Cirrus BRS deployments - Alan Klapmeier's comments on NPR

"Bill Denton" wrote in message
...
Unfortunately, you are buying into exactly the reasons for the Cirrus'
poor
history.

First, the chute is not an option, it is a necessity. When the airplane
reaches a particular state or meets a certain set of parameters, your only
possible course of action is to deploy the BRS. When you reach a
particular
state, if you are in an Archer or a 172, you can recover. But if you are
in
a Cirrus, you absolutely must deploy the BRS; there is no recovery.

Second, you made the statement: "THEN we can start discussing when to pull
it (the chute)." Unfortunately, it is not a matter that can be discussed.
Again, when the airplane reaches a particular state or meets a certain set
of parameters, your only possible course of action is to deploy the BRS.
There is no room for discussion.

Now let me give you an example that is in no way indicative of the
operation
of the Cirrus. You go out to fly a new airplane. On the panel is a placard
reading: "Nose-up angles greater than 30 degrees will render this aircraft
uncontrollable and control cannot be regained. The BRS must be deployed
immediately or it will not be effective". So, you're flying along and
exceed
a 30 degree nose-up attitude, and you get a warning horn. A panel scan
tells
you that you have exceeded the allowed angle. So what do you do?

I would leave before anyone has a chance to reach for the start switch.

Bill Denton wrote:

There's really not a problem with the Cirrus, the problem is with pilots who
either didn't educate themselves about the airplane, or who think they know
more than the people who designed and built the plane.

Maybe, but the time-honored solution to that type of problem is to quit building or
buying planes like that.

George Patterson
This marriage is off to a shaky start. The groom just asked the band to
play "Your cheatin' heart", and the bride just requested "Don't come home
a'drinkin' with lovin' on your mind".

Unfortunately, if we followed your solution, everyone would still be lying
down on the wing to pilot a fabric-covered canard that needed a rail to take
off.

Almost every technological advance requires additional training, resulting
in an upgrade in skills and mindset. Consider the transition from props to
jets. I doubt if many pilots (other than the test pilots) made the
transition without additional training.

The Cirrus is not necessarily a dangerous airplane; it is a different
airplane, that looks a lot like many other GA airplanes. Which it isn't. Too
many pilots think they can just skim the POH and go. I read an article last
night that indicated that by offering additional training, Cirrus has been
able to make major inroads in it's accident problems.

Now, the inevitable analogy:

When antilock brake systems for automobiles first began achieving widespread
market penetration, the number of accidents involving police cars increased
dramatically. There were three primary reasons for this:

Exposure - Police officers drive a lot, and much of it is stop and go
driving.

Conditions - Police officers frequently drive at high speeds, which require
"hard stops". And they frequently drive on roads in less than optimal
conditions (maintenance, weather, etc.).

Training - Police officers were trained to "pump" the brakes, a technique
that causes ABS to work with even less efficiency than conventional brakes.

So, police departments implemented re-training programs that taught the
officers both to apply steady pressure to the brake pedal, and helped them
break their old pattern of pumping the brakes.

The accident rate returned to close to previous levels.

And this is analogous to the Cirrus situation. It requires retraining, but
given the proper training it's not an especially dangerous aircraft...




"G.R. Patterson III" wrote in message
...


Bill Denton wrote:

There's really not a problem with the Cirrus, the problem is with pilots
who
either didn't educate themselves about the airplane, or who think they
know
more than the people who designed and built the plane.

Maybe, but the time-honored solution to that type of problem is to quit
building or
buying planes like that.

George Patterson
This marriage is off to a shaky start. The groom just asked the band
to
play "Your cheatin' heart", and the bride just requested "Don't come
home
a'drinkin' with lovin' on your mind".

"Bill Denton" wrote
Now, the inevitable analogy:

When antilock brake systems for automobiles first began achieving widespread
market penetration, the number of accidents involving police cars increased
dramatically. There were three primary reasons for this:

Exposure - Police officers drive a lot, and much of it is stop and go
driving.

Conditions - Police officers frequently drive at high speeds, which require
"hard stops". And they frequently drive on roads in less than optimal
conditions (maintenance, weather, etc.).

Training - Police officers were trained to "pump" the brakes, a technique
that causes ABS to work with even less efficiency than conventional brakes.

So, police departments implemented re-training programs that taught the
officers both to apply steady pressure to the brake pedal, and helped them
break their old pattern of pumping the brakes.

The accident rate returned to close to previous levels.

Yes, it's a great analogy. A supposed safety advance was introduced
into the cars. After retraining, the result was almost as safe (not
safer) as what it replaced, and more expensive to boot. Without
retraining, it was a lot more dangerous. What was the advantage
again?

And this is analogous to the Cirrus situation. It requires retraining, but
given the proper training it's not an especially dangerous aircraft...

But it's supposed to be a safer aircraft than what we fly. It was
supposedly designed for safety. Now we think that maybe with
sufficient retraining it won't be especially dangerous.

Michael

" "Bill Denton" wrote
And this is analogous to the Cirrus situation. It requires retraining,
but
given the proper training it's not an especially dangerous aircraft...


The Cirrus was touted to be safer than all the other airplanes. Now we find
out it is 300% more lethal than the Cessna 182S.

Michael, your perception of my post is so off base as to be
irrelevant. Go reread my posts with an open mind and try to fathom
whay I was saying.

Ron Lee



(Michael Houghton) wrote:

Howdy!

In article ,
Ron Lee wrote:
(Rick Durden) wrote:

Ron,

It's interesting to read of your anti-safety perspective...the
approach that if a pilot errs, he is sentenced to death.

Rick, you completely missed my point. I am hardly "anti-safety." I
am opposed to potential crutches that allow poor flight decisions to
be rectified by "pulling the handle."

It is very difficult to reconcile those two sentences, and you fail to
do so.

You use pejorative terms to describe the use of the safety system for
the things it was designed specifically for (and delivered on).
You harp on the pilot's culpability.

To suggest that any error means death is unsupportable and a gross
mischaracterization of reality. We don't know that either of these
two events would have been fatal and certainly we do not know that a
series of mistakes led to "pulling the handle." Better to concentrate
on better decision skills than equipping all GA aircraft with a
parachute.

You suggest, by your choice of words, that the pilots in both cases
had no business pulling the handle -- that their decision making skills
were somehow defective.

If you are in IMC at low altitude and you have instruments going haywire,
you have a situation that can turn deadly in an instant, with no room
to recover. You weren't in that airplane. You cannot judge that pilot's
choice the way you are. You have no specific knowledge (any more than the
rest of us) of what was actually happening.

Reread Rick Durden's words about the adoption of parachutes in the
military and observe how your words mimic the attude that had to be
overcome then.

I will be the first to admit that I am not the best pilot. But I will
compare my decision making with any other pilot and come out quite
well.

I'm afraid that your words suggest a different evaluation. You demean
the use of safety devices that have been empirically shown to work in
the field -- devices that you are not being forced to use.

yours,
Michael


--
Michael and MJ Houghton | Herveus d'Ormonde and Megan O'Donnelly
| White Wolf and the Phoenix
Bowie, MD, USA | Tablet and Inkle bands, and other stuff
| http://www.radix.net/~herveus/

Greg, if you are the type pilot who relies upon such a system instead
of proper flight planning and judgment to avoid potentially fatal
situations, I have no desire to ever fly in an aircraft with you as
PIC. Of course these comments may or may not apply to these cases.

I am merely raising points to consider and a few of you are going
postal misinterpreting my comments. Makes me wonder of you are
dealers.

Ron Lee

Greg Copeland wrote:

On Mon, 19 Apr 2004 14:37:27 +0000, Michael Houghton wrote:

Howdy!

In article ,
Ron Lee wrote:
(Rick Durden) wrote:

Ron,

It's interesting to read of your anti-safety perspective...the
approach that if a pilot errs, he is sentenced to death.

Rick, you completely missed my point. I am hardly "anti-safety." I
am opposed to potential crutches that allow poor flight decisions to
be rectified by "pulling the handle."

It is very difficult to reconcile those two sentences, and you fail to
do so.

You use pejorative terms to describe the use of the safety system for
the things it was designed specifically for (and delivered on).
You harp on the pilot's culpability.

To suggest that any error means death is unsupportable and a gross
mischaracterization of reality. We don't know that either of these
two events would have been fatal and certainly we do not know that a
series of mistakes led to "pulling the handle." Better to concentrate
on better decision skills than equipping all GA aircraft with a
parachute.

You suggest, by your choice of words, that the pilots in both cases
had no business pulling the handle -- that their decision making skills
were somehow defective.

If you are in IMC at low altitude and you have instruments going haywire,
you have a situation that can turn deadly in an instant, with no room
to recover. You weren't in that airplane. You cannot judge that pilot's
choice the way you are. You have no specific knowledge (any more than the
rest of us) of what was actually happening.

Reread Rick Durden's words about the adoption of parachutes in the
military and observe how your words mimic the attude that had to be
overcome then.

I will be the first to admit that I am not the best pilot. But I will
compare my decision making with any other pilot and come out quite
well.

I'm afraid that your words suggest a different evaluation. You demean
the use of safety devices that have been empirically shown to work in
the field -- devices that you are not being forced to use.

yours,
Michael

Simply put, which pilot do you want to be? The live one on the ground
saying words like, "maybe" or the dead one on the ground with a chute
still packed and the last words spoken, "I can recover"? Which crutch
would you rather use? A chute or ego?

I'd rather be the "maybe" guy myself. Seems Ron would rather be the
later. I'm with ya Michael!

Cap, you may be right but my point remains that there may be
underlying training/judgement issues that if solved will save many
more lives than the parachutes ever will. For every possible live
saves by a airplane chute, there may be a hundred or more lost because
of pilot error. So unless plane parachutes are mandated, the payback
is mucho better on fixing the pilot problem.

Ron Lee


(Captain Wubba) wrote:

(Ron Lee) wrote in message ...
Greg Copeland wrote:
Simply put, which pilot do you want to be? The live one on the ground
saying words like, "maybe" or the dead one on the ground with a chute
still packed and the last words spoken, "I can recover"? Which crutch
would you rather use? A chute or ego?

I'd rather be the "maybe" guy myself. Seems Ron would rather be the
later. I'm with ya Michael!

I would rather be the pilot that does not need a parachute. Will you
be going out and buying a Cirrus...or will you continue to fly "less
safe" planes without that system?

Ron Lee

Well, I'd *rather* be the pilot who doesn't have an engine failure.
I'd *rather* be the pilot who doesn't have a vacuum failure in nasty
hard IMC. I'd *rather* be the pilot who never got a bad vector into a
thunderstorm cell. Let me know when you can guarantee that these
things won't happen to me (or you), OK?

But most of all I'd *rather* be the pilot with one more option to save
the lives of my passengers and myself when things go South. That I
*can* guarantee...buy flying a plane with a BRS chute. That is all
this is - an option. You think a pilot is going to pop a chute on a
$200,000 airframe and turn it into nifty piece of non-flying
avante-garde artwork because he wants to see what the ride down feels
like?

This is no more a 'crutch' than GPS is a crutch. Should we go back to
four-course radio ranges, because these 'new-fangled' VORs encourage
pilots to rely on them, and not maintain the skills that they had 'way
back then'?

Flying is *all* about risk management. To accomplish virtually
anything, one must take certain risks, and smart pilots judge those
risks based on the availability of options to deal with the problems
they might bring. I know some very good pilots who will not fly
single-engine at night in hard IMC. Their call...they understand the
risks, and they are the ones putting their butts on the line. That
might change now if they can fly a Cirrus, because they would have one
more, final option in case things get *really* bad. Would they want to
pull the chute? Obviously not...nor would they want a forced landing
off field...but they would take *either* if the other choice is a nice
headstone with their name on it somewhere.

Yes, I'll continue flying Cessnas. But if I have my choice between
flying a plane that has a chute and one that doesn't, all else being
equal, of *course* I'd choose the plane with the chute. Who wouldn't?
Would you go to a restaurant with 5 things on the menu, instead of an
identical place that had 20, just because you *might* choose not to
eat any of the other choices?

There is no doubt the BRS system has saved lives. There is no doubt
that it is an added safety feature. It is a great, new tool in the
risk-management portfolio of the wise pilot...an option to save lives
when all the other options are gone. As such, it is a great benefit to
the aviation community, and I can only hope that it becomes increasing
common.

Cheers,

Cap

Thomas, I see your point. Let's take it to an extreme. I am a pilot
flying a parachute equipped plane. I have to use an airports
facilities really, really bad. I see an airport under me. I decide
the best way down is to deploy the parachute so that the leather seats
are not ruined. The plane is destroyed but it was my call and my call
alone that my course of action was right.

You have no right to respond negatively to my course of action because
only I and I alone was there to assess all the factors involved.

However, I will say that I was an idiot.

Ron Lee


Thomas Borchert wrote:

Richard,

whether the
parachute is the correct option to deal with vacuum failure or even total
electrical failure.


I don't think that is ever the question. If the pilot in command thinks it
is, then it is. I can't believe you're suggesting the speech at the grave
containing the words "Ah, but he chose the correct option" - which, in
effect, you do.

--
Thomas Borchert (EDDH)

Answer to question 1 is one. A CAPS-like system would not have
helped. He had an engine failure at relatively low altitude and
turned back to the airport, hit a utility pole and ultimately died
from horrific burns.

Pilot error.

Ron Lee



(Dean Wilkinson) wrote:

Hi Ron,

A question for you:

How many pilots that you knew well on a personal level have died in
general aviation accidents?

A second question:

If your answer is other than zero, what did you say to other people
afterwards about the circumstances of their accident? Did you assign
any blame to them? Might a CAPS system saved their lives?

Your attitude on this subject indicates to me that your answer to
question number 1 will be zero, but if not, I would be interested in
hearing your answer to question number 2.

Dean

(Ron Lee) wrote in message ...
(Rick Durden) wrote:

Ron,

It's interesting to read of your anti-safety perspective...the
approach that if a pilot errs, he is sentenced to death.

Rick, you completely missed my point. I am hardly "anti-safety." I
am opposed to potential crutches that allow poor flight decisions to
be rectified by "pulling the handle."

To suggest that any error means death is unsupportable and a gross
mischaracterization of reality. We don't know that either of these
two events would have been fatal and certainly we do not know that a
series of mistakes led to "pulling the handle." Better to concentrate
on better decision skills than equipping all GA aircraft with a
parachute.

I will be the first to admit that I am not the best pilot. But I will
compare my decision making with any other pilot and come out quite
well.

Ron Lee