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How 'bout a thread on the F-22 with no mud slinging, no axe grinding, no emotional diatribes, and just some clear, objective discussion?
The things I'd be most interested in a 1. Was the YF-22/YF-23 a fair flyoff or was it a case of Northop designing what the air force asked for and Lockheed giving them what they really wanted? How much of the decision was based on the capabilities of the aircraft and how much on the track record of the companies involved? 2. Is there anything unheard of popping up in the F-22's flight testing that hasn't happened in other programs? IIRC the F-15 experienced delamination on the horizontal stabilizers. They also clipped the wingtips and added the dogtooth to the horizontal stab. The F-18 had to have those small strakes added to the top of the LERX. The F-100 experienced roll reversal. The F-102 wouldn't go fast enough without a substantial redesign. So is there anything extraodinarily unusual about the kinks they're working out on the F-22 or is a mountain being made of a mole hill? 3. Was it really necessairy to add that "A" in? Has it really fooled any politicians? 4. Is there any rational reason for the air force to push forward with the F-22 if it *is* having significant problems? 5. Is there a way to cram two AIM-9Xs in the space taken by one -9M? That's about all I can think of at the moment. Any takers? |
#2
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On Tue, 06 Jan 2004 00:00:52 GMT, Scott Ferrin
wrote: The things I'd be most interested in a 1. Was the YF-22/YF-23 a fair flyoff or was it a case of Northop designing what the air force asked for and Lockheed giving them what they really wanted? How much of the decision was based on the capabilities of the aircraft and how much on the track record of the companies involved? There's been a lot of air down the intakes since I was closely involved, but from my seat I would say the flyoff was fair. The two companies took different approaches to the RFP. Lockheed's was arguably less risky. They chose to breadboard the avionics while Northrop opted to fly prototypes. Northrop was stealthier while Lockheed was more agile. Lockheed had "stealth fighter" production experience with F-117 while Northrop was doing a wide range of "cats and dogs" including Tacit Rainbow, Peacekeeper gyros, B-747 fuselage sections, and smarting from failures with A-9, F-20 etc. Conversely, Northrop was partnered with MacAir who had a good management record and production reputation for F-4, F-15 and F-18. Lockheed was linked with Boeing and GD. Northrop opted for difficult to manufacture curving surfaces while Lockheed went more for the polygon shape of the F-117 (they've smoothed the shape considerably over time). 2. Is there anything unheard of popping up in the F-22's flight testing that hasn't happened in other programs? When you push technology you always get "new" things happening. There will probably be more glitches in software, man-machine interface and weapons suite than airframe flying problems. The F-100 experienced roll reversal. Actually it was adverse yaw and departure from controlled flight. "Roll reversal" is too benign a term. It really wasn't a redesign solution so much as a training to fly that particular airplane that made the problem go away. The F-102 wouldn't go fast enough without a substantial redesign. Not enough engine on the 102 and not yet understanding "area rule", hence the F-106 that took care of both issues. So is there anything extraodinarily unusual about the kinks they're working out on the F-22 or is a mountain being made of a mole hill? Say PAH-LAH-TICKZ. There are those that support and those that oppose. Most of the mountains of one side are molehills for the other. 3. Was it really necessairy to add that "A" in? Has it really fooled any politicians? It has become customary to somehow nod to the attack function. Not necessary. Someone is made happy by the nomenclature. Who cares? 4. Is there any rational reason for the air force to push forward with the F-22 if it *is* having significant problems? Yes, there is the rational reason that you've already got fifteen years development expended, you've got an obsolescent Eagle flight and no replacement on the horizon, and there is no problem of such significance that would justify scrapping the program. You may have noted that in Iraqi Freedom we lost one fixed aircraft for 16,000 sorties. In Desert Storm we lost one fixed wing for every 3500 sorties. In SEA, we lost one F-105 every 65 sorties. I kind of favor the investment in technology over spending the blood and gristle. 5. Is there a way to cram two AIM-9Xs in the space taken by one -9M? Probably. Or maybe something else. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" Smithsonian Institution Press ISBN #1-58834-103-8 |
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"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message ... Conversely, Northrop was partnered with MacAir who had a good management record and production reputation for F-4, F-15 and F-18. Lockheed was linked with Boeing and GD. Northrop's B-2 managment had shot themselves in the foot comming back from lunch drunk. That caused a bias against Northrop's managment by the government. There was also a critical issue with the pilots liking the displays, as Lt Col Couch had rejected the B-2's display system on first flight. The pilots liked the YF-22 displays best. Additionally, the YF-23 program resisted the DARPA subsidy for using Ada in critical systems, while Lockheed pledged compliance. Lockmart had also been more co-operative in delivering a prototype of what the contract asked for, while Northrop tried to deliver what the government wanted now. So, in the three politically sensitive issues for the selection, the YF-22 held the best hand. |
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On Mon, 5 Jan 2004 17:40:37 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote: "Ed Rasimus" wrote in message .. . Conversely, Northrop was partnered with MacAir who had a good management record and production reputation for F-4, F-15 and F-18. Lockheed was linked with Boeing and GD. Northrop's B-2 managment had shot themselves in the foot comming back from lunch drunk. That caused a bias against Northrop's managment by the government. There was also a critical issue with the pilots liking the displays, as Lt Col Couch had rejected the B-2's display system on first flight. The pilots liked the YF-22 displays best. Additionally, the YF-23 program resisted the DARPA subsidy for using Ada in critical systems, while Lockheed pledged compliance. Lockmart had also been more co-operative in delivering a prototype of what the contract asked for, while Northrop tried to deliver what the government wanted now. So, in the three politically sensitive issues for the selection, the YF-22 held the best hand. ISTR Northrop being in the doghouse at the time for cost overruns on TSAAM and McDonnell for it's part in the A-12. I don't think that helped the YF-23's case. Also Lockeed did an extensive redesign between selection and prototype flight whereas Northrop didn't take advantage of the opportunity. Northop's didn't have the finale engine nacelles (they were bigger than they would have been in the production model because they didn't change them when the thrust reverser requirement was dropped) and it didn't have the final missile bays. IIRC the forward fuselage would have been slightly stretched to fit a second bay for the Sidewinders in front of the main bay. Also with Northrop not demonstrating high AOA flight as Lockheed did it probably didn't help them. I sometimes wonder if Northrop was a little overconfident. Lockeed really pushed it when it came to the flyoff as they did later on the X-35. Northrop didn't seem to feel the need. |
#5
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Actually Scott,the nacelles on the production F-23 would have been a bit
*smaller* and rounded at the top versus squared off like the prototypes,which as you pointed out,still had the extra space for the defunct reversers.They also would have been a bit closer together.The intakes would have been different as well.No decision had been made AFAIK regarding the second weapons bay,but I do know there was a plan to put the AIM-9's on rails on the inside of the bay doors(it was a pretty wide bay) and using a rotary launcher for the AIM-120's..The two bay arrangement used a trapeze style launch rack..Despite your plea for no axe grinding,I predict that it will manifest itself,and I'll keep my own biased opinions to myself :-) I'd say Ed's reply sums it up pretty well though(as usual).Happy New Year.. |
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#7
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As I understand it, the Lockheed proposal that won couldn't fly!
So yeah... I guess they did need a "redesign". Kevin F-117A: The Black Jet Website www.f-117a.com Scott Ferrin wrote in message . .. Also Lockeed did an extensive redesign between selection and prototype flight whereas Northrop didn't take advantage of the opportunity. |
#8
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F-117A Webmaster wrote:
As I understand it, the Lockheed proposal that won couldn't fly! So yeah... I guess they did need a "redesign". The two YF-22 prototypes made over 110 test flights (more than 70 before contract award). I have no idea how you could square that with the claim that the design "couldn't fly." -- Tom Schoene Replace "invalid" with "net" to e-mail "If brave men and women never died, there would be nothing special about bravery." -- Andy Rooney (attributed) |
#9
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On Mon, 5 Jan 2004 17:40:37 -0800, "Tarver Engineering"
wrote: "Ed Rasimus" wrote in message .. . Conversely, Northrop was partnered with MacAir who had a good management record and production reputation for F-4, F-15 and F-18. Lockheed was linked with Boeing and GD. Northrop's B-2 managment had shot themselves in the foot comming back from lunch drunk. That caused a bias against Northrop's managment by the government. B-2 was released into production in 1988. It was built, designed, and managed at Pico Rivera in what was logically named the "B-2 Division". The ATF/YF-23 program was run from the Aircraft Division in Hawthorne. Two distinctly different places. ATF fly-off decision came in 1990, so it doesn't track that several thousand people at Pico Rivera would have been caught drunk several years before program decision on a different aircraft built at a different plant by a different division of the company. We might also note that the B-2 co-production company was the F-22 partner of Lockheed. I will agree, however, that Northrop management was not the most competent. During Spring of '88, the chairman of MacAir came to Hawthorne and held a "come to Jesus" meeting in which he expressed his displeasure at Northrop senior management. At that time, the decision was made to move avionics development to St. Louis. There was also a critical issue with the pilots liking the displays, as Lt Col Couch had rejected the B-2's display system on first flight. The pilots liked the YF-22 displays best. Fusion of data and presentation was a critical design issue. It wouldn't surprise me in the slightest if there were customer issues with the two company proposals. But, that would have been primarily software driven at the time of contract award. Additionally, the YF-23 program resisted the DARPA subsidy for using Ada in critical systems, while Lockheed pledged compliance. Lockmart had also been more co-operative in delivering a prototype of what the contract asked for, while Northrop tried to deliver what the government wanted now. Can't agree with that. In late '80s/early '90s the mandate was Ada. Northrop had no choice and was certainly compliant. The RFP set requirements and each competitor interpreted how best to meet them. So, in the three politically sensitive issues for the selection, the YF-22 held the best hand. You've mentioned program management, cockpit displays and language for software. I don't think any of those could be called "politically sensitive" issues. The major political sensitivity would be production location and at the time of contract award, which was pre-merger for both contenders, the apparent production would take place in the LA area. Cost overruns by Northrop on B-2 as well as some scandal on parts ordering on missile guidance systems for the Electronics Division certainly muddied the political waters and may have cost Northrop some points. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" Smithsonian Institution Press ISBN #1-58834-103-8 |
#10
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B-2 was released into production in 1988. It was built, designed, and
managed at Pico Rivera in what was logically named the "B-2 Division". Very minor point. The B-2 was managed at Pico but manufactured at Palmdale in the high desert save for some component parts. Eventually the entire B-2 program moved to USAF Plant 42 at Palmdale. The ATF/YF-23 program was run from the Aircraft Division in Hawthorne. Two distinctly different places. ATF fly-off decision came in 1990, so it doesn't track that several thousand people at Pico Rivera would have been caught drunk several years before program decision on a different aircraft built at a different plant by a different division of the company. I am sounding like a "Me too" here but the B-2 program had a lot of issues dealing with both the El Segundo and Hawthorne operations. They almost operated like several different companies in total competition with one another. We might also note that the B-2 co-production company was the F-22 partner of Lockheed. Help me here. Boeing was a majo rmanufacturing partner of the B-2. I don't remember muchif any involvement from Lockheed in the B-2 program even though they were across the runway from Northrop at Palmdale. You've mentioned program management, cockpit displays and language for software. I don't think any of those could be called "politically sensitive" issues. The major political sensitivity would be production location and at the time of contract award, which was pre-merger for both contenders, the apparent production would take place in the LA area. Full use of Ada was a source selection criteria at one time. Final selection when the findings of the source selection board reach the decison makers often gets influenced by political imperative and past peformance. Cost overruns by Northrop on B-2 as well as some scandal on parts ordering on missile guidance systems for the Electronics Division certainly muddied the political waters and may have cost Northrop some points. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" Smithsonian Institution Press ISBN #1-58834-103-8 Steve |
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