Best dogfight gun?

On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 16:59:45 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote:

On Fri, 12 Dec 2003 08:15:44 -0800, Mary Shafer
wrote:

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 22:36:54 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:

In message , Chad Irby
writes

Mary adds some info and makes some big errors:

They were back at base. Bomber and attack and SEAD F-4Es only have
guns to defend themselves.

Absolutely incorrect! All, repeat ALL F-4s always carried Sparrows. We
didn't always have room for AIM-9s, but I never saw a combat sortie
flown by an F-4 when I was there without Sparrows.

I have spent the time since you posted this trying to figure out where
I got the idea that they left the Sparrows at home when they went out
with bombs. I'd have sworn I read it somewhere, but I can't find it
now. Either it was a) another airplane, b) a total misunderstanding,
or c) a work of fiction I can't find now.

Whatever. As you say, it's not true.

Fewer than half the USAF F-4 were fighters with AAM. Since the
non-fighter F-4s would have been carrying their ordnance during the
inbound half of the flight and only been able to get into the fur ball
outgoing, I'd say guns were under-represented in kills. This probably
proves that the escort F-4s had more chances at MiGs than the
home-going non-fighters.

The reason that A/A loaded F-4s got more kills is more subtle. It has
to do with the politics of "ace-building" between the USN and USAF and
the mis-guided over-classification of TEABALL. See Michel's Clashes or
Thompson's "To Hanoi and Back".

I read both those and remembered the discussion just well enough to
know that I couldn't produce a coherent version of it here, so I just
skipped it entirely. I remember Chuck de Bellevue (is that right? I
have a terrible memory for names) talking about the ace-building
competition and one of the USN guys grousing about it.

I still think that having bombing a target as one's mission on a
sortie will incline the person to press on toward the target, rather
than jettisoning the bombs to close on an enemy airplane. After all,
that's letting the enemy pilot succeed in keeping you from bombing
your target. It's not as spectacular as blowing your airplane out of
the sky, but it's just as effective, at least for that one mission.
Of course, it wouldn't be just F-4s. The F-105s, for example, would
be in the same situation.

Escorts didn't even get many shots as they were often used to provide
blocking or herding of MiGs to direct them to a kill zone where the
555th was being vectored on a discrete frequency to do the shooting.

Since the NVAF used ground controllers heavily, did they monitor all
the frequencies? I know it's too much for pilots to manage, but a
ground facility should have a little more monitoring capability.

Is the 555th now at Nellis flying the A-10 or is that the 5555th? Or
should I say "was" instead? The numbers seem to be remarkably
unstable considering.

Thanks for the corrections, Ed. I dunno where I got the wrong ideas
from, but I have, I hope, extirpated them.

Mary


--
Mary Shafer Retired aerospace research engineer

In message , Mary Shafer
writes
Since the NVAF used ground controllers heavily, did they monitor all
the frequencies? I know it's too much for pilots to manage, but a
ground facility should have a little more monitoring capability.

Others (Ed particularly but others too) will have better information,
but falling back on "Clashes" there was a SIGINT centre called 'Teaball'
which did just this: the trouble was getting its messages relayed
through often-flaky radio links and acted upon in a timely manner.

Having a ground-based centre intercept signals, translate them,
correlate them and confirm them, and then get warning to the relevant
aircraft is a non-trivial task even when everyone is amply supplied with
working radios and free frequencies and you've got a complete and
accurate air picture.

Uncertainty over exactly who is where increases the problems. Add in
"protect the source" constraints to hide the fact that you're
successfully eavesdropping from enemy intelligence, and it gets very
tricky indeed. And having busy pilots get vague warnings from "who he?"
doesn't help when they believe they have more immediate threats to their
survival.


Eavesdropping isn't trivial but it's doable. Turning that into immediate
tactical information and communicating it in a usefully timely manner,
is a still a challenge today.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Mary Shafer
writes
Since the NVAF used ground controllers heavily, did they monitor all
the frequencies? I know it's too much for pilots to manage, but a
ground facility should have a little more monitoring capability.

Others (Ed particularly but others too) will have better information,
but falling back on "Clashes" there was a SIGINT centre called 'Teaball'
which did just this: the trouble was getting its messages relayed
through often-flaky radio links and acted upon in a timely manner.

I thought there was an EC-121 usually performing this kind of work?

Brooks


Having a ground-based centre intercept signals, translate them,
correlate them and confirm them, and then get warning to the relevant
aircraft is a non-trivial task even when everyone is amply supplied with
working radios and free frequencies and you've got a complete and
accurate air picture.

Uncertainty over exactly who is where increases the problems. Add in
"protect the source" constraints to hide the fact that you're
successfully eavesdropping from enemy intelligence, and it gets very
tricky indeed. And having busy pilots get vague warnings from "who he?"
doesn't help when they believe they have more immediate threats to their
survival.


Eavesdropping isn't trivial but it's doable. Turning that into immediate
tactical information and communicating it in a usefully timely manner,
is a still a challenge today.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

In message , Kevin Brooks
writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
Others (Ed particularly but others too) will have better information,
but falling back on "Clashes" there was a SIGINT centre called 'Teaball'
which did just this: the trouble was getting its messages relayed
through often-flaky radio links and acted upon in a timely manner.

I thought there was an EC-121 usually performing this kind of work?

Teaball's info was radioed to a relay aircraft, codenamed Luzon (usually
a KC-135), but the radios on Luzon were flaky and prone to interference
and _that_ was the reliability problem.

Also, there was a complex structure of "who controlled what units when"
which varied by mission and depended on "whose radios were working": Red
Crown, Disco, College Eye and Teaball all could be in charge at
different times in a mission.

Sometimes it seems a miracle any of the pilots involved survived.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Kevin Brooks
writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
Others (Ed particularly but others too) will have better information,
but falling back on "Clashes" there was a SIGINT centre called
'Teaball'
which did just this: the trouble was getting its messages relayed
through often-flaky radio links and acted upon in a timely manner.

I thought there was an EC-121 usually performing this kind of work?

Teaball's info was radioed to a relay aircraft, codenamed Luzon (usually
a KC-135), but the radios on Luzon were flaky and prone to interference
and _that_ was the reliability problem.

Also, there was a complex structure of "who controlled what units when"
which varied by mission and depended on "whose radios were working": Red
Crown, Disco, College Eye and Teaball all could be in charge at
different times in a mission.

Sometimes it seems a miracle any of the pilots involved survived.

Based upon a quick perusal, it appears what you are presenting is true, but
not the "whole truth", so to speak. The EC-121's apparently were indeed
performing at least some of the same kind work in support of the
inbound/outbound fighters--FAS mentions that the EC's of the 193rd TEWS
(PaANG) apparently did also have some interception gear onboard, and another
source indicates linguists were indeed included in the crew loads when the
EC's were operating over SEA.

Brooks

In message , Kevin Brooks
writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
Teaball's info was radioed to a relay aircraft, codenamed Luzon (usually
a KC-135), but the radios on Luzon were flaky and prone to interference
and _that_ was the reliability problem.

Also, there was a complex structure of "who controlled what units when"
which varied by mission and depended on "whose radios were working": Red
Crown, Disco, College Eye and Teaball all could be in charge at
different times in a mission.

Sometimes it seems a miracle any of the pilots involved survived.

Based upon a quick perusal, it appears what you are presenting is true, but
not the "whole truth", so to speak. The EC-121's apparently were indeed
performing at least some of the same kind work in support of the
inbound/outbound fighters--FAS mentions that the EC's of the 193rd TEWS
(PaANG) apparently did also have some interception gear onboard, and another
source indicates linguists were indeed included in the crew loads when the
EC's were operating over SEA.

Quoting Michel directly,

"There was considerable SIGINT and other information about the MiGs
available from a variety of sources, but this information was jealously
guarded by the American agencies that collected it: just because
American aircrews were being shot down for lack of this information they
saw no reason to release it."

Teaball was established at Nakhom Phanom in late July 1972 to
co-ordinate the reception, analysis and dissemination of that
information. Direct dissemination just didn't seem to happen, at least
according to Michel.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Kevin Brooks
writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
Teaball's info was radioed to a relay aircraft, codenamed Luzon
(usually
a KC-135), but the radios on Luzon were flaky and prone to interference
and _that_ was the reliability problem.

Also, there was a complex structure of "who controlled what units when"
which varied by mission and depended on "whose radios were working":
Red
Crown, Disco, College Eye and Teaball all could be in charge at
different times in a mission.

Sometimes it seems a miracle any of the pilots involved survived.

Based upon a quick perusal, it appears what you are presenting is true,
but
not the "whole truth", so to speak. The EC-121's apparently were indeed
performing at least some of the same kind work in support of the
inbound/outbound fighters--FAS mentions that the EC's of the 193rd TEWS
(PaANG) apparently did also have some interception gear onboard, and
another
source indicates linguists were indeed included in the crew loads when
the
EC's were operating over SEA.

Quoting Michel directly,

"There was considerable SIGINT and other information about the MiGs
available from a variety of sources, but this information was jealously
guarded by the American agencies that collected it: just because
American aircrews were being shot down for lack of this information they
saw no reason to release it."

Teaball was established at Nakhom Phanom in late July 1972 to
co-ordinate the reception, analysis and dissemination of that
information. Direct dissemination just didn't seem to happen, at least
according to Michel.

OK, I was apparently confusing the situation with Red Crown. You might find
an article by a USAF intel/EWO type of interest; it indicates Red Crown was
getting its info from EA-3B's and EC-121M's, and then forwarding that info
to the strike packages (though their info may have been only available to
the USN packages). Red Crown was also apparently exchanging info with
Teaball, but did not require Teaball to originate warnings/directions. I am
wondering how accurate the assertion that Teaball info had to come from
Teabll via that relay RC-135 was, since that source also indicates Teaball
was exchanging info with USAF AWACS EC-121's--we know that these early
generation AWACS did also directly control intercepts that resulted in Migs
being downed (first occured in July '67).

Brooks

http://www.dodccrp.org/6thICCRTS/Cd/...k7/012_tr7.pdf

Brooks


--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk