#1 Jet of World War II

On Fri, 08 Aug 2003 09:40:56 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

The Stirling has always been my personal favorite among the three for looks (other
than the original top turret), and if I had my druthers they'd have stuck the
proposed 110-foot wing on them and maybe shortened the gear. But there was no way
that they could have been produced in adequate numbers.

Still too heavy for my likings. Like you, I think the Halifax B.III
was the best contender, with the Lancs second.

More on LR Spits in my other response.

and 9th AF, we might have been able to swap for P-47s which would at least allow us
to escort to 375 miles or so by spring, even if we couldn't get the Spits we needed.

The P-47s would probably be out: the RAF wanted them to replace
Hurricanes for Tactical support in the Far East by mid-1944, but IIRC
they didn't get significant deliveries until early 1945. The USAAF
(quite rightly) had first call on lend-lease aircraft, and I can't see
the RAF getting P-47s until the USAAF was happy with the numbers it
had available. The Mustang was a different issue, given the
importance of the British contribution to getting it and the Packard
Merlin into production in the first place.

[3 Group flying B-24s]

3 Gp. was only the initial contingent; most of the force would transition over
eventually.

I just don't think the numbers would be available for that in 1944.
Again, the USAAF would have first call (alongside the USN and
Churchill's personal transport/cigar ferry....). One, maybe two
Groups might have been usable in the context of heavy attritional
losses, but I can't see the RAF replacing the whole of the 2,000
Lancasters and Halifaxes Bomber Command had on strength by the end of
1944. Personally, I suspect 205 Group only really got them due to the
fact that they'd lucked into enough to equip one squadron* before
Pearl Harbour and the following ramping-up of USAAF lend-lease
allocations.

[* Not actually operating B-24s in December 1941, but able to
mysteriously hold on to their initial allocation which actually made
it out to Egypt in the spring of 1942 before the Halverson force and
the 12th AF Libs arrived to suck up all the following B-24s that
followed.]

As an alternative, given these constraints, I suggest expanding 2
Group as a daylight bomber force.

An option, although I'm not familiar with where they were based at the time, and
whether their base infrastructure would support heavies.

They had some in East Anglia, and could be allocated more. Just like
3 Group (and 8 Group), they were adjacent to USAAF bases, so the fuel
pipeline and rail links would have been available. I think the B-25
is a contender he it had the range for shallow penetration raids
to the Ruhr, reasonable defensive armament and a good bombload. I
suggest phasing out the Boston in 2 Group and replacing it with the
Mitchell, and using the six to eight squadrons in 2 Group for daylight
strategic bombing. Further expansion could follow if the aircraft
were available.

I'd really like to see a good source on the Stirling, given my affection for it.

Try "The Stirling Bomber", by M. J. F. Bowyer, Faber & Faber, London
1980. ISBN 0 571 11101 7. It's not as comprehensive as I'd like
[most books aren't], but it's the best reference I've found for the
Stirling.

[snip gratuitous, sickening and totally uncalled-for agreement on
other points]

Gavin Bailey

--

"...this level of misinformation suggests some Americans may be
avoiding having an experience of cognitive dissonance."
- 'Poll shows errors in beliefs on Iraq, 9/11'
The Charlotte Observer, 20th June 2003

The Revolution Will Not Be Televised wrote:

On Fri, 8 Aug 2003 11:03:12 +0100, "Keith Willshaw"
wrote [well, Guy did, the last
quoted material is from Keith]:

[long-range Spits for a daylight BC effort]

You've arrived at pretty much the same conclusions we did, although we
said either
the Spit Mk. VIII or else the IX with the VIII's leading edge tanks as a
start.

Given that Mk VII/VIII production was underway at the end of 1942,
there's no reason they couldn't have been made available with
rear-fusleage tanks as the 1945 production IXs and XVIs we Fighter
Command were actively against it due to C of G issues affecting
manoeverability, but in this instance I think they would have been
over-ruled if a decision was made at Air Staff level to pursue
daylight strategic operations [just like they got the LR Mk IIs and
had to use them to escort the Knapsack Blenheim raid in Ausgust 1941].

Frankly, even Mk Vs would have been useful with a 75-gallon rear tank
and 90-gallon slipper tanks. This would have increased endurance over
normal internal fuel capacity to a total of 250 gallons or about 300%.
They would have been uncomfortably unstable on take-off, but the 8th
AF overcame similar problems with the rear-fuselage tank for the P-51B
(deleted by the RAF in their Mustang IIIs for the same manoeverability
prejudice). This would have improved a little with the large chord Mk
VIII tailplane.

My contention here is that Fighter Command would still get the IXs as
fast as they could be produced, while older Vc airframes were fitted
with the rear fuselage tank, meaining no impact on Mk IX supplies in
the short term. A similar process of getting the most out of older
airframes can be seen in the conversion of stock Vbs to LF Vbs in the
summer of 1943, so I don't think this is too implausible.

I think you may be underestimating the difficulty re the Mk V. Quill, in His
"Spitfi A Test Pilot's Story," devotes an entire chapter to "Longitudinal
Stability and Increased Range." He describes the weight additions and Cg
problems that led to the installation of bobweights on the Mk. Vs, as well as the
first fitting of a 75 gallon tank to a Mk. IX (ML 186), which he flew from
Salisbury Plain to the Moray Firth and back at low altitude and economical cruise
-- this a/c had a bob-weight in the elevator system plus an enlarged horn
balance. Quill writes that "the aeroplane was unstable to start with but as soon
as I had used up the rear fuselage fuel the handling was back to normal . . ."

While he and Joe Smith felt that some longitudinal instability at the start of
the flight was acceptable (as with the Mustang), the margins seem to have been
much smaller in the case of the Spit. The Mustang's stability was judged
acceptable once the rear tank was down to somewhere between 25 and 50% (opinions
differ), and if you want to extend the escort range it's the amount of fuel you
can carry internally to fight and return on that determines escort radius, no
matter how much fuel you hang externally to boost endurance.

Talking about the development of the Mk. XIV into the Mk. XVIII, Quill writes
that "the basic stability margins of this aircraft, with its more forward center
of gravity due to its heavier engine, and with the latest standard of modified
elevator and the larger vertical tail surfaces, were thought likely to be
adequate to enable the aircraft to be cleared for long-range escort duties
accepting some instability in the early stages. However, we had more difficulty
than we anticipated in reaching an acceptable standard of handling with the rear
tank in use and the war was over before it was possible to clear the aircraft
with the rear tank in full operation."

"The next and final stage in the longitudinal stability story was the
incorporation of what came to be known as the 'Spiteful' tail. This had greatly
enlarged (27 %) horizonta and vertical tail surfaces and was fitted to some Mk.
22s, all Mk. 24s, some Seafire 46s and all Seafire 47s and all Spitefuls and
Seafangs."

"It was a major production change and, had the pressures of war permitted its
earlier introduction, for instance on the Mk. XIVs and Mk. XVIII, the Spitfire
would have become a very fine long-range escort fighter. As it was, although the
Seafire 47 and Spitfire 24 were both very long-range aeroplanes compared with the
early marks of Spitfire, the fact is that throughout the period of Spitfire
wartime operations problems of longitudinal stability imposed a severe limitation
on its range."

The two-stage Merlin was shorter and lighter than the Griffon, but was still
about 6" longer (second stage supercharger case) and 200 lb. heavier than the
single stage Merlins, and the Mk. Vs had already been suffering from overstess
breakups due to too far aft Cg prior to the fitting of bobweights. I don't think
Mk. Vs would have worked.

The next stage would have been Mk VIIIs with the same rear-fuselage
tank, with the leading-edge tankage helping to offset their higher
fuel consumption to give a broadly similar endurance and range. I
don't doubt that there wouldn't have been enough rear fuselage tanks
to equip full production, but Fighter Command and the overseas
commands would still get the shorter-range, umodified VIIIs and IXs.
Speaking of which, the extra range would have been very popular in
Australia, Burma and Italy. At any rate, overall production would not
suffer, as only a minority of airframes could be fitted as rear
fuselage tank production started, and this could be done to them while
in storage at Maintenance Units after delivery from the factory.

If Mk. VIII airframes were available we would have taken them as is, and asked
for more. Even the unmodified Mk. VIII would get us to the Ruhr at least,
probably a bit further.

We
told Supermarine to put more development effort into the rear tank, even
if it held
up the Mk. XIV.

No need to - the supply of two-stage Griffons was the main bottleneck
for Mk XIV production, and there would still be unmodified Mk VIII
airframes available by the end of 1943 for conversion to Mk XIVs as
the Griffons came along.

Lots of Mk.VIIIs were what we needed, not the Mk. XIV, so we would have grabbed
those airframes. The delay in the Mk. XIV would have been a question of
development manpower available. They were still working out the bugs on the Mk.
XIV at the time, and we would have told them to put that on the back burner and
get tanks into the leading edges of Mk. IXs, convert over to Mk. VIII production,
and/or devote much more effort to qualifying a rear fuselage tank.

I suspect Boulton Paul would have ended up
working with Supermarine for the internal tanks (just like they did in
1942 for the external Spitfire drop tanks), but I don't know what
would have had to give way at either firm in 1943 to allow the
increased internal tankage to be developed.

I suspect F.21
development would have been held up at Supermarine, as the Mk VIII
airframe (which was the basis of the Mk XIV) was already in series
production. This just means the RAF don't get two squadrons worth of
F.21s in spring 1945, after interminable airframe development work
throughout most of 1944 delays them anyway. No great loss there,
methinks.

See comments above.

We realised that Fighter Command was likely to scream
over any
slowdown in production of the Mk. IX in the run up to the Invasion, so
figured this
would need to be decided at Air Ministry/MAP or higher level.

Absolutely. But this is worth dwelling on. A couple of wings of LR
Spit Vcs operating out of Coltishall or Ludham escorting 8th missions
*as they did historically* in the summer of 1943, alongside the 8th FC
P-47s, and escorting deeper-penetration 2 Group B-25 raids would have
proved their worth within a couple of months, and would have increased
8th AF effectiveness (allowing deeper B-24 penetrations due to an
expanded escort force). Obviously, the LR Vcs would not be optimal,
but even they could prove to be useful escorts, helping to supress
bomber losses and having much greater opportunities for combat at
their initiative than the rest of FC Spit units on Circus operations
to the Pas de Calais.

See my comments on Spit V Cg problems above. In 1943, with lots of Mk. IXs not
able to do much, I think the effort needed to go there or into the Mk. VIII. The
Spit V was just too inferior at B-17/24 heights, even assuming it could carry the
fuel (better than nothing, I grant you, but I expect fighter squadron morale
would have been the pits). As it was, RAF Spits (Vs and I suspect mostly IXs)
were able to escort to Antwerp. Extending that to Emden, the Ruhr and much of
France would have had a ripple effect, making more P-47 groups available to go
deeper, and then use the P-38s and P-51s for TARCAP.

The logic of upgrading and expanding the 12 Group LR Spit escort force
would have been inescapable, even if the RAF were less wedded to
demonstrating the potential of daylight strategic bombing than the
USAAF was. The same dynamic as affected the RAF Mustang IIIs
historically (doing anything particularly effective? No? Then escort
8th AF raids.). The critical factor is that an embronic LR escort
force operating out of 12 Group would not neccessarily prejudice 11
Groups supplies of Spit IXs for any potential Battle of Britain Mk II
which was their trump card for annihilating the needs of other
commands for the best fighter currently in production at the strategic
planning level.

[At the Air Ministry, Air Staff Meeting for the Planning of Offensive
Fighter Operations, 30th July 1943.]

AOC 11 Group: "These Spits handle like dogs with the rear tanks full.
Rate of climb is reduced, and they wallow about like pregnant cows. I
will not ask my pilots to fight under this disadvantage."

AOC 12 Group: "We wire the rear fuselage tank filler cap shut when on
defensive operations. No disadvantage there. And our pilots empty
their rear tanks first when on operations. We don't even need to fill
them full for sweeps over eastern Holland and the German border, just
enough to cover the climb and initial cruise to the enemy coast. No
disadvantage there. And my long-range Spitfire squadrons are making
more claims than most of AOC 11 Group's wings: perhaps this might be
why all his best Squadron and Wing leaders are trying to transfer to
those squadrons."

AOC 11 Group: "That's all very well, but I will not suffer a
reduction of Spitfire IX deliveries to benefit 12 Group's operations
at the expense of the defence of the south-east of England and
London."

Vice-Chief of the Air Staff: "12 Group haven't received any Spitfire
IXs at this point. AOC 12 Group is using converted Spitfire Vs."

AOC 12 Group: "In view of our success, we would ask the CAS to
release Spitfire VIIIs as they are produced from my M.U.s to convert
in the same manner."

Director Fighter Operations Overseas "What about our promised
deliveries of VIIIs to Australia and Burma. They need the range just
as much as AOC 12 Group?."

AOC 12 Group: "Clearly other commands want the LR Spitfire as well.
I suggest the VCAS recommends increased tankage production and the MAP
is instructed accordingly."

And that's what we planned to push for: Mk. VIIIs or Mk. IXs with VIII tanks,
plus whatever extra fuel Supermarine could make work until the Mustangs were
available in sufficient numbers. Ideally, we wanted the Mk. XVI a year earlier.

As it was,
since
Arnold was already twisting Portal's arm to get him to give up the RAF's
allocation
of 300 Merlin-Mustangs for the immediate future so that they could be used
by the 8th
and 9th AF, we might have been able to swap for P-47s which would at least
allow us
to escort to 375 miles or so by spring, even if we couldn't get the Spits
we needed.

I don't think the British were willing to compromise over their
allocations of Mustang IIIs, although they historically were willing
to make cutbacks in their allocations in favour of the 8th AF when
they were suffering heavy losses (e.g. 20-25% of their I.E. Mustang
strength per month in spring 1944).

That's what I'm talking about. In the fall of '43, Arnold got Portal to give up
his Mustangs for a few months, in exchange for P-47s.

But with an expanding force of
longer-ranged Spits escorting from East Anglia to the Ruhr, the
pressures would have been less. The P-38 and Mustang were still going
to be required for deep-penetration missions, but the Spits could have
provided a major and obvious benefit.

Sure, we agree on this.

This is worth dwelling on, as the real key to a successful RAF
daylight bombing offensive was winning air superiority using escort
fighters more than it lay in increasing the defensive capacity of the
bombers themselves. I see the two as complimentary, but with a large
enough force of "rear-tank" Spit Vs and then VIIIs, the RAF could have
bombed the Ruhr successfully in daylight with their existing night
bombers by 1944. They would have required heavier escorts, and
probably could only have operated in tandem with deeper-penetration
B-17 raids taking on the brunt of the resistance, but they would have
been a practicable proposition, albeit with higher risks of
disasterous losses on individual missions if the Luftwaffe got to
them. On the plus side, their all-weather bombing capability on
large-scale industrial and area targets was probably superior to the
8th AF at that point, and this would have increased the overall
effectiveness of the bombing campaign as a whole.

Just my opinion, though.

Agrees with our reasoning exactly, with the reservations stated re the Mk. V.

Guy

In message , ArtKramr
writes
You fly where you are told to fly. Nobody will ever ask you for "your
definition" of anything.

The operational analyst will, these days. (If he didn't splice some
recording gear into your aircraft anyway)

Got to get as much info on what works and what doesn't, as you can:
there's a lot less margin for error these days.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

Guy Alcala wrote in message .. .
Geoffrey Sinclair wrote:

From Avro Lancaster by Harry Holmes.

B I empty weight January 1942 29,580 pounds, fixed military load
4,120 pounds, so tare weight 33,700 pounds. Gross weight 60,000
pounds, 5,120 HP take off power.

snip much good stuff

He doesn't happen to list just what is included in the fixed military load, does he?
Guns, radios, bombsights, O2, armor?

No break down of fixed military load.

After giving the tare weight (airframe plus fixed military load) comes
the rest of the load, "Crew, removable military load, fuel and oil, bombs
and carriers".

Bomber Command War Diaries usually give the strength and losses
of the attacking force by aircraft type, which gives overall percentages.

Bomber Command War Losses gives you the details by individual
aircraft.

What level of detail is wanted?

Loss rates of Merlin-engined Lancs, Hercules-engined same and Halifax IIIs on the
same mission would be helpful.

TIA,


Well the war losses gives the loss by serial number, including
summary tables in the appendix by mark, but not the sortie totals.

The war diaries gives the basic types in a particular mission,
Lancaster, Stirling, Halifax etc, but not the sortie totals by
mark number. So overall it is a case of counting the numbers
to give the losses by aircraft mark, and overall losses by
aircraft design. The two references would show the losses on
other operations on a given night, like minelaying, so these can
be removed to give an overall percentage loss rate for a given
target.

Also if you want percentages then presumably you want to know
the abort rates and the overall number and type of aircraft that
were credited with attacking the target. I expect this will require
trips to the PRO.

There is the situation about Halifax mark numbers, marks I, II, V,
merlin engines, the rest were hercules. The hercules versions had
the extended wingtips, 1,275 square feet if wing area versus
1,250 square feet. During the mark II/V production run the mid
upper turret was changed from 2 to 4 guns.

The rectangular tail was introduced in mid 1943 and included
modification of existing aircraft. Many of the earlier types had
ended up operating at around the mark III weights, as a result
squadrons started to take weight out of the aircraft, including turrets.

Mark I series 1 (no mid upper turret, empty 34,000, max 55,000 pounds,
12,000 pound maximum bomb load, merlin X, service ceiling 22,000 feet)
Mark I series 2 (series 2 and 3 empty 35,000, max 60,000 pounds)
Mark I series 3 (series 3 had 1,220 HP engines versus 1,130 HP)

Mark II series 1 (mid upper turret, empty 35,800, max 60,000 pounds,
merlin XX, 1,220 HP)
Mark II series 1 special (empty 35,000 pounds, no nose turret, 13,000
pound bomb load)
Mark II series 1a, most with rectangular vertical tail, glazed nose,
merlin 22, introduced the 4 gun mid upper turret.

Mark V series 1, mark Vs were effectively mark II with dowty undercarriage.
Mark V series 1 special (no nose and often mid upper turret, 36,000 and
61,500 pounds, service ceiling 22,000 feet)
Mark V series 1a, rectangular vertical tail, glazed nose, service ceiling
21,000 feet.

In January 1944 the merlin engined types were permanently suspended
from operations against German targets, the mark III began arriving in
squadrons in November 1943. So presumably what is wanted as a first
look are the November 1943 to February 1944 losses. One point the
RAAF history makes is it could make a big difference where you were
in the bomber stream. The most famous incidence is at Peenemunde,
only the last wave was intercepted.

Mark III, extended wings, rectangular tail, glazed nose, 38,332 pounds
empty, 65,000 pounds loaded, often with H2S fitted, service ceiling
20,000 feet, 13,000 pound bomb load
Mark VII, mark III with different version of hercules engines, bomb
load 12,000 pounds.
Mark VI as per mark III but some cleared to 68,000 pounds, bomb
load 12,000 pounds.

One point is some of the merlin engined types were fitted with 4
bladed propellers, which added 1,000 feet to the service ceiling
with better high altitude rate of climb, and helped on long endurance
flights, seems to be mainly mark V aircraft.

Most of the above from Halifax at War by Brian J Rapier, which is
mainly stories of the men who flew the aircraft.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

In article ,
Dave Eadsforth writes:
In article , Peter Stickney
writes

Sorry for the late reply - I've been busy at work, and we took
advantage of the non-monsoon weather yesterday to effect a Vehicle
Recovery Operation (Hauling my brother's 1932 Fird 1-1/2 ton out of
the Hornet (both Yellowjecket and White-Faced - The White-Faced are
Evil - they live in underground nests, which they defend vigorously
with red-hot 18" Japanese Bayonets) and grapevine (Didn't know that
grape vines can get 1" in diameter - stuff's as strong as a steel
cable, too) Alder thicket (Those are the ones with 4" thorns), with
the surrounding ground too soft to use the heavy trucks or teh dozer
to pull. (At least we don't have Snakes, Venomous, Lethal, 47
variation, here in NH), Needless to say, you don't feel like posting
much, after that.

In article ,
Dave Eadsforth writes:
Thanks, Dave. But I should have been more explicit. The Merlin
engined Lancs are fiarly consistantly documented. The one that seems
off is the Hercules powered Lancaster II.

Beg your pardon, I should have been more attentive...

There's been a lot of stuff
published about it that doesn't make sense, and an accurate context
for the numbers that do exist is hard to come by.

Interesting bit about the "Lincoln-Type" landing gear, though.
The numbers that you've posted also explain why some sources are off.
They seem to be quoting the number for the modified aircraft.

Yes, a study of AVRO production line management in 1945 could be
interesting.

Not a problem at all, and I'm glad to get the info you posted. Good
info never hurts, even if it wasn't what you were originally looking
for.

--
Pete Stickney
A strong conviction that something must be done is the parent of many
bad measures. -- Daniel Webster

Peter Stickney wrote:
snip

Andm, for thh definitions of "Fixed" vs "Removable" Military load, I
haven't found any explicit definitions, but I do happen to have the
Erection adn Maintenance Manuals for the Night-fighter Mosquitos, and
the CG computation tables list items considered to be "Removable"

snip Mossie list

At a guess, Removable Military Load is whatever can be pulled at an
airfield without special equipment. The Fixed Military Load must be
things like Armo(u)r Plate, and self-sealing fuel tanks, which would
require that the airplane be taken apart to some extent to remove.

Presumably just the hard to get to armor, as much of it is in plain sight
and easily accessible (like the seat back in a Lanc, or the armor
protecting the waist gunners in a B-17 or B-24).

BTW, Amazon lists an outfit called Crecy Publications Ltd. in the UK,
which supposedly has the reprints of the Stirling (1/III/IV, Halifax and
Lanc I/III/X Pilot's notes; however no prices are given, and they are all
unavailable. Going to Crecy's website none are listed, so does anyone know
if they ever did publish them, or is this some vaporware?

Guy

In article , Guy Alcala
writes
BTW, Amazon lists an outfit called Crecy Publications Ltd. in the UK,
which supposedly has the reprints of the Stirling (1/III/IV, Halifax and
Lanc I/III/X Pilot's notes; however no prices are given, and they are all
unavailable. Going to Crecy's website none are listed, so does anyone know
if they ever did publish them, or is this some vaporware?

This thread has had an awful lot of weights listed for various types not
all clear as to what they include. Does anybody know the original
bomb/fuel load for the B.1 Lanc?

I'm trying to find out how big the bomb load could have been for a full
fuel load, and a fuel load for max bomb load (working on 14,000lbs).

--
John

John Halliwell wrote in message ...
In article , Guy Alcala
writes
BTW, Amazon lists an outfit called Crecy Publications Ltd. in the UK,
which supposedly has the reprints of the Stirling (1/III/IV, Halifax and
Lanc I/III/X Pilot's notes; however no prices are given, and they are all
unavailable. Going to Crecy's website none are listed, so does anyone know
if they ever did publish them, or is this some vaporware?

This thread has had an awful lot of weights listed for various types not
all clear as to what they include. Does anybody know the original
bomb/fuel load for the B.1 Lanc?

I'm trying to find out how big the bomb load could have been for a full
fuel load, and a fuel load for max bomb load (working on 14,000lbs).


Lancaster fuel tankage was 2,154 British gallons, the UK oil official
history notes 315 gallons of 100 octane avgas weighed 2,240 pounds,
other avgas grades were heavier, 300 gallons weighing 2,240 pounds.
So a full fuel load was around 16,000 pounds.

You could add 400 more gallons in overload tanks in the fuselage.

The early Lancasters were cleared to 60,000 pounds of which
26,300 pounds was available for the "removable load", figure
around 250 pounds per crew member, body, clothing, parachute,
oxygen, the removable load probably included the machine guns
as well as their ammunition.

Geoffrey Sinclair
Remove the nb for email.

On Sat, 09 Aug 2003 07:52:50 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

[snip unacceptable tirade of rational discourse]

[3 Group flying B-24s]

Remember, though, that the U.S. phased out B-24 production at 3 of the 5 factories
making them (Douglas Tulsa, Convair Fort Worth, and North American in Dallas) during
1944, as Ford and Consolidated San Diego were able to produce sufficient numbers for U.S.
requirements. Even so, according to Joe Baugher's website the RAF received 1,600 B-24H, J
and Ls between Spring '44 and August '45, so there was clearly excess capacity
available.

OK, I can accept the increased B-24 availability in 1944, but what do
we lose as a consequence, and what do we do in 1943 meanwhile?

They had some in East Anglia, and could be allocated more. Just like
3 Group (and 8 Group), they were adjacent to USAAF bases, so the fuel
pipeline and rail links would have been available.

I was thinking more of runway/taxiway/ hardstand length and strength, as well as hangar
size, bomb dumps, accomodations etc. All would likely need upgrading.

They'd just re-allocate the bases to the relevant groups. Swap a
grass strip for an asphalt one in another Group. I don't think it's a
major issue.

I think the B-25
is a contender he it had the range for shallow penetration raids
to the Ruhr, reasonable defensive armament and a good bombload. I
suggest phasing out the Boston in 2 Group and replacing it with the
Mitchell, and using the six to eight squadrons in 2 Group for daylight
strategic bombing. Further expansion could follow if the aircraft
were available.

Nah, same limitations of range and ceiling as the B-26s, with a smaller bombload.

Really? I thought it had a better range and bombload, but I'm no
expert. I saw it fulfilling a diversionary/supporting role, hitting
airfields and less-heavily defended targets outside the major heavy
Flak belts and giving the Luftwaffe controllers headaches trying to
identify the main raiding force formations. In other words, doing for
the B-24s in 3 Group what the 2nd Bomb Division B-24s did for the
B-17s in the rest of the 8th AF historically at this point.

Hell,
the mediums were operating down below Stirling height (both the R-2600s in the B-25 and
the R-2800s in the B-26 had single-stage two-speed supercharging, optimized for about
15,000 feet) which is okay for relatively lightly defended tactical targets but a really
bad idea going after German industrial targets. If they wanted to go to Germany from
England it had to be with heavies, or the unavailable in sufficient numbers Mossie.

The tactical bombers had to face the Flak when operating over western
Germany in 1945, and it was suvivable given adequate support and
decent planning. And many of the tactical targets they did hit had
substantive flak defence (albeit nowhere near 1943 Ruhr levels, let
alone 1945 Politz levels). Even so, I wouldn't suggest using them as
a deep-penetration strategic force.

Well, if it would help get things back to normal around here, whenever one of us chooses
to present and discuss factual data that contradicts hoary old myth and one-sided
perceptions, the other could accuse him of belittling the accomplishments, bravery and/or
importance of various aircrew nationalities/theaters/periods.

At last, a contribution in this thread which reaches beyond
rationality to advocate a return to the traditional and time-honoured
mode of usenet discourse.

How much civil discussion,
analysis and argument can r.a.m. stand? ;-)

Of course, the key difference between a USAAF daylight strategic
bombing effort and an RAF one would be the greater efficiency of the
latter. I mean, once we factor out all those ludicrous PX
requirements for Coca-Cola, ice-cream and signed movie star's
underwear, we should free up about 50% extra import capacity for bombs
and replacement aircraft.....

Gavin Bailey


--

Another user rings. "I need more space" he says.
"Well, why not move to Texas?", I ask. - The ******* Operator From Hell

The most exciting takeoff was in a contest between an F-8F and, as I
remember it, an F-9F. They left the start at the same time and a couple of
hundred feet later the F-8 went straight up. It was at a couple of thousand
feet (maybe not quite that high) before the F-9 left the ground.

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
. ..
Cub Driver wrote:

I shall have to re-play my tape of a UK airshow that Douglas Bader
narrates
and tells of his first flight in a jet it went something like "Well,
there I
sat in the cockpit ready for my first flight and braced myself.....and
you
know, the thing took off down the runway like an old lorry!"

That sounds about right. The B-47 had the advantage of peacetime
development, but its engines were so slow to spool up that the plane
had to land under power with a parachute. Lacking the power, it would
crash if it had to go around.

While correct about the B-47, you're talking about two separate issues.
The
Meteor's (and all early jets) slow accel time on take-off had nothing to
do with
spool-up time, as they'd already be spooled up prior to takeoff, and
everything
to do with their relatively low power to weight ratios and low thrust at
low
speeds. I will now make way for Mr. Stickney, who I trust will be along
any
moment now to give his thrust vs. power lecture, much as it must irritate
him to
have to constantly repeat it ;-)

Guy

P.S. Say, Pete and Urban, this is the sort of thing that definitely
belongs in
the FAQ. That will save lots of typing (and teeth-gnashing) in future.