Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944

Bill Shatzer wrote:

Joel Ehrlich ) writes:

Or prehaps to greater effect, reinstalling the belly turrets they had removed
as "un-needed".

Did RAF bombers -ever- have belly turrets?

Certainly none of the "heavies". It was the dorsal turret which
was discontinued on some models.

That's not quite correct. Lancasters had belly turrets, but they were being
removed or left off in early '44 to improve performance, and because there was
little perceived need for them. Except for the Canadians in 6 Group, who were
re-installing them. Some a/c (Lancs for sure, I forget whether Halifaxes did also)
had a flexible Vickers K gun mounted in the (empty) radar bulge early on, when H2S
production was running behind that of the fairings.

Guy

Keith Willshaw wrote:

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...

snip

The British had to suspend their night ops over Germany. That's not well
known
because they were put onto invasion targets in the same time frame.

Probably because its untrue

The simple fact is that during March 1944 bomber command flew a total
of 9031 sorties with a loss rate of under 4%. Nuremburg was indeed a
disaster
but an isolated one. The following month the number of sorties was HIGHER
and losses were around 2.6%.

Raids on Germany occurred on almost every night with raids being made on
Berlin , Hanover, Osnabruck, Dusseldorf, Kiel and Cologne.

To be sure, deep penetration raids much beyond the Ruhr would have been stopped
in April for the next several months in any case, because the nights were
getting too short to allow them. Post-invasion the situation changed. With
total allied air superiority by day, and allied fighters (and ground troops)
well forward on the continent (from September 1944), it was possible to go
deeper on shorter nights, at least for targets in southern Germany, because the
bombers had to spend far less time over enemy territory. And the nights were
getting longer again, in any case.

Examples include :-

Cologne - raided on 20th by 357 Lancasters and 22 Mosquitos of Nos 1, 3, 6
and 8 Groups. 4 Lancasters lost. This concentrated attack fell into areas of
Cologne which were north and west of the city centre and partly industrial
in nature. 192 industrial premises suffered various degrees of damage,
together with 725 buildings described as 'dwelling-houses with commercial
premises attached'. 7 railway stations or yards were also severely damaged

Dusseldorf - heavily hit on the 22nd by 596 aircraft - 323 Lancasters, 254
Halifaxes, 19 Mosquitos - of all groups except No 5. 29 aircraft - 16
Halifaxes and 13 Lancasters - lost, 4.9 percent of the force. 2,150 tons of
bombs were dropped in this heavy attack on a German city which caused much
destruction. The attack fell mostly in the northern districts of Düsseldorf.
Widespread damage was caused. On the same evening 238 Lancasters and 17
Mosquitos of No 5 Group and 10 Lancasters of No 1 Group were despatched to
Brunswick. Few German fighters were attracted to this raid and only 4
Lancasters were lost, 1.5 per cent of the force

Karlsruhe - 24 April was attacked by 637 aircraft - 369 Lancasters, 259
Halifaxes, 9 Mosquitos of all groups except No 5 Group. 19 aircraft - 11
Lancasters, 8 Halifaxes - lost, 3.0 per cent of the force

Essen - 26 April was bombed by 493 aircraft 342 Lancasters, 133 Halifaxes,
18 Mosquitos.
7 aircraft - 6 Lancasters, 1 Halifax were lost, 1.4 per cent of the force.

Which perfectly illustrates that most of the raids were to the Ruhr or similar
distances, only Karslruhe being somewhat beyond that, on the line Kiel -
Hannover - Karlsruhe. And Karlsruhe is very close to the French border, where
shot down aircrew, at least, had some chance of evading.

Guy

ArtKramr wrote:

We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly turret.
They wouldn't take them. Big mistake.

I presume they did so because they preferred some other aircraft (or
weapon system) which we also offered. Do you know what the preferred
alternative might have been?

Perhaps they wished to avoid large manning requirements and sought
aircraft with fewer required crew positions.


Jack

Jack wrote:

ArtKramr wrote:

We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly turret.
They wouldn't take them. Big mistake.

I presume they did so because they preferred some other aircraft (or
weapon system) which we also offered. Do you know what the preferred
alternative might have been?

Perhaps they wished to avoid large manning requirements and sought
aircraft with fewer required crew positions.

The British used B-17s in combat before we ever did. They were B-17Cs which
were used by day, but proved to be less than wonderful. Contrary to Art's
assertion, Bomber Command did operate some B-17Gs, but they were used by
100 Group (electronic countermeasures), not as part of the main force.
Coastal Command also used them, but the B-17 was less suited to night
bombing than the British a/c, barring considerable modifications. Given
that the B-17 was preferred by the 8th AF for daytime missions over the
B-24, and the B-24 was preferred in the Pacific and for various other
roles, there was no good reason for RAF Bomber Command to use them in
preference to the Lancaster and Halifax.

Guy

Not having enough aviation fuel was a big problem late in 1944. Earlier,
the
Germans had a pretty good handle on it, as the 3/30/44 raid to Nuremburg
showed.

They nightfighters whacked at least 80 Brit bombers, total lost that
night
94-96.

The British had to suspend their night ops over Germany. That's not well
known
because they were put onto invasion targets in the same time frame.

Probably because its untrue

The simple fact is that during March 1944 bomber command flew a total
of 9031 sorties with a loss rate of under 4%. Nuremburg was indeed a
disaster
but an isolated one.

The RAF definitely was defeated over Germany by the Luftwaffe in the Spring of
1944. Being put onto invasion targets has obscured this fact.

"Bomber Command had lost 4,160 aircraft missing and crashed in England.
Harris's failure to bring Germany to her knees, and the cost of his failure,
had become embarrassingly evident to every man but himself.

And in a letter to
the Air Ministry on April 7, 1944, he came as close as ever in his life to
conceding that he was in deep trouble:

'The strength of the German defenses [he wrote] would in time reach a point at
which night-bombing attacks by existing methods and types of heavy bombers
would involve percentage casualty rates which in the long run could not be
sustained...we have not yet reached that point, but tactical innovations which
have so far postponed it are now practically exhausted....'

This was a preamble to a demand for ten suadrons of night fighters to support
his bombers. It was the final admission of defeat for the Trenchard
doctrine....Now Bomber Command had discovered that even night operations
against Germany could no longer be continued on their existing basis unless the
enemy's night-fighter force could be crippled of destroyed."

--Bomber Command, p. 308 by Max Hastings

The Americans also had to stop deep penetrations inot Germany (they had made
precious few) until they got Mustangs and longer-legged P47's and also some
P-38's.

It's a tragedy that the USAAF had a long range escort within its grasp even in
1942, and didn't see it. That was the P-38. A P-38 group was sent to England
in 1942 but wound up in Africa after Torch. The VIIIth fighter CG, Hunter,
wanted to concentrate on the P-47. This was a big mistake. It was shown that
even a few dozen P-38's could break up the massed attacks by the Germans. But
they weren't supported, nor was the idea pushed. Eaker seemed to think that
some magic number of B-17's could be self-defending. That ultimately cost him
his job.

To get back on target, so to speak, the Americans got back over Germany by
adding the long range fighter (and new commanders) to the mix. The RAF had no
such solution.

Walt

snip
Soo, he was in the 415th or 422nd NFS, stationed in the Med and later
England/Belgium...?
snip
The
415th sounds really familiar,... his flight jacket had an emblem
of an owl(bird of some kind) holding a tommygun looking around in the dark
with a flashlight or a candle.

From this iste, 415th or 420th patches seem to match the description :
http://members.aol.com/brimiljeep/We...hAAF2Page.html

Damian

"ArtKramr" wrote in message
...
Subject: Night bombers interception in Western Europe in 1944


We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly turret.They
wouldn't take them. Big mistake.

The RAF operated at least one squadron of B-17's and a number of B-24's
Bomber command were NOT impressed by the type and operated them
mainly as EW aircraft jamming German communications

Keith

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
Not having enough aviation fuel was a big problem late in 1944.
Earlier,
the
Germans had a pretty good handle on it, as the 3/30/44 raid to
Nuremburg
showed.

They nightfighters whacked at least 80 Brit bombers, total lost that
night
94-96.

The British had to suspend their night ops over Germany. That's not
well
known
because they were put onto invasion targets in the same time frame.

Probably because its untrue

The simple fact is that during March 1944 bomber command flew a total
of 9031 sorties with a loss rate of under 4%. Nuremburg was indeed a
disaster
but an isolated one.

The RAF definitely was defeated over Germany by the Luftwaffe in the
Spring of
1944. Being put onto invasion targets has obscured this fact.

"Bomber Command had lost 4,160 aircraft missing and crashed in England.
Harris's failure to bring Germany to her knees, and the cost of his
failure,
had become embarrassingly evident to every man but himself.


Bull**** - losses in the first 4 months of 1944 were as follows

Month Lost Crashed %Loss
January 314 38 5.6
Febuary 199 21 5.2
March 283 39 3.6
April 214 25 2.4


During this period the B-17's of US 8th AF were suffering very
similar loss rates. For example on the 19th Jan 1944 the USAAF
dispatched 675 B-17's and 188 B-24's to Frankfurt with an escort
of 89 P-38's, 503 P-47's and 40 P-51's

34 B-17's and B-24's were lost , a loss rate of 3.94 %




And in a letter to
the Air Ministry on April 7, 1944, he came as close as ever in his life to
conceding that he was in deep trouble:

'The strength of the German defenses [he wrote] would in time reach a
point at
which night-bombing attacks by existing methods and types of heavy bombers
would involve percentage casualty rates which in the long run could not be
sustained...we have not yet reached that point, but tactical innovations
which
have so far postponed it are now practically exhausted....'


So in fact in the spring of 1944 he is saying he has NOT been defeated,

This was a preamble to a demand for ten suadrons of night fighters to
support
his bombers. It was the final admission of defeat for the Trenchard
doctrine....Now Bomber Command had discovered that even night operations
against Germany could no longer be continued on their existing basis
unless the
enemy's night-fighter force could be crippled of destroyed."



On the contrary it was a way of ensuring that he got his night fighters,
and it worked.

--Bomber Command, p. 308 by Max Hastings

The Americans also had to stop deep penetrations inot Germany (they had
made
precious few) until they got Mustangs and longer-legged P47's and also
some
P-38's.

It's a tragedy that the USAAF had a long range escort within its grasp
even in
1942, and didn't see it. That was the P-38. A P-38 group was sent to
England
in 1942 but wound up in Africa after Torch. The VIIIth fighter CG,
Hunter,
wanted to concentrate on the P-47. This was a big mistake. It was shown
that
even a few dozen P-38's could break up the massed attacks by the Germans.
But
they weren't supported, nor was the idea pushed. Eaker seemed to think
that
some magic number of B-17's could be self-defending. That ultimately cost
him
his job.

To get back on target, so to speak, the Americans got back over Germany by
adding the long range fighter (and new commanders) to the mix. The RAF
had no
such solution.


Horsefeathers.

The RAF returned to bombing German targets after D-Day as
did the US 8th AF. Ask any surviving German night fighter pilot
about the RAF response, the Mosquito intruders caused them
terrible losses.

Keith

Subject: Night bombers interception....
From: Jack
Date: 7/15/2004 9:26 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

ArtKramr wrote:

We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly turret.
They wouldn't take them. Big mistake.

I presume they did so because they preferred some other aircraft (or
weapon system) which we also offered. Do you know what the preferred
alternative might have been?

Perhaps they wished to avoid large manning requirements and sought
aircraft with fewer required crew positions.


Jack


They sacrificed everything for max bomb load. Armor, armament everything. Even
their crews. But they flew at night to cut their losses, sacrificing accuracy
and effectiveness. There will always be an England (sheesh)


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Subject: Night bombers interception....
From: Guy Alcala
Date: 7/15/2004 10:04 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

Jack wrote:

ArtKramr wrote:

We offered to give the Brits B-17's each with a big fat belly turret.
They wouldn't take them. Big mistake.

I presume they did so because they preferred some other aircraft (or
weapon system) which we also offered. Do you know what the preferred
alternative might have been?

Perhaps they wished to avoid large manning requirements and sought
aircraft with fewer required crew positions.

The British used B-17s in combat before we ever did. They were B-17Cs which
were used by day, but proved to be less than wonderful. Contrary to Art's
assertion, Bomber Command did operate some B-17Gs, but they were used by
100 Group (electronic countermeasures), not as part of the main force.
Coastal Command also used them, but the B-17 was less suited to night
bombing than the British a/c, barring considerable modifications. Given
that the B-17 was preferred by the 8th AF for daytime missions over the
B-24, and the B-24 was preferred in the Pacific and for various other
roles, there was no good reason for RAF Bomber Command to use them in
preference to the Lancaster and Halifax.

Guy


They never used them where they really needed them against night fighter attack
with their big fat 50 caliber Browning heavy machine guns. The German planes
were never well armored enough to withstand the American 50's. The war at night
would have gone a lot better for the Brits with B-17's..and their belly turrets
with powerful twin 50's. Have you ever seen a German fighter take the full
blast from American twin 50's? It's a beautiful sight to see and a lovely
emotional experience never to be forgotten.




Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer