Best dogfight gun?

"Alan Minyard" wrote:
The gun is selected by the USAF, not the contractor. (IIRC)

Is the cannon going to be GFE?
USAF I believe would approve/disapprove whatever cannon is selected by
the
prime contractor based on the requirements outlined in the contract
that
was
awarded.

I really do not know. On ships all of the guns are GFE, on aircraft I
do
not know.
I do know that the selection of weapons is a Govt decision, not the
contractors.

Approval of whatever selection is made by the prime contractor would be,
but
according to the GD fact sheet on the JSF program the contract to design
produce and integrate the weapon for the JSF was awarded to GD by LMT,
not
the US Government.

http://www.gdatp.com/products/lethality/jsf/JSF.pdf


They can award a sub-contract, but the decision as to what weapon to use
is up to the Pentagon.

What "weapon to use" is defined by the specifications if the "weapon to use"
isn't GFE or identified specifically in the contract. The news article at
the end of last year was:

"Lockheed Martin Drops BK 27 Cannon For GD's GAU-12 For JSF By Neil
Baumgardner.
Lockheed Martin [LMT] last week decided to change the cannon in its F-35
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), dropping the longstanding BK 27 27mm gun offered
by Alliant Techsystems" (Defense Daily November 2002).

No comment appeared in that article that the Pentagon had dropped the BK 27.
The Pentagon's role in this instance appears to be, does the "weapon
selected" meet contract requirements.

Ed,

What is the difference between direct close airsupport, and close
airsupport, or is it just all lumped together and called close air
support.

I think what you might be referring to is Close Air Support and Troops In
Contact. Troops In Contact is a type of CAS where the troops are in direct
fire with the enemy. General rule of thumb is if the bad guys are one
kilometer or less from the good guys, it's a TIC situation. That range can
be a lot greater depending on the situation (i.e. - tank v. tank
engagement).

Sounds like some sort of semantic argument. I never heard the term
"direct close air support" used in any official context. Close Air
Support is the employment of tac air assets in direct support of
ground units. It would, by its very nature be "direct".

The only distinctions I am aware of are between CAS (i.e. hitting the
enemy's front line) and BAI (Battlefield Air Interdiction) which is
hitting the enemy's assets slightly behind their front line to get
supplies, units moving up etc.

There are two types of CAS--immediate and preplanned. Preplanned icludes
CAS
sorties integrated into the ground maneuver plan and submitted IAW the
ATO.
Immediate CAS is not included in the ATO (at least not specifically; CAS
sorties can be included in the ATO without specifications, from what I
gather, sort of a "CAS reserve") and addresses those situations not
foreseen
in the planning process. According to CGSC ST 100-3 (1996 edition),
immediate CAS provides the commander with flexibility, and can be used to
exploit success, reinforce or retain momentum, deal with enemy
counterattacks, and provide security.

This is old stuff. Pre-planned CAS still exists largely as you describe it,
but the other type of CAS which used to be 'immediate' CAS (as it exists on
an ATO) is X-CAS, or 'Push' CAS. The idea is to have a predetermined number
of assets airborne for a particular Vul period, either in a CAS stack or in
kill boxes. These assets can then be assigned to do a variety of tasks,
such as striking a TST (time sensitive target), immediate CAS request from a
FAC forwarded to the ASOC, emergency CAS for non-FAC qualified troops, etc.

The new book on JCAS is the 3-09.3, and while it doesn't deal with the ATO
aspects (in the Air Force the reference for that would be the 3-1), it is
very much the TT&P on how to do CAS today.

Either Buffdriver or the resident Strike eagle Driver might be able to
shed
light on any doctrinal changes in the CAS arena that have occurred since
the
publication of that text.

Brooks

Give me a second while I stow my used barf-bag. I realize that CAS is a
mission, not an aircraft, but there is an aircraft in the inventory that
does the mission better than any other. Dropping a JDAM on coordinates just
isn't going to work for TIC situations, for starters.

Of course, since some elements of 'CAS' are now delivered from bombers
cruising at altitude, perhaps they've added to the nomenclature!

*BARF*!!!

snip enormously long diatribe arguing against the effectiveness of a gun
for CAS

Again, not a ringing endorsement of the strafing runs...

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

Paul -

20mm is particularly ineffective for the type of CAS in the stories you use
to argue your point. Additionally, these were Mud Hen guys who don't train
to strafe, and in fact hadn't practiced strafe since they left the RTU.
They also didn't press in close enough to decrease the bullet dispersion,
which would also allow for an increase in energy when the bullets impacted.
I doubt you've seen the HUD footage from that mission, but I can tell you in
the valley they were operating in I wouldn't have taken an E model any
closer than they did. This is not a slam against the Mud Hen guys, they did
great work, but they simply don't train to use the gun like Warthog pilots
do.

I will venture to say with great certainty if A-10s had been doing the
shooting, there wouldn't have been a need for a Maverick or bomb pass
follow-up.

ATTACK!

So they only used the bombs when it was a factor of outright
survival--understandable IMO.

Still hardly a persuasive argument why the guns are indispensible. Why
wasn't 20mm able to adequately suppress, deter or destroy the enemy?

Large dispersion from long slant range by crews who hadn't strafed since the
F-15E school house. That isn't the only reason, but it goes a long way
towards understanding why the strafe passes didn't work so well.

APKWS is currently planned for use only on rotary assets, beginning in
2006
IIRC.

Again, is that because it is physically impossible to adapt it or
develop something similar? Has analysis shown that it would be
ineffective? Or is it "not in the plan, we just strafe for danger
close"?

Who is to say whether it will be employed on fixed-wing aircraft. 2006
isn't here yet.

You seem to forget that the min
separation factor for 20mm is *25 meters*

Which tells you much about its lethality, no?

No, it doesn't. With the dispersion rate of a group of 20mm rounds, you
have a lot higher likelihood of hitting what your aiming at and minimizing
collateral damage. Bombs can get ugly in a hurry with troops in contact,
hence the much larger radius of .1% probability of incompacitation of troops
farther from the bomb impact.

, while for bombs that minimum
jumps to between 145 and 500 meters (depending upon whether you are in a
protected or open position).

And those are the only options that can be considered?

What do you suggest? Since this discussion has digressed from best dogfight
gun to why you need (or don't need) a gun for close air support, I'd love to
hear what you have to say about the A-10 and pilots who practice with their
gun for CAS on almost every sortie.

"Hog Driver" wrote

, while for bombs that minimum
jumps to between 145 and 500 meters (depending upon whether you are in
a
protected or open position).

And those are the only options that can be considered?

What do you suggest? Since this discussion has digressed from best
dogfight
gun to why you need (or don't need) a gun for close air support, I'd love
to
hear what you have to say about the A-10 and pilots who practice with
their
gun for CAS on almost every sortie.

It says that if CAS requires a gunfire component then we need a 'Hog or
'Hog-equivalent to fly the mission. It says little about whether a gun
should be part of the baseline for e.g., the F-35. A-10s are specifically
designed for that mission with protection, airspeed and ammo tank size all
optimized for it. A fast(er)-mover with no protection, with a small ammo
tank is a move back to the "any old fighter will do" school of CAS, the one
that the Air Force keeps trying to return to everytime the notion of
replacing A-10s with F-16s gets floated.

On the other hand, in discussing the baseline for new fighters here, some
have drug out the CAS argument to buttress the notion that a gun should be
designed into any new fighter. If seems to me that all the arguments in
favor of including a gun are along the lines of "marginal utility in all
roles but covering many roles, low cost, flexible asset" lines which is fair
enough. No one has argued that a gun is a key element of a new fighter,
instead we've been discussing how much a gun offers in the margin in both A
to A and CAS applications and which gun is best for it.

In message , Hog Driver
writes
So they only used the bombs when it was a factor of outright
survival--understandable IMO.

Still hardly a persuasive argument why the guns are indispensible. Why
wasn't 20mm able to adequately suppress, deter or destroy the enemy?

Large dispersion from long slant range by crews who hadn't strafed since the
F-15E school house. That isn't the only reason, but it goes a long way
towards understanding why the strafe passes didn't work so well.

Which is one of the reasons I'm not convinced that "a gun on every
aircraft because we might need it for CAS" is a compelling argument.

Again, is that because it is physically impossible to adapt it or
develop something similar? Has analysis shown that it would be
ineffective? Or is it "not in the plan, we just strafe for danger
close"?

Who is to say whether it will be employed on fixed-wing aircraft. 2006
isn't here yet.

And won't ever be a fixed-wing date (later than 2006 for sure), if the
attitude persists that "there's no need for anything better, a strafing
pass will do just fine".

Which tells you much about its lethality, no?

No, it doesn't.

Back when I was an infantryman we trained to keep at least ten metres
between troops; how many enemy troops can you get per pass with a 25m
danger space?

And those are the only options that can be considered?

What do you suggest?

Adapting APKWS for fast movers is one potential, different guns another
(maybe something in 30mm firing AHEAD ammunition? The US is adopting it
for the AAAV and the Germans for the Puma). Really Small Diameter Bombs
with GPS or laser guidance?

Is there a need? Quite possibly so. Is it met by existing systems? Not
fully, it seems. What's the requirement? Something flexible, multirole,
weighing under a thousand pounds (and not too much drag) for several
(four or five) shots, with significantly more lethality and
effectiveness than the M61, preferably without eating hardpoints.
Laser-guided 70mm with multirole fuzes (prox for air targets or
dispersed troops, impact for soft targets, delay for bunkers and light
armour) is one example candidate.

Since this discussion has digressed from best dogfight
gun to why you need (or don't need) a gun for close air support, I'd love to
hear what you have to say about the A-10 and pilots who practice with their
gun for CAS on almost every sortie.

Concerns about survivability in a MANPADS environment, but the A-10's
gun backed by a trained pilot is a much better tool for the task than a
M61 on a F-15. (The A-10 was _designed_ for the job, it would be
embarrassing if it wasn't capable)

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

In article ,
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

In message , Hog Driver
writes

Large dispersion from long slant range by crews who hadn't strafed since the
F-15E school house. That isn't the only reason, but it goes a long way
towards understanding why the strafe passes didn't work so well.

Which is one of the reasons I'm not convinced that "a gun on every
aircraft because we might need it for CAS" is a compelling argument.

....and if that were the only argument, you might have a point.

But since several people have pointed out other good reasons to have
guns on fighters, and since you haven't come up with a good reason to
*not* have one (one more missile or a minute's worth of fuel aren't very
good reasons at all), the only thing left is to think about cost, and
since guns for planes are a very small amount of the final sticker price
of a modern plane...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

In message , Hog Driver
writes
snip enormously long diatribe arguing against the effectiveness of a gun
for CAS
Again, not a ringing endorsement of the strafing runs...

I will venture to say with great certainty if A-10s had been doing the
shooting, there wouldn't have been a need for a Maverick or bomb pass
follow-up.

I'll agree completely, but then you won't fit the A-10's gun system into
a thousand pounds: nearest handy source says 1723 kilograms loaded
weight, or four times a typical M61 installation. (All that extra energy
comes at a cost...)

Can you put four thousand pounds into every tactical fighter 'just in
case'? It's a specialised weapon.


One issue I'd like a horse's mouth job on - I'd heard claims the A-10s
were pulled out of Afghanistan, or at least had their role reduced,
because of issues about their performance in hot, high-altitude
conditions. True, Chinese whisper, false?

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

In message , Chad Irby
writes
In article ,
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:
Which is one of the reasons I'm not convinced that "a gun on every
aircraft because we might need it for CAS" is a compelling argument.

...and if that were the only argument, you might have a point.

But since several people have pointed out other good reasons to have
guns on fighters, and since you haven't come up with a good reason to
*not* have one (one more missile or a minute's worth of fuel aren't very
good reasons at all),

Shame that you give up a lot more than that even for a 20mm
installation.

the only thing left is to think about cost, and
since guns for planes are a very small amount of the final sticker price
of a modern plane...

If you think that's the case, _you_ pay for integration, installation,
maintenance and training.

It adds up to a pretty decent chunk of change.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

In article ,
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

Chad Irby writes

But since several people have pointed out other good reasons to have
guns on fighters, and since you haven't come up with a good reason to
*not* have one (one more missile or a minute's worth of fuel aren't very
good reasons at all),

Shame that you give up a lot more than that even for a 20mm
installation.

Not really. Fuel is heavy as hell, and missiles (plus the hardpoints,
plus the fire controls for them) aren't as light as you'd think for a
useful one. Then there's the external drag and area issues. As long as
you're not hauling around GAU-8 installs, the weight isn't that extreme.
And especially when you consider the weight per shot (a half-dozen 20mm
bursts versus even one or two missiles) is pretty darned reasonable.

the only thing left is to think about cost, and
since guns for planes are a very small amount of the final sticker price
of a modern plane...

If you think that's the case, _you_ pay for integration, installation,
maintenance and training.

It adds up to a pretty decent chunk of change.

Not compared to keeping even *more* missiles in the inventory, and the
increased inventory of very expensive hardware to keep checking them and
making them work. Even something as simple as an AIM-9 takes a boatload
of work to keep functional, whether you fire them or not. And when you
*do* fire them in practice, you're burning off, in one shot, most of the
lifetime cost of a small gun system...

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.