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#151
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In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote: What did we get out of it? We changed the way we organize, train and fight our wars. We lost one F-105 for every 65 sorties over N. Vietnam in '66 and '67. We lost one fixed wing aircraft for every 3500 sorties during Desert Storm. We lost one fixed wing aircraft...period, in Iraqi Freedom for 16,500 sorties. We learned some lessons. Do you suppose the fact that Iraq didn't have the advantage of real-time super-power support (from the Soviets) in the form of arms, training, and "advisors" has anything to do with it? You might want to check out the equippage, advising, training and doctrine in place at the start of Desert Storm What part of "real-time" support, arming, training, and advisors do you not understand? ... before repeating that bit of revisionism. The only revisionism here are people trying to imply that battlefield opposition in Iraq was even a fraction of what existed in Vietnam (or Korea, for that matter) Some analysts even contend that the failure of Soviet militarysupport so clearly displayed contributed to the collapse of the SU. Some analysts also claim Elvis was hiding in the same rat hole with Saddam...but escaped. Gorbachev's glasnost/perestroika policies are the main reason the East Bloc collapsed. --Mike |
#152
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On Sun, 13 Jun 2004 17:37:13 GMT, Michael Wise wrote:
In article , Ed Rasimus wrote: Do you suppose the fact that Iraq didn't have the advantage of real-time super-power support (from the Soviets) in the form of arms, training, and "advisors" has anything to do with it? You might want to check out the equippage, advising, training and doctrine in place at the start of Desert Storm What part of "real-time" support, arming, training, and advisors do you not understand? What part of "in place" doesn't equate with "real-time"? ... before repeating that bit of revisionism. The only revisionism here are people trying to imply that battlefield opposition in Iraq was even a fraction of what existed in Vietnam (or Korea, for that matter) At the start of Desert Storm, the military of Iraq was ranked as fifth largest in the world. Battlefield opposition at the start of Vietnam was strictly small-arms, guerilla forces. Ia Drang was an enlightenment. But, there was no armor, little artillery, zero modern logistics possessed by the VC at the start in '64-'65. The Air Order of Battle possessed by NVN was never more than 120 aircraft and usually closer to 75 throughout the war. Some analysts even contend that the failure of Soviet militarysupport so clearly displayed contributed to the collapse of the SU. Some analysts also claim Elvis was hiding in the same rat hole with Saddam...but escaped. Gorbachev's glasnost/perestroika policies are the main reason the East Bloc collapsed. Gorbachev's policies can also be attributed to the generational shift from the leadership of the Stalinist cronies to the thirty year younger generation that he represented. His glasnost (what a concept--free exchange of information with the non-communist world) and perestroika (participating in a free-trade global economy rather than continuing the failures of central planning) were little more than acknowledgement of the shortcomings recognized by George F. Kennan in 1947. --Mike Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" Smithsonian Institution Press ISBN #1-58834-103-8 |
#153
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In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote: One interesting thing I've noted is that Vietnam vets who fought hand-to-hand combat seem to overwhelmingly be far less retroactively gung-ho on the war than those who flew fixed wing far above. Why do you suppose that is? There could be a number of reasons. First, the number who today claim "hand-to-hand combat" seems unfortunately to be drastically inflated by thousands of poseurs claiming to be something they were not. See Burkitt's "Stolen Valor" for some astonishing tales. I doubt any of us who are or have been on active duty have much trouble spotting a poseur. I'm speaking based on conversations I had with people who most definitely fought hand-to-hand, like the people I served with who flew CSAR, some of the people I worked with at the VA, and more than a handful of disabled vets who I assisted in getting their benefits. Why is it that most of those people are far less gung-ho about that conflict than people such as yourself who flew high above the ground? I'm not trying to denigrate any type of combat experience, but 24/7 dangers faced on the ground apparently fostered different impressions. Of those who served on the ground, the proportion of career to draftee and officer to lower-rank enlisted could change the perception of events. Of ground vets from Vietnam, I have seldom encountered any that went so far as John Kerry in their condemnation of their fellow warriors. Are you speak of encounters with them while the war was still going...or years later? As for those who flew "far above", you might want to consider the sustained loss rates of the Rolling Thunder participants in comparison to those "hand-to-hand" combats. Or, maybe check the proportion of POWs between the ground and air combatants. Nobody questions the dangers faced by aircrews who flew missions in Vietnam. However, in a fast-mover your odds of getting back to base outside the country for a cold beer and a hot meal are much better than the grunt in the jungles with an M-16 even surviving. I don't see how that can be denied. It's one of the reasons I wasn't a grunt...even though I knew the chances of surviving any more than a handful of potential CSAR missions was not good. --Mike |
#154
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In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote: Do you suppose the fact that Iraq didn't have the advantage of real-time super-power support (from the Soviets) in the form of arms, training, and "advisors" has anything to do with it? You might want to check out the equippage, advising, training and doctrine in place at the start of Desert Storm What part of "real-time" support, arming, training, and advisors do you not understand? What part of "in place" doesn't equate with "real-time"? "In place at the start" is static. It means at point A, this, this, and that were there. Real-time means that not only were this, this, and that there at point A, but they were sustained and augmented throughout the conflict. So to answer your question of "What part of "in place" doesn't equate with 'real-time'"?: none of it equates to real-time. ... before repeating that bit of revisionism. The only revisionism here are people trying to imply that battlefield opposition in Iraq was even a fraction of what existed in Vietnam (or Korea, for that matter) At the start of Desert Storm, the military of Iraq was ranked as fifth largest in the world. Great, and I hear Spiderbreath, Kansas has the 3rd largest ball of yarn in the world. A gazillion trained bodies with a dirty AK's in one hand and white flags in the other does not constitute a major force. Battlefield opposition at the start of Vietnam was strictly small-arms, guerilla forces. Ia Drang was an enlightenment. But, there was no armor, little artillery, zero modern logistics possessed by the VC at the start in '64-'65. The Air Order of Battle possessed by NVN was never more than 120 aircraft and usually closer to 75 throughout the war. So we have established that Iraq was better prepared at the onset of battle than was Vietnam. I imagine a decade of high-intensity fighting with Iran probably had something to do with that. In any case, I didn't refer to what may or may not have existed at a single static moment; I'm referring to outside help from a major super-power throughout the entire conflict. Did Iraq have that for even a day of Operation Re-elect Bush or the latest war? Some analysts even contend that the failure of Soviet militarysupport so clearly displayed contributed to the collapse of the SU. Some analysts also claim Elvis was hiding in the same rat hole with Saddam...but escaped. Gorbachev's glasnost/perestroika policies are the main reason the East Bloc collapsed. Gorbachev's policies can also be attributed to the generational shift from the leadership of the Stalinist cronies to the thirty year younger generation that he represented. His glasnost (what a concept--free exchange of information with the non-communist world) and perestroika (participating in a free-trade global economy rather than continuing the failures of central planning) were little more than acknowledgement of the shortcomings recognized by George F. Kennan in 1947. They were also 99% of the reason why the East Bloc fell. --Mike |
#155
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#157
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On Sun, 13 Jun 2004 18:09:46 GMT, Michael Wise wrote:
In article , Ed Rasimus wrote: One interesting thing I've noted is that Vietnam vets who fought hand-to-hand combat seem to overwhelmingly be far less retroactively gung-ho on the war than those who flew fixed wing far above. Why do you suppose that is? There could be a number of reasons. First, the number who today claim "hand-to-hand combat" seems unfortunately to be drastically inflated by thousands of poseurs claiming to be something they were not. See Burkitt's "Stolen Valor" for some astonishing tales. I doubt any of us who are or have been on active duty have much trouble spotting a poseur. I'm speaking based on conversations I had with people who most definitely fought hand-to-hand, like the people I served with who flew CSAR, some of the people I worked with at the VA, and more than a handful of disabled vets who I assisted in getting their benefits. Burkitt reserves a lot of space in his book to discuss the VA. Why is it that most of those people are far less gung-ho about that conflict than people such as yourself who flew high above the ground? I'm not trying to denigrate any type of combat experience, but 24/7 dangers faced on the ground apparently fostered different impressions. Indeed they do. The sustained combat experience on the ground is decidedly different than an hour or two "across the fence." But there is also the difference between several days of intense ground combat (and let's acknowledge that SEA was considerably less intense than the incredible duration of battle in WW II), and months of daily rising to face the mission of the day. Consider the Luftwaffe who had no end of tour, but simply flew until the war would be over or they would be dead. During Rolling Thunder, I got up each day and went to a briefing with 25 other guys. On average, each and every day for six months, one of those 25 would be lost. Some days, none. Some days three or four. Average, one a day. Keep going to the briefing and one day you will be the one. Of those who served on the ground, the proportion of career to draftee and officer to lower-rank enlisted could change the perception of events. Of ground vets from Vietnam, I have seldom encountered any that went so far as John Kerry in their condemnation of their fellow warriors. Are you speak of encounters with them while the war was still going...or years later? I continue to encounter veterans from all services. As for those who flew "far above", you might want to consider the sustained loss rates of the Rolling Thunder participants in comparison to those "hand-to-hand" combats. Or, maybe check the proportion of POWs between the ground and air combatants. Nobody questions the dangers faced by aircrews who flew missions in Vietnam. However, in a fast-mover your odds of getting back to base outside the country for a cold beer and a hot meal are much better than the grunt in the jungles with an M-16 even surviving. I don't see how that can be denied. It's one of the reasons I wasn't a grunt...even though I knew the chances of surviving any more than a handful of potential CSAR missions was not good. The odds of completing a 100 mission NVN tour were poor. In '66 an F-105 was lost every 65 missions over NVN. For every five that started a tour, three of the five would be lost. 40% survival rate. There are definitely ground units from the war that suffered similar rates, but that is the exception. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" Smithsonian Institution Press ISBN #1-58834-103-8 |
#158
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Subject: Two MOH Winners say Bush Didn't Serve
From: Ed Rasimus Date: 6/13/2004 12:22 PM Pacific Daylight Time Message-id: You seem intent on becoming a regular contributor here. If that is so, then might I suggest that you read just a bit more slowly and try to detach a bit from your agenda. Only I have an agenda and you have none?. 'Id say that your claim that we won in VN is clearly an agenda..And one lacking in merit on any basis. |
#159
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"Ed Rasimus" wrote Recently at a ceremony in Colorado a man in the uniform of an AF colonel, wearing wings and the AF Cross, told stories of having been a POW, escaping captivity, evading capture, heroic flights, etc. His problem was that he never rose above the rank of A/1C, that he was never a pilot, never a POW and never left the US when he was on active duty. His biggest problem was that also on the podium was the National Commander of the Nam-POWs who proceeded to blow the whistle on him. The reality is that while there were hundreds of thousands who saw ground combat in SEA, there were millions who served in support functions both in country and elsewhere. Many have made claims of combat experience that are untrue. Many, of course are very true. During Desert Storm, there was a USAF guy from Lakenheath, I believe. Went home on leave just after (or during) operations, and was interviewed, on TV, as to his experiences in Iraq. "Pilot, almost got shot down, blowing stuff up, me and my wingman, blah blah blah" Turns out he was also an A1C. Pete |
#160
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In article ,
Ed Rasimus wrote: One interesting thing I've noted is that Vietnam vets who fought hand-to-hand combat seem to overwhelmingly be far less retroactively gung-ho on the war than those who flew fixed wing far above. Why do you suppose that is? There could be a number of reasons. First, the number who today claim "hand-to-hand combat" seems unfortunately to be drastically inflated by thousands of poseurs claiming to be something they were not. See Burkitt's "Stolen Valor" for some astonishing tales. I doubt any of us who are or have been on active duty have much trouble spotting a poseur. I'm speaking based on conversations I had with people who most definitely fought hand-to-hand, like the people I served with who flew CSAR, some of the people I worked with at the VA, and more than a handful of disabled vets who I assisted in getting their benefits. Burkitt reserves a lot of space in his book to discuss the VA. Meaning what? Does he claim combat vets and/or disabled vets working for the VA are less than honest? During Rolling Thunder, I got up each day and went to a briefing with 25 other guys. On average, each and every day for six months, one of those 25 would be lost. Some days, none. Some days three or four. Average, one a day. Keep going to the briefing and one day you will be the one. Well my hat goes off to you and to all those who paid in blood or risked that blood doing what their country told them to do. I find it next to impossible to understand how any vet (especially a combat vet) would make statements about not "****ing on somebody if they were one fire" when that somebody also risked their all and shed blood for their country. Partisanship should never trump honor and respect. It's sad that uber-partisans of both major political parties in the U.S. have lost sight of that (if they ever had it in the first place). As for those who flew "far above", you might want to consider the sustained loss rates of the Rolling Thunder participants in comparison to those "hand-to-hand" combats. Or, maybe check the proportion of POWs between the ground and air combatants. Nobody questions the dangers faced by aircrews who flew missions in Vietnam. However, in a fast-mover your odds of getting back to base outside the country for a cold beer and a hot meal are much better than the grunt in the jungles with an M-16 even surviving. I don't see how that can be denied. It's one of the reasons I wasn't a grunt...even though I knew the chances of surviving any more than a handful of potential CSAR missions was not good. The odds of completing a 100 mission NVN tour were poor. In '66 an F-105 was lost every 65 missions over NVN. For every five that started a tour, three of the five would be lost. 40% survival rate. There are definitely ground units from the war that suffered similar rates, but that is the exception. I don't doubt what you're saying for a minute. Never having been in combat, I can't speak from experience, but numbers on paper be damned...I'll take fighting from above over eyeball to eyeball at close quarters any day. --Mike |
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