If this is your first visit, be sure to check out the FAQ by clicking the link above. You may have to register before you can post: click the register link above to proceed. To start viewing messages, select the forum that you want to visit from the selection below. |
|
|
|
Thread Tools | Display Modes |
#11
|
|||
|
|||
Lost comm -- what would you do?
Well this sort of happened to me a few weeks ago. Went out to get some
actual on a low visibility / low ceiling evening from MMU to SWF (about 45 nm flight). I don't remember the exact routing, but it was the typical one that involves flying to the HUO VOR, then a radial off the VOR to intercept the IAF for the ILS 27 approach. Winds were strong out of the SW above 1500 feet, so getting up there took all of 20 minutes. After I was handed off from the "busy" NY approach freq (127.6) to the one handling SWF's airspace, I tried for about 3 minutes to check-in on the new freq. I kept hearing a guy who sounded like an approach controller, but it sure sounded like Boston center. I was thick in the soup at 4000, about to make that turn at HUO, and couldn't raise _anybody_ on the freq. Fortunately the plane I was flying has a Garmin in it, so I toggled back to the previous frequency, said I couldn't raise anybody, and finally received the correct frequency to dial in. (I think the controller messed up, not me, but it's moot at this point). So I finally check in with the new controller, and he says I'm about to overshoot the localizer... which I can plainly see on the GPS. I make the turn pretty tight, and get lined up for the approach. At this point, I know now I should have called this approach off and asked for vectors to get lined back up, because up until this point, I had not had a chance to brief, get weather, tune radios, or anything... I'd been dealing with what I thought was a lost comm situation. Let's just say that the approach was less than optimal, and I definitely should have been more ahead of the plane than I ended up being. To top off the stress, I broke out literally 100 feet above minimums, into a VERY thick fog bank that only allowed me to see the approach lights, not the actual runway. But, that's legal with an ILS, so I continued down to minimums, dropped the throttle, dropped in flaps to 30, and finally saw the runway (at least the first half - SWF has a 10k foot strip). When I got on the ground, I think I let the plane roll out just a bit longer than usual, just so I could finally get my bearings fully in place - I definitely scared myself on that approach. The lesson I learned from that is to constantly evaluate where you are in relation to where you should be - i.e., should you have gotten the ATIS by now? Should you have briefed the approach? What about the missed approach procedure? By the time I got to HUO, I had done none of those things, and it didn't cross my mind as I was shooting the approach - I dialed in the ILS and basically locked it in as best I could while reminding myself what the minimum altitude was. I know I handled the inadvertant "lost comm" part properly by going back to the previous controller, and not wasting too much time on the wrong frequency... but I realize now I should have done more to make sure I didn't fall so far behind the plane. -- Guy |
#12
|
|||
|
|||
Lost comm -- what would you do?
VOR to intercept the IAF for the ILS 27 approach. Winds were strong out
Whoops, meant the ILS 9 approach. |
#13
|
|||
|
|||
Lost comm -- what would you do?
In article t,
"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote: "Michael" wrote in message ups.com... Nope, years prior. Can't find the cite anymore. Short version - Baron on an IFR flight plan over the Gulf, due to crossed wires a fighter is sent to take a look. Weather is cruddy, pilot botches the intercept (realize that at 8000 ft, cruise speed for a Baron is just about the same as stall speed for a fighter) and there's a midair. Fighter pilot bails out successfully. Baron pilot and his pax go in. At the time (this was over a decade ago) a huge stink was raised. There was talk of a lawsuit, but it was squashed via sovereign immunity. Supposedly, intercept procedures were changed. However, a friend of mine was flying on a DVFR flight plan from over the Gulf in his Twin Comanche and looked back, upon hearing a strange noise, to see an F-16 hanging just off his wing, everything hanging out. Seconds later, the pilot has do dive away to avoid a stall, coming within several feet of my friend. So nothing has changed. Is this it? NTSB Identification: ATL83MA084B Accident occurred Sunday, January 09, 1983 in CHERRY POINT, NC Aircraft: McDonnell Douglas F4C, registration: AFNG BEECH D55, registration: N7142N Injuries: 7 Fatal, 2 Uninjured. THE TWO ACFT COLLIDED AT ABOUT 9,500 FT MSL 30 MI SOUTH OF CHERRY POINT. AFTER DEPARTING NASSAU, THE PLT OF THE BE-D55 NEVER ACTIVATED HIS FLT PLAN. AN ADIZ PENETRATION TIME WAS THEREFORE NEVER ESTABLISHED. WHEN THE UNIDENTIFIED ACFT ENTERED WARNING AREA W-122, THE USAF CONTACTED FAA ATC FOR IDENTIFICATION INFO. SINCE FAA WAS NOT CONTROLLING ANY TRAFFIC IN THAT AREA AN INTERCEPT ORDER WAS ISSUED. AT 1637 FAA GOT A POSITION REPORT FROM THE BE-D55 & RELAYED IT TO MILITARY CONTROL. HOWEVER, THE TWO FIGHTER ACFT CONTINUED TO CLOSE IN ON THE TARGET FOR RADAR CONTACT. THE LEAD ACFT WAS TO CLOSE ABOUT 1,000 FT BELOW THE TARGET AT A PREPLANNED CLOSURE RATE OF 50 KTS (ACTUAL RATE WAS 127 KTS). SECONDS BEFORE THE COLLISION, THE BE-D55 TURNED LEFT AS REQUESTED BY FAA ATC THUS TURNING IT INTO THE PATH OF THE OVERTAKING INTERCEPTOR WHICH ALSO HAD TURNED LEFT TO BREAK OFF THE INTERCEPT. THE SAFETY BOARD DID NOT DETERMINE THE PROBABLE CAUSE OF THIS ACCIDENT, BUT OFFERED STATEMENTS OF CAUSE. What isn't said in this narrative is the reason the pilot was in this predicament in the first place was that he was told to clear customs in Florida. He didn't like that, so he decided in flight that he would proceed to New Bern (?) or Wilmington (?) to clear customs because that was the direction he originally wanted to go. |
#14
|
|||
|
|||
Lost comm -- what would you do?
"john smith" wrote in message ... What isn't said in this narrative is the reason the pilot was in this predicament in the first place was that he was told to clear customs in Florida. He didn't like that, so he decided in flight that he would proceed to New Bern (?) or Wilmington (?) to clear customs because that was the direction he originally wanted to go. His destination was Norfolk. There are a few other things not said in this narrative. The Baron pilot had six passengers in a six place aircraft, he penetrated an ADIZ without a flight plan, and the intercept was conducted in IMC. http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR84-07.pdf |
#15
|
|||
|
|||
Lost comm -- what would you do?
"Roy Smith" wrote in message ... A student and I took off today IFR from HPN. Destination was FWN (Sussex, NJ). Rhumb line course is 42 NM at 294 degrees. Clearance was "Westchester 1, RV CMK, CMK 275R to intercept SAX 039R, SAX, direct FWN, maintain 3000, expect 4000 after 10 minutes". Departing runway 34, the SID is "climb to 1000, then left turn 295, expect vectors to departure fix". CMK is 14 miles at 037. We depart, check in with NY Approach, and get "maintain 4000". Nothing about heading, so we stay on the SID heading of 295, which conveniently is pointing us right at our destination. Here's the question. If you went lost comm, what would you do? Technically, our next waypoint is still CMK, so "fly the route previously cleared" would have us head direct CMK then as cleared. But, every mile we fly on 295 takes us further and further away from CMK, and making a, say, 150 degree, course change to head back to CMK seems pretty dumb. Yet, they wouldn't have given us such a circuitous route if there wasn't some good reason they needed to keep us away from the rhumbline. The route is off-airways, but you note that the VOR-A (http://204.108.4.16/d-tpp/0511/05412VGA.PDF) MSA is 3100. Assume you're familiar with the area, and know that 4000 clears all terrain that might possibly be a factor along any route you might pick. So, what would you do? Turn back to CMK and proceed from there? Keep on the 295 heading until you intercept the CMK 275 or the SAX 039, whichever comes first (assuming that heading even intercepts those at all). Turn direct SAX? Hit the reset button and start the scenario again? I'd squawk NORDO briefly then return to the assigned beacon code, turn towards SAX, fly the VOR-A, land. |
#16
|
|||
|
|||
Lost comm -- what would you do?
"Michael" wrote in message oups.com... The other (much scarier) possibility would be the existence of a flight restricted area - temporary or otherwise - along the direct course, and the unpleasant possibility of an incompetently handled military interception in IMC (which has already killed at least one completely innocent pilot and pax legally operating IFR on a flight plan) or simply a heat seeking missile up the exhaust. If that's the case, think twice about that shortcut. If you're referring to the BE55/F-4C midair near Cherry Point in 1983 there are a few items you remember incorrectly. That interception wasn't incompetently handled, the civilian pilot wasn't completely innocent, wasn't operating legally, and wasn't on an IFR flight plan. |
#17
|
|||
|
|||
Lost comm -- what would you do?
If you're referring to the BE55/F-4C midair near Cherry Point in 1983 there
are a few items you remember incorrectly. Quite possibly. That interception wasn't incompetently handled, The targeted intercept altitude was 1000 ft below the Baron, yet the intercepting F4C wound up at the same altitude as the Baron. The targeted closure rate was 50 kts, but the intercepting F4C closed at 120+ kts. I would call that incompetent. the civilian pilot wasn't completely innocent So what crime was he guilty of? wasn't operating legally Really? At the time of impact, he was making a turn as directed by ATC. He called in and made a position report prior. There is some question as to whether his flight plan was opened, but he's not here to defend himself, and my experience is that crossed wires between different facilities are not all that rare. I've had search and rescue called out for me because I supposedly failed to close a DVFR flight plan. It was only after I called the facility with which I had closed the flight plan after completing my ADIZ penetration that they admitted that in fact they had a record of me closing the flight plan - they simply never forwarded it to the facility responsible for my destination airport. So given that the pilot made a position report once in range and was complying with ATC instructions, I think it more likely that there was a simple snafu rather than willful failure to activate a flight plan. and wasn't on an IFR flight plan That may be true - but he had filed some sort of flight plan, be it IFR or DVFR. I've been leery of the possibility of such problems ever since I was given a clearance through a hot restricted area. That's a no-****ter. I was vectored for traffic significantly off my route, then was cleared present position direct destination. I was in and out of IMC, cruising IFR at 6000 ft, when I realized that the frequency was awfully quiet. I was unable to raise center on any of the published frequencies for my area and headed straight for a restricted area (that my original flight planned route missed by miles). Fortunately, I was able to raise the tower controller at the military field next to the restricted area, who then turned me over to the local military approach controller - who vectored me around the restricted area since it was hot. I wonder, had I lost comm due to equipment problems rather than poor radio coverage, if, after I caught a missile up the exhaust pipe, people would be claiming that I was not operating legally. I'm sure some fault would be found with what I did, and maybe there would be no record found of the clearance. Michael |
#18
|
|||
|
|||
Lost comm -- what would you do?
On 30-Nov-2005, "Steven P. McNicoll" wrote: That interception wasn't incompetently handled, I'm not sure of your definition of "incompetently handled" is, but it seems the NTSB found the collision more the fault of the Phantom Phlyer than the Baron pilot. Here's the quote from the end of the report you linked us to: The Nat.ona1 Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the F-4C pilot to maintain an appropriate intercept c1osir;g speed and a safe separation distance between his airplane and the Beech Baron. Contributing to the accident were the Beech Baron pi1o:'s penetration of the Air Defense Identification Zone and his faiiure to follow any of several prescribed procedures which would have permitted early positive identification after penetration, and the failure of the Fertile Controi staff to coordinate information concerning positive identification of the Baron in a timely manner, delaying a decision to terminate the intercept mission. It must have been awful to find the hair and blood embedded in the Phantom's wing. I just hope everyone in the Baron died before they even knew what was happening. Scott Wilson |
#19
|
|||
|
|||
Lost comm -- what would you do?
"Michael" wrote in message oups.com... The targeted intercept altitude was 1000 ft below the Baron, yet the intercepting F4C wound up at the same altitude as the Baron. The targeted closure rate was 50 kts, but the intercepting F4C closed at 120+ kts. I would call that incompetent. The interception was less than perfect but certainly did not descend to the level of incompetent. The collision occurred after the intercept was broken off and the F-4 turned away from the Baron and began a climb. Unfortunately, the Center controller had shortly before that directed the Baron to turn to the left, placing it in the path of the F-4. So what crime was he guilty of? He was in violation of FAR 99.11. He was operating an aircraft in an ADIZ, he had not filed or activated a proper flight plan. Really? At the time of impact, he was making a turn as directed by ATC. Right, a turn that put him in the path of the interceptors that ATC knew to be operating in close proximity. Not a stellar move by the controller. He called in and made a position report prior. There is some question as to whether his flight plan was opened, but he's not here to defend himself, and my experience is that crossed wires between different facilities are not all that rare. The only flight plan he filed was to Fort Pierce Florida. There's no question that that flight plan was not opened, the Baron pilot never established contact with enroute VFR advisory service after departure. That may be true - but he had filed some sort of flight plan, be it IFR or DVFR. Yes, he filed a DVFR flight plan to Fort Pierce. He initially filed a flight plan to Norfolk. When informed that US regulations required him to enter the US in Florida he filed a flight plan to Fort Pierce. But after departing Nassau he headed for Norfolk instead of Fort Pierce and never activated his filed flight plan. Why would he? His flight plan had him going to Fort Pierce, but he was going to Norfolk. |
#20
|
|||
|
|||
Lost comm -- what would you do?
wrote in message ... I'm not sure of your definition of "incompetently handled" is, but it seems the NTSB found the collision more the fault of the Phantom Phlyer than the Baron pilot. Here's the quote from the end of the report you linked us to: The Nat.ona1 Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the F-4C pilot to maintain an appropriate intercept c1osir;g speed and a safe separation distance between his airplane and the Beech Baron. Contributing to the accident were the Beech Baron pi1o:'s penetration of the Air Defense Identification Zone and his faiiure to follow any of several prescribed procedures which would have permitted early positive identification after penetration, and the failure of the Fertile Controi staff to coordinate information concerning positive identification of the Baron in a timely manner, delaying a decision to terminate the intercept mission. Here's another quote from that report: "The National Transportation Safety Board did not determine the probable cause of this accident and offered the following statements of cause:" You quoted only the probable cause statement of NTSB members Patricia Goldman and Patrick Bursley. Member Vernon Grose saw it a bit differently: "The probable causes of this accident were (a) the unauthorized penetration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), (b) ambiguity in responsibility between the Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC) and NORAD SAGE facilities regarding identification and control of unknown aircraft, (c) deviation by the Baron pilot from a requirement to activate a previously filed VFR flight plan and thus declare ADIZ penetration, (d) fsilure [sic] of the Baron pilot to file and activate an instrument flight plan before operating in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC), (e) inadequate tracking sensitivity for both ground and airborne radar for the intended mission, (f) use of an excessive closure rate between unidentified aircraft and F4-C while depending on visual identification in IMC, and (g) continuation of the F-4C intercept mission after identification of the Baron hed [sic] been established." |
|
Thread Tools | |
Display Modes | |
|
|
Similar Threads | ||||
Thread | Thread Starter | Forum | Replies | Last Post |
Lost comm while VFR in Class Bravo | Roy Smith | General Aviation | 10 | April 23rd 04 11:12 PM |
Lost comms after radar vector | Mike Ciholas | Instrument Flight Rules | 119 | January 31st 04 11:39 PM |
Lost comm altitude? | Roy Smith | Instrument Flight Rules | 12 | January 11th 04 12:29 AM |
Soviet Submarines Losses - WWII | Mike Yared | Military Aviation | 4 | October 30th 03 03:09 AM |
Lost comm - Arrival | Michael 182 | Instrument Flight Rules | 3 | July 28th 03 12:04 AM |