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#21
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On Sat, 18 Oct 2003 00:28:03 -0600, "Daryl Hunt"
wrote: "phil hunt" wrote in message ... Multi-role, but with an emphasis on air superiority. Just as the A-10 has multi-role capability: you can shoot down other aircraft with it, but no-one would say it's designed as a fighter. Ever play a game called, "Air Wars"? You should give it a try. It's out of print these days. I would kill for a copy of it and the qualified people to play it. Play that game using an A-10 and you will change your story. I am afraid that a simulation is about the only way you will find out where you are incorrect. The A-10 is a dead duck against other AC outside of L-5. Playing games is a long, long way from combat. People who play games need to realize that they are "playing a game" that does not reflect reality. Al Minyard |
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#23
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Kevin Brooks wrote:
ess (phil hunt) wrote in message ... snip No, it has never, since the days when the LWF morphed into the multi-role F-16 which entered into service, had an emphasis on "air superiority" (other than the handful of A model ADF variants mentioned earlier). Both US and European users placed more emphasis on its use in the strike role, and its first major combat use, by the Israelis, saw more strike missions than air superiority use (you do recall what kind of aircraft toted the bombs to Osirak in 82?). I'll have to disagree. The Europeans used the F-16 primarily as an interceptor/air superiority a/c in the early days while they still had squadrons of other types available for A/G work, with a secondary A/G role (there were individual variations between different nations as to emphasis; some had F-16s in dedicated A/A squadrons, some used them for both missions, some had squadrons for each), and other countries have also used it as their primary air superiority a/c if they couldn't afford F-15s (which is to say, almost every customer). And while the Israelis used F-16s to bomb Osirak (in 1981, not 1982), it was because the a/c had the range to get there and back unrefueled, along with sufficient accuracy with dumb bombs; they'd previously planned to use F-4s with smart bombs and buddy-tank them at low-level over SA/Iraq, not an idea that anyone could get very enthusiastic about. In 1982 over the Bekaa, along with F-15s the F-16s were the primary air superiority a/c (and scored more kills than the F-15s did), while A-4s, F-4s and Kfirs handled most of the strike missions. The Israelis have always wanted multi-role fighter a/c (they were the first to use the F-15 for A/G); for instance, the main reason they took the A-4 was to get their foot in the door with the U.S., hoping to get F-4s later. Only afterwards did they discover that the a/c suited their needs very well, and they ordered a lot more. F-16s were forced into the swing-fighter role by the USAF, so as not to compete directly with the F-15 in the air superiority business. The USAF was afraid that Congress would stop production of the F-15 (a better place to start if you want multi-role) in favor of the F-16 for cost reasons if the two a/c went head-to-head in A/A, so they eliminated the A/G part of the F-15 training syllabus as well as stopped A/G weapons compatibility testing in 1975 or 1976 (problems of a/c availability owing to F100 engine problems and shortages in the early days was also a factor in eliminating the A/G syllabus, as pilot shortages were occurring owing to an inability to generate enough training sorties), and made the F-15 a dedicated A/A-only bird while the F-16 was shunted off to be the F-4 replacement and was not, repeat NOT, to be considered a direct competitor to the F-15. The F-16 has done an excellent job in that role, and its capabilities in that area have received more and more emphasis over the years, its A/A performance naturally decreasing as a result. The F-15 is clearly better suited as a multi-role platform owing to its size, but that's kind of irrelevant if most potential customers can't afford to buy, maintain or operate them. Guy |
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Alan Minyard wrote:
On Sat, 18 Oct 2003 00:28:03 -0600, "Daryl Hunt" wrote: "phil hunt" wrote in message ... Multi-role, but with an emphasis on air superiority. Just as the A-10 has multi-role capability: you can shoot down other aircraft with it, but no-one would say it's designed as a fighter. Ever play a game called, "Air Wars"? You should give it a try. It's out of print these days. I would kill for a copy of it and the qualified people to play it. Play that game using an A-10 and you will change your story. I am afraid that a simulation is about the only way you will find out where you are incorrect. The A-10 is a dead duck against other AC outside of L-5. Playing games is a long, long way from combat. People who play games need to realize that they are "playing a game" that does not reflect reality. Especially if they're playing SPI's old "Air War," which in many ways turned physical reality on its head. See the mighty Buff outturn the F-104 at 480 KTAS plus! David Isby's knowledge of physics was, shall we say, unusual. Guy |
#25
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"phil hunt" wrote in message . .. On Fri, 17 Oct 2003 11:30:54 +0100, Keith Willshaw wrote: An optimised bomber would look like an A-10 or Tornado. ADV or IDS... |
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Alan Minyard wrote in message . ..
On Sat, 18 Oct 2003 00:28:03 -0600, "Daryl Hunt" wrote: "phil hunt" wrote in message ... Multi-role, but with an emphasis on air superiority. Just as the A-10 has multi-role capability: you can shoot down other aircraft with it, but no-one would say it's designed as a fighter. Ever play a game called, "Air Wars"? You should give it a try. It's out of print these days. I would kill for a copy of it and the qualified people to play it. Play that game using an A-10 and you will change your story. I am afraid that a simulation is about the only way you will find out where you are incorrect. The A-10 is a dead duck against other AC outside of L-5. Playing games is a long, long way from combat. People who play games need to realize that they are "playing a game" that does not reflect reality. Amen. Even some of the "professional" games (such as the Corps Battle Simulation package used by the Army during division and corps level Warfighter exercises, and the brigade-and-below sim package as well) sometimes are wildly inaccurate, especially if you start trying to apply it to specific tactical results. Brooks Al Minyard |
#27
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Guy Alcala wrote in message ...
Kevin Brooks wrote: ess (phil hunt) wrote in message ... snip No, it has never, since the days when the LWF morphed into the multi-role F-16 which entered into service, had an emphasis on "air superiority" (other than the handful of A model ADF variants mentioned earlier). Both US and European users placed more emphasis on its use in the strike role, and its first major combat use, by the Israelis, saw more strike missions than air superiority use (you do recall what kind of aircraft toted the bombs to Osirak in 82?). I'll have to disagree. The Europeans used the F-16 primarily as an interceptor/air superiority a/c in the early days while they still had squadrons of other types available for A/G work, with a secondary A/G role (there were individual variations between different nations as to emphasis; some had F-16s in dedicated A/A squadrons, some used them for both missions, some had squadrons for each), and other countries have also used it as their primary air superiority a/c if they couldn't afford F-15s (which is to say, almost every customer). From what I have read, the european partners were also asking for the multi-role capability from the get-go. I can buy into some of them focusing a bit more on the air-to-air role than the USAF did, but only so far, as I don't recall any of them pressing for a BVR capability as would have been available with even the USAF's early ADF versions. And while the Israelis used F-16s to bomb Osirak (in 1981, not 1982), it was because the a/c had the range to get there and back unrefueled, along with sufficient accuracy with dumb bombs; they'd previously planned to use F-4s with smart bombs and buddy-tank them at low-level over SA/Iraq, not an idea that anyone could get very enthusiastic about. In 1982 over the Bekaa, along with F-15s the F-16s were the primary air superiority a/c (and scored more kills than the F-15s did), while A-4s, F-4s and Kfirs handled most of the strike missions. The Israelis have always wanted multi-role fighter a/c (they were the first to use the F-15 for A/G); for instance, the main reason they took the A-4 was to get their foot in the door with the U.S., hoping to get F-4s later. Only afterwards did they discover that the a/c suited their needs very well, and they ordered a lot more. Which goes to the point that the F-16 was a multi-role platform. F-16s were forced into the swing-fighter role by the USAF, so as not to compete directly with the F-15 in the air superiority business. The USAF was afraid that Congress would stop production of the F-15 (a better place to start if you want multi-role) in favor of the F-16 for cost reasons if the two a/c went head-to-head in A/A, so they eliminated the A/G part of the F-15 training syllabus as well as stopped A/G weapons compatibility testing in 1975 or 1976 (problems of a/c availability owing to F100 engine problems and shortages in the early days was also a factor in eliminating the A/G syllabus, as pilot shortages were occurring owing to an inability to generate enough training sorties), and made the F-15 a dedicated A/A-only bird while the F-16 was shunted off to be the F-4 replacement and was not, repeat NOT, to be considered a direct competitor to the F-15. The F-16 has done an excellent job in that role, and its capabilities in that area have received more and more emphasis over the years, its A/A performance naturally decreasing as a result. The F-15 is clearly better suited as a multi-role platform owing to its size, but that's kind of irrelevant if most potential customers can't afford to buy, maintain or operate them. I can see the point about the internal politics of the decision, but not exclusive of all other factors. If this had really been simply and only a matter of protecting the F-15, then why has the A/G function never been significantly redressed in the past few years, when it was no longer a factor? The Navy did so with the F-14 (witness the Bombcat). I'd imagine that more went into these decisions than just budget-fights; the F-15 is without a doubt the better of the two in the air superiority role when you include the BVR capability, greater AAM load, and better radar (IIRC, though there may not be much difference today between the latest F-16 blocks and the F-15C in this regard). To summarize, you seem to disagree with the bit about mud moving being more important to *all* of the initial users from the beginning of operational use--OK, I can grant that some of the Euro users placed a higher degree of importance on the AA role than the USAF did. But in toto, all of the users wanted a multi-role aircraft (strangely, this is not true today, as we have seen the Italians lease thier older ADF variants exclusively for the AA role), and that was the major point of my argument. Brooks Guy |
#28
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Kevin Brooks wrote:
Guy Alcala wrote in message ... Kevin Brooks wrote: ess (phil hunt) wrote in message ... snip No, it has never, since the days when the LWF morphed into the multi-role F-16 which entered into service, had an emphasis on "air superiority" (other than the handful of A model ADF variants mentioned earlier). Both US and European users placed more emphasis on its use in the strike role, and its first major combat use, by the Israelis, saw more strike missions than air superiority use (you do recall what kind of aircraft toted the bombs to Osirak in 82?). I'll have to disagree. The Europeans used the F-16 primarily as an interceptor/air superiority a/c in the early days while they still had squadrons of other types available for A/G work, with a secondary A/G role (there were individual variations between different nations as to emphasis; some had F-16s in dedicated A/A squadrons, some used them for both missions, some had squadrons for each), and other countries have also used it as their primary air superiority a/c if they couldn't afford F-15s (which is to say, almost every customer). From what I have read, the european partners were also asking for the multi-role capability from the get-go. I can buy into some of them focusing a bit more on the air-to-air role than the USAF did, but only so far, as I don't recall any of them pressing for a BVR capability as would have been available with even the USAF's early ADF versions. The ADF wasn't available at the time (AIM-120 was supposed to enter service in the mid-80s, and there seems to have been some hope that later European F-16s might be equipped with it during production), and besides, there was still considerable doubt about the utility of BVR in NW European airspace if the Pact had started to move. None of the EPG nations had A/A BVR capability prior to the F-16; they all used the F-104G as their "all-weather" interceptor, armed with AIM-9s. The F-16s took over that job first, while the F-104s (and F-5s and Mirages) went pure strike/attack. And at the time the F-16 was ordered by the EPG, the Luftwaffe had yet to receive their first F-4Fs, specifically ordered without BVR capability. Those were used to replace F-104Gs, which had been tasked the same as the F-4Fs came to be: two Geschwader of dedicated fighters, two Geschwader of Jabos. And while the Israelis used F-16s to bomb Osirak (in 1981, not 1982), it was because the a/c had the range to get there and back unrefueled, along with sufficient accuracy with dumb bombs; they'd previously planned to use F-4s with smart bombs and buddy-tank them at low-level over SA/Iraq, not an idea that anyone could get very enthusiastic about. In 1982 over the Bekaa, along with F-15s the F-16s were the primary air superiority a/c (and scored more kills than the F-15s did), while A-4s, F-4s and Kfirs handled most of the strike missions. The Israelis have always wanted multi-role fighter a/c (they were the first to use the F-15 for A/G); for instance, the main reason they took the A-4 was to get their foot in the door with the U.S., hoping to get F-4s later. Only afterwards did they discover that the a/c suited their needs very well, and they ordered a lot more. Which goes to the point that the F-16 was a multi-role platform. As was the F-15, in Israeli service. But the F-16 wasn't designed to be one from the start, (the F-15, while always slanted towards the A/A mission, included A/G capability from the beginning. The "Not a pound for air to ground" nonsense didn't start until the LWF program appeared, and the F-15 had the CCIP/CCRP capability from the start, while the F-16 added it during the transition from YF to F). F-16s were forced into the swing-fighter role by the USAF, so as not to compete directly with the F-15 in the air superiority business. The USAF was afraid that Congress would stop production of the F-15 (a better place to start if you want multi-role) in favor of the F-16 for cost reasons if the two a/c went head-to-head in A/A, so they eliminated the A/G part of the F-15 training syllabus as well as stopped A/G weapons compatibility testing in 1975 or 1976 (problems of a/c availability owing to F100 engine problems and shortages in the early days was also a factor in eliminating the A/G syllabus, as pilot shortages were occurring owing to an inability to generate enough training sorties), and made the F-15 a dedicated A/A-only bird while the F-16 was shunted off to be the F-4 replacement and was not, repeat NOT, to be considered a direct competitor to the F-15. The F-16 has done an excellent job in that role, and its capabilities in that area have received more and more emphasis over the years, its A/A performance naturally decreasing as a result. The F-15 is clearly better suited as a multi-role platform owing to its size, but that's kind of irrelevant if most potential customers can't afford to buy, maintain or operate them. I can see the point about the internal politics of the decision, but not exclusive of all other factors. If this had really been simply and only a matter of protecting the F-15, then why has the A/G function never been significantly redressed in the past few years, when it was no longer a factor? The Navy did so with the F-14 (witness the Bombcat). I imagine the F-15E and the gaping maw of the F-22 (and latterly the F-35) have absorbed any funds that might otherwise have gone into F-15A/C upgrades. Horner was complaining about the inability of the US F-15Cs to bomb during DS after the A/A threat had diminished to zero, owing to lack of training and equipment (he claimed that Saudi F-15s did bomb), so it's not as if it's a new problem. I suspect that the difference also has much to do with the navy's greater need for extra strike capacity; they have far less space available on the carriers so couldn't afford to not use the F-14 multi-role given the reduced threat to the CVBG, especially when their primary long-range strike asset (the A-6E) was going away, and the air groups were also being considerably decreased in size. The Air Force usually has ramp space for F-15Es, F-117s and F-16s in addition to the F-15Cs (if needed), and given the reduced A/A threats we've been going up against since DS it's probably not that big a deal. We could probably leave the F-15Cs home without any significant extra risk, and use F-15Es or F-16Cs for the job. To a considerable extent that's what we've been doing. I'd imagine that more went into these decisions than just budget-fights; the F-15 is without a doubt the better of the two in the air superiority role when you include the BVR capability, greater AAM load, and better radar (IIRC, though there may not be much difference today between the latest F-16 blocks and the F-15C in this regard). The F-15 will always have a better radar range than the F-16 against the same target (given similar-technology radars) owing to its larger antenna size. Of course, there's a question of when is enough, enough. The AESA radar for the F-16 was stated to have achieved a detection range between 80 and 90nm (the exact figure was classified) on a 1 sq.m target; using the same technology, the larger radar in the F-15 was achieving 105nm against the same target. If the AIM-120 has an effective max. range of 40nm or so, how much is the extra 15-25nm really worth? Oof course, you could be using part of the larger array for jamming or comms in the F-15, while achieving the same radar range as the F-16. But, so much of the targeting info is coming from offboard sensors now, that may no longer be all that significant a factor. At any given time, which has the better data links may be more important. The Dutch F-16MLUs that scored the BVR AIM-120 kill(s) over Yugoslavia, had the target info data-linked to them by the other F-16 section, which had detected the MiGs. There's likely to be more and more of this sort of thing, where an AWACS or other sensor detects, locates and classifies the target with the shooter staying radar-silent and firing on data generated offboard, never going active themselves. In that scenario the F-16's smaller RCS may well be of more value (to prevent detection by an opposing radar) than the F-15's more powerful onboard radar. As for missile loads, it's 8 vs. 4 (typically) or 6 (air defense). You can buy and operate roughly 1.5 to 1.8 F-16s for the cost of one F-15, so there's not a lot in it either way. To summarize, you seem to disagree with the bit about mud moving being more important to *all* of the initial users from the beginning of operational use--OK, I can grant that some of the Euro users placed a higher degree of importance on the AA role than the USAF did. Not just the Europeans; many of the Asian countries also use the F-16 as their primary air superiority a/c. I think the Venezuelans do as well, not that they had any need for the a/c's capability. But in toto, all of the users wanted a multi-role aircraft (strangely, this is not true today, as we have seen the Italians lease thier older ADF variants exclusively for the AA role), and that was the major point of my argument. The Italians had a dedicated air superiority/interceptor force equipped with the F-104S (AIM-7/Aspide RHMs), which is what the F-16ADFs are replacing until Typhoon enters service. Guy |
#29
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Guy Alcala wrote in message ...
Kevin Brooks wrote: Guy Alcala wrote in message ... Kevin Brooks wrote: ess (phil hunt) wrote in message ... snip No, it has never, since the days when the LWF morphed into the multi-role F-16 which entered into service, had an emphasis on "air superiority" (other than the handful of A model ADF variants mentioned earlier). Both US and European users placed more emphasis on its use in the strike role, and its first major combat use, by the Israelis, saw more strike missions than air superiority use (you do recall what kind of aircraft toted the bombs to Osirak in 82?). I'll have to disagree. The Europeans used the F-16 primarily as an interceptor/air superiority a/c in the early days while they still had squadrons of other types available for A/G work, with a secondary A/G role (there were individual variations between different nations as to emphasis; some had F-16s in dedicated A/A squadrons, some used them for both missions, some had squadrons for each), and other countries have also used it as their primary air superiority a/c if they couldn't afford F-15s (which is to say, almost every customer). From what I have read, the european partners were also asking for the multi-role capability from the get-go. I can buy into some of them focusing a bit more on the air-to-air role than the USAF did, but only so far, as I don't recall any of them pressing for a BVR capability as would have been available with even the USAF's early ADF versions. The ADF wasn't available at the time (AIM-120 was supposed to enter service in the mid-80s, and there seems to have been some hope that later European F-16s might be equipped with it during production), and besides, there was still considerable doubt about the utility of BVR in NW European airspace if the Pact had started to move. None of the EPG nations had A/A BVR capability prior to the F-16; they all used the F-104G as their "all-weather" interceptor, armed with AIM-9s. The F-16s took over that job first, while the F-104s (and F-5s and Mirages) went pure strike/attack. And at the time the F-16 was ordered by the EPG, the Luftwaffe had yet to receive their first F-4Fs, specifically ordered without BVR capability. Those were used to replace F-104Gs, which had been tasked the same as the F-4Fs came to be: two Geschwader of dedicated fighters, two Geschwader of Jabos. True or false, the nations that bought the darned thing wanted a multi-role platform? From the outset? In fact demanded it, being one of the major factors leading to various design changes that went into the aircraft between prototype and production? The one source I have handy says "true". And while the Israelis used F-16s to bomb Osirak (in 1981, not 1982), it was because the a/c had the range to get there and back unrefueled, along with sufficient accuracy with dumb bombs; they'd previously planned to use F-4s with smart bombs and buddy-tank them at low-level over SA/Iraq, not an idea that anyone could get very enthusiastic about. In 1982 over the Bekaa, along with F-15s the F-16s were the primary air superiority a/c (and scored more kills than the F-15s did), while A-4s, F-4s and Kfirs handled most of the strike missions. The Israelis have always wanted multi-role fighter a/c (they were the first to use the F-15 for A/G); for instance, the main reason they took the A-4 was to get their foot in the door with the U.S., hoping to get F-4s later. Only afterwards did they discover that the a/c suited their needs very well, and they ordered a lot more. Which goes to the point that the F-16 was a multi-role platform. As was the F-15, in Israeli service. But the F-16 wasn't designed to be one from the start, (the F-15, while always slanted towards the A/A mission, included A/G capability from the beginning. The "Not a pound for air to ground" nonsense didn't start until the LWF program appeared, and the F-15 had the CCIP/CCRP capability from the start, while the F-16 added it during the transition from YF to F). That really depends upon where you label "at the start". Yes, the LWF program was originally aimed at producing a hot-rod dogfighter on the cheap. But by the time it entered into opwerational service the aircraft had already undergone design changes aimed at making it a multi-role platform--vert and hor tail surfaces revisions, wing revisions, and a multi-mode radar were all largely products of that effort. F-16s were forced into the swing-fighter role by the USAF, so as not to compete directly with the F-15 in the air superiority business. The USAF was afraid that Congress would stop production of the F-15 (a better place to start if you want multi-role) in favor of the F-16 for cost reasons if the two a/c went head-to-head in A/A, so they eliminated the A/G part of the F-15 training syllabus as well as stopped A/G weapons compatibility testing in 1975 or 1976 (problems of a/c availability owing to F100 engine problems and shortages in the early days was also a factor in eliminating the A/G syllabus, as pilot shortages were occurring owing to an inability to generate enough training sorties), and made the F-15 a dedicated A/A-only bird while the F-16 was shunted off to be the F-4 replacement and was not, repeat NOT, to be considered a direct competitor to the F-15. The F-16 has done an excellent job in that role, and its capabilities in that area have received more and more emphasis over the years, its A/A performance naturally decreasing as a result. The F-15 is clearly better suited as a multi-role platform owing to its size, but that's kind of irrelevant if most potential customers can't afford to buy, maintain or operate them. I can see the point about the internal politics of the decision, but not exclusive of all other factors. If this had really been simply and only a matter of protecting the F-15, then why has the A/G function never been significantly redressed in the past few years, when it was no longer a factor? The Navy did so with the F-14 (witness the Bombcat). I imagine the F-15E and the gaping maw of the F-22 (and latterly the F-35) have absorbed any funds that might otherwise have gone into F-15A/C upgrades. Horner was complaining about the inability of the US F-15Cs to bomb during DS after the A/A threat had diminished to zero, owing to lack of training and equipment (he claimed that Saudi F-15s did bomb), so it's not as if it's a new problem. I suspect that the difference also has much to do with the navy's greater need for extra strike capacity; they have far less space available on the carriers so couldn't afford to not use the F-14 multi-role given the reduced threat to the CVBG, LOL, where were you during that recent thread where some guy adamantly claimed the threat to the CVBG today was the same if not greater than it was previously? especially when their primary long-range strike asset (the A-6E) was going away, and the air groups were also being considerably decreased in size. The Air Force usually has ramp space for F-15Es, F-117s and F-16s in addition to the F-15Cs (if needed), and given the reduced A/A threats we've been going up against since DS it's probably not that big a deal. We could probably leave the F-15Cs home without any significant extra risk, and use F-15Es or F-16Cs for the job. To a considerable extent that's what we've been doing. Remember the (severe) ramp space crunch at Aviano during the Kosovo operation? I'd imagine that more went into these decisions than just budget-fights; the F-15 is without a doubt the better of the two in the air superiority role when you include the BVR capability, greater AAM load, and better radar (IIRC, though there may not be much difference today between the latest F-16 blocks and the F-15C in this regard). The F-15 will always have a better radar range than the F-16 against the same target (given similar-technology radars) owing to its larger antenna size. Of course, there's a question of when is enough, enough. The AESA radar for the F-16 was stated to have achieved a detection range between 80 and 90nm (the exact figure was classified) on a 1 sq.m target; using the same technology, the larger radar in the F-15 was achieving 105nm against the same target. If the AIM-120 has an effective max. range of 40nm or so, how much is the extra 15-25nm really worth? Oof course, you could be using part of the larger array for jamming or comms in the F-15, while achieving the same radar range as the F-16. The ability to see the other guy first is always going to be of tremendous advantage; having a radar that *detects* only at the max effective weapons range effectively limits that weapon range even more (have to decide if it is a threat, decide on engagement plan, and engage). But, so much of the targeting info is coming from offboard sensors now, that may no longer be all that significant a factor. At any given time, which has the better data links may be more important. The Dutch F-16MLUs that scored the BVR AIM-120 kill(s) over Yugoslavia, had the target info data-linked to them by the other F-16 section, which had detected the MiGs. There's likely to be more and more of this sort of thing, where an AWACS or other sensor detects, locates and classifies the target with the shooter staying radar-silent and firing on data generated offboard, never going active themselves. In that scenario the F-16's smaller RCS may well be of more value (to prevent detection by an opposing radar) than the F-15's more powerful onboard radar. The RCS advantage is a factor, but how much I don't know. Given that the F-15 can also take advantage of other sensors and remain under EMCON, then it may also boil down to its greater weapons load and operating range--I doubt there is any engraved-in-stone answer to this dilemma, to be honest. As for missile loads, it's 8 vs. 4 (typically) or 6 (air defense). You can buy and operate roughly 1.5 to 1.8 F-16s for the cost of one F-15, so there's not a lot in it either way. Buy, yes; not sure about the greater disparity in operating costs. They should be pretty much even except for those costs related to the second engine. To summarize, you seem to disagree with the bit about mud moving being more important to *all* of the initial users from the beginning of operational use--OK, I can grant that some of the Euro users placed a higher degree of importance on the AA role than the USAF did. Not just the Europeans; many of the Asian countries also use the F-16 as their primary air superiority a/c. I think the Venezuelans do as well, not that they had any need for the a/c's capability. But all of them seem to have wanted a multi-role capable platform; none of them are operating the ADF version with its greater limitation on air-to-ground capability. The *only* nation I know of that is truly using it in a air-to-air pure role, and wanted it in that form, is Italy; I believe even the Portugese are modifying their older ADF versions to allow multi-role use. But in toto, all of the users wanted a multi-role aircraft (strangely, this is not true today, as we have seen the Italians lease thier older ADF variants exclusively for the AA role), and that was the major point of my argument. The Italians had a dedicated air superiority/interceptor force equipped with the F-104S (AIM-7/Aspide RHMs), which is what the F-16ADFs are replacing until Typhoon enters service. Yep. Brooks Guy |
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