though I am not sure how
effective
it really is in that role)...

Our SA80 bayonet even has a saw in the scabbard as well as wire-cutting
capability. Like you, I'm dubious about its actual utility. How many
saws does a rifle section need? Why not issue one or two proper saws per
section, if there's a real requirement, rather than give everyone a
folding saw on a bayonet scabbard?

But the air-combat equivalent for a bayonet would be something on the
line of permanently issuing a halberd or bill, or at least a Bloody Big
Sword to every soldier and insisting it be carried everywhere they take
a rifle: it might be useful for those occasions where troops find
themselves at arm's length from the enemy, but it displaces a
significant amount of beans, bullets or batteries from the basic combat
load. A worthwhile tradeoff, or would the troops be better off with more
of their main armament?

Not if their main armamnet was incapable of handling the situation that
arose. That is the difference, when viewed against the Anaconda model. Had
you taken up that M61 space and crammed a few new radios, or another few
pounds of fuel onboard, it would still not have allowed those CAS aircraft
to do what they were *there* to do, which was support the troops engaged, no
matter how close the separation of the two combatants. With the M61's they
did that.


Depends on a lot of factors. For instance, the F-15E both kept a gun
that isn't ideal for its primary mission of ground attack (shell too
light, slant range on the short size, rate of fire derated for
strafing)
and halved the ammunition supply. It's not a bad decision because it's
quick and saves money, but it reflects the low priority.

Low priority and outright elimination are two different things. ISTR
reading
that those 10th LID guys in Anaconda were *very* happy to have strafe
support from F-15E's, A-10's, and even AH-64's.

The AH-64s got badly hammered (seven of eight badly damaged and IIRC
five were so shot up they never flew again...), and again IIRC the A-10
was pulled out early on because it struggled to cope with the
hot-and-high conditions.

Those AH-64's were indeed getting hammered--but because they hung around and
continued to press home repeated gun runs against the critical targets. How
many AH-64 crews were lost? None. How many lives did they save on the
ground? We'll never know.


The question is not "did they want strafe" but "did they want effective
fire support even at close range"? Not the same thing, not at all.

They wanted fire that would not also kill them in the bargain, which is why
they repeatedly *requested* strafe, again and again. In some cases they
later resorted to using LGB's, with the curious methos of walking them in as
if they were conventional rounds, from what I could decypher. And yet they
still continued to request gun runs...wonder why?


I doubt you'll find a soldier there who insisted on the support fire
coming from a given asset or weapon now and forever... provided it was
available and turned Bad Guys into Dead Guys (or at least Hiding Guys)
without creating blue-on-blue then it will be considered Good..

Yep, and what was available that day (or days, as IIRC this lasted well into
the next day) was CAS, and what those soldiers kept asking for from the CAS
was guns, at least in the early stages. Tells me they liked the guns.


If you were designing the capability from scratch, would you insist on
the M61? Consider a larger-calibre weapon with more A/G punch like a
KCA? Or go for fuel and/or lightness, and hang a podded gun for 'danger
close' missions?

That depends. Since cost is always a factor at some point, the use of the
M61 may be the best solution (you still retain an inherent marginal
strafe
capability at minimal cost, and if you want more punch you can still
*add*
those pods you keep talking about).

Trouble is, when you've got an internal gun you've eaten up weight:
tending to, if you're using guns you're stuck with what you've fitted.
Remember, we're not discussing a major frontline capability here, but an
emergency reversion. Can you justify _more_ guns when you have one built
into the airframe anyway and crews expensively trained in its use?

It is not that important an issue. The fact is that all of the incoming
aircraft we will be fighting with in the foreseeable future, minus the STOVL
version of the F-35, have guns included in their armament suites. I say
great, keep 'em and keep that flexibility they give us.


Or maybe use a 25mm weapon, or the
Mauser 27mm.

Interestingly, the F-35 took this approach for some versions. So did the
AV-8B.

Details are rather unimportant to the current question at hand
(courtesy thread drift), which is, "Gun versus no gun". You say no gun, I
say if possible retain the gun and remain more flexible by doing so.

Then explain the STOVL JSF, which opted for a gun pod rather than an
internal solution despite CAS being high on its priority list.

From what I gather that was dictated by the addition of the STOVL
capability, which necessitates making room for the lift fan, etc.


Trouble is, stories of "F-15E bravely makes strafing passes" deservedly
get headlines. "F-15E really regrets having to call skosh fuel and
leave
station" don't: but an internal gun is getting on for a thousand pounds
of fuel, which translates to more loiter time or range. And it isn't
negotiable.

We have KC's that refuel TACAIR.

If the US can claim it's never run short of tanking assets in-theatre,
I'll call them liars, because they're the only force to achieve that.

And unless the tankers are flying low orbits over the firefights,
breaking off to refuel still means "not on station". More fuel means
more time between those absences.

Those absences are kind of meaningless if the alternative is another couple
of circuits with an arament suite that does not allow you to serve the
customers down below, aren't they? I doubt the groundpounder down below who
is in a situation where his options are such that he wants a strafe/can't
risk even a PGM is going to be very relieved by the knowledge that his CAS
stack can do a few more circles without being able to actually handle his
request.


If you are talking the CAS mission, which
we are now doing, then it is reasonable to accept that those assets will
be
doing their thing relatively close to the EA. And stop acting as if a
thousand pounds of fuel is the end of the world--that works out to what,
a
whopping 125 gallons? If your CAS effort is dependent upon a 125 gallon
fuel
margine you are likely in deep do-do already.

How much flying time does that get you, loitering in a notional 'CAS
stack'?


It does NOT matter if that CAS asset can't conduct the kind of attack you
need!

When you're a long way from home, time on station gets to be
important, because so much of the sortie and your fuel load gets eaten
up in "getting there" and "getting home". (CAP experience in the
Falklands comes to mind, where that sort of fuel could double on-station
time)

I'd suggest that if your CAS effort is so short of usable ordnance, or
so badly co-ordinated and equipped, that you're depending on guns...
you've also got something badly wrong.

You just don't get it, do you? "**** happens" in combat, and flexibility is
what allows you to adjust. having that aerial gun option is a tool for
flexibility. If you don't want that flexibility, fine, but the
powers-that-be here in the US seem to consider it worthwhile, as evidenced
by the recent comments from our resident Strike Eagle pilot in another
similar thread of late. I'll side with the "more tools are better than less
when dealing with uncertainty" side of the house.

Brooks

Ahh, total agreement at last. The issue is complex. It extends well
beyond stats and kill rates or calibers and fire rate. I still argue
for guns on fighters.



Better to have it and not need it than to need it and not have it.

"Chad Irby" wrote
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

If "lack of guns" is the real problem, surely gun-armed fighters are
a complete and satisfactory answer?

It's not a simple question of "lack of guns."

It's "relying on missiles 100% and not having guns when they're really
bloody useful."

We learned that lesson over 30 years ago, and a whole new generation of
bean counters are trying to resurrect the kind of silliness that the
McNamara school brought us in Vietnam...

Now, here's a question: for the 200Kg or so weight budget (I have no idea
about volume) of an internal gun and ammo tank, would you rather have 1, 2
or 3 more AIM-9Xs/ASRAAMs?

There's always a lip-curl reflex about "bean counters" but every time you
make a choice, you've rejected an alternative. There's money, weight, volume
and time budgets because all of those are fungible, exchangeable among the
possible choices.

Remove a gun and save money? Sure, but you spend that money, space, power
and weight for something else, possibly more ordnance of a different kind.
Or maybe not. Maybe more volume for better ESM or countermeasures or a lower
crap-out rate for your RADAR.

The guy who straps on the airplane (which I will never do) has to live with
those choices and he may curse the "bean counters" who made them but every
single characteristic (not just gun/no gun) within a weapons system competes
with some other alternative. The payoff for some of these trades isn't
always as obvious as a tank full of cannon rounds but it's there.

"Thomas Schoene" wrote in message link.net...
Tony Williams wrote:

Now let's look at the opposition. The 'European standard' 27mm Mauser
BK 27, selected over any US gun by the JSF contenders, weighs 100 kg
and uses much less space (only one barrel).

Of course, the BK27 was then abandoned by Lockheed Martin after the JSF
source selection and replaced by a 25mm GAU-12/U Gatling gun.

I understand that was at the initiative of GD, who happened to be
given the contract for designing the JSF's BK 27 gun installation and
also just happen to make the GAU-12/U (shouldn't they have declared an
interest, or something?) .....their argument was on cost grounds, not
quality (and I suspect they may have received a sympathetic hearing in
favour of a US gun rather than a German one, especially post-Iraq).
The BK 27 was originally selected purely on merit.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Military gun and ammunition discussion forum:
http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/