Kills with Guns

Joining this late because I have been gone but if it helps here is a
collection of data I put out years ago ----



An Air Combat Summary for Western Fighters:



Since 1979, American made fighters have been engaged in air combat at
least 214 times and have downed around 214 aircraft. Air Battles that
have occurred were from the Bekaa Valley and Persian Gulf to around the
world during the coup attempt in Venezuela. Engagements and Kills were
recorded throughout more than 3400 air-to-air and air-to-ground combat
sorties. Western aircraft included the F-4E Phantom, F-14 Tomcat, F-15
Eagle, F-16 Falcon, F-5E Tiger II, Mirage F-1, and F-18 Hornet
fighter-bombers. These engagements resulted in (with this data base) 214
confirmed Kills with only the two air-to-air combat losses. No direct
correlation is made with those kills offically sanctioned by the
respective air forces; for instance, Israel and Pakistan will make a
determination of "personal kill" versus "squadron kill" based on the
exact way the pilot performed rulling out louck and chance in the
scoring. There we



23 x M-61 gun kills

48 x AIM-7 Sparrow kills from F-15, F-18, & F-14's

04 x AIM-120 AMRAAM kills from the F-16 (4) and F-15 (1)

03 x AIM-54 Phoenix Kills

130 x IR missile kills from all types of aircraft utilizing

either AIM-9 Sidewinder, Magic 550, or Python missiles

2 x maneuvering suicides

1 x bail out

3 x from air-to-ground ordnance while airborne

------

214



During this time, only two Western aircraft were downed by Russian built
aircraft. One South African Mirage F-1 by a Cuban flown Angolian MiG-23
with an AA-8 Aphid and a US Navy F/A-18C by an Iraqi flown MiG-25 Foxbat
with an AA-6 Acrid. There were two Saudi F-15C's that downed 2 x
Iranian F-4E's back in the mid 1980's when they were trying to defect.
Also a Navy F-14 downed a USAF RF-4C in an advertent Sidewinder firing
over the Med. There were other statistics where dedicated attack
aircraft were downed by fighters but the details have not been accounted
for here. The First Gulf War (Iran-Iraq War) there were well over 300
air-to-air encounters with the Iranian scoring around 135 Kills and the
Iraqi's around 85, but the data is still very confused because there
were not engagements just run downs and encounters during strike
missions. Surprisingly the Iraqi's favored the Super 530 IR version on
the F-1 Mirage because of its range. The Iranians were reported to have
made at least three AIM-54 kills which have been recorded because they
would be F-14 kills and it does represent the only combat use of the
AIM-54.



A Summary of the Gulf War and Bosnian Air-to-Air Kills



06 x MiG-29 Fulcrum's

... 4 x AIM-7 Sparrow Kills

... 1 x AIM-120 AMRAAM Kill

... 1 x Maneuvering
Suicide's

08 x F-1 Mirages

... 4 x AIM-7 Kills

... 2 x AIM-9 Kills

... 1 x Maneuvering
Suicide

04 x MiG-21/F-7 Fishbed's

... 3 x AIM-9 Kills

... 1 x AIM-7 Kill

08 x MiG-23 Flogger's

... 6 x AIM-7 Kills

... 2 x AIM-9 Kills

03 x MiG-25 Foxbat's

... 2 x AIM-7 Kills

... 1 x AIM-120 Kill

06 x Su-7/17/22

... 3 x AIM-7 Kills

... 2 x AIM-9 Kills

... 1 x Mk-83 Bomb

02 x Su-25 Frogfoot

... 2 x AIM-9 Kills

01 x IL-76 Candid transport

... 1 x AIM-7 Kill

01 x PC-9 Trainer

... pilot bailout

07 x Helo's

... 2 x AIM-7 Kills

... 1 x AIM-9 Kills

... 2 x Gun Kills

... 1 x LGB Kill

... 1 x Walleye Kill

04 x Gastreb Light Attack

... 1 x AIM-120 AMRAAM
Kills

... 3 x AIM-9M Kills

02 x Blackhawk Helicopters (fratricide)

... 1 x AIM-120 AMRAAM Kill

... 1 x AIM-9M Kill

---------------------------------------

..... 24 x AIM-7 Kills (33 launches for
73%)

..... 04 x AIM-120 AMRAAM Kills (6 fired)

..... 16 x AIM-9 KIlls (19 launches for
84%)

..... 02 x 30mm Gun Kills

..... 02 x Maneuvering Suicides

..... 01 x Bailout

..... 03 x Air-to-Ground Ordnance

---------------------------------------

52 x Total Gulf/Bosnia Air-to-Air
Victories

Then Add:

04 x USN Kills on Libyan Su-22's

01 x USN Kill on an RF-4C

01 x RSAF Kills on 2 x F-4E's from Iran

03 x AIM-54 Kills from Iranian F-14's

24 x Israeli Air Force Kills From 1979 to
the Bekaa Valley

89 x Israeli Air Force Kills During the
Bekaa Valley War:

13 x Pakistani Air Force Kills During the
Border War:

03 x Venezuelan Air Force Kills During the
2nd Coup Attempt:

18 x South African Air Force Kills During
the Angolian War:

04 x Gastreb's downed over Bosnia

02 x Iraqi Aircraft downed after Gulf War

-----

214



None of these engagements occurred directly against Soviet/Warsaw Pact
Air Forces although almost all were against Soviet manufactured
machines. Some were fourth generation MiG-29 Fulcrums but no Su-27
Flanker fighters. A couple of Su-25 Frogfoot were downed by Pakistani
F-16's and the one Pakstani F-16 lost to fratricide is counted not as a
combat loss but as a missile kill. Sukhoi Su-27's have since seen combat
in the sporadic air war between Ethiopia and Euritrea, no real numbers
available now.



Enemy fighters have fired 19 to 22 missiles and made five gun passes
with only three hits and two kills. It is interesting to note that over
half of the attacks were considered out-of-envelope attempts due to the
fact that the enemy pilots could not achieve a better position or did
not understand how to. So the pilot-factor in these engagements had a
significant impact on the outcome.



During the dynamics of these engagements the average radar first
contacts were under 20 NM until the Gulf War and then the average
appeared to slip out to 28 NM, even though some individual pilots
acquired contacts as far as 50 NM. This is surprising for many
considering that the F-15 was employed by the Israelis, but the Bekaa
Valley was characterized by very short range radar contacts. The lack of
an average longer range radar contact was primarily due to the complex
and sophisticated nature of the operational environment that required
pilot compensation for formations, terrain, weather, surface-to-air
threats, and the presence of enemy aircraft. The demands for the
positive ID (identification) of targets also effected the nature of the
air battles.



The Soviets employed, by themselves or through numerous surrogate
pilots, tactical "experiments", as Soviet analyst Col Babich would say,
that were not yet addressed in the literature from the Warsaw Pact Air
Forces. Only recently have these more exotic evaluations been identified
in the writings by Soviet tacticians. With a better understanding of the
capabilities of modern Western weapon systems, the Soviets have
attempted to produce tactical geometry's and intercept dynamics that
utilize larger numbers of aircraft with the objective of exceeding the
technical capabilities of the radar such as scan and track rate, search
volume, and overall pilot task loading. Ultimately these factors would
try to reduce "situation awareness" (SA) and "mutual support" (MS)
bringing the friendly formations into "killing zones" or "ambush
points". "Decoy" or "monkey" formations would serve as obvious "bait" in
an attempt to set up the more tactically experienced Western pilots for
an unobserved entry by a MiG element or trapped into one or more of
these "killing zones" for demise by the whole enemy formation. Because
of this, most targets were not "cooperative" and therefore the actual
engagement setups were basically short ranged and radar lock-ups were
discouraged due to the numbers of targets at many different bearings.



There was also a basic "timing" problem, that directly relates to the
skill level of the engaged pilots. In many cases, the Soviet advisory
technicians and their brothers in arms thought that they had properly
"pincered" or "enveloped" the formation of US built fighters. In other
words, they were satisfied from a C3I standpoint that the enemy
formation was properly countered and engaged by their fighters who were
given an entry advantage. Why their pilots never came home was a big
mystery, especially since it looked so good on the GCI radar scopes.
What of course happened was that the US built fighters, through superior
onboard systems, system mechanization, air-to-air weapons, maneuver
performance, pilot skills, and overall realistic training, were able to
correct for a bad start and quickly kill the attackers inside the
resolution cell of their command and control system. Despite the fact
that the Soviets are now saying all of the "right things" when it comes
to appreciating these kinds of air battles, but they are far from
realizing any wide spread benefits from changing the emphasis of their
training.



The most important lesson learned were based on the fact that the US
fighters could react quickly to threatening situations, they were very
difficult to see or hit, and the pilots could reverse a bad situation
rapidly without making themselves more vulnerable to random events. The
pilot's ability to keep his eyes and attention outside the aircraft and
still monitor his sensors and weapon system carried the day. During the
approximately 30 Middle East engagements, situation awareness was lost
only three times, according to unofficial pilot debriefs. That means the
pilots and their flight members lost track of events only 1% of the
time. Most of us couldn't do that well driving home from work. To make
that remarkable fact happen took exactly what is called "Western
Technology". The sad thing is, considering all of what we said, that we
can abuse this incredible edge over the Soviets by over-doing it on the
"technology" and system "pet rock" side without a corresponding balance
in requirements. The keep it simple stupid (KISS) principle has never
been more important.



Exchange ratios from the major air conflicts since the Korean War. The
air-to-air exchange ratio is straight forward but the campaign exchange
reflects the simple ratio of aircraft lost to all causes divided by the
number destroyed from all causes. We have a tendency to dwell on the
successes and not examine the failures. The Soviets just look at the
bottom line, aircraft invested versus aircraft expended. In the Korean
War, despite our great air-to-air success rate over the MiG-15 by the
F-86, the Soviets praise the North Koreans for "a draw" with the US
Superpower since in the overall "campaign" the US lost around the same
2000 machines that they did. That is also why they have looked so
seriously at the Middle East Wars, their "campaign" averages were mush
worse.



A best guess determination at what it took to get a missile kill
throughout the conflicts since South East Asia. Together they give a
fairly interesting picture of how the various air wars went and they all
agree on the fact that the Soviet equipment didn't carry the day.
Technology was clearly in the favor of the West, but there was such an
excessive amount of it with little regards to the support side of the
weapons, success was hit or miss and sometimes actually overlooked. The
US Navy had terrible luck with the Sparrow missile, the USAF and Israeli
Air Force had better, primarily due to land based operations with more
time and space for maintenance and checkout. The Navy relied heavily on
Sidewinder IR missiles, the USAF had to be embarrassed into it. Despite
limited F-8 experiences, it was the USAF that became the Vietnam War's
"gun fighters", simply because Navy Phantoms (F-4B/N/J/S) had none by
choice, despite later regrets. Perhaps the best success story has been
that of the Sidewinder "L" (AIM-9L) version that has been so

No offense, but your article format isn't easy to read. And I think you're
off with your AMRAAM #s. I believe the totals stand closer to at least 6
rather than 4 (2 F16 Iraq, 2 F16 Bosnia, 2 F15 Bosnia). And I'm not sure
what your general points are.

"The most important lesson learned were based on the fact that the US
fighters could react quickly to threatening situations, they were very
difficult to see or hit, and the pilots could reverse a bad situation
rapidly without making themselves more vulnerable to random events"

More to the point, could you simply say they had better A-A training? I
don't understand the difficult to see bit, given that Western fighters are
typically larger. The lesson that experience counts, in combat or anything
else, it hardly new. And it was learned in Linebacker via Top Gun (and FWS
later) if it was forgotten.

"The US Navy had terrible luck with the Sparrow missile, the USAF and
Israeli Air Force had better, primarily due to land based operations with
more time and space for maintenance and checkout. The Navy relied heavily on
Sidewinder IR missiles, the USAF had to be embarrassed into it."

I'm not sure where you got these ideas. The USAF had such success with the
Sparrow because a hand-picked unit of F-15 fighters, with the best available
NCTR technology (unavailable to the Navy) were given the cherry-picked
opportunities to pursue A-A BVR engagements. An F-14 pilot is quoted as
commenting that the AIM-7 is a magic bullet once it gets off the rails. How
many BVR engagements has the USN had? One (by a panicky RIO)? And the USAF
was embarrased into adopting the Sidewinder? Professionally, Eagle Drivers
are embarrased to be forced into a dogfight (vs. smacking BVR), but I've
never heard one be embarrased by the AIM-9 unless they were on the receiving
end of one in training!

TV

"TV" wrote in message
...
Olds died and it wasn't even mentioned here!?! Wow. For a long time,
based on interview snippets I heard from him, I thought he was an arrogant
git. But I saw a TV interview of him, that was fairly recent, where a lot
of those comments were shown to be taken out of context. Confident, yes.
Git, not. Great stories in general, and he definitely projected a solid
image.

Certainly was covered here. Remember though the memorial service was held
on the 30th he died on the 14th.

Tex Houston

Since I could not follow up on every detail as I did then over time you
may be right in the AMRAAM's but in the beginning the admission of who
or what aircraft was carrying them and even if they were entered into
the Gulf War were very sketchy in details. Fact was the F-15's retained
the AIM-7 longer because of vibration and flow-issues over the wing with
slammer's on the rails and the fact that they had a special Sparrow
tailored to their liking. The F-16 entered the Gulf Zone after the War
but in time to get the first AMRAAM kill (active pit bull as it was) and
then time moved on. The Sparrow was a favorite to the F-15 for a longer
time and especially the Israeli's who wanted the US to embargo it to the
Middle East but that did not last long. Main concerns were fratricide of
course, where the Sparrow could be made dumb but shutting off the radar
or the CW which in one case was documented by the IAF during the Bekaa,
but it was not to avoid a friendly it was to prevent the MiG from being
hit over Syria - an ROE no no. The first years of AMRAAM training
generally saw in the simulators the attrition of friendlies pretty high.
As to preferring the BVR to the WVR shot well I guess that is all good
bar talk but in reality things began to merge as the IR missiles became
stronger in range and ability to "see" a target - hence they were used
more and more in the forward hemisphere - while the Sparrow with its
large motor and warhead continued to run down targets better in the
stern. The Bekaa data would be the latest good sort out of missiles.
The Iraq data with all the US kills shows the trend moving to chasing
down the enemy although there were still a couple of good engagements
more of the classical style. Dorr has a great summary of the F-15 kills
in the Gulf War and I have summarized that and other inputs in the book
done during the events.

Now take all the lessosn from AIM ACE and yopu see as you said that the
air to air environment is getting real deadly to all players and the
ability to launch (F-Pole perhaps) far out makes a difference even over
sorting - so what would an Iranian Air War look like, that will be
interesting. But with MiG-31's, linked MiG-29M's and Su-30's, ground
SA-10 and SA-15's merged into an IADS the whole nice world of the F-15
and F-22 could suddenly pop holes - so I suspect they are working that
real carefully. Then again - the better pilot survives longer - and in
that he generally gets more kills regardless of his mount, but with an
enemy flying stronger machines both sides loose many more. And the
missiles like AMRAAM are slowly taking a back seat to some longer range
beauties - and again the race is on. So I am just offering you what I
had for the groups to ponder - there is no real message and it is my
opinions from about 35 years of being in the middle of a lot of it - so
if you don't like them fine




"TV" wrote in message
...
No offense, but your article format isn't easy to read. And I think
you're off with your AMRAAM #s. I believe the totals stand closer to
at least 6 rather than 4 (2 F16 Iraq, 2 F16 Bosnia, 2 F15 Bosnia).
And I'm not sure what your general points are.

"The most important lesson learned were based on the fact that the US
fighters could react quickly to threatening situations, they were very
difficult to see or hit, and the pilots could reverse a bad situation
rapidly without making themselves more vulnerable to random events"

More to the point, could you simply say they had better A-A training?
I don't understand the difficult to see bit, given that Western
fighters are typically larger. The lesson that experience counts, in
combat or anything else, it hardly new. And it was learned in
Linebacker via Top Gun (and FWS later) if it was forgotten.

"The US Navy had terrible luck with the Sparrow missile, the USAF and
Israeli Air Force had better, primarily due to land based operations
with more time and space for maintenance and checkout. The Navy relied
heavily on Sidewinder IR missiles, the USAF had to be embarrassed into
it."

I'm not sure where you got these ideas. The USAF had such success
with the Sparrow because a hand-picked unit of F-15 fighters, with the
best available NCTR technology (unavailable to the Navy) were given
the cherry-picked opportunities to pursue A-A BVR engagements. An
F-14 pilot is quoted as commenting that the AIM-7 is a magic bullet
once it gets off the rails. How many BVR engagements has the USN had?
One (by a panicky RIO)? And the USAF was embarrased into adopting the
Sidewinder? Professionally, Eagle Drivers are embarrased to be forced
into a dogfight (vs. smacking BVR), but I've never heard one be
embarrased by the AIM-9 unless they were on the receiving end of one
in training!

TV

On Tue, 3 Jul 2007 20:54:12 -0400, "TV" wrote:

Coincidentally Ed, I'm just reading Palace Cobra now. I might have more
questions when I finish, but for now do you mind if I ask:

1- Relating to this thread, what do you think was most missing from U.S.
A-A? Guns, more reliable missiles, better ROE, Combat Tree (NCTR), or better
communication (like when you guys got robbed of thos Migs- the
"Mig-hoarding" of Udorn reminds me of the 55th in Desert Storm)? Or just
more Migs?

Training--realistic, concentrated, dissimilar training.
Tactics--abandonment of welded wing and training in fluid attack/loose
deuce mutual support tactics.

I always had a gun--both F-105 and F-4E. Not a factor. Missile
reliability was. Poor training in AIM-7 applications was an issue.
Only Fighter Weapons School guys in USAF got really concentrated
training in the Sparrow. Frequent carriage of the missiles with
attendant thumps, bumps and stresses caused deterioration and low
reliability.

ROE was definitely a factor. Required VID for most of the war for most
of the players. No airfield strikes until Linebacker was another
issue.

Combat Tree was a late technology advance and would have made a
difference as well.

2- Would you have prefered to fly the F-105G or the F-4E for your missions?
For the planes as well as for the separate hunter/killer missions.

As the "killer" element, I liked the F-4E. It was compatible with the
F-105G and carried a good load with good systems. When it was
available in the early years, the F-105D (single seat) was a good
killer as well.

3- This relating to Olds. I also recently read Going Downtown. Having read
Thud Ridge a long time ago, it was also pretty decent. Broughton certainly
didn't suffer from lack of confidence either! I know you and the other
River Rats don't feel the warmest feelings towards him, but I was wondering
why when he was on trial (and Yeager was backing him up, so he couldn't have
been a total buffoon), Olds backed away from the trial. Career politics or
something more personal? I certainly don't want to much rake Olds in any
way, I'm curious about the history of the moment. General Ryan certainly
seemed like a jack-ass.

Olds was airborne and just a few miles N. of Haiphong during the
Turkestan incident. He actually saw the strafing occur. I spoke with
him about it (actually he spoke and I listened,) a few years ago. He
recalled being astonished that someone was doing that since the ship
and the restrictions were specifically briefed that morning!

He was investigating officer for 13th AF on the incident. He didn't
think too much of Broughton's actions.

4- Did they really conduct an ORI in the middle of a successful air
campaign?!

The ORI took place in January of '73, right after completion of
Linebacker II, exactly as recounted in Palace Cobra. (I still see Turk
Turley ever year at River Rats reunions.)


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

John Carrier wrote:


wrote in message
oups.com...
On Jun 30, 1:54 pm, "John Carrier" wrote:
"Schlomo Lipchitz" wrote in message

...

Whevever I see a TV show about the F-4, all the AF guys do is bitch
about the early models not having a gun. Just how many kills (if any)
have the F-14, F-15, F-16, and F-18 had with guns???

On the Navy side, Zero for the F-14 and F-18. I don't think the USAF
F-15/16 drivers have ever gotten a gun kill either, it's possible the
Israelis have. With modern missile systems, you generally have to drive
through the missile envelope to get to guns, so it makes little sense to
pass up the opportunity and expose yourself more than necessary. A gun
kill
in a post-Vietnam world would also often require entering a
hard-maneuvering
engagement that is generally an unhealthy place to be.

An interesting note. Most Vietnam gun kills were scored by the F-105,
perhaps the least maneuverable aircraft in wide service there.

No Crusader gun kills?

The question was about the modern aircraft. For the F-8, if I counted
correctly, 4 with the gun only, 3 more sidewinder + gun. And one with no
ordnance expended ;-).

And another 10 or so which were Sidewinder only.
John, Given the lack of reliability of the F-8's guns,
how much were you really relying on them?
Was doctrine at the time to take advantage of the situation that
since, in order to set yourself up for a gun shot, you'd drive right through
the Sidewinder's best engagement zone and geometry, that you'd push for the
gun shot, but it was mostly a follow-up if the missile didn't work?


--
Pete Stickney
Without data, all you have is an opinion

"Peter Stickney" wrote in message
...
John Carrier wrote:


wrote in message
oups.com...
On Jun 30, 1:54 pm, "John Carrier" wrote:
"Schlomo Lipchitz" wrote in message

...

Whevever I see a TV show about the F-4, all the AF guys do is bitch
about the early models not having a gun. Just how many kills (if
any)
have the F-14, F-15, F-16, and F-18 had with guns???

On the Navy side, Zero for the F-14 and F-18. I don't think the USAF
F-15/16 drivers have ever gotten a gun kill either, it's possible the
Israelis have. With modern missile systems, you generally have to
drive
through the missile envelope to get to guns, so it makes little sense
to
pass up the opportunity and expose yourself more than necessary. A gun
kill
in a post-Vietnam world would also often require entering a
hard-maneuvering
engagement that is generally an unhealthy place to be.

An interesting note. Most Vietnam gun kills were scored by the F-105,
perhaps the least maneuverable aircraft in wide service there.

No Crusader gun kills?

The question was about the modern aircraft. For the F-8, if I counted
correctly, 4 with the gun only, 3 more sidewinder + gun. And one with no
ordnance expended ;-).

And another 10 or so which were Sidewinder only.
John, Given the lack of reliability of the F-8's guns,
how much were you really relying on them?
Was doctrine at the time to take advantage of the situation that
since, in order to set yourself up for a gun shot, you'd drive right
through
the Sidewinder's best engagement zone and geometry, that you'd push for
the
gun shot, but it was mostly a follow-up if the missile didn't work?

The guns weakness was the length of the flexible feeds from the ammo cans
located behind the cockpit (head high) and the guns which were in the lower
forward fuselage. Under G, some flexing would occur, the belted ammo would
catch and break a link. The trick was to avoid firing at anything over 4 G,
and preferably around 2.5 ... not easy against a turning adversary.

As I noted in an earlier post, you usually flew though the Sidewinder
envelope prior to reaching a gun solution. So ... rely on the missile.
Snap (opportunity) shot at high TCA was still available with guns. The WCS
allowed both guns and missiles to be available, missiles on the pickle and
guns on the trigger.

Pushing for the gun shot was generally ill-advised in a multi-plane
engagement. The time expended from sidewinder envelope (1NM and within 40
degrees in the era) to guns (1000') created a predictable path the free
bogey could exploit.

The Thuds got lots of gun kills because most of the time that's what they
had and all they had. With A/A missile armament, the gun is primarily a
weapon of (somewhat unusual) opportunity and often (in the training
environment) ego.

R / John

The article at:

http://www.afa.org/magazine/July2007/0707strafing.asp

includes the following:

"We're using the gun quite a bit in the Iraq and Afghanistan
operations.
The fighters are using lots of 20 mm off F-15Es and F-16s and 30 mm
off A-10s to hit ground targets. Why is that? For individuals, the gun
is
probably one of the most accurate weapons, with the least collateral
damage. That 20 mm will end the bad guy's life, but stray rounds will
just drive into the ground, and that's it.

In Iraq, the adversary uses both road networks and riverine networks.
There have been a number of occasions where boats have been
identified
carrying insurgents on the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, and we've
used
20 mm and 30 mm guns to destroy those boats. A moving target is hard
to hit with a bomb. With a gun, it's no big deal. In one instance, the
enemy
was getting ready to move people somewhere to do something later that
night, but we removed them from the fight.

The same thing happened in Balad, where we found people going to get
roadside bomb supplies. We have been using the gun against single
persons
who have been planting improvised exposive devices. You'll have an
individual
with a truck, and a couple of other individuals; you'll see them get
out and
move around, trying to dig a hole, and you'll bring in an F-16 or an
F-15E, or
maybe an A-10, and you'll use 20 or 30 mm and go kill them. If you
have troops
in contact, or you have individuals in buildings, you do the same
thing."


Discussions about aircraft guns usually center on air-to-air usage,
but
nowadays, that's a secondary mission. With the primary usage of
aircraft guns being strafing. For how long has this been true?

On Jun 30, 8:44 pm, vincent norris wrote:
An interesting note. Most Vietnam gun kills were scored by the F-105,
perhaps the least maneuverable aircraft in wide service there.

John, there ought to be some interesting stories about those kills.



Americans should be ashamed to talk about what they did to Vietnam.







vince norris

Certainly was covered here. Remember though the memorial service was held
on the 30th he died on the 14th.

Huh, I don't have any such thread from the 14th onwards showing up. Darn
newsgroup provider!

TV