About when did a US/CCCP war become suicidal?

"Howard Berkowitz" wrote in message
...
In article , "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


It has been quite a few years since I sat through the very basic
lectures
we
received on the SADM (being in the very last EOBC class to go through
that
phase), but IIRC the PAL was set up such that failure to input the
proper
code would result in the device inerting itself.

From my recollection of open sources, the inerting was of the arming
mechanism, not the actual nuclear components. In other words, to use it,
you'd have to build and reinstall at least an entirely new arming and
firing system, but the physics package was intact.

In contrast, some later PALs were supposed to damage the nuclear
components to a point that they would only be useful as (possibly
contaminated) raw materials. One example cited was that a
neutron-absorbing safety wire or rod, normally retracted from the inside
of the hollow pit during the firing process, could be broken off inside
the pit if the PAL decided there was an unauthorized firing attempt.

I don't know. This has gotten way beyond my actual knowledge, which was
limited to what little they taught us during that couple of days at the ADM
training site, and what little I have read in open sources since then (which
you have totake with a grain of salt, since a couple of the leading sources
could not even agree on the critter's actual weight with and without its
casing). They did not get very specific with the PAL details, as we had no
need to know them, other than to mention that it would render the device
unusable if the code was improperly input (I would presume it gave you X
attempts to get it right). Heck, even the calculations we ran for the depth
of placment were all based upon theoretical/assumed yields--they did not
give out the actual yields except as a rather wide range within which the
actual values fell. The last overseas ADM company drew down while I was
still on active duty, IIRC, quickly followed by the last ADM company
army-wide (which was located at FT Hood, again IIRC). My last active duty
company CO had been assigned to the one in Italy--he never provided any
details, either (understandably) other than to say that the biggest thing he
as a lieutenant did was repetitive inspections and inventories of the
weapons they had custody of (SADM and MADM).

Brooks

Am Sat, 28 Feb 2004 00:02:47 -0500, schrieb "Kevin Brooks"
:

In the event of war, these reserve demolition targets would be prepared by
German personnel from the WBK (a quasi-military structured German civil
service organization, IIRC).

Thanks to all for clearing up something I was wondering about for some
time. BTW, the WBK is AFAIK the territorial army (not part of NATO),
which would have "garrision duty" in case of a war within German
borders (organising callup of reserves, protecting key installations
and so on).
Owe
--
My from-adress is valid and being read.
www.owejessen.de

"Owe Jessen" wrote in message
...
Am Sat, 28 Feb 2004 00:02:47 -0500, schrieb "Kevin Brooks"
:

In the event of war, these reserve demolition targets would be prepared
by
German personnel from the WBK (a quasi-military structured German civil
service organization, IIRC).

Thanks to all for clearing up something I was wondering about for some
time. BTW, the WBK is AFAIK the territorial army (not part of NATO),
which would have "garrision duty" in case of a war within German
borders (organising callup of reserves, protecting key installations
and so on).

They sure seemed to be an integral part of NATO when their rep briefed our
engineer OBC class back during the mid-eighties. I am not sure how any
element of the West German armed forces could have been labled as not being
"part of NATO"? We expected to work with them if the situation had ever
turned nasty, and I am pretty sure that in the event of war they reported to
the responsible military commander for their respective areas.

Brooks

Owe
--
My from-adress is valid and being read.
www.owejessen.de

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
. ..
False reporting gave the Soviets (and western intel
shops) wildly optimistic views of Soviet readiness states that started to
evaporate in Afghanistan.

And of course once the truth was known, the Reagan-era pentagon was still
spinning the story for the public and congress of the growing Soviet threat
and how that were building a blue-water navy, so we needed a 600 ship navy
to counter.

Source: "Fall from Glory: The men who sank the U.S. Navy" by Gregory L.
Vistica (1996)

"james_anatidae" wrote:

"Paul F Austin" wrote in message
...
False reporting gave the Soviets (and western intel
shops) wildly optimistic views of Soviet readiness states that started to
evaporate in Afghanistan.

And of course once the truth was known, the Reagan-era pentagon was still
spinning the story for the public and congress of the growing Soviet threat
and how that were building a blue-water navy, so we needed a 600 ship navy
to counter.

The problem is, that unlike an Army, a Navies readiness can be
discerned much more easily. Either it is at sea, or it is not.
Either it is cruising, or it is moored.

And in fact, across the 80's, the Soviet was at sea in increasing
numbers and increasing activity. And in fact they were moving
steadily towards building a blue-water Navy, and increasing in ability
to interfere should a second Battle of the Atlantic occur.

D.
--
Touch-twice life. Eat. Drink. Laugh.

(Peter Stickney) wrote in message ...
In article ,
(Tom Adams) writes:
(Tom Adams) wrote in message . com...
"james_anatidae" wrote in message ...
I was wondering at about what point that the United States going to war with
the Soviet Union become an almost certain act of mutual destruction. I'm
assuming it sometime in 1960's or 70's, since what I've seen of the Soviet
nuclear capability before that point doesn't seem to be all that
threatening. It looks like they would have been really bad for us
Americans, but not unsurvivable.

I think October 23, 1961 is a watershed date. That is the day that
the Soviet Union exploded the Tsar Bomba, the largest bomb ever
exploded.

Note that the yield of this bomb did not represent the technical limit
on the yield of a hydrogen bomb. It is my understanding that there is
no known limit. Instead, the Tsar Bomba represents a kind of
political limit in a historical context. After the Tsar Bomba, the
politicians on both side put on the brakes.

It was possible to create a threat to kill everyone in the US or the
USSR almost instantly (on a clear day, anyway) between 1962 and 1965,
by deploying space-based high-yield orbiting hydrogen bombs.

But no such threat was ever developed. I am not sure what
considerations prevented the development of such a threat.

Size and Weight. Nobody was capable of putting a 30-40 ton warhead of
that size at those heights. Well, that, and atmospheric attenuation -
all the prompt stuff, and the heat, gets absobed pretty quickly by the
Atmosphere, and there'd be no fallout. There would, if you chose the
right height, be pretty severe EMP effects, but you don't need a
whopping huge bomb for that.

In a rough translation from LEO weight to ICBM throw weight I can see
the SL-12 Proton and variants delivering something in the 30 T range
as an ICBM. IIRC that was what its justification was for Khurshchev.
Comparison, SS-9 6 T ICBM warhead,, 4 T to LEO as SL-11 (and
variants), SL-12 (Proton) 42T to LEO.

http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/icbm/r-36.htm SS-9
http://www.braeunig.us/space/specs/proton.htm SL-12

Am Sat, 28 Feb 2004 22:45:38 -0500, schrieb "Kevin Brooks"
:

Thanks to all for clearing up something I was wondering about for some
time. BTW, the WBK is AFAIK the territorial army (not part of NATO),
which would have "garrision duty" in case of a war within German
borders (organising callup of reserves, protecting key installations
and so on).

They sure seemed to be an integral part of NATO when their rep briefed our
engineer OBC class back during the mid-eighties. I am not sure how any
element of the West German armed forces could have been labled as not being
"part of NATO"? We expected to work with them if the situation had ever
turned nasty, and I am pretty sure that in the event of war they reported to
the responsible military commander for their respective areas.


I mean in the sense they were not under command of NATO, but of the
ministry of defense. All German field units were part of the integral
command structure, but the territorial units were under German
command. Everything AFAIR, of course. :-)
Owe
--
My from-adress is valid and being read.
www.owejessen.de