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#11
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"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message ... On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 10:50:56 -0800, "Tarver Engineering" wrote: I see UAVs under the direct control of the men on the ground as the replacement for the A-10. Some sort of game boy type interface to designate targets would be all the human interface required. In that manner the tendancy of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions might be eliminated. That would take a quantum leap in sensor technology as well as an incredible level of logistic support. What you suggest would require some sort of UAV platoon attached to a maneuver element with pre-packaged UAV rounds, a launch/recovery capability, a cadre of trained operators, reload munitions, etc. etc. etc. Not a low-tech, mud-reliable sort of weapon. I fail to see how it is any different from an A-10, without the operator and operator support requirements. UAVs are already flying in US airspace using existing comercially available sensors. My vehicle in atonomous mode could come to the battle and then go home when exhasted. Such UAVs are already envisioned as loiterers, where a battle may occur in the future, or along a transportation link. Then there is the question of battle-field view. While the guy on the ground may be able to see the enemy immediately in front of him, he seldom knows what else is out there and threatening. That takes a detached, at altitude, observer. Hunkering in a foxhole or a tracked vehicle buttoned-up, looking at a 12.1 inch LCD display that reports what the eye in the nose of the UAV happens to be looking at is a difficult perspective from which to manipulate CAS. CAS is now done with a JDAM from a B-one at thousands of feet. The only thing that was holding back the technology was the moral issue of having a flying machine kill without an operator, but that was answered by CIA years ago. You proposal also doesn't address the complexities of airspace coordination for employment of a CAS system within the mix of aviation, indirect fire assets and direct fire from supporting or flanking units. Letting "game-boy" operators fly armed UAVs to deliver ordinance at the engagement level is not a trivial problem. Atonomous UAVs are the future, reguardless of the screeching of the fighter mafia. And, the "tendency of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions" is an unsupported cheap shot. The A-10 (and any other CAS system) has made few friendly fire mistakes. They happen, but it isn't epidemic. The A-10's record vs the rotary wing equivalents for blue on blue incidents is poor. I would rather blame the machine than the inter-service reality in this forum. |
#12
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On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 12:32:07 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote: "Ed Rasimus" wrote in message .. . On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 10:50:56 -0800, "Tarver Engineering" wrote: I see UAVs under the direct control of the men on the ground as the replacement for the A-10. Some sort of game boy type interface to designate targets would be all the human interface required. In that manner the tendancy of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions might be eliminated. That would take a quantum leap in sensor technology as well as an incredible level of logistic support. What you suggest would require some sort of UAV platoon attached to a maneuver element with pre-packaged UAV rounds, a launch/recovery capability, a cadre of trained operators, reload munitions, etc. etc. etc. Not a low-tech, mud-reliable sort of weapon. I fail to see how it is any different from an A-10, without the operator and operator support requirements. UAVs are already flying in US airspace using existing comercially available sensors. My vehicle in atonomous mode could come to the battle and then go home when exhasted. Such UAVs are already envisioned as loiterers, where a battle may occur in the future, or along a transportation link. OK, I misunderstood your initial post. When you said "direct control of the men on the ground" I assumed you were suggesting an organic UAV capability in the maneuver element. What you explain now, is simply a full-blown tactical system with everything but the pilot-in-the-loop. At some future time, data processing may make that practical, but right now the wetware is still the most size/weight effective solution. The loiterer doesn't seem a practical model over an ongoing engagement. Much too MANPAD intensive to be tolerated. Certainly the current use of UAVs as recce platforms or even very limited (due to small payload) interdiction systems is working well. CAS, however is often very critical in terms of "danger close" criteria, run-in directions, and other factors. Then there is the question of battle-field view. While the guy on the ground may be able to see the enemy immediately in front of him, he seldom knows what else is out there and threatening. That takes a detached, at altitude, observer. Hunkering in a foxhole or a tracked vehicle buttoned-up, looking at a 12.1 inch LCD display that reports what the eye in the nose of the UAV happens to be looking at is a difficult perspective from which to manipulate CAS. CAS is now done with a JDAM from a B-one at thousands of feet. The only thing that was holding back the technology was the moral issue of having a flying machine kill without an operator, but that was answered by CIA years ago. Some CAS is done from a heavy type at altitude with JDAM, but I think the questioner's phrase "Traditional CAS" refers to troops-in-contact and immediate fire support situations which may require a nose-to-nose look at the enemy. I'll be the first to agree that modern weapons with stand-off capability and high accuracy make the definitions of what CAS really is more debatable. I don't think there is any moral issue involved with or without an operator. If the targeting is against a military objective, I'm comfortable. You proposal also doesn't address the complexities of airspace coordination for employment of a CAS system within the mix of aviation, indirect fire assets and direct fire from supporting or flanking units. Letting "game-boy" operators fly armed UAVs to deliver ordinance at the engagement level is not a trivial problem. Atonomous UAVs are the future, reguardless of the screeching of the fighter mafia. I don't think I was screeching. I agree that there is a bright future for UAVs with increasing missions. But, I don't go so far as to accept the sensationalized concept of video game whiz-kids snapped off the back streets of the inner city to do the job. If you check out the operators of the current crop of UAVs, you'll find a lot of active and former fighter types. The hands and the mind still function pretty well long after the body quits tolerating the high-G environment. And, the "tendency of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions" is an unsupported cheap shot. The A-10 (and any other CAS system) has made few friendly fire mistakes. They happen, but it isn't epidemic. The A-10's record vs the rotary wing equivalents for blue on blue incidents is poor. I would rather blame the machine than the inter-service reality in this forum. Sorry, I won't accept that assertion. The A-10s record is very good with regard to CAS. And, there is nothing inherent about "the machine"--it is as vulnerable to fratricide mistakes as any other system. Taking the pilot out of the loop is the real issue and there's no evidence to indicate that the potential for fratricide goes down. I'd contend that taking the man out of the system will increase the probability of error. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" Smithsonian Institution Press ISBN #1-58834-103-8 |
#13
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"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message ... On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 12:32:07 -0800, "Tarver Engineering" wrote: "Ed Rasimus" wrote in message .. . On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 10:50:56 -0800, "Tarver Engineering" wrote: I see UAVs under the direct control of the men on the ground as the replacement for the A-10. Some sort of game boy type interface to designate targets would be all the human interface required. In that manner the tendancy of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions might be eliminated. That would take a quantum leap in sensor technology as well as an incredible level of logistic support. What you suggest would require some sort of UAV platoon attached to a maneuver element with pre-packaged UAV rounds, a launch/recovery capability, a cadre of trained operators, reload munitions, etc. etc. etc. Not a low-tech, mud-reliable sort of weapon. I fail to see how it is any different from an A-10, without the operator and operator support requirements. UAVs are already flying in US airspace using existing comercially available sensors. My vehicle in atonomous mode could come to the battle and then go home when exhasted. Such UAVs are already envisioned as loiterers, where a battle may occur in the future, or along a transportation link. OK, I misunderstood your initial post. When you said "direct control of the men on the ground" I assumed you were suggesting an organic UAV capability in the maneuver element. What you explain now, is simply a full-blown tactical system with everything but the pilot-in-the-loop. At some future time, data processing may make that practical, but right now the wetware is still the most size/weight effective solution. The ground operator would have the capability of designating targets and the ability to change the level of agression of the autonomous vehicle. I want to get pilots out of the mud, not send them into harm's way. There is a similar autonomous vehicle envisioned for the F-35, but it can wait until the F-22 is either produced, or cancelled. The loiterer doesn't seem a practical model over an ongoing engagement. Much too MANPAD intensive to be tolerated. Certainly the current use of UAVs as recce platforms or even very limited (due to small payload) interdiction systems is working well. CAS, however is often very critical in terms of "danger close" criteria, run-in directions, and other factors. The loiter vehicle is moving forward first, as it is funded for paper investigation of the idea. That way it stays out of the obvious reality check issues for "silver bullet" type assets. Then there is the question of battle-field view. While the guy on the ground may be able to see the enemy immediately in front of him, he seldom knows what else is out there and threatening. That takes a detached, at altitude, observer. Hunkering in a foxhole or a tracked vehicle buttoned-up, looking at a 12.1 inch LCD display that reports what the eye in the nose of the UAV happens to be looking at is a difficult perspective from which to manipulate CAS. CAS is now done with a JDAM from a B-one at thousands of feet. The only thing that was holding back the technology was the moral issue of having a flying machine kill without an operator, but that was answered by CIA years ago. Some CAS is done from a heavy type at altitude with JDAM, but I think the questioner's phrase "Traditional CAS" refers to troops-in-contact and immediate fire support situations which may require a nose-to-nose look at the enemy. I'll be the first to agree that modern weapons with stand-off capability and high accuracy make the definitions of what CAS really is more debatable. A 2000 pound bomb dropped accurate does the same job from 15,000 feet as it does from 200 feet; perhaps even better, as the man on the ground has better control of the target's coordinates. That is not always true, as my brother has a story of his company commander calling a strike on his own company's position, but that is another issue. The CO got his bronze star and never went out again. (ie heroin addict) I don't think there is any moral issue involved with or without an operator. If the targeting is against a military objective, I'm comfortable. How about a wedding? (Afghanistan) You proposal also doesn't address the complexities of airspace coordination for employment of a CAS system within the mix of aviation, indirect fire assets and direct fire from supporting or flanking units. Letting "game-boy" operators fly armed UAVs to deliver ordinance at the engagement level is not a trivial problem. Atonomous UAVs are the future, reguardless of the screeching of the fighter mafia. I don't think I was screeching. I agree that there is a bright future for UAVs with increasing missions. But, I don't go so far as to accept the sensationalized concept of video game whiz-kids snapped off the back streets of the inner city to do the job. If you check out the operators of the current crop of UAVs, you'll find a lot of active and former fighter types. The hands and the mind still function pretty well long after the body quits tolerating the high-G environment. Which is why we are discussing autonomous vehicles for filling the role of "traditional CAS". I have the impression that the Infantry is as pleased to stay out of that type of situation as a fighter pilot is to have BVR weapons. And, the "tendency of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions" is an unsupported cheap shot. The A-10 (and any other CAS system) has made few friendly fire mistakes. They happen, but it isn't epidemic. The A-10's record vs the rotary wing equivalents for blue on blue incidents is poor. I would rather blame the machine than the inter-service reality in this forum. Sorry, I won't accept that assertion. The A-10s record is very good with regard to CAS. Not as good as the Army's own rotary wings. And, there is nothing inherent about "the machine"--it is as vulnerable to fratricide mistakes as any other system. That depends on how well the operator can see the battle and follow instructions. Taking the pilot out of the loop is the real issue and there's no evidence to indicate that the potential for fratricide goes down. The Army's own assets are statistically less likely to blue on blue. I'd contend that taking the man out of the system will increase the probability of error. My man is on the ground, saving his own life. Do you think Cleland was fragged? |
#14
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On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 13:44:13 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote: Do you think Cleland was fragged? No, Cleland was a victim of his own clumsiness. He dropped the grenade out of his own hand. That story is pretty well known. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" Smithsonian Institution Press ISBN #1-58834-103-8 |
#15
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Ed Rasimus wrote: On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 13:44:13 -0800, "Tarver Engineering" wrote: Do you think Cleland was fragged? No, Cleland was a victim of his own clumsiness. He dropped the grenade out of his own hand. That story is pretty well known. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" Smithsonian Institution Press ISBN #1-58834-103-8 Actually, recently the story was changed due to another soldier coming forth and admitting that it was his grenade, and that he had straightened the pin, having been told that was the warrior like thing to do. The story was well covered here in Georgia. I guess I could find a link if you wish. Bob McKellar, former Cleland constituent |
#16
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On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 18:42:08 GMT, "Thomas Schoene"
wrote: In general, however, the Navy is migrating to no gun-based CIWS at all. LPD-17 has just RAM and 30mm Mk 46 turrets for small-baot defense. Unless things change from what was shown at concept design, DD(X) will have 40mm guns for close-in defnse, but not for anti-missile duties. If they do change, I think the most likely swap will be to 30mm MK 46 turrets in place of the 40mm, but still with no missile-defense role. For anti-missile defense, it will rely on ESSM. What's the 40mm proposed for the DD(X)? I had assumed from the few concept drawings they'd be using the Mk 46 turrets for commonality to start with. --- Peter Kemp Life is short - drink faster |
#17
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"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message ... On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 12:32:07 -0800, "Tarver Engineering" wrote: "Ed Rasimus" wrote in message .. . On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 10:50:56 -0800, "Tarver Engineering" wrote: I see UAVs under the direct control of the men on the ground as the replacement for the A-10. Some sort of game boy type interface to designate targets would be all the human interface required. In that manner the tendancy of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions might be eliminated. That would take a quantum leap in sensor technology as well as an incredible level of logistic support. What you suggest would require some sort of UAV platoon attached to a maneuver element with pre-packaged UAV rounds, a launch/recovery capability, a cadre of trained operators, reload munitions, etc. etc. etc. Not a low-tech, mud-reliable sort of weapon. I fail to see how it is any different from an A-10, without the operator and operator support requirements. UAVs are already flying in US airspace using existing comercially available sensors. My vehicle in atonomous mode could come to the battle and then go home when exhasted. Such UAVs are already envisioned as loiterers, where a battle may occur in the future, or along a transportation link. OK, I misunderstood your initial post. When you said "direct control of the men on the ground" I assumed you were suggesting an organic UAV capability in the maneuver element. What you explain now, is simply a full-blown tactical system with everything but the pilot-in-the-loop. At some future time, data processing may make that practical, but right now the wetware is still the most size/weight effective solution. Actually, the ground forces are well on their way to having UAV's as an organic element, even down to the platoon level. The USMC has already initiated production of the small Dragoneye, which is essentially about a two man load--the operator uses a laptop to control the aircraft and observe the intel feed (and no, it is unlikely to be any kind of weapons carrier). The Army has established a squadron/battalion sized ISR element to serve in its new Stryker Brigade Combat Teams, and I believe the plan is to have them operate their own small UAV's in the not-too-distant future. snip I don't think I was screeching. I agree that there is a bright future for UAVs with increasing missions. But, I don't go so far as to accept the sensationalized concept of video game whiz-kids snapped off the back streets of the inner city to do the job. If you check out the operators of the current crop of UAVs, you'll find a lot of active and former fighter types. The hands and the mind still function pretty well long after the body quits tolerating the high-G environment. The objective right now for the ground forces is to get useful UAV's into operation at the lowest possible echelons. From what I have seen regarding Dragoneye, it is a pretty simple system to operate. I would imagine the Army's new focus on rotary UAV's will also emphasize ease of operation (I doubt the Army wants to commit rated pilots to flying its UAV's as the USAF has been doing); trying to attach additional qualified pilots to each and every meneuver brigade/battalion, etc., to operate their organic UAV's would impinge upon the pool of pilots available to fly the manned aircraft in the AVN BDE's. And, the "tendency of the A-10 to make blue on blue incursions" is an unsupported cheap shot. The A-10 (and any other CAS system) has made few friendly fire mistakes. They happen, but it isn't epidemic. The A-10's record vs the rotary wing equivalents for blue on blue incidents is poor. I would rather blame the machine than the inter-service reality in this forum. Sorry, I won't accept that assertion. You are correct there. IIRC there were two A-10 frat incidents during ODS (one engagement of a British Warrior AFV and one of a USMC LAV); on the other hand, there was also a rather nasty AH-64 frat incident (hit a Bradley IIRC). So there is no real preponderance of evidence to support the idea that the A-10 was "poor" in comparison to the rotary assets in this regard--one incident versus two incidents is statistically meaningless. The A-10s record is very good with regard to CAS. And, there is nothing inherent about "the machine"--it is as vulnerable to fratricide mistakes as any other system. Taking the pilot out of the loop is the real issue and there's no evidence to indicate that the potential for fratricide goes down. I'd contend that taking the man out of the system will increase the probability of error. Yep. It will be quite a while before the crunchies would be comfortable with the idea of autonomous UCAV's flying the CAS missions, especially those TIC missions you mentioned earlier. Brooks Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" Smithsonian Institution Press ISBN #1-58834-103-8 |
#18
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"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message ... On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 13:44:13 -0800, "Tarver Engineering" wrote: Do you think Cleland was fragged? No, Cleland was a victim of his own clumsiness. He dropped the grenade out of his own hand. That story is pretty well known. Actually, Ed, if you do a Google on it there is some evidence to support that may not have been the case. Cleland thought that was what must have happened, but another man who was on the ground with him now claims it was another individual who dropped the grenade. Nobody can no for sure, and it really does not matter in the end. Brooks Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" Smithsonian Institution Press ISBN #1-58834-103-8 |
#19
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Peter Kemp wrote:
On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 18:42:08 GMT, "Thomas Schoene" wrote: In general, however, the Navy is migrating to no gun-based CIWS at all. LPD-17 has just RAM and 30mm Mk 46 turrets for small-baot defense. Unless things change from what was shown at concept design, DD(X) will have 40mm guns for close-in defnse, but not for anti-missile duties. If they do change, I think the most likely swap will be to 30mm MK 46 turrets in place of the 40mm, but still with no missile-defense role. For anti-missile defense, it will rely on ESSM. What's the 40mm proposed for the DD(X)? I had assumed from the few concept drawings they'd be using the Mk 46 turrets for commonality to start with. Northrop Grumman bid two Bofors 40mm Mk 3. (BIW proposed three 30mm Mk 46) In the latest pictures they're still there, sitting on top of the helo hangar in low-RCS enclosures. http://raytheon.com/businesses/rids/gallery/300_ddx.jpg (very big picture) But I will not be at all surprised to see them replaced by 30mm. -- Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail "Our country, right or wrong. When right, to be kept right, when wrong to be put right." - Senator Carl Schurz, 1872 |
#20
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On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 23:18:29 GMT, "Thomas Schoene"
wrote: Peter Kemp wrote: On Sun, 14 Mar 2004 18:42:08 GMT, "Thomas Schoene" wrote: In general, however, the Navy is migrating to no gun-based CIWS at all. LPD-17 has just RAM and 30mm Mk 46 turrets for small-baot defense. Unless things change from what was shown at concept design, DD(X) will have 40mm guns for close-in defnse, but not for anti-missile duties. If they do change, I think the most likely swap will be to 30mm MK 46 turrets in place of the 40mm, but still with no missile-defense role. For anti-missile defense, it will rely on ESSM. What's the 40mm proposed for the DD(X)? I had assumed from the few concept drawings they'd be using the Mk 46 turrets for commonality to start with. Northrop Grumman bid two Bofors 40mm Mk 3. (BIW proposed three 30mm Mk 46) In the latest pictures they're still there, sitting on top of the helo hangar in low-RCS enclosures. Thanks for the info and the pic Tom, much appreciated. --- Peter Kemp Life is short - drink faster |
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