Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944

The Brits are hyper-defensive about the effect on target. The German war
machine was not significantly hindered by the British Area Campaign. The
Germans expended much fewer resources to defend than the Brits did to
atttack.

Remind us again about the numbers of AA personnel and 88mm that were
considered necessary?


The Germans used Hitler Youth, Russian POW's, impressed workers, and even women
in the Flak batteries.

The RAF was immolating its finest young men.

And although the resources put into the flak guns, ancillary equipment and the
ammo were considerable, that was nothing like the resources put into Bomber
Command.

And that huge investment, almost 1/3 of the whole British war effort, had
little relative return.

Further, Harris resisted at least for a year putting BC onto more useful
targets.

Walt

The British used B-17s in combat before we ever did. They were B-17Cs which
were used by day, but proved to be less than wonderful.

The Brits ignored American advice on how to use the B-17. Admittedly, the
B-17C was not ready for the big leagues.

Walt

ArtKramr wrote:

Subject: Night bombers interception....
From: Andrew Chaplin
Date: 7/16/2004 12:16 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

I think the expression you're looking for is also a title to an
excellent book on Canadian war art: A Terrible Beauty.

Yup. Great title.

I am pretty sure Heather Robertson, the author of _A Terrible Beauty :
the art of Canada at war_, pinched it from William Butler Yeats's
"Easter, 1916":

Too long a sacrifice
Can make a stone of the heart.
O when may it suffice?
That is heaven's part, our part
To murmur name upon name,
As a mother names her child
When sleep at last has come
On limbs that had run wild.
What is it but nightfall?
No, no, not night but death;
Was it needless death after all?
For England may keep faith
For all that is done and said.
We know their dream; enough
To know they dreamed and are dead.
And what if excess of love
Bewildered them till they died?
I write it out in a verse --
MacDonagh and MacBride
And Connolly and Pearse
Now and in time to be,
Wherever green is worn,
Are changed, changed utterly:
A terrible beauty is born.
--
Andrew Chaplin
SIT MIHI GLADIUS SICUT SANCTO MARTINO
(If you're going to e-mail me, you'll have to get "yourfinger." out.)

In message , WalterM140
writes
The British used B-17s in combat before we ever did. They were B-17Cs which
were used by day, but proved to be less than wonderful.

The Brits ignored American advice on how to use the B-17. Admittedly, the
B-17C was not ready for the big leagues.

Could that be why they ignored the advice?

Mike
--
M.J.Powell

It would have been quite easy to stop P-38 escorts in 1943, just attack
them early, and force them to jettison their external tanks, they were
carrying about as much or more fuel externally than internally.

It was -shown- that even a few dozen P-38's had a very delerious effect on the
tactics of the German day fighters.

There's no "it would have been quite easy to..." to it. What you suggest was
not a factor.

Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in
May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly
expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF
deployed against Germany and include reserves etc.

Thanks for the minutia.

The point is that Eaker and Hunter, 8th BC and 8th FC CGs respectively could
have stressed long range escorts and pushed P-38 enhancements, stressed
solving the technical problems, and so forth in 1942. P-38's were available in
England in 1942.

Eaker and Hunter didn't do that.

Eaker was not the only one and he did ask for long range tanks on
his fighters. It is not a simple good guy/bad guy situation.

Eaker dawdled on it. It wasn't important to him.

Eaker thought the B-17's could defend themselves until very late in the game.

He -was- sacked, after all.

Eaker even suggested that the first Mustang groups go to the 9th AF. He didn't
understand the problem. He didn't allow for improvements and reinforcments of
the German AF. P-38's of longer range and better reliability could have been
provided well before they were. An all P-38 force could have done what a mixed
P-47, P-51 and P-38 force DID do-- wreck the German day fighter force. -- if
it had been stressed earlier. But it was not.

Now, you'll dispute this of course. But the problems the long range escorts
gave the Germans rested on this:

The Germans had to up-armor and up-arm their single engine fighters and add
twin engine bomber destroyers to the mix, in order to kill B-17's in large
numbers. -Any- of the three main US fighters on the scene (P-38, P-47,
P-51)could have made that up-armoring and use of the twin engine bomber
destroyers impractical.

Walt

Subject: Night bombers interception....
From: Andrew Chaplin
Date: 7/17/2004 7:48 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

ArtKramr wrote:

Subject: Night bombers interception....
From: Andrew Chaplin
Date: 7/16/2004 12:16 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

I think the expression you're looking for is also a title to an
excellent book on Canadian war art: A Terrible Beauty.

Yup. Great title.

I am pretty sure Heather Robertson, the author of _A Terrible Beauty :
the art of Canada at war_, pinched it from William Butler Yeats's
"Easter, 1916":

Too long a sacrifice
Can make a stone of the heart.
O when may it suffice?
That is heaven's part, our part
To murmur name upon name,
As a mother names her child
When sleep at last has come
On limbs that had run wild.
What is it but nightfall?
No, no, not night but death;
Was it needless death after all?
For England may keep faith
For all that is done and said.
We know their dream; enough
To know they dreamed and are dead.
And what if excess of love
Bewildered them till they died?
I write it out in a verse --
MacDonagh and MacBride
And Connolly and Pearse
Now and in time to be,
Wherever green is worn,
Are changed, changed utterly:
A terrible beauty is born.
--
Andrew Chaplin
SIT MIHI GLADIUS SICUT SANCTO MARTINO
(If you're going to e-mail me, you'll have to get "yourfinger." out.)



The poem itself is a terrible beauty


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

From: smartace11@

My origninal question was mainly
about whether different run in headings between flights would have avoided
some
aimed AAA and possibly flack concentrations

More than likely. But medium bomber loss rates in Europe, especially as the
war progressed, were reasonably low. Ovrall, in the MTO, the B-26 loss rate
was one per 148 combat sorties and in the ETO one per 210 sorties. The B-25
loss rate in the MTO was one per 164 sorties, and in the Pacific one per 52
sorties.
Both the B-17 and B-24 in the ETO had loss rates of about one per 62 sorties.
Of course, these general figures hide some interesting details. For example.
The B-26 loss per sortie rate in the early days against the Japanese (attacks
against Lae, Salamaua and Rabaul) was one per 24 sorties and for B-25s one per
19. During the first year of MTO operations (June 42-June 43, the North
African phase) the loss rate for B-26s was one per 20 sorties, for the B-25 one
per 43 sorties.
In general, in whatever theater, low-level missions were killers. In the MTO
and the ETO, the medium groups largely abandoned these tactics except for
specific needs, while in the Pacific they used them extensively throughout the
war.


Chris Mark

WalterM140 wrote:

It would have been quite easy to stop P-38 escorts in 1943, just attack
them early, and force them to jettison their external tanks, they were
carrying about as much or more fuel externally than internally.

It was -shown- that even a few dozen P-38's had a very delerious effect on the
tactics of the German day fighters.

There's no "it would have been quite easy to..." to it. What you suggest was
not a factor.

Only because the Germans rarely did so. U.S. fighter commanders were surprised
that they didn't try it more often, because it was so obviously a good idea.
Indeed, the Luftwaffe had tried to do so for a while, but heavy singl-engine
fighter losses (against P-47s) had resulted in an order from either Goring or
Schmidt (I forget which) sometime in the late-43 early '44 period (I forget) to
cease such attacks and move the fighters back. A bad decision.

BTW, ISTR for Geoffrey's info that the early J models were all retrofitted with
leading edge tanks either shortly before or shortly after achieving IOC in the ETO.

Also P-38 numbers grew from 302 in December 1942 to 567 in
May 1943 then declined to 372 in October 1943 before rapidly
expanding to 1,063 in April 1944. The numbers are for the USAAF
deployed against Germany and include reserves etc.

Thanks for the minutia.

Not minutia in this case, but very germane, as the lack of P-38 numbers was a
factor. Production was very limited at the time. Then there's the extra training
time for multi-engine, which would add some additional delay to getting units
operational/providing replacement pilots.

The point is that Eaker and Hunter, 8th BC and 8th FC CGs respectively could
have stressed long range escorts and pushed P-38 enhancements, stressed
solving the technical problems, and so forth in 1942. P-38's were available in
England in 1942.

Eaker and Hunter didn't do that.

While Eaker and Hunter were doctrinally blind to the need for far too long, the
need for a long-range fighter in the ETO in 1942 was hardly obvious given the
shallow penetrations we were making at the time. Arnold ordered Giles to increase
the internal fuel of the fighters around June '43 IIRR (don't have the reference,
"To Command The Sky" by McFarland and Newton, handy), giving him six months to
achieve it. Besides the P-38 was only in the ETO for a couple of months before
they were all sent to the Med.

I consider one of the great historical "what ifs" to be what if at least some P-38s
had remained in the 8th from November 1942 until September '43 (we'd have to assume
that P-38 production was sufficient that the 78th FG wouldn't have had its P-38s
stripped from it and sent to the Med as attrition replacements, so they weren't
forced to transition to the P-47). Would we have been able to fix the P-38's high
altitude/cold and wet climate problems prior to the availability of the P-51?

As it is, we know from Zemke that turbosupercharger control freeze-up was still an
issue in August _1944_ (IIRR he was flying a J-15), despite the problem being
identified no later than when the 55th FG had gone operational in mid-October '43.
Even assuming that the problems (engines, turbo controls, cockpit heat, dive flaps;
the boosted ailerons were a 'nice to have') had been fixed earlier, was it possible
to produce enough P-38s in that period to supply the needs of the PTO, MTO _and_
ETO? It seems unlikely, given the relatively low production totals of the P-38
compared to the single-engine a/c, and cost -- both the P-47 and P-38 cost about
double the P-51 to build in money, materiel and man-hours; fuel requirements were
also about double.


Eaker was not the only one and he did ask for long range tanks on
his fighters. It is not a simple good guy/bad guy situation.

Eaker dawdled on it. It wasn't important to him.

Eaker thought the B-17's could defend themselves until very late in the game.

He -was- sacked, after all.

True.

Eaker even suggested that the first Mustang groups go to the 9th AF. He didn't
understand the problem. He didn't allow for improvements and reinforcments of
the German AF. P-38's of longer range and better reliability could have been
provided well before they were. An all P-38 force could have done what a mixed
P-47, P-51 and P-38 force DID do-- wreck the German day fighter force. -- if
it had been stressed earlier. But it was not.

Assuming that the numbers had been available, which seems questionable, but I agree
with your basic idea.

Now, you'll dispute this of course.

I doubt Geoffrey will, as he's been mostly agreeing with you.

But the problems the long range escorts
gave the Germans rested on this:

The Germans had to up-armor and up-arm their single engine fighters and add
twin engine bomber destroyers to the mix, in order to kill B-17's in large
numbers. -Any- of the three main US fighters on the scene (P-38, P-47,
P-51)could have made that up-armoring and use of the twin engine bomber
destroyers impractical.

Assuming they had the internal fuel capacity, and that took time to get into
production and service even after it was given top priority by Arnold.

Guy

Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: ost (Chris Mark)
Date: 7/17/2004 10:09 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

From: smartace11@

My origninal question was mainly
about whether different run in headings between flights would have avoided
some
aimed AAA and possibly flack concentrations

More than likely. But medium bomber loss rates in Europe, especially as the
war progressed, were reasonably low. Ovrall, in the MTO, the B-26 loss rate
was one per 148 combat sorties and in the ETO one per 210 sorties. The B-25
loss rate in the MTO was one per 164 sorties, and in the Pacific one per 52
sorties.
Both the B-17 and B-24 in the ETO had loss rates of about one per 62 sorties.
Of course, these general figures hide some interesting details. For example.

The B-26 loss per sortie rate in the early days against the Japanese (attacks
against Lae, Salamaua and Rabaul) was one per 24 sorties and for B-25s one
per
19. During the first year of MTO operations (June 42-June 43, the North
African phase) the loss rate for B-26s was one per 20 sorties, for the B-25
one
per 43 sorties.
In general, in whatever theater, low-level missions were killers. In the MTO
and the ETO, the medium groups largely abandoned these tactics except for
specific needs, while in the Pacific they used them extensively throughout
the
war.


Chris Mark



The B-26's were unsuited to low level operations and were not used down on the
deck. The B-25's were fine on the deck and were used there. All B-25's were
pulled from the ETO and moved to the MTO and Pacific which accounts for the
numbers you quote.



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...
Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944
From: "Keith Willshaw"
Date: 7/16/2004 5:03 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:


"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...
Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944


We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly
turret.They
wouldn't take them. Big mistake.

The RAF operated at least one squadron of B-17's and a number of B-24's
Bomber command were NOT impressed by the type and operated them
mainly as EW aircraft jamming German communications

Keith


They were getting the **** shot out of them every night as they flew
planes
with no belly turrets. And hey used the planes with belly turrrets,
B-17's and
B-24's for electronic jammimg? Brilliant. Just brilliant.


It was since they Germans needed those electronic aids to
find them. Bottom line Art is that most hight bombers
never saw what killed them and no radar guided turrets
were then available.

The option then was fit a belly turret of doubtful utility
and to do so you have to remove the H2S Radar dome
you need to find the target.

Keith