America's Army Sucks, Fact

you need to study the US civil war and compare MCCLELLAN and Grant to
see why the US didnt like Monte. Grant lost way more people in one day
then MCCLELLAN would loose in his whole tour, but Mcclellan would not
gain any ground, Grant did. All

Overwhelming force (translationlenty of gun fodders) makes
Butchers like Grant or Sherman win and the finest officers North American
continent has ever seen like Lee,Forrest or Stuart lose.

WalterM140 wrote:

Reduce that dud rate to
zero and the whole Brit expeditionary force becomes POWs.

You could equally say reduce the dud rate to zero and the odds are good the
FAA
doesn't have any a/c left, because most of them have been shot down. The
reason so
few bombs detonated is because the FAA pilots had the normal instinct for
self-preservation, and usually flew as low and fast as they could to make the
job
of the defenses much harder. But this meant that bombs were often dropped
from
altitudes too low to allow sufficient time for fuse operation, so many of the
bombs
dudded, or the fuse delays were so long (to allow time for the wingmen to
clear the
target before the bombs exploded) that bombs which weren't stopped by
structure
inside the ship passed on through and out the other side before exploding.
The
whole reason for the defenses was to make the pilots more worried about
survival
than destroying their targets, thus increasing the incident of duds. CTG
317.0
(the amphibious shipping), Commodore Clapp, was very glad that the Argentine
pilots
were chosing to make level bomb runs instead of pop-up dive attacks, for just
that
reason.


Well, that's interesting, but it seems to indicate that the Brits were gambling
they could induce the Argintines to attack incorrectly. Not very prudent.

It wasn't a gamble at all, it was planned that way. Clapp had been a Buccaneer
observer and squadron commander, and he chose San Carlos Water for the landings and
set up the ships and land defenses to provide the Argentine pilots with just that
dilemma. The layout of the defenses was optimised to hit pilots making pop-up dive
attacks; British missiles would have been more effective as well, not being
bothered as much by ground clutter, and there would have been less worry about
having to check fire to avoid shooting up friendly troops/ships on the other side
of the water. As it was, the Argentine pilots chose to come in very low and fast,
limiting their acquisition time and the effectiveness of their attacks, but
improving their survival rate. Looked at objectively, they should have accepted
the higher losses of dive attacks for the potentially higher gains, but then that's
easy to say from the comfort of my chair.

You seem to agree that if -all- the bombs had detonated the Brit supporting
force would have been reduced below a level where the invasion could have been
supported.

Doubtful. Most of the bombs hit the escorts outside of San Carlos Water; some were
effectively knocked out of the war in any case, even though they weren't sunk.
Only two LSLs were hit by bombs in SCW, Sir Lancelot and Sir Galahad, and the
amount of damage caused if they'd gone off would have depended on where they hit
and what they were carrying at the time. If all the bombs had gone off then it's
possible that the British government might have decided that the cost was too high,
and it would almost certainly have delayed the ground forces. But they had lots of
reinforcing ships on the way, most of which arrived when the war was over or nearly
so, so their stores/equipment weren't needed. Argentina had no such second wave
capability. And Fuerza Aerea target priorities on D-Day sucked, which was
ultimately a far bigger problem than the dud bombs. Hitting the escorts didn't
delay the land campaign; hitting more of the supply ships before they could unload
would have.

Assuming that they'd ever been hit, the loss of Fearless would have caused a major
delay as she was the amphibious command ship, but her sister Intrepid could have
taken over, albeit at lower efficiency. Other than that, the Brits would have had
to lose a carrier; everything else (other than lives) was replaceable. As an
example, losing Atlantic Conveyor and the Chinook/Wessex helos she was bringing
down was the single most important blow to the campaign that the British suffered,
but her sister Atlantic Causeway arrived less than a week later, bringing another
28 or so helos with her (Wessex/Sea King). Another two ships were coming south
bringing more Chinooks and other helos, and arrived right about the time of the
surrender.

Guy

redc1c4 wrote:

Denyav wrote:

I wonder why Brits under command of incompetent Generals suffered much less
casaulties than US soldiers under command of military geniuses on D-Day?

because the US drew the toughest sectors?

No, because the Brits stopped for tea! Yes. Really. Folks who were there have
told me about it.

-- Charlie Springer

"W. D. Allen Sr." wrote:

For real soldiers, look other the other side of the Alantic, Britian.

By Jove! I think you are right. Is that a bunch of WOGs from Nepal I see?

Alistair Gunn wrote:

WalterM140 twisted the electrons to say:
Well, that's interesting, but it seems to indicate that the Brits
were gambling they could induce the Argintines to attack incorrectly.
Not very prudent.

The reason the Argentines came in low was Sea Dart, and the reason they
knew to come in at low to beat Sea Dart[1] was because they had two Type
42s of their own. However it's only prudent to assume that it if someone
sells you military kit that the version they sell you isn't as good as
the one they use themselves, so they might have been concerned that a
pop-up attack would have left them fatally exposed to Sea Dart[2]?

[1] Though I believe they was a successful engagement with Sea Dart
against a target at 50 feet?

Yes, in open water. Exeter claimed to have shot down at least one and
possibly two A-4Cs of Grupo 4, during the combined SuE/A-4 attack on 30? May
in which the Argentines believe (or claim to) that they hit HMS Invincible,
while the Brits say they never got close and actually overflew HMS Avenger,
missing her.

[2] Though, IRIC, the Type 42s (and HMS Bristol) where never deployed
into San Carlos Water.

Correct, although Antrim's Sea Slug also limited them somewhat. As a
practical matter, neither Sea Slug or Sea Dart was a factor in/around San
Carlos Water, as the Argentine a/c were coming in 50-100 nm on the deck; any
pop up would have been to clear the hills around the water, leaving far too
little time for the radar-guided area SAM systems to acquire. Exeter shot
down a Learjet while in SCW, but that a/c was cruising at 40,000 feet.
Coming in as low as the fighter-bombers did essentially limited the
engagements to visual detection/acquisition/tracking; even the Sea Wolf ships
usually had insufficient time to fire using radar control when inshore.
Rapier, OTOH, might well have done considerably better if the FAA had gone in
for pop-up dive attacks.

Guy

Well, that's interesting, but it seems to indicate that the Brits were
gambling
they could induce the Argintines to attack incorrectly. Not very prudent.

It wasn't a gamble at all, it was planned that way. Clapp had been a
Buccaneer
observer and squadron commander, and he chose San Carlos Water for the
landings and
set up the ships and land defenses to provide the Argentine pilots with just
that
dilemma. The layout of the defenses was optimised to hit pilots making
pop-up dive
attacks; British missiles would have been more effective as well, not being
bothered as much by ground clutter, and there would have been less worry
about
having to check fire to avoid shooting up friendly troops/ships on the other
side
of the water. As it was, the Argentine pilots chose to come in very low and
fast,
limiting their acquisition time and the effectiveness of their attacks, but
improving their survival rate. Looked at objectively, they should have
accepted
the higher losses of dive attacks for the potentially higher gains, but then
that's
easy to say from the comfort of my chair.

You seem to agree that if -all- the bombs had detonated the Brit supporting
force would have been reduced below a level where the invasion could have
been
supported.

Doubtful. Most of the bombs hit the escorts outside of San Carlos Water;
some were
effectively knocked out of the war in any case, even though they weren't
sunk.
Only two LSLs were hit by bombs in SCW, Sir Lancelot and Sir Galahad, and the
amount of damage caused if they'd gone off would have depended on where they
hit
and what they were carrying at the time. If all the bombs had gone off then
it's
possible that the British government might have decided that the cost was too
high,
and it would almost certainly have delayed the ground forces. But they had
lots of
reinforcing ships on the way, most of which arrived when the war was over or
nearly
so, so their stores/equipment weren't needed. Argentina had no such second
wave
capability. And Fuerza Aerea target priorities on D-Day sucked, which was
ultimately a far bigger problem than the dud bombs. Hitting the escorts
didn't
delay the land campaign; hitting more of the supply ships before they could
unload
would have.

Assuming that they'd ever been hit, the loss of Fearless would have caused a
major
delay as she was the amphibious command ship, but her sister Intrepid could
have
taken over, albeit at lower efficiency. Other than that, the Brits would have
had
to lose a carrier; everything else (other than lives) was replaceable. As an
example, losing Atlantic Conveyor and the Chinook/Wessex helos she was
bringing
down was the single most important blow to the campaign that the British
suffered,
but her sister Atlantic Causeway arrived less than a week later, bringing
another
28 or so helos with her (Wessex/Sea King). Another two ships were coming
south
bringing more Chinooks and other helos, and arrived right about the time of
the
surrender.

Guy


Sounds like good info. Thanks,

Walt

In message , John Mullen
writes
"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message
...
Which pale beside his achievements. Montogomery like Patton
was a prima-donna, a pain in the arse and an excellent
field commander. Like all generals he made mistakes but
got things more right than wrong.

The relationship betwen the two men is beautifully described in Chester
Wilmotts book... what ws it called? The Road to Europe maybe?

The Struggle for Europe.

--
He thinks too much: such men are dangerous.
Julius Caesar I:2

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

you need to study the US civil war and compare MCCLELLAN and Grant to
see why the US didnt like Monte. Grant lost way more people in one day
then MCCLELLAN would loose in his whole tour, but Mcclellan would not
gain any ground, Grant did. All

Overwhelming force (translationlenty of gun fodders) makes
Butchers like Grant or Sherman win and the finest officers North American
continent has ever seen like Lee,Forrest or Stuart lose.



More in one day? Didn't McClellan command at Antietam?

Bad civilian leadership will negate any military prowess. Look at the Germans.

The rebel government was extremely incompetent. State governments often just
ignored edicts from Richmond. The rebel government also had to resort to
conscription early on. When things started going badly, the rebel armies
largely faded away. There was little that the government in Richmond could do
to stop it.

Neither Grant nor Sherman were butchers. They were both masters of Maneuver.

In his campaign around Vicksburg, Grant used maneuver well and extensively to
defeat the rebels when they had generally more forces available than he did.
In the overland campaign, Grant constantly maneuvered around Lee's left. This
was ultimately successful. Grant did order the Cold Harbor assault. He
learned from that. Lee it was for 'hey-diddle-diddle-right up the middle'
tactics. He lost more men on every day of the Seven Days Battle than little
Mac did, and don't forget the third day at Gettysburg. No wonder Lee's army
was riven with desertion.

Sherman constantly turned the rebel forces out of ther positions during the
Atlanta campaign. After he left Atlanta, no sizeable rebel force opposed him
at all.

And don't forget Hood, who had seen that third days' attack at Gettyburg, yet
practically immolated his army at Franklin.



Walt

Of course Montgomery's incidental connection to the Dieppe raid pales when
compared to his other failures like not getting his D-Day onbjectives,
failing
to clear the approaches to Antwerp and Market-Garden.


Which pale beside his achievements. Montogomery like Patton
was a prima-donna, a pain in the arse and an excellent
field commander. Like all generals he made mistakes but
got things more right than wrong.

Keith


Montgomery has no -real- achievements.

His "victory" over the Afrika Korps at El Alamein came only after he had
overwhelming superiorty and the Germans ran out of gas.

Montogmery's ideas advanced not one whit from 1918 until the day he died.

"I think it true that Montgomery was completely formed as a soldier at the end
of the First World War. He did not grow after that. He became
increasingly
efficient, but he did not absorb a new idea. At fifty he was the same man he
had been at thirty."

--"Churchill and the Montgomery Myth" p. 92 by R.W. Thompson

Thompson continues:

"He read everything he could lay his hands upon that was relevant to his
profession, but some things appear to have been against his nature.
Outstanding among these things was his failure to grasp the theory of the
'expanding torrent' expounded by Liddell Hart. His whole essentially tidy mind
liked the 'set-piece' attack, and all went well until the breakthrough demanded
exploitation. Again and again his senior military friends hammered home the
vital necessity of swift exploitation of the breakthrough. He accepts it but
he cannot --think-- it, and he cannot do it...

[Montgomery wrote in 1924]

"I have not mentioned exploitation anywhere. Perhaps I should have done so,
and if I ever get out a revised edition I will do so. I was anxious not to
try and teach too much. The first thing to my mind is to get them to understand
the elementary principles of attack and defense. But I think you are probably
right, and exploitation should have been brought out."

Thompson continues:

"Seven years later Montgomery was still fighting shy of exploitation and the
expanding torrrent. His draft for the new Training Manual was sent to Liddell
Hart for criticism by Brigadier Fisher, Chief of Staff to General Sir David
Campbell, G.O.C- in C. Again the problems of exploiting success were not dealt
with. Liddell Hart sent his detailed comments and Fisher wrote:

'September 7, 1930

I had a long talk to Montgomery and we went carefully through your criticisms
with the new Infantry Training--with the result that the great
majority of them
are being incorporated in the final proof. The importance of the expanding
torrent are being specially emphasized...'

Yet when the new Training Manual appeared the problems of exploitation were
neither neither emphasized nor understood. Indeed by omissions of passages from
the old manual and the substitutions of new, the tactics of the First World War
were preserved."

--"Churchill and the Montgomery Myth" pp 90-91 by R.W. Thompson.

"Montgomery's failure to destroy the enemy at Alam Halfa must be a measure of
his capacity as a general. Alan Morehead, writing soon after these events, is
as emphatic as Horrocks about Montgomery's intentions:

'On one matter the C-in-C was especially emphatic. This was to be a static
battle. Except in the fluid gap in the south no-one was to budge an inch in
any direction. It did not matter if the enemy were routed; there was to be no
pursuit. Everyone must stand fast. The enemy must be beaten off and then left
alone.
The reason for this was that the real conflict with Rommel was going to
follow later on when everything was ready.'

-"Churchill and the Montgomery Myth" p.103 by R.W. Thompson

So Montgomery later generated 13,000 casualties when he didn't have to. Had he
hit the Afrika Korps in September, before it had a chance to prepare
defensively, he might have spared many of his men's lives. His combat power
relative to the Axis in this time frame was not likely to grow enough warrant a
delay. But if your mindset is stuck in World War One, and you feel you
personally must control as much as possible of everything that happens, then a
delay might be indicated.

Also consider:

"The British had such superiority in weapons, both in quality and quantity,
that they were able to force through any and every kind of operation... For
the rest, the British based their planning on the principal of exact
calculation, a principal which can only be followed where there is complete
material superiority. They actually undertook no -operations- but relied simply
and solely on the effect of their artillery and air force."

--Erwin Rommel

Montgomery is the most overrated general of all time.

Walt

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , John Mullen
writes
"Keith Willshaw" wrote in message
...
Which pale beside his achievements. Montogomery like Patton
was a prima-donna, a pain in the arse and an excellent
field commander. Like all generals he made mistakes but
got things more right than wrong.

The relationship betwen the two men is beautifully described in Chester
Wilmotts book... what ws it called? The Road to Europe maybe?

The Struggle for Europe.


That's the one!

Thanks.

John