CRS: V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft

Congressional Research Service =98 The Library of Congress
CRS Report for Congress

V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft
Updated August 4, 2005
Christopher Bolkcom
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft
Summary
The V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft, capable of vertical or short
take off and
landing, with forward flight like a conventional fixed-wing aircraft.
The MV-22 is
the Marine Corps' top aviation priority. Marine Corps leaders believe
that the
Osprey will provide them an unprecedented capability to quickly and
decisively
project power from well over the horizon. The Air Force's CV-22
version will be
used for special operations. Army officials have testified that the
service has no
requirement for the V-22, but he Navy has expressed interest in
purchasing MV-22s
for a variety of missions.
The V-22 program has been under development for over 25 years. Safety
and
maintenance concerns have arisen during this period (due in large part
to three fatal
accidents). The commander of the V-22 maintenance squadron admitted to
falsifying
maintenance records to make the aircraft appear more maintainable than
it was, and
three Marines were found guilty of misconduct. The program has
maintained support
from many in Congress despite these deficiencies. The program has
undergone
restructuring to accommodate congressional direction, budget
constraints, and
recommendations from outside experts, and DOD managers.
After a 17 month hiatus, the Osprey embarked on its second set of
flight tests
in May of 2002. Tests were completed in June 2005 to the satisfaction
of Navy
testers, who believe that the V-22 has resolved all technical and
engineering
problems identified in internal and external reviews. A decision on
full rate
production awaits approval by the DOD Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation
and the Defense Acquisition Board.
Supporters tout the V-22's potential operational capabilities
relative to the
helicopters it will replace. It will fly faster, farther and with more
payload than the
CH-46 Sea Knight the Marine Corps currently operate. They argue that
this
combination of attributes, coupled with the ability to take off and
land vertically will
provide the Marine Corps with new and potentially transformational
capabilities.
Detractors tend to emphasize the V-22's long development schedule,
its three fatal
accidents, and its high cost relative to the helicopters it will
replace. V-22 opponents
argue that modern helicopters also offer capabilities superior to the
CH-46's and
more cost effectively than the Osprey.
Through FY2005, $18.1 billion had been provided for the V-22 program.
The
Defense Department's Selected Acquisition Report of December 31,
2004, estimated
the total acquisition of a 458-aircraft program would be $50.5 billion,
which
translates into a program unit acquisition cost of $110 million per
Osprey.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
System Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Early Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Accidents and Fatalities Worsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Maintenance and Parts Falsifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Reviews and Restructuring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Current Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Key Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Should the Defense Department Procure the V-22 Aircraft? . . . . . . .
.. . . . 11
Main Arguments of Those Who Say "Yes" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. . . . . . 11
Main Arguments of Those Who Say "No" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. . . . . . 12
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix: V-22 Block Configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix: V-22 Block Configurations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
List of Figures
Figure 1. V-22 Osprey in Flight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
List of Tables
Table 1: V-22 Acquisition Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Table 2: Summary of V-22 FY2006 Congressional Action . . . . . . . . .
.. . . . . . . . 14
Table 3. Summary of V-22 FY2005 Congressional Action . . . . . . . . .
.. . . . . . . . 14
Table 3. Summary of V-22 FY2005 Congressional Action . . . . . . . . .
.. . . . . . . . 14
1 For example, February 17, 2005, Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Michael
Hagee
testified that "The MV-22 remains the Marine Corps number one
aviation acquisition
priority." Testimony available on House Armed Services Committee
website, at
[http://armedservices.house.gov/schedules/].
2 Lt. Gen. Frederick McCorkle, "Transforming Marine Aviation,"
Marine Corps Gazette,
May 2000, p.26.
V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft
Introduction
The V-22 Osprey is the Marine Corps' top aviation priority.1 Marine
Corps
leaders believe that the Osprey will provide them an unprecedented
capability to
quickly and decisively project power from well over the horizon. In the
words of one
former leader, its "...combination of increased payload with vastly
improved speed
and range make the Osprey the aircraft that defines the commander's
area of
influence as it relates to placing Marines on the ground."2 The
aircraft's promise,
however, has been dimmed by a series of challenges to its
affordability, safety, and
program management.
The V-22 tilt-rotor design combines the helicopter's operational
flexibility of
vertical take off and landing with the greater speed, range, and fuel
efficiency of a
turboprop aircraft. The V-22 Osprey takes off and lands vertically like
a helicopter
but flies like a fixed-wing aircraft by tilting its wing-mounted rotors
90 degrees
forward to function as propellers.
The V-22 is intended to perform a variety of Marine Corps and Air Force
missions, including troop and equipment transport, amphibious assault,
search and
rescue, and special operations. The Marines' MV-22 version can
transport 24
fully-equipped troops some 200 nautical miles (nm) at a speed of 250
knots (288
mi/h), exceeding the performance of the CH-46 medium-lift assault
helicopters the
MV-22 will replace. The Air Force's CV-22 version (with a range of
500 nm) will
be used for special operations. Army officials have testified that the
service has no
requirement for the V-22, but the Air Force has expressed strong
interest in the
CV-22 for its Special Operations Command, which plans to buy at least
50 CV-22s.
The Navy has expressed interest in purchasing MV-22s for a variety of
missions,
(e.g., personnel recovery, fleet logistic support, aerial refueling,
special warfare) but
has no funds budgeted in the current Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).
Developed and produced by Bell Helicopter Textron of Fort Worth, TX,
and
Boeing Helicopters of Philadelphia, PA, the aircraft is powered by two
T406
turboshaft engines produced by Allison Engine Company of Indianapolis,
IN, a
subsidiary of Rolls-Royce North America. Fuselage assembly will be
performed in
CRS-2
Philadelphia, PA. Drive system rotors and composite assembly will be
completed
in Fort Worth, TX, and final assembly and delivery will be completed in
Amarillo,
TX.
Through FY2005, $18.1 billion had been provided for the V-22 program.
The
Defense Department's Selected Acquisition Report of December 31,
2004, estimated
the total acquisition of a 458-aircraft program would be $50.5 billion,
which
translates into a program unit acquisition cost of $110 million per
Osprey. The
program acquisition cost includes funding for both development and
production of
the aircraft and related activities, whereas flyaway cost excludes
research-development cost, thus making such estimates significantly
lower than
estimates of total program acquisition cost.
On June 18, 2005, the MV-22 program completed its second round of
operational evaluation (OPEVAL) flight tests and Navy testers
recommended that
DOD declare it operationally suitable, and effective for military use.
DOD's Director
of Operational Test and Evaluation must also endorse the Osprey and the
Defense
Acquisition Board (DAB) must review the program before full-rate
production can
begin.
Background
The V-22 program has been under development for over 20 years. Safety
and
maintenance concerns have arisen during this period, but the program
has maintained
support from many in Congress nonetheless. The program has undergone
restructuring to accommodate recommendations from outside experts and
DOD
managers.
System Description
The V-22 is a tilt-rotor aircraft, capable of vertical or short take
off and landing,
with forward flight like a conventional fixed-wing aircraft. About 65%
of the
airframe is made of graphite-epoxy composite materials. The Marine
Corps's
MV-22 version will have the following characteristics:
Propulsion: 2 T406 turboshaft engines
Crew: 3
Passengers: 24 combat troops
Max. vertical take off weight: 47,500 lb
Max. short take off weight: 55,000 lb
Speed at max. weight: 250 knots/hour
Combat radius: 200+ nm
The airframes of the Marine Corps MV-22 and the Air Force CV-22 variant
for
Special Operations Command will have some 90% commonality; the primary
differences being in avionics. The CV-22 will carry 18 troops, with
auxiliary fuel
CRS-3
Figure 1. V-22 Osprey in Flight
tanks increasing combat radius to about 500 miles. This variant may
carry a 50-cal
GAU-19 nosegun for self defense.
DOD plans to field V-22s in four blocks: Blocks B and C for the Marine
Corps,
and Blocks 10 and 20 for the Air Force. Block B aircraft were produced
first in
FY2004 and will be the aircraft with which the Marine Corps will
achieve initial
operational capability (IOC). Block B aircraft will improve upon those
used in EMD
testing (Block A aircraft) with upgrades to avionics, communications,
navigation.
It will also feature a retractable fuel probe, a ramp gun (for self
defense), a joist, and
an improved position for the "fastrope" (a method for personnel to
quickly exit the
aircraft while in hover). The Air Force will achieve IOC with the Block
10 variant,
which will be based on the Block B, but feature advanced avionics, such
as terrainfollowing
radar, and directed infrared countermeasures, that will allow special
operations forces to penetrate hostile areas in all weather and
terrain. The Marine
Corps and Air Force plan to begin developing the most capable V-22
variants - the
Block C and Block 20 respectively - in FY06, and begin producing them
in FY09
and FY12 respectively. See the appendix for a complete list of V-22
features by
Block.
Early Development
The V-22 is based on the XV-15 tilt-rotor prototype which was developed
by
Bell Helicopter and first flown in 1977. The Department of Defense
began the V-22
program in 1981, first under Army leadership, but with the Navy/Marine
Corps later
taking the lead in developing what was then known as the JVX
(joint-service vertical
take-off/landing experimental aircraft). Full-scale development of the
V-22 tilt-rotor
aircraft began in 1986.
Like some other tactical aviation programs (such as the F/A-18E/F Super
Hornet, F/A-22 Raptor and Joint Strike Fighter), the total number of
V-22 aircraft
planned for procurement has decreased over time. In 1989 the Defense
Department
projected a 663-aircraft program with six prototypes and 657 production
aircraft (552
MV-22s, 55 CV-22s, and 50 HV-22s). As projected in 1994, however, the
program
CRS-4
3 Former Secretary of Defense Cheney tried to terminate the program in
1989-92, but
Congress continued to provide funds for development of the V-22. The
George H. Bush
Administration's FY1990 budget requested no funds for the program. In
submitting that
budget to Congress on April 25, 1989, Defense Secretary Cheney told the
House Armed
Services Committee that he "could not justify spending the amount of
money ... proposed
..=2E. when we were just getting ready to move into procurement on the
V-22 to perform a very
narrow mission that I think can be performed ... by using helicopters
instead of the V-22."
comprised 523 production aircraft (425 MV-22s, 50 CV-22s, and 48
HV-22s).
Procurement of these 523 aircraft was to continue into the 2020s, since
the Defense
Acquisition Board limited annual expenditures for Marine MV-22s to $1
billion
(FY1994 dollars) when it approved entry into engineering and
manufacturing
development (EMD) in September 1994. The Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR),
released May 19, 1997, recommended accelerated procurement of 458
production
aircraft (360 MV-22s for the Marines; 50 Air Force CV-22s; and 48 Navy
HV-22s).
Such a 458-aircraft program is now projected.
On March 19, 1989, the first of six MV-22 prototypes was flown in the
helicopter mode and on September 14, 1989, as a fixed-wing plane. Two
of these
aircraft were destroyed in crashes. Prototype aircraft numbers three
and four
successfully completed the Osprey's first Sea Trials on the USS Wasp
(LHD-1) in
December 1990. The fifth prototype crashed on its first flight (June
11, 1991),
because of incorrect wiring in a flight-control system; the fourth
prototype crashed
on July 20, 1992, while landing at Quantico Marine Corps Air Station,
VA, killing
seven people and destroying the aircraft. This accident was caused by a
fire resulting
from hydraulic component failures and design problems in the engine
nacelles.3
Flight tests were resumed in August 1993 after changes were
incorporated in the
prototypes. Flight testing of four full-scale development V-22s began
in early 1997
when the first pre-production V-22 was delivered to the Naval Air
Warfare Test
Center in Patuxent River, MD. The first EMD Flight took place on
February 5,
1997. The first of four low-rate initial production aircraft, ordered
on April 28,
1997, was delivered on May 27, 1999. Osprey number 10 completed the
program's
second Sea Trials, this time from the USS Saipan (LHA-2) in January
1999.
Operational evaluation (OPEVAL) testing of the MV-22 began in October
1999
and concluded in August 2000. On October 13, 2000, the Department of
the Navy
announced that the MV-22 had been judged operationally effective and
suitable for
land-based operations. On November 15, 2000, the Marine Corps announced
that the
Osprey had successfully completed sea trials and had been deemed
operationally
effective and suitable for both land- and sea-based operations.
Successfully completing OPEVAL should have cleared the way for full
rate
production. This decision was to have been made in December 2000, but
was
postponed indefinitely, due a mixed report from DOD's director of
operational test
and evaluation, and to two fatal accidents.
CRS-5
4 V-22 JAGMAN Executive Summary, United States Marine Corps, Division
of Public
Affairs, July 27, 2000, p.1.
5 Audit Report: V-22 Osprey Joint Advanced Vertical Aircraft. Report
No. D-2000-174.
Office of the Inspector General. Department of Defense. August 15,
2000.
Accidents and Fatalities Worsen
On April 8, 2000, another Osprey crashed near Tucson, Arizona during an
exercise simulating a noncombatant evacuation operation. All four crew
members
and 15 passengers died in the crash. An investigation of the accident
found that the
pilot was descending in excess of the recommended flight envelope which
may have
caused the aircraft to experience an environmental condition known as
"power
settling" or "vortex ring state." According to Lt. Gen. Fred
McCorkle, the pilot was
descending more than a thousand feet per minute. The recommended
descent rate is
800 feet per minute." Following a two-month suspension of flight
testing, the Osprey
recommenced OPEVAL in June 2000, with pilots flying a slightly tighter
flight
envelope. A July 27, 2000 report by the Marine Corps Judge Advocate
General
(JAG) (which had access to all non-privileged information from the
safety
investigation) confirmed that a combination of "human factors"
caused the crash.
This mishap appears not to be the result of any design, material or
maintenance
factor specific to tilt-rotors. Its primary cause, that of a MV-22
entering a Vortex
Ring State (Power Settling) and/or blade stall condition is not
peculiar to tilt
rotors. The contributing factors to the mishap, a steep approach with a
high rate
of descent and slow airspeed, poor aircrew coordination and diminished
situational awareness are also not particular to tilt rotors.4
A DOD Inspector General study concluded that the V-22 would not
successfully
demonstrate 23 major operational effectiveness and suitability
requirements prior to
the December 2000 OPEVAL Milestone III decision to enter full rate
production in
June 20015. The Marine Corps agreed with DOD's assessment of the
deficiencies,
but said that they had been aware of these deficiencies before the
beginning of
OPEVAL. Furthermore, the Marine Corps said that they had an approved
plan
designed to resolve the deficiencies prior to the Milestone III
decision.
On November 17, 2000, DOD's Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation
issued a mixed report on the Osprey; saying although "operationally
effective" the
V-22 was not "operationally suitable, primarily because of
reliability, maintainability,
availability, human factors and interoperability issues." The report
recommended that
more research should be conducted into the V-22's susceptibility to the
vortex ring
state blamed for the April 8, 2000 crash.
On December 11, 2000, a MV-22 Osprey crashed near Jacksonville, NC,
killing
all four Marines on board. This was the fourth Osprey crash since 1991
and the third
lethal accident. The aircraft's pilot, Lt. Col. Keith M. Sweeney was
the program's
most experienced pilot and was in line to command the first squadron of
Ospreys.
The aircraft's copilot, Maj. Michael Murphy was second only to
Sweeney in flying
CRS-6
6 James Dao, "Marines Ground Osprey Fleet After Crash Kills Four,"
New York Times, Dec.
12, 2000.
7 An un-redacted version of JAG investigation into the April 2000 V-22
crash indicates that
investigators found three "noteworthy" maintenance "areas of
concern", including the
Osprey's hydraulics system. A Naval Safety Center presentation to the
Blue Ribbon Panel
brought to light several previously unreported maintenance problems -
including
hydraulics failures - that caused engine fires or other problems
during the Osprey's
operational testing.
8 Mary Pat Flaherty, "Osprey Crash Blamed on Leak, Software,"
Washington Post, Apr. 6,
2001.
9 Louise Story. "Maker of Tubes for Osprey Aircraft is Indicted."
New York Times. June
8, 2005. Christopher J. Castelli. "Former Supplier of Hydraulic
Tubing for V-22 Osprey
Faces Indictment." Inside the Navy. June 13, 2005.
time on the Osprey.6 The Marine Corps grounded the Osprey fleet pending
a mishap
board investigation. On April 5, 2001, the Marine Corps reported that
the crash was
caused by a burst hydraulic line in one of the Osprey's two engine
casings, and a
software malfunction that caused the aircraft to accelerate and
decelerate
unpredictably and violently when the pilots tried to compensate for the
hydraulic
failure.7 The Marine Corps report called for a redesign of both the
hydraulics and
software systems involved.8
Maintenance and Parts Falsifications
In December 2000, an anonymous letter was mailed to the media by
someone
claiming to be a mechanic in the Osprey program. The letter claimed
that V-22
maintenance records had been falsified for two years, at the explicit
direction of the
squadron commander. Enclosed in the letter was an audio tape that the
letter's author
claimed was a surreptitious recording of the squadron commander
directing
maintenance personnel to lie about the aircraft until the V-22 LRIP
decision was
made. On January 20, 2001, it was reported that the V-22 squadron
commander
admitted to falsifying maintenance records. The Marine Corps
subsequently relieved
him of command and reassigned him to a different position. At a May 1,
2001
hearing, members of the Senate Armed Services Committee expressed their
concern
that false data might impede DOD's ability to accurately evaluate the
V-22 program
and identify problem areas and potential improvements. The Department
of
Defense's Inspector General (IG) conducted an investigation. On
September 15,
2001, it was reported that three Marines were found guilty of
misconduct and two
were reprimanded for their actions.
In June 2005 a U.S. grand jury indicted a company that had supplied
titanium
tubing for the V-22 program. The indictment charged the company with
falsely
certifying the quality of the tubes. The V-22 test program was halted
for 11 days in
2003 due to faulty tubes. Replacing deficient tubes cost the V-22
program $4
million. Navy officials do not believe that these deficient tubes
caused fatal mishaps,
but the grand jury will conduct its own investigation.9
CRS-7
10 This panel was chaired by retired Marine General John R. Dailey and
included retired Air
Force General James B. Davis, Norman Augustine, and MIT professor
Eugene Covert.
11 Adam Hebert, "Minimal Sustainable Rate Will Dramatically Cut
Near-Term V-22 Buys,"
Inside the Air Force, Apr. 20, 2001.
12 DOD News Briefing, Wed. June 27, 2001, 1:30PM and Kerry Gildea,
"New V-22 Plan
Sustains Lower Tier Contractors, Jones Reports," Defense Daily, May
15, 2001.
Reviews and Restructuring
On April 19, 2001, a Blue Ribbon panel formed by then-Secretary of
Defense
William Cohen to review all aspects of the V-22 program, reported its
findings and
recommendations.10 These findings and recommendations were also
discussed
during congressional testimony on May 1, 2001. The panel recommended
that the
program continue, albeit in a restructured format. The panel concluded
that there
were numerous problems with the V-22 program - including safety,
training and
reliability problems - but nothing inherently flawed in basic
tilt-rotor technology.
Because of numerous safety, training, and reliability problems, the
V-22 was not
maintainable, or ready for operational use.
The panel recommended cutting production to the "bare minimum"
while an
array of tests were carried out to fix a long list of problems they
identified with
hardware, software and performance. Cutting near term production was
hoped to free
up funds to pay for fixes and modifications. Once the changes had been
made and the
aircraft was ready for operational use, the Panel suggested that V-22
out year
purchases could be made in large lots using multi year contracts to
lower acquisition
costs. Program officials estimated that the minimal sustainable
production rate is 12
aircraft per year, which would be less than half the Ospreys once
planned for
FY2002.11 In P.L.107-107 Sec.123, Congressional authorizers codified
the Blue
Ribbon Panel's recommendation to produce V-22's at the minimum
sustainable rate
until the Secretary of Defense can certify that the Osprey is safe,
reliable,
maintainable, and operationally effective.
DOD appears to have taken managerial and budgetary steps to incorporate
the
Blue Ribbon Panel's recommendations. For example, DOD's FY2001
supplemental
funding request asked for a reduction of $475 million in procurement
and an increase
of $80 million in R&D funds. The additional R&D funding was to be used
to
support initial redesign and testing efforts to address deficiencies,
logistics, flight
test, and flight test support for V-22 aircraft. The reduction in
procurement funding
reflected the need to reduce production to the minimum rate while the
aircraft design
changes are being developed and tested.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's FY2002 budget amendment, unveiled
June 27,
2001, included a request for the procurement of 12 Ospreys. DOD
comptroller Dov
Zakheim and Marine Corps Commandant Gen. James Jones both stated that
the
procurement of 12 aircraft in FY2002 would allow them to sustain the
V-22
subcontractor base while simultaneously addressing the Osprey
program's needs.12
CRS-8
13 "Navy Loses Osprey Authority," Washington Post, May 22, 2001 and
Hunter Keeter,
"Aldridge Maneuvers V-22 Acquisition Authority Away from Navy,"
Defense Daily, May
22, 2001 and Linda de France, "V-22 Osprey Production Authority
Transferred from Navy
to DoD," Aerospace Daily, May 22, 2001.
14 Christopher Castelli, " NASA Review Panel Endorses Resumption of
V-22 Flight Tests,"
InsideDefense.com,. Nov. 14, 2001.
15 "Text: Aldridge Memo on V-22," Inside the Navy, Jan. 7, 2002.
16 Tony Capaccio, "Textron-Boeing V-22 Needs Two years of Testing,
Aldridge Says,"
Bloomberg.com, Oct. 16, 2001.
Following the Blue Ribbon panel's recommendations, DOD Undersecretary
for
Acquisition Edward "Pete" Aldridge assumed acquisition authority
for the V-22
program. Undersecretary Aldridge changed the V-22 program's status
from an ACAT
1C program - which gives the Department of the Navy the highest
required
authority for production decisions - to an ACAT 1D program. Under the
latter
category, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) will decide if and when
the program
is ready to enter full rate production. Other ACAT 1D programs, for
example,
include the F/A-22 Raptor and the now-cancelled RAH-66 Comanche
helicopter.13
A NASA-led review of the V-22 program, released November 6, 2001,
concluded that there were no known aero-mechanical phenomena that would
stop the
tilt rotor aircraft's development and deployment. The study focused
on several aeromechanics
issues, including Vortex Ring State, power problems, auto-rotation, and
hover performance.14
In a December 21, 2001, memo to the Secretaries of the Air Force and
the Navy,
and the Commander-in-Chief, Special Operations Command, Undersecretary
of
Defense Aldridge gave his authorization for the V-22 to resume flight
testing in the
April 2002 time frame. Secretary Aldridge expressed support for range,
speed, and
survivability goals of the V-22. He noted, however that the program
still had
numerous technical challenges to overcome, and emphasized that the V-22
must
demonstrate that "1) it can meet the needs of the warfighter better
than any other
alternative, 2) it can be made to be reliable, safe, and operationally
suitable, and 3)
it is worth its costs in contributing to the combat capability of U.S.
forces." Secretary
Aldridge approved the flight test program under the condition that the
production rate
be slowed to the minimum sustaining level, that it be comprehensive and
rigorous,
and that the restructured program is fully funded in accordance with
current
estimates.15 Undersecretary Aldridge estimated that the V-22 would
require at least
two years of flight testing before DOD could conclude that the aircraft
is safe,
effective, and "worth the cost."16
Mechanical adjustments slowed the V-22 test schedule, and the MV-22
took its
first test flight on May 29, 2002. The Air Force CV-22 resumed flight
tests on
September 11, 2002. Flight tests were designed to explore both
technical and
operational concerns. Technical concerns include flight control
software and the
reliability and robustness of hydraulic lines. Operational concerns
being explored
include whether the Osprey is too prone to Vortex Ring State to make it
a safe or
CRS-9
17 Thomas Ricks, "V-22 Osprey to Face Make or Break Tests,"
Washington Post, Dec. 25,
2002, p.14.
18 Jefferson Morris, "Pilot: Resumption of V-22 Testing To Be Treated
Like First Flight,"
Aerospace Daily, Apr. 29, 2002.
19 Christopher Castelli. "Navy Convenes Mishap Board to Investigate
Latest V-22 Incident."
Inside the Navy. July 5, 2004.
20 Christian Lowe. "V-22 Ospreys Require New Engine Component Every
100 Hours." Navy
Times. July 16, 2004.
21 Joseph Neff, "Eased Standards 'Fix' Osprey," Raleigh News &
Observer, May 19, 2002,
p=2E1.
22 "Aldridge Makes Progress Check on MV-22 at NAS Patuxent River,"
Defense Daily, Feb.
11, 2003.
23 Tony Capaccio, "Boeing-Textron B-22 Gets Favorable Review From
Pentagon Tester,"
Bloomberg.com, May 19, 2003.
effective aircraft, whether this potential problem is further
exacerbated by multiple
Osprey's flying in formation, and how well the V-22 handles at sea.17
The principal difference between the aircraft that were grounded in
2000 and the
aircraft that began testing 17 months later (called "Block A"
aircraft) are re-routed
hydraulic lines, and an improved caution and warning system.18
Technical glitches
were experienced during tests. Hydraulic failures, for example,
continued during the
reinstated flight test program, once on August 4, 2003, (due to a
mis-installed clamp)
and again on September 5, 2003. In June 2004 a V-22 was forced twice to
make an
emergency landing. During one landing, the aircraft suffered a "Class
B" mishap
(one causing between $200,000 and $1 million in damage).19 An
investigation
revealed that the V-22 suffered from widespread problems with an engine
component
that required replacement every 100 flight hours.20
In conjunction with resuming flight testing, the Navy Department
modified
certain V-22 requirements. For instance, the V-22 is no longer required
to land in
helicopter mode without power (also known as "autorotation"),
protection from
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons has been eliminated. The V-22
is no longer
required to have an "air combat maneuvering" capability; instead it
must demonstrate
"defensive maneuvering." Also, the requirement that troops be able
to use a rope or
rope ladder to exit the cabin at low altitudes has been eliminated.21
Also concurrent
with the resumption of V-22 flight testing, DOD began an in-depth study
of
alternatives to pursue in case the aircraft does not pass muster.
Options reportedly
include purchasing the S-92, or upgrading CH-53, or EH101
helicopters.22
After one year and 466 hours of flight testing, DOD reviewed the
Osprey's
progress. On May 15, 2003, Thomas Christie, DOD's Director of
Operational Test
and Evaluation (DOT&E) reportedly graded Bell-Boeing's improvements
to the
Osprey's hydraulics as "reasonable and appropriate" and
"effective."23 Christie also
reportedly approved of the testing that had been completed and was
satisfied with
what had been learned about the V-22's susceptibility to Vortex Ring
State. On May
CRS-10
24 "Letter of Observation in Support of MV-22 Program Compliance with
Section 123 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002." Commander,
Operational Test
and Evaluation Force. Department of the Navy. February 18, 2005.
20, 2003, the Defense Acquisition Board also reviewed the program
approved of the
flight test program's progress.
DOD had planned to procure the V-22 at 11 aircraft (the minimum
sustainable
rate) through its FY2005 budget request. Marine Corps officials had
recommended
increasing the production rate in FY2006 to 20 aircraft. However, in a
August 8,
2003, memorandum, Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Michael
Wynne
announced that this acceleration "presents more risk than I am
willing to accept."
Instead, Wynne restructured the planned procurement, reducing the
FY2006 purchase
to 17 aircraft. "For subsequent years' procurement planning,
production rates should
increase by about 50% per year for a total of 152 aircraft through
FY09," according
to the August 8th memo. Wynne directed that the savings resulting from
the reduced
procurement (estimated at $231 million) be invested in improving the
V-22's
interoperability, by funding the Joint Tactical Radio System, Link 16
and Variable
Message Format communication. Wynne also directed that a multi-year
procurement
(MYP) of the V-22 be accelerated. While some suggest that this
restructuring will
more quickly deliver high-quality aircraft to the Marines and Special
Operations
Forces, others fear that slowing procurement will inevitably raise the
platform's cost.
In December 2004 the V-22 budget and schedule were restructured again.
Program Budget Decision 753 (PBD-753) cut 22 aircraft from the V-22's
production
schedule and $1.3 billion from the budget between FY2006 and FY2009
Current Status
On June 18, 2005, the MV-22 program completed its second round of
operational evaluation (OPEVAL) flight. The test program was marked by
two
emergency landings, a Class B mishap, a small fire in an engine
compartment, and
problems with the prop-rotor gear box. However, Navy testers
recommended that
DOD declare it operationally suitable, and effective for military use.
This
recommendation was based, in part, on observations that the MV-22 had
complied
with the objectives of P.L.107-107 Sec.123: hydraulic components and
flight control
software performed satisfactorily, the aircraft was reliable and
maintainable, the MV-
22 operated effectively when employed with other aircraft, and the
aircraft's
downwash did not inhibit ground operations.24
DOD's Director of Operational Test and Evaluation must also endorse
the
Osprey and the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) must review the program
before
full-rate production can begin. The Marine Corps wants to increase
production from
the current rate of 11 Ospreys a year to 16 in FY07, 24 in FY08, and
eventually about
43 per year. Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is anticipated for
February or March
2007. The May 2005 flight test schedule for CV-22 has been extended by
more than
a year. Developmental testing is scheduled to be completed in September
2007 and
OPEVAL in November 2007. IOC is anticipated in 2009.
CRS-11
If full-rate production is approved, the V-22 is hoped to be procured
on the
schedule depicted in Table 1 below.
Table 1: V-22 Acquisition Plan
FY MV-22 CV-22 Total
Aircraft
Block B
New Mod or
Build Retrofit
Block C Block 10 Block 20
04 9 3 2 14
05 8 2 3 13
06 9 4 2 15
07 14 14 2 30
08 19 5 24
09 30 6 36
10 35 5 40
11 38 5 43
12 43 5 48
13 43 5 48
14 43 5 48
Key Issues
Should the Defense Department Procure the V-22 Aircraft?
Main Arguments of Those Who Say "Yes". The Defense Department
should accelerate procurement of the V-22, which the Marine Corps
considers its
most important aviation program, in order to obtain these aircraft
sooner and at more
economical production rates. The V-22 is needed to replace aging
military
helicopters in all the services, which are costly to maintain and
operate safely and
effectively. The Army should reconsider its decision not to buy the
V-22, which the
Air Force wants to procure for its Special Operations missions and
combat search
and rescue. The Osprey represents a truly joint capability, as
evidenced by the
Navy's desire to purchase MV-22s for search and rescue, and other
missions.
This tilt-rotor aircraft will provide the operational flexibility of a
helicopter
without the helicopter's inherent limitations of speed, range, and
altitude. While
there may be new helicopters that could replace and improve on
today's military
helicopters, V-22 proponents say that none of them would match the
Osprey's
capabilities. When landing on hostile shores in a third-world conflict
(typically
lacking important infrastructure such as airfields and roads), the V-22
would be
CRS-12
25 Sen. Ted Stevens et al., "Continuation of the V-22 Aircraft
Program," remarks in the
Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, Apr. 19, 1989, pp.
S4507-S4509.
26 The potential civil application of tilt-rotor technology is also
considered by some a good
reason to pursue the V-22 program. A February 1988 study by the FAA and
NASA
concluded that tilt-rotors could help relieve airport congestion by
diverting commuters and
short-distance passengers to vertiports in urban centers. The
importance of U.S. production
of a tilt-rotor aircraft for civilian purposes was the subject of a
hearing on July 17, 1990, by
the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology's Subcommittee
on
Transportation, Aviation, and Materials. In 1992, Congress enacted
legislation (H.R. 6168)
directing the Secretary of Transportation to establish a "civil
tilt-rotor development advisory
committee" to evaluate the feasibility and viability of developing
civil tilt-rotor aircraft and
infrastructure necessary to incorporate tilt-rotor aircraft into the
national transportation
system.
critical for the transport of Marines from ship to shore. Senior DOD
officials have
testified that the V-22 would have, for example, made a significant
contribution the
to war on terrorism in Afghanistan.
The Osprey has been rigorously tested and its accident rate is
consistent with
other aircraft development programs, supporters say. While some
technical problems
have been encountered, leading experts have testified that there are no
technological
barriers to the employment of tilt-rotor technology. Engineering-level
modifications
have, put the Osprey program back on track. The recently complete
OPEVAL
demonstrates that the V-22 program has resolved all of the concerns
expressed by the
Blue Ribbon Panel and by Congress.
Supporters of the V-22 also cite the tilt-rotor's potential value for
civil aviation,
law enforcement, and foreign sales by the U.S. aerospace industry.25
The
development of tilt-rotor aircraft for the armed services could have
significant
spin-off effects for civil aviation and U.S. technology, giving the
U=2ES. aerospace
industry a major competitive advantage in the international market.26
Main Arguments of Those Who Say "No". The V-22 is unaffordable in
the present budgetary environment, when the cost of buying large
numbers of these
transport/cargo aircraft would most likely be at the expense of more
critical defense
needs. Ship-to-shore logistical operations can be performed by less
expensive
helicopters for the kinds of landing operations in which the Marines
are likely to be
involved, where the V-22's greater speed and range would not be needed.
Moreover,
Marine assault missions in an opposed landing would involve
ship-to-shore
movement of troops and equipment, which would require coordination with
aircraft
having less speed and range than the V-22. Others have argued that the
Osprey's
hypothetical contribution to the war in Afghanistan is questionable due
to the high
altitude of that country, and the Osprey's inability to improve
greatly over helicopter
performance in this area.
Opponents cast doubt on the Osprey's operational capabilities and
operational
concepts. A January 12, 2001 presentation by the GAO to the V-22 Blue
Ribbon
Panel for instance said that the V-22's cabin may not be large enough
to carry 24
combat-equipped Marines, and that the severe rotor down wash might
impede the
ability of troops to exit the aircraft and move into combat positions.
Also, to avoid
CRS-13
27 See, for example, Everest Riccioni, "Osprey or Albatross?,"
Defense News, Jan. 27, 2004.
28 Michael Dornheim, "Tiltrotor Wake 'More Complex' Than Classic
Vortex Ring State,"
Aviation Week & Space Technology, July 15, 2002.
entering Vortex Ring State, Osprey's will have to descend slowly,
which will make
them vulnerable to ground fire in combat situations. Critics also
challenge
comparison's that are made between the Osprey and conventional
helicopters. The
Osprey can, they concede, lift three times more dead weight than can
the CH-46. But
the Osprey is also three times heavier and five times more expensive
than the Sea
Knight. Also, the CH-46 is a 1970s-era helicopter. Critics argue that
the V-22's
performance should be compared to contemporary aircraft (such as the
EH-101), not
one that is 30 year's old. When compared to contemporary helicopters,
critics argue,
the V-22's capabilities don't appear nearly as impressive.27
In light of several V-22 crashes, three involving fatalities, many
argue that the
tilt-rotor technology is not sufficiently mature to merit the
Osprey's production and
fielding. Studies suggest that tilt-rotor aircraft are more susceptible
to airflow
instabilities that can cause Vortex Ring State than are traditional
helicopters.28 And
our understanding of the kinds of airflow anomalies that have caused
numerous
deaths in V-22 flight testing are still very immature. Whatever
commercial value a
tilt-rotor aircraft might some day have for civil aviation, the V-22's
value as a
military system is insufficient to justify its high cost ($110 million
per aircraft) in
these times of budgetary constraints and higher priority defense needs.
Finally,
critics also argue that the Navy is "dumbing down" the V-22's
requirements and
making it a less effective aircraft.
Congressional Action
Throughout the program, supporters have called for accelerating
procurement
beyond the levels projected in the Administration's plan, arguing
that this would
reduce program costs over the long term and would get more aircraft in
service
sooner. In a potentially contrary development, on December 23, 2004, an
internal
DOD Program Budget Decision (PBD 753) was leaked to the press. PBD 753
recommended cutting 22 aircraft from the V-22 production plan between
FY2006
and FY2009.
The administration's FY2006 request included $1.8 billion in
procurement and
RDT&E funding for the V-22. The request, as well as congressional
action, is
summarized in Table 2, below.
CRS-14
Table 2: Summary of V-22 FY2006 Congressional Action
(millions of dollars)
USN USAF SOCOM
Budget Request
Procurement
=B7 FY2006
=B7 Advance Procurement
=B7 Mods
RDT&E
(9 Aircraft) 993.3
67.3
81.0
206.3
(2 Aircraft) 233.8
10.5
..1
39.5
00
117.9
29.9
Authorization, House
H=2ER. 1815 (109-89)
Matched request + 2 RDT&E Matched request
Authorization, Senate
S=2E 1042 (109-69)
Matched requests
Appropriations, House
H=2ER. 2863 (109-119)
Matched request -11.5 FY06 proc.
+3.5 mods
+2 RDT&E
Matched request
The administration's FY2005 request included $1.6 billion in
procurement and
RDT&E funding for the V-22. The request, as well as congressional
action, is
summarized in Table 3, below.
Table 3. Summary of V-22 FY2005 Congressional Action
(millions of dollars)
USN USAF SOCOM
Budget Request
Procurement
=B7 FY2005
=B7 Advance Procurement
=B7 Mods
RDT&E
(8 Aircraft) 846.6
71.5
3=2E4
304.1
(3 Aircraft) 305.6
11.0
..3
16.4
0
00
75.1
Authorization, House
H=2ER. 4200 (108-491)
Matched requests
Authorization, Senate
S=2E 2400 (109-260)
Matched requests
Authorization Conference
H=2ER. 4200 (108-767)
- 42 RDT&E Matched requests
Appropriations, House
H=2ER. 4613 (108-553)
- 51 RDT&E Matched requests
Appropriations, Senate
S=2E 2559 (108-284)
+7 RDT&E Matched requests
Appropriations,
Conference
H=2ER. 4613 (108-622)
- 38 RDT&E Matched requests
CRS-15
Appendix: V-22 Block Configurations
MV-22 Block A (OPEVAL and
Training configuration)
! Improvements to
hydraulic line
clearances
! Flight Control software
improvements
MV-22 Block B
! Improved Nacelle
maintenance
! Retractable fuel probe
! Avionics,
communications,
navigation upgrades
! Production icing
system
! Ramp gun
! Hoist
! Improved fastrope
location
MV-22 Block C
! Flight incident recorder
! Radar altimeter sling
load modification
! Fuel dump
modification
! Weather radar
! Wheel well fire
suppression
! Oil cooler inlet screen
! Main Landing Gear
brake redesign
! Mid wing gear box
indicator
! Slip ring
! Cargo hook door
upgrade
CV-22 Block 10
! SIRFC
! DIRCM
! Multi mode radar
! "Silent Shield"
! Flight engineer's data
display
! Flight engineer's seat
! Low probability of
intercept/detection
radar altimeter
! TCAS (terrain collision
avoidance system)
! Troop commander's
situational awareness
! ALE-47 decoy
! Navigation
improvements
! Lower antenna
! Dual digital map
! GATM (global air
traffic management)
CV-22 Block 20
! Geo-reference coupled
approach to hover
! Terrain Following
below 50 kts
corrections
! CV-22 Heads up
Display (HUD)
! Digital Map System
upgrades
! Great Circle
Navigation corrections
! Performance calculator
! Passenger Oxygen
! JTRS cluster 1 with
Link 16
! Emergency power
! Fuel dump corrections