Osama bin Laaden

OT - FYI - What happens with al Qaeda will directly effect our ability
to fly without the onerous restrictions that now exist.

Big John
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THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
07 January 2004

Summary

The release of a new tape by Osama bin Laden is always an
important event. The most recent one is particularly important because
of the tone it takes. It is far from resigned, but it is a gloomy
analysis of al Qaeda's situation, focusing on the failure of Saudi
Arabia and the Gulf states to resist the United States. Al Qaeda has a
great deal to be gloomy about. Events were very much moving in its
favor since the U.S. invasion of Iraq. But December was a terrible
month for al Qaeda: The United States began to gain control over the
insurrection, and the diplomatic situation in the region began to
shift in the U.S. favor. Al Qaeda has a problem and is searching for a
solution.

Analysis

Osama bin Laden released a new audio tape during the week of
Jan. 5. It was different in tone and focus than prior tapes. The focus
was less on the United States, Israel or Kashmir than on the Arab
world in general and the Arabian Peninsula in particular. The tone was
bleak and filled with anger at betrayal by Arab rulers. It represents
an honest assessment of the war from al Qaeda's view, and it reveals
the war is not going well for them.
Among the things bin Laden said: "O Muslims: The situation is
serious and the misfortune is
momentous. By God, I am keen on safeguarding your religion and your
worldly life. So, lend me your ears and open up your hearts to me so
that we may examine these pitch-black misfortunes and so that we may
consider how we can find a way out of these adversities and
calamities.... These (Gulf) states came to America's help and backed
it in its attack against an Arab state which is bound to them with
covenants of joint defense agreement ... they finally submitted and
succumbed to U.S. pressure and opened their air, land and sea bases to
contribute toward the U.S. campaign, despite the immense repercussions
of this move. Most important of these repercussions is that this is a
sin against one of the Islamic tenets..."
Based on the above, the extent of the real danger -- which the
region in general and the Arabian Peninsula in particular is being
exposed to -- has appeared. It has become clear that the rulers are
not qualified to apply the religion and defend the Muslims. In fact,
they have provided evidence that they are implementing the schemes of
the enemies of the nation and religion and that they are qualified to
abandon the countries and peoples.
This is the essential tone of the entire statement: A serious
misfortune has befallen the Islamic world. The responsibility rests
with Arab rulers in general and on Saudi Arabia in particular. It was
their collaboration with the United States that created these
"pitch-black misfortunes" and forced al Qaeda to search for a way out
of the "adversities and calamities." It is far from a declaration of
surrender, but it is also far from the defiant triumphalism of earlier
statements.
To understand bin Laden's mood, it is important to look at the
war from a strategic standpoint. The United States mounted an
effective invasion of Iraq, using Kuwait as a base of operations, and
with the overt or covert cooperation of all other contiguous Arab
nations, including Saudi Arabia. The United States was surprised by
the coherence and tempo of operations of the Iraqi guerrillas, but the
insurrection never moved outside the country's Sunni areas in any
substantial way and therefore was confined to a relatively small part
of Iraq. Even in this region, after several months of indecisive and
ineffective action, the United States mounted a counteroffensive after
Ramadan that resulted in a substantial decline in guerrilla operations
north of Baghdad, and a much less intense tempo of operations in
Baghdad and to the west.
Iraq's internal politics also have moved in an unsatisfactory
direction. The majority Shia, in a vague alliance with the Kurds, have
not so much supported the United States as opposed the Sunnis. They
also have no use for the foreign jihadists moving into Iraq. They are
prepared to cooperate with the Americans, exchanging support now for
control of the government later. The Sunni sheikhs, observing the
deterioration of the guerrillas' military situation, are repositioning
themselves, making deals with the Americans. The prospect of Shiite
domination without any U.S. goodwill cushioning that process is more
frightening to the Sunnis than the guerrilla movement. Therefore, the
Baathist guerrilla movement is under severe pressure, while the
foreign jihadists operating without the Baathists have no roots in
Iraq, nor does the Sunni leadership welcome them. Therefore, al
Qaeda's hope of bogging down the United States in Iraq as they bogged
down the Soviets in Afghanistan is disappearing.
The broader strategic situation is even more unsatisfactory. Al
Qaeda was hoping that Sept. 11 would trigger a massive rising among
the Islamic masses, toppling regimes that were collaborating with the
United States and forcing others to change their policies. That simply
hasn't happened. Some expected the invasion of Iraq to generate a
massive upheaval in the Islamic world. It didn't. Whatever the
feelings of the Islamic masses, they have not translated into a
massive political moment.
Quite the contrary: The movement in the Islamic world has been
toward collaboration with the United States. The most important case
is Iran, which has been moving toward such an alignment since
September 2003, in a process that broke into public view after the
earthquake in Bam. The Iraqi Shiite leadership has generally close
ties to Iran, forged during years of exile and struggle against Saddam
Hussein. Their accommodation with the United States and participation
in the Iraqi Governing Council would not have taken place without
Iran's approval. Iran's nterests are geopolitical. The United States,
seeking a solution to the Iraqi guerrilla war, induced Iranian-Shiite
cooperation by
promising a Shiite-dominated government in Iraq that certainly would
be, if not a satellite, a buffer on Iran's western flank.
The Iranian shift increased Saudi Arabia's dependence upon the
United States. Saudi Arabia's nightmare is Iran as the dominant
regional power without a Saudi security guarantee from the United
States. That is precisely the direction events were going this past
fall. Saudi Arabia grudgingly accommodated the United States before
the war. Afterward, as the guerrilla movement intensified in Iraq, the
United States turned to Iran, further eroding Saudi security. As this
process took place, the Saudis had to move against al Qaeda in the
kingdom. This was a fundamental U.S. goal in its invasion of Iraq. It
did not happen quite the way the United States might have wanted it,
but it did happen. The Saudis
and the other Gulf states have moved aggressively to accommodate U.S.
interests -- including attacking al Qaeda throughout the region.
The avalanche of bad news did not stop there. Libya, fully
aware of the trends in the region, decided this was a propitious time
to move closer to the United States. In the Arab world, only Syria
remained outside the process. The Syrians had badly misread the
situation during last summer, betting that the United States would get
bogged down in Iraq. They bet on the guerrillas. Suddenly, as December
wore on, they realized that they had not only guessed wrong, but had
become completely isolated in the Arab world and surrounded on all
sides by enemies. Damascus began to make accommodating gestures as the
New Year began, inviting Likud Knesset members to Damascus and sending
President Bashar al-Assad off to Turkey.
In Pakistan, jihadists tried -- and failed -- twice to kill
President Gen. Pervez Musharraf. The danger to Musharraf's life did
not prevent him from reaching out to India in a peace process, nor did
the attempts trigger a military or popular
rising against him. Al Qaeda knows that the culminating battle of the
war will be waged in northwestern Pakistan when U.S. forces go after
Osama bin Laden and his command cells. They must topple Musharraf to
generate a major obstacle to U.S. plans. Therefore, the jihadists must
get Musharraf. So far, they have failed.
At the moment, nothing is going al Qaeda's way. That does not
mean al Qaeda is defeated. The war isn't over 'til it's over, and as
the United States is showing in Iraq, reversals in war are common; the
measure of victory is how quickly and effectively one adjusts to the
reality and creates a new strategy. Al Qaeda has clearly lost the
first round; it is readying for the second.
This second round appears to consist of two parts. One has been
clearly defined: Al Qaeda will try to bring down the Saudi government.
Riyadh's assault on al Qaeda certainly has hurt the group, but it has
not destroyed it. The Wahhabi zeal -- which has fueled al Qaeda -- has
its home in Saudi Arabia and is deeply rooted there. Opposition to the
Saudi regime is not trivial. Whether al Qaeda can overthrow the
regime is unclear, but bin Laden's statements make it clear that this
is where his focus will be.
There is then the question of an attack on the United States.
Bin Laden concedes that Sept. 11 failed to achieve al Qaeda's
strategic goals. In fact, events since then have moved in just the
opposite direction. The problem was the lack of political preparation
in the Islamic world. The weakness among Arab regimes generally and
Saudi Arabia particularly meant that the U.S. response -- rather than
triggering massive anti-American resistance -- resulted in broad-based
collaboration.
Another attack on the United States on the same order as Sept.
11 is not likely to succeed either, since collaboration has
intensified. Given that al Qaeda does not intend simply to kill
Americans, but rather to achieve political goals in the Islamic world
by killing Americans, an attack at this moment squanders resources
without achieving the wanted goal. At the same time, al Qaeda must
demonstrate that it has a way out of the "pitch-black misfortunes"
that have befallen it. It must do something, and do it quickly.
Overthrowing the Saudi regime is not going to happen
soon.
From a strictly strategic viewpoint, al Qaeda should postpone
attacking the United States until it can reshape the politics of the
Saudi peninsula. From a political viewpoint, the more impotent al
Qaeda appears, the less its chances to achieve that political
redefinition. It is caught in a chicken-or-egg problem -- and time,
most definitely, is not on al Qaeda's side.
One solution would be what we would call a trans-Sept. 11
attack -- an attack that dwarfed Sept. 11 in significance. Obviously a
nuclear, biological or chemical attack designed to cause enormous
casualties would be such an attack and potentially -- and we emphasize
potentially -- would accomplish two things. It might reinvigorate al
Qaeda in the Islamic world by reinforcing its capabilities and
competence -- neither is highly respected at the moment -- thus
contributing to the political reality bin Laden spoke of. Second, it
might -- in al Qaeda's mind -- convince the American public that the
price of fighting al Qaeda is too high. There is a risk, of course.
The Islamic masses might well take the same course that followed Sept.
11: vigorous conversation coupled with inaction, and the American
public might want blood
instead of withdrawal.
A serious question is whether al Qaeda can pull off a
trans-Sept.11 attack. It might be forced to go for a Sept. 11-type
attack because that is the best available. Or, alternatively, it might
decide to avoid any attacks in the United States, opting instead to
focus resources on the struggle in Saudi Arabia and on bringing down
Musharraf in Pakistan.
These are some of al Qaeda's choices. Which it will choose is
an open question. What is clear is that al Qaeda is at a crossroads
and -- like the United States in the spring of 2002 -- it does not
have really good choices, and therefore, must choose the best of a bad
lot. Al Qaeda's original war plan is obsolete. The straight line it
drew from Sept. 11 to the Caliphate has hit a wall. Bin Laden knows
it. He doesn't have a good Plan B, but he will have to cook one up
anyway. The war is not over, but for the moment, it is al Qaeda's turn
to sweat out a solution to a difficult strategic problem. If they
can't do that, then the war could very well be over, at least for this
generation.
.................................................. ................

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"Big John" wrote in message
...
OT - FYI - What happens with al Qaeda will directly effect our ability
to fly without the onerous restrictions that now exist.

Big John

`````````````````````````````````````````````````` ``````````````````````````
```````````````````````````````````

THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
07 January 2004

Summary

The release of a new tape by Osama bin Laden is always an
important event. The most recent one is particularly important because
of the tone it takes.

Snip
This information is provided by PURE PURSUIT as a service to
members of the Military and Air Defense Community with the purpose of
offering relevant and timely information on defense, aviation,
emergency, and terrorism issues. Posts may be forwarded to other
individuals, organizations and lists for non-commercial purposes. For
new subscriptions, or to unsubscribe, please send an e-mail to Nena
Wiley at :


Interesting stuff. Keep us posted.
--
Jim in NC

Morgans

This is pretty deep stuff but not what is being posted by the main
stream media.

As you may have noticed, they have changed their tactics and when we
change ours they may have to change again.

Most of my contacts in the Military (down to GI's at the end of the
food chain) are optimistic.

Enough. Any more that can be attached to or effect GA flying I will
try to extract and post.


Big John
Pilot ROCAF


On Sun, 11 Jan 2004 00:41:35 -0800, "Morgans"
wrote:


"Big John" wrote in message
.. .
OT - FYI - What happens with al Qaeda will directly effect our ability
to fly without the onerous restrictions that now exist.

Big John

````````````````````````````````````````````````` ```````````````````````````
```````````````````````````````````

THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
07 January 2004

Summary

The release of a new tape by Osama bin Laden is always an
important event. The most recent one is particularly important because
of the tone it takes.

Snip
This information is provided by PURE PURSUIT as a service to
members of the Military and Air Defense Community with the purpose of
offering relevant and timely information on defense, aviation,
emergency, and terrorism issues. Posts may be forwarded to other
individuals, organizations and lists for non-commercial purposes. For
new subscriptions, or to unsubscribe, please send an e-mail to Nena
Wiley at :


Interesting stuff. Keep us posted.