Friendly Fire Notebook

On 15 Apr 2004 23:31:32 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

SAC remained a specified command and not chopped to PACAF or
7th AF for employment. This very issue is the core of Michel's book,
"Eleven Days of Christmas."

Yeah, Michel pretty much blames SAC for everything that went wrong in the world
after 1966, but that doesn't change the fact he was correct about their
involvement in what went wrong during LB II.

I think that is painting with too broad a brush. What Marshal says is
that the isolation of SAC dating back to the LeMay involvement at the
beginning led to an unresponsive command structure. SAC was certainly
pivotal in maintaining deterrence throughout the Cold War, but they
weren't a contributor to air power in an effective way for lesser
wars.

And, Marsh points out, the unresponsiveness of the SAC leadership to
the requests of the local commanders cost a lot of B-52 crews their
lives or freedom on day 1 through 6 of LB II.

Linebacker I was significantly more effective than Rolling Thunder.

Agree.

But,
the damage inflicted by LB II was the decisive factor.

I'll have to disagree with you there Ed. I did a lot of research for a 40 page
masters thesis and nearly every target struck during LB II had either already
been struck during LB I or was struck repeatedly during LB II basically turning
over rubble. Ed, B-52s alone dropped over 4,000 M-117 on the Kinh No
railyard...which had already been 60% disabled in November. BUFFs dropped over
3,000 M-117 on the Thai Nguyen Thermal Power Plant....also struck repeatedly in
November. I mean, come on Ed, they sent 36 B-52 sorties after the damn Hanoi
Radio site, dropped over 3,000 bombs, lost 4 B-52s and never even took the damn
thing out. On day #9 a pair of F-4Es hit it with a few LGBs and knocked it off
the air for months. No Ed, I'm going to have to disagree, we were mainly
turning over rubble and making a political statement during those days and
nights.

We had been bombing NVN on and off for eight years. There are only a
limited number of targets in an area the size of RP VI. It is almost
inevitable that you will be re-striking previously struck targets.
But, in LB II, we escalated to a previously unused level of force and
in a very short period restruck almost every significant target in the
area. Additionally we added targets such as all of the MiG bases and
(as you note) radio Hanoi. We took out all of the major RR bridges in
town, got confirmed kills on 43 SAM sites, restruck Thai Nguyen steel
and the power plant, hit Viet Tri and Phu Tho's power plants, etc.
etc.

They had previously been able to take strikes and bring their
significant manpower to bear in restoring operations in days or even
hours. With LB II, the round-the-clock intensity meant that couldn't
be done.

Academic
interpretation of the events will not prevail as long as there are a
bunch of us participants still around to speak the truth.

I'm sorry Ed, but I've researched every target hit by B-52s during LB II and
even the ones struck for the first time (and there were only 3 or 4) were hit
again and again. I used an accuracy of 1000 feet and plugged the numbers into
todays targeteering software and the .pd inflicted on nearly every BUFF target
was .8 or better after being struck the second time. Problem is most targets
were hit 3, 4 or even 5 times. I know you've seen me say this to Kramer before
Ed, but just because you were a participant doesn't mean you've got an accurate
view of events.

I've got to state that while participation doesn't guarantee
understanding, it does provide insight and a level of detail that
can't be gleaned from poring through micro-fiche archives of op-rep 4s
and unit histories written by a squadron Lt as an additional duty.

On a similar subject, I'll be attending Army General Command & Staff College
next year at Ft. Leavenworth and I just received my "book report" reading list
for the Air Force prep course preceeding the Army course (basic Air Force 101 I
guess ??). #21 on a list of 26 was "When Thunder Rolled". I guess I'll have to
pick it up Ed. Looking forward to reading it.

You mean you haven't read it yet? You might want to continue waiting
until Sept 28th when it will be released in paperback by Random
House/Presidio Press for $6.99. The new book, tentatively titled
"Phantom Flights/Bangkok Nights" will be out from Smithsonian this
fall as well. It contains a few stories about Linebacker I and II seen
out the front window rather than from the back of the library.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

"buf3" wrote in message
(BUFDRVR) wrote in message


I went to AOB(Air Observer, Bombardier) School at James Connally AFB,
TX in 1957 on my way from pilot training to a co-pilot position in
RB-47s at Little Rock AFB. It was a six month school with training in
dead reckoning, celestial navigation, radar navigation and radar
bombing. We picked up an additional rating, another set of wings and
were called "Triple-Headed-Monsters".

Gene Myers

That was late in the game, in 1950 through 1954, they were sent to
Ellington, graduating as a Navigator w/ a set of Navigator Wings, then
Mather for Bombardier, graduating as a Bombardier w/ a set of Bombardier
Wings, then stayed at Mather for Aerial Observer School(Radar) ,graduating
with a set of AOB wings, these 3 in addition to Senior Pilot or Command
Pilot wings in their possession, since all AC candidates in the beginning
were the high time men on each Base they came from.
Thus 4 sets of wings = 4-headed Monsters!

"buf3" wrote in message

We picked up an additional rating, another set of wings and
were called "Triple-Headed-Monsters".

Gene Myers

If you only picked up an additional set of wings to complement your Pilot
wings, one woudl think you would be called 2 - headed Monsters? Your
predecessors in the program had 4 sets of wings.

On 16 Apr 2004 00:12:06 GMT, (ArtKramr) wrote:

Subject: Friendly Fire Notebook
From: Ed Rasimus
Date: 4/15/04 3:00 PM Pacific Daylight Time

It is inevitable that individuals who through no fault of their own
are doing what they are told are going to be looked down upon because
of higher level policy decisions. The various interpretations were
that SAC was "too valuable

Guys who died in bombers were just as dead as guys who died in fighters.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

And the "ground pounders", sailors, etc were just
as dead as either one of them

Al Minyard

I think that is painting with too broad a brush.

Yes, it was, but Michel's anti-SAC bias shines throughout the book and is the
only negative aspect to his writing. I felt he could drop the anti-SAC attitude
and still make his point.

And, Marsh points out, the unresponsiveness of the SAC leadership to
the requests of the local commanders cost a lot of B-52 crews their
lives or freedom on day 1 through 6 of LB II.

Absolutely agree.

They had previously been able to take strikes and bring their
significant manpower to bear in restoring operations in days or even
hours. With LB II, the round-the-clock intensity meant that couldn't
be done.

Ed, the railyard at Kihn No was still out of action from strikes in November,
same holds true for the Thai Nguyen Thermal Power Plant. I don't disagree that
some significant damage was inflicted, but it was not significant enough to
impact the political leadership in NVN. They returned to Paris because congress
never went into session (most likely because they had recessed for Christmas)
and voted to suspend military funding. The NVN looked out the window, heard the
air raid sirons and said; "we're not getting anything for this". They didn't
look out the window and say; "my God, the damage is so horrible if it continues
we'll be destroyed, we must stop it."

But, in LB II, we escalated to a previously unused level of force and
in a very short period restruck almost every significant target in the
area.

and struck them again and again and again....

I've got to state that while participation doesn't guarantee
understanding, it does provide insight and a level of detail that
can't be gleaned from poring through micro-fiche archives of op-rep 4s
and unit histories written by a squadron Lt as an additional duty.

How about most of the sources Michel used (I even included his work)? Michel
did the same thing I did (plus conduct interviews). Are you saying his work is
suspect or does he get a pass "because he was there"?

It contains a few stories about Linebacker I and II seen
out the front window rather than from the back of the library.


I'm sorry Ed, but I'm still going to have to disagree that "being there" is any
more important to accurate fact collecting. In fact, in my case, and I've said
this before, if someone writes a book on Iraqi Freedom, I'll be the first one
to buy it, because I was so damn busy in my own little world that the big
picture swept completely buy me.


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

BUFDRVR wrote:

snip

They had previously been able to take strikes and bring their
significant manpower to bear in restoring operations in days or even
hours. With LB II, the round-the-clock intensity meant that couldn't
be done.

Ed, the railyard at Kihn No was still out of action from strikes in November,
same holds true for the Thai Nguyen Thermal Power Plant. I don't disagree that
some significant damage was inflicted, but it was not significant enough to
impact the political leadership in NVN. They returned to Paris because congress
never went into session (most likely because they had recessed for Christmas)

Correct. Nixon thought they would vote to deny funds as soon as they came back.

and voted to suspend military funding. The NVN looked out the window, heard the
air raid sirons and said; "we're not getting anything for this". They didn't
look out the window and say; "my God, the damage is so horrible if it continues
we'll be destroyed, we must stop it."

Right.

But, in LB II, we escalated to a previously unused level of force and
in a very short period restruck almost every significant target in the
area.

and struck them again and again and again....

I've got to state that while participation doesn't guarantee
understanding, it does provide insight and a level of detail that
can't be gleaned from poring through micro-fiche archives of op-rep 4s
and unit histories written by a squadron Lt as an additional duty.

How about most of the sources Michel used (I even included his work)? Michel
did the same thing I did (plus conduct interviews). Are you saying his work is
suspect or does he get a pass "because he was there"?

Ed seems to have a bit of a blind spot about this, even though you and I have given
him numerous contemporary sources involving the direct participants in the
negotiations, which he can check. Once again, I recommend a perusal of Nixon's
"No More Vietnams," as well as

The palace file / Nguyen Tien Hung and Jerrold L. Schecter. New York : Harper &
Row, c1986.

The former has Nixon's account of the negotiations and what he was trying to
accomplish (and what he felt he could), the latter contains the photostats of the
actual telegrams/letters Nixon was sending to Thieu throughout this period, as well
as Thieu's handwritten comments on them. Nixon just barely manages to maintain his
patience with Thieu as the latter keeps asking for changes (many for good reason),
but finally just loses his temper and almost in so many words, tells Thieu to sign
it or else. Thieu's delaying behavior continues up until well into January, and
IIRR even into June or so of 1973 (when the final accord was signed).

The deal was done in October 1972, Thieu's insisting on substantive changes
(especially withdrawal of PAVN troops from the south) which the U.S. (in this
context, Nixon and Kissinger) knew the DRVN would never accept, blew the deal,
especially as the latter thought they had a shot at getting it all by just sitting
back and waiting for congress to act, so they pulled out. Nixon started LB II
mainly to convince Thieu that the U.S. would back the RVN with bombing and other
support if the DRVN violated the accords (which Nixon fully expected would happen),
the DRVN agreed to essentially the same terms (with a few cosmetic changes in
wording) as they had agreed to in October, Nixon in effect then told Thieu he'd
better sign if he wanted US support, as we were going to sign regardless of whether
or not he did. Thieu signed, under protest, and did everything he could to hold up
the process, because he felt (rightly, as it turned out) that the RVN was
essentially being sold out.

There is absolutely no support in the historical record, none, for Ed's belief that
LB II somehow 'won' the war or even that it brought about significantly better
terms, or that Nixon and Kissinger were even trying to accomplish that. Both men
have denied that the final terms were substantially different from October's:

"On November 20th . . . Kissinger presented Thieu's proposed changes, as well as
some of our own . . . After several tough negotiating sessions , I concluded that
if we were to reach an agreement, we would have to abandon most of Thieu's major
demands. I instructed Kissinger to seek a settlement along the lines of the
October agreement."

Nixon, "No More Vietnams," pg. 156.

Both men are clear about the limited goals they had for LB II, and getting a
substantial improvement in the October terms wasn't one of them.. While neither of
them are exactly known for their veracity when discussing their own actions, the
paper record as well as the accounts of others (US, RVN and DRVN) who participated
in the negotiating process backs up their account. "The Palace File" telexes show
the various minor changes made in the terms throughout the negotiations, as Nixon
(or sometimes Kissinger or Haig) inform Thieu of them. The DRVN refused to give in
on the major changes that Thieu wanted, and as shown in the quote from Nixon above,
the US accepted that they would not agree to them, and negotiated accordingly.

Guy

Guy Alcala wrote:

There is absolutely no support in the historical record, none, for Ed's belief that
LB II somehow 'won' the war or even that it brought about significantly better
terms, or that Nixon and Kissinger were even trying to accomplish that.

Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
fact that LB II won the VN war: it - and it alone -
convinced the N. Vietnamese that the gloves were coming
off, for the very first time. They had a choice: return
to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
or return completely to the stone age at home.
For the very first time, the N. Vietnamese approached the
talks with something other than deceit and delay in mind:
their continued survival.

Academics can revise history as much as they want, as can
bureaucrats and politicians write books glorifying their
own involvement and marginalizing the contributions of
others (best recent example: Richard Clarke's shameless
book-marketing 09/11 committee) - but they cannot change
the actual events that occurred. Far too many direct
participants (and individuals extremely interested in
then-current events) survive to permit them to push their
"inspired by a true story" fiction on an unsuspecting public.

In fact, I was so impressed with the change in direction at
that time, I returned to active duty back then... and became
a "lifer".

Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
fact that LB II won the VN war

That same "historical record" says the 8th Air Force bombing missions into
Germany destroyed the Germans war making capability. That "fact" has been
disproven countless times.

They had a choice: return
to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
or return completely to the stone age at home.

You sound like LeMay. You do realize they already were in the stone age right?
Tell me, what critical infastructure did we destroy during LB II that wasn't
already operating at less than 25%?

For the very first time, the N. Vietnamese approached the
talks with something other than deceit and delay in mind:
their continued survival.

Wrong. They had already agreed to the same document in October '72 that they
did in January '73. Linebacker I and the Freedom Porch missions proved to the
NVN that ARVN ground forces and U.S. Air power could, quite effectively,
prevent their conquest of SVN. The solution; sign a Peace Accord removing the
U.S. from the picture, which they agreed to in October '72 and had it not been
for SVN President Nguyen Van Thieu's refusal to publicly "ok" the deal (I don't
believe he had to sign anything as SVN was not a participant in Paris), LB II
would never have been required. NVN was not fighting for their survival *ever*
during that conflict. Their industrial base was barely existant in 1964, they
counted on imports from China and the Soviet Union for everything except rice
and since we never took real measures to cut off their imports (mining of
Haiphong harbor in 1972 was like closing the barn door after the horses got
out), their existance was never threatened...even during LB II.

Academics can revise history as much as they want

There's no doubt that this does occur, but not in this case. You could prove
your point simply by providing some sort of proof that the bombing during LB II
was causing such damage that the NVN government feared they would be defeated
if it did not stop.

Far too many direct
participants (and individuals extremely interested in
then-current events) survive to permit them to push their
"inspired by a true story" fiction on an unsuspecting public.

While I was only 4 at the time, you can consider me one of your; "individuals
extremely interested in then-current events". In fact, nearly every one in the
USAF should be interested in getting the real scoop on LB II, because learning
the wrong lesson is often worse then not learning a lesson at all....


BUFDRVR

"Stay on the bomb run boys, I'm gonna get those bomb doors open if it harelips
everyone on Bear Creek"

On 17 Apr 2004 02:20:13 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

I think that is painting with too broad a brush.

Yes, it was, but Michel's anti-SAC bias shines throughout the book and is the
only negative aspect to his writing. I felt he could drop the anti-SAC attitude
and still make his point.

Sounds like your wearing your heart on your sleeve. Marsh simply and
clearly states the relationship between SAC and the unified command.
He points out the parochialism driven by the bomber-generals and the
failure of leadership that cost a lot of airplanes during LB II.
Statement of the events and pointing out the relationships isn't
"anti-SAC bais."

But, in LB II, we escalated to a previously unused level of force and
in a very short period restruck almost every significant target in the
area.

and struck them again and again and again....

Then your research probably disclosed the original prep order that
directed the wings to conduct a full scale, maximum effort for THREE
DAYS. The option to extend beyond the original three day effort was
because we still had targets to hit and we were still inflicting heavy
damage.

I've got to state that while participation doesn't guarantee
understanding, it does provide insight and a level of detail that
can't be gleaned from poring through micro-fiche archives of op-rep 4s
and unit histories written by a squadron Lt as an additional duty.

How about most of the sources Michel used (I even included his work)? Michel
did the same thing I did (plus conduct interviews). Are you saying his work is
suspect or does he get a pass "because he was there"?

I'm not saying either. He doesn't get a pass because of attendance and
his work is excellent. I have written a formal review of his book and
the two faults that I found (which don't outweigh the excellent
detail, the probing analysis and the extremely valuable enemy
perspective), were the short-shrift given to the daytime ops and the
emphasis on the NVN view of the battle as "the Dien Bien Phu of the
air war." If that was a "victory" for them it was most assuredly
Phyrric.




Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8

On 17 Apr 2004 13:42:06 GMT, (BUFDRVR) wrote:

Nope. The historical record categorically confirms the
fact that LB II won the VN war

That same "historical record" says the 8th Air Force bombing missions into
Germany destroyed the Germans war making capability. That "fact" has been
disproven countless times.

There is history and there is history. A lot of history is
interpretive and some is even revisionist. You might say the 8th
didn't destroy German industry, but you could just as easily suggest
that lack of petroleum products, lack of precision machine tooling,
lack of ball-bearings, lack of a viable transportation network, etc.
won the war.

They had a choice: return
to the Paris talks with a fortright attitude toward peace,
or return completely to the stone age at home.

You sound like LeMay. You do realize they already were in the stone age right?
Tell me, what critical infastructure did we destroy during LB II that wasn't
already operating at less than 25%?

For a stone age country, the seemed to generate an incredible number
of electronic emissions, starting with the early warning radar that
would ping us on the tankers through the command/control that
integrated the MiGs, SAMs and AAA fire. Or maybe the transportation
that managed to ship arms and materiel to sustain the combat
operations in the south.

Academics can revise history as much as they want

There's no doubt that this does occur, but not in this case. You could prove
your point simply by providing some sort of proof that the bombing during LB II
was causing such damage that the NVN government feared they would be defeated
if it did not stop.

I think the simple cause/effect relationship of recalcitrance in
Nov-Dec, then in just eleven days an agreement is signed and within
six weeks C-141s are flying in and out of Gia Lam bringing the POWs
home is all the proof required.

Far too many direct
participants (and individuals extremely interested in
then-current events) survive to permit them to push their
"inspired by a true story" fiction on an unsuspecting public.

While I was only 4 at the time, you can consider me one of your; "individuals
extremely interested in then-current events". In fact, nearly every one in the
USAF should be interested in getting the real scoop on LB II, because learning
the wrong lesson is often worse then not learning a lesson at all....

Absolutely true, Santayna. The lesson of LB II taken in the context of
an eight year war against NVN is that the Powell/Bush doctrine is
correct---don't enter a war without a clear objective. Once committed,
win quickly with overwhelming force. When victory is achieved have a
defined exit strategy.

If you think the lesson of LB II is something different, you're in the
wrong business.


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
Smithsonian Institution Press
ISBN #1-58834-103-8