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#102
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Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: ojunk (Steve Mellenthin) Date: 7/17/2004 12:09 PM Pacific That is where I was headed with the question. Thanks for the response. It has been my impression, perhaps erroneous, that the choice of the stream stragegy was not the best decision at times when a loose gaggle and varying run-in headings and altitudes between the 2-4 airgraft groupings would have been more effective. As I said, only an impression not backed up by much research or fact. Steve That makes for lousy bomb patterns on the target. Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
#103
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Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: (WalterM140) Date: 7/17/2004 1:12 PM Pacific Standard Time Message-id: Once air superiority was available the RAF flew their daylight missions in loose gaggles of 2-4 aircraft staggered in height to minimise flak damage. That might have been influenced by the fact that no other aircraft type could fly in the tight formations used by the B-17. I've heard that B-26s could also fly in very tight formations, but I shouldn't think as at high an altitude as the B-17. B-17's could maintain formation at heights almost twice as high as the altitude at which Bomber Command usually operated, either by day or by night. Walt Walt No trick maintaining formation at high altitudes. The trick is hitting the target from high altitudes. Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
#104
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Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: ojunk (Steve Mellenthin) Date: 7/17/2004 11:58 AM Pacific Standard Time Message-id: The B-26 of WW2 was the Martin Marauder, that of Vietnam was the Douglas Invader which was originally designated A-26 and was a later design largely replacing the B-26. I stand corrected. Lack of familiarity with the earlier B-26. See my website for B-26's in combat from every angle. Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
#105
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ubject: Night bombers interception....
From: (WalterM140) Date: 7/17/2004 1:48 PM Pacific Standard Time The Americans were ultimately able to make daylight precision bombing pay off, although not the way they intended, that is true. Walt But the B-26's working from 10,000 feet exceeded their wildest dreams of bombing accuracy Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
#106
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Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: Guy Alcala Date: 7/17/2004 1:23 PM Pacific Standard Time Message-id: Chris Mark wrote: From: smartace11@ My origninal question was mainly about whether different run in headings between flights would have avoided some aimed AAA and possibly flack concentrations More than likely. But medium bomber loss rates in Europe, especially as the war progressed, were reasonably low. Ovrall, in the MTO, the B-26 loss rate was one per 148 combat sorties and in the ETO one per 210 sorties. The B-25 loss rate in the MTO was one per 164 sorties, and in the Pacific one per 52 sorties. Chris, could I know the source of your loss rate figures? I've had difficulty in tracking down MTO and early PTO data to compare the B-25 and B-26. Guy Remember that the B-25's were in the MTO. A less hazardous theatre. Arthur Kramer 344th BG 494th BS England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany Visit my WW II B-26 website at: http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer |
#107
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In article 40f8ceaa$0$1306$5a62ac22@per-qv1-newsreader-
01.iinet.net.au, says... This sort of ignores the fact the RAF had been steadily building up the bomber support system, and the loss rates had peaked in earlier times, with new tactics helping to drop the losses back into the acceptable category. For example late 1941, and mid 1943. What sort of tactics were used? It comes down to whatever Hastings defines as the Trenchard doctrine, the unescorted bomber devastating the target had long been disproved before March 1944. What do these escort fighters do? -- Logically we attempt to devise reasons for our irrational behaviour. Observations of Bernard - No 62 |
#108
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The 'special navigation equipment' carried on Wilde Sau Bf 109s and FW 190s consisted of a UV lamp and specially coated maps. The special nav features of the FuG 16Z were not utilized because they would have required a personal controller for each "Boar", so instead they were following the Reichjägerweile (general information fighter broadcast - "The four-motor bombers are approaching Kassel; all aircraft within range, strong raid approaching Kassel", that sort of thing. No naviads in the cockpits of the Wilde Sau airmen I have interviewed. I believe these aircraft had artificial horizons, the FuG 16Z, ultraviolet or Radium instrumentation dials. The guys I have interviewed were in 10./JG 300 primarily, and they were the only instrument-rated Wilde Sau; the difference is that the rest of the program were basically day fighters, flying under exceptionally good night visibility. As I said before, the only thing they said was different from the standard daylight Bf 109s in use, was the small UV maplight. Its probable that you are right and that other Staffels in the program had slightly better navaids, but it was never intended to use "night-flyers" in the program, just standard day fighter pilots. We had a long conversation with Oberst Herrmann on this exact subject as part of our interview. Protecting a fighter pilots night vision was all important, the Luftwaffe even had a device to measure the speed of recovery of eyes after being illuminated by light. The the the wild sow hunted aircraft that had been caught in searchlights. Yes, as they all said, "The eyes of a hunter is what was needed - no radar, no controller, nothing was more important than excellent night vision." I heard that from every NJG pilot we tracked down. They did perform ground controled interceptions that this was of course limited by the number of Wurzburg radars and oppertators: Not during the actual Wilde Sau program, but following its termination, they did exactly this. Once the rest of JG 300 went back to exclusively daylight combat, the sole remaining nightfighter Staffel in JG 300 (the massively overstrength 10th Staffel at Jüterbog), THEN controllers were used to guide single Bf 109s toward their targets. From what I have been told, this was not done during the earlier period, when Wilde Sau's were primarily hunting Viermots over citiesl I believe mosquitoes were the main target. There were several Mosquito Jagd units, operating from September 44 to April 1945, including NJGr 10, 10./JG 300, two gruppes within NJG 11, etc., but these were all after the Sept 44 demise of the Wilde Sau program. The Me 109G6 U4N was equipped with Naxos to home onto bomber emisions and to also home back to homebase. This type was little used because it came at the end of wild sow tactics when the Luftwaffe had managed to get its radars working again. Also the reluctance of bomber crews to leave the H2S on, since all of them knew by then that their suspicions concerning the Germans homing on it had already been confirmed. A Mosquito was deliberately sent up as bait and it was immediately tracked and attacked by a Naxos-equipped fighter. Later, an H2S was operating on the -ground-, and a Luftwaffe fighter homed onto it. After that incident, crews were quite judicious with its use, and the LW realized it was not going to be an effective tracking tool. I believe that great of squadrons in training was between 20 to 75 percent. Finnish pilots trained by the Germans in night fighting had only a 10 percent death rate simply because they were far better trained to start with. The "airman's death" that met most of the Wilde Sau airmen was caused by their general inexperience, compounded by the rigors of night combat. It was everything the day fighter nachwuchs faced, multiplied many times. Its a wonder any of them made it through more than a flight or two. The correct translation of "Wilde Sau" Wild Sow not Wild Boar. It alludes to the wild sow's willingness to aggressively defend its young. I know their songs Its difficult for me to call professional nightfighter airmen "old lady pigs", so I used Boars - my mistake, but it was intentional. Quite often when the German radar was working the link between the ground and night fighter was not. They were being jammed and intruded upon for the last two years of the war. When the voice RT was 'stepped on', most NJ pilots had their bordfunkers switch to Morse, which was not as easier to operate in a dirty environment. I meant to say it was easier to operate in that environment. Silly slip.... The introduction of the Bernhard-Bernhardine system improve matters. This system was very jam proof it told a night fighter exactly where was in that provided a secure telemetry to link the night fighter with ground control by a ticker tape. One cool part of that system is that it was the first on earth to provide a blind landing capability, when hooked to a three-axis autopilot. The Interim Nightfighter (Me 262 B-1a/U1) 'version 2' carried this setup, as did a couple captured Ju 88 nightfighters. It is a fascinating system. I Would like to know the technology of it? Look up the K-22 automatic pilot. If you send me a note off board, I will forward some more info about it. I have read that the Luftwaffe was heading towards fully automatic interceptions, this system was perhaps only one step away. Very close. Allies were always only a step behind, but by late 1944, early 1945, the night arm of the Luftwaffe was playing with amazing toys. You have any information on the German EGON system which was similar to "oboe". This was quite an advanced night bombing device on the Luftwaffe's side but I am not sure where it was used if ever. Sorry - its at the PRO in England. I focus on nightfighters over Europe, so I didn't copy that file when I saw it. Berndard was essentially an early datalink system intended for large bombers but it evolved into a fighter director.that was quite advanced for its day. Because the German Lichtenstein radar had large aerials aircraft were slowed down considerably this limited number of interceptions they were able to achieve. Crews often scored 4, 5, or even more Abschusse in a single sortie. Other Experten crews managed up to 7. Faster speed does not help a radar interception of a slow target in low/zero visibility. The ideal situation occurred when the night fighter pilots managed to infiltrate into the middle of the bomber stream, it was in this situation that these multiple victories occurred. In the middle of the bomber stream jamming and window was minimal. Yes - like piranhas in a fishtank, no place for the bombers to turn... I believe diversionary raids however frequently lead the night fighters on a fruitless chase: they often were led to the wrong city and then lacked the speed to defend the correct one in time. Exactly so. Other times, they sat in their cockpits on the ground watching a distant city burn, as their flight controllers denied them permission to launch, supposedly because the target was not yet known. For the pilots, it was unbearable. v/r Gordon ====(A+C==== USN SAR Its always better to lose -an- engine, not -the- engine. |
#109
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From: Guy Alcala g_alcala@junkpostoffic
Chris, could I know the source of your loss rate figures? Part of a project I'm working on. I've been plugging away at a history of the air war in the MTO off and on for some years and got curious about operations in other theaters and how they compared. Whether B-25 or B-26, losses track pretty closely with mission profile. For example, the 319th, a B-26 group sent to the MTO, was trained in low-level attacks. But after less than three months, losses were so severe that it was withdrawn from combat and retrained in medium altitude bombardment, after which losses plummeted. The 310th, a B-25 outfit, was somewhat similar, although it kept a specialized low-level squadron for sea sweeps for a long time. Whether B-25 or B-26, used as medium altitude bombers, losses were in the roughly one per 150-200 sortie range and 3-4 times higher when they went down on the deck. B-26 losses were higher than B-25 losses in the MTO. I suspect the biggest reason was better single-engine performance by the B-25. B-26s also had much higher abort figures than the B-25, several times higher, in fact. I suspect better reliability and easier maintenance of the B-25s Wright engines, played some role in this, but more important likely was the problems the B-26 had with its electrically operated props, so that a generator failure would lead to a mission abort. Conversely, in the Pacific, with the B-25 groups flying low-level missions, the hydraulicly operated props caused losses. Typically, a plane would take a hit in the oil cooler and start losing oil. Had the plane been at 10,000 feet, that engine's prop would have been feathered and the engine shut down. Good chance the old bird would make it home or to an emergency field. But on the deck shutting down the engine was not an option. The plane had to maintain power on both engines until it got clear of the target. Unfortunately, by that time, oil pressure might well have dropped so low that the prop couldn't be feathered. The B-25 had good short field performance compared to the B-26. That made it more desirable in the rougher theaters of operation. Turnaround time on the B-25 was quicker as well, so that it was possible when needed, say as during the Anzio invasion, for a single plane to fly multiple sorties in a single day. Maximum lifting capability was around two-thirds greater (depending somewhat on models compared) for the B-25 compared to the B-26, basically meaning that B-25s could stagger into the air with seemingly impossible loads. Thus, in the Pacific, you would have B-25s staging out of Palawan flying missions to bomb shipping in Saigon, staying in the air 10 or 11 hours. All the B-26 units in Italy were eventually phased out, as they had been in the Pacific, so that eventually B-26s only operated in the ETO. Chris Mark |
#110
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WalterM140 wrote:
The Brits ignored American advice on how to use the B-17. Admittedly, the B-17C was not ready for the big leagues. Could that be why they ignored the advice? Perhaps. I'll suggest that there was -no way- given the British experience in WWI that they were going to the heavy daylight bomber route in WWI. And I don't blame them a bit for that. Assuming that your second "WWI" above should read "WWII", I'd point out that the Brits did go the "heavy daylight bomber route" in WW II, initially and later. Losses on the early raids to Wilhelmshaven etc. by Wellingtons (both 'heavies', and reasonably well-armed by the standards of the day) convinced them that "self-defending bomber formations" weren't. They lacked a long-range escort fighter at the time, and the BoB delayed any development of same, but they continued to fly some daylight missions with heavies, within escort range by Stirlings in 1941 and '42, beyond escort range by Lancs in 1942. The latter were more in the nature of special missions, but the escorted Stirling missions were relatively routine. The Stirling was ill-suited to daylight missions against well-defended targets, but the RAF did give the missions a tryout. And after air superiority had been won and escort could be provided, the heavies flew an increasing percentage of daylight missions in 1944 and 1945. Guy |
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