flying low...military video

So the numbers you cite indicate an ~11% speed increase by airliners
over that prescribed by 91.117 (250 knots), unlike the ~43% (441 KCAS)
mentioned in the F-16's AIB report. That works out to the F-16
exceeding the 250 knot airspeed limit by about four times more than
what the airliners do.

Given those numbers, I'm inclined to believe that the speeds at which
the military routinely operates on MTRs is considerably more
significant (by about a factor of four) than that at which airliners
operate in terminal airspace under positive control and separated from
all other aircraft by ATC in Class B airspace.

MTR flights are not provided radar services by ATC in most instances,
because FAA radars do not provide coverage at near ground level out in
the desert where most MTRs are located.

Thanks for the data point.

Larry, I routinely flew in MTRs at 540KTAS or greater, (but not over .95M),
540knts was the "programmed training speed" for the B-1, program speed for
the B-52 was 340KTAS.
BT

On Wed, 3 Jan 2007 16:51:11 -0800, "BT" wrote
in :

I routinely flew in MTRs at 540KTAS or greater, (but not over .95M),
540knts was the "programmed training speed" for the B-1, program speed for
the B-52 was 340KTAS.

Many thanks for your input. At last, someone who has firsthand MTR
experience.

What would you suggest to keep the fast-movers from splattering the
low-level civil flyers?

Do any of the suggestions I proposed in this message thread make any
sense to you?

Larry, the idea of a MAP or Missed Abort Procedure (or what ever) does not
make sense.
I have flown as instructor and evaluator on many MTRs and have had to abort
more than a few, either for hazardous weather (TRW) or an aircraft system
problem. There is already a standard procedure used to abort a low level
run. (climb, avoid weather if possible, call ATC) In the instance you
describe (I believe it was the F-16s in Florida) it would have made no
difference on the abort procedure, the abort procedure would be predicated
on knowing where you are to begin with. And in this instance the F-16s did
not know where they were, so they would not know to avoid certain airspace
if they did not already know they were close to it.

Remember, when I aborted low level, it was pitch to 30degrees nose high,
starting at 540KTAS and going to full AB, we would punch above 10K MSL in a
heart beat and have to push over to remain below Class A while we tried to
get ARTCC to answer up. If we hit VMC on the way up we tried to maintain VMC
until back with ATC. Some times we had to climb higher because ATC had poor
coverage in our area. (Out West) An abort out of low level was an emergency
procedure. Remember, I flew MTR (IR routes) in actual IMC and with TF
engaged. No, my radar was not good at picking out LBFs from the ground
clutter.

How to avoid slow moving LBFs? Before we go "Flame on", I fly LBFs and
Gliders. Primary method is the Mk-1 CEB (Mark-1 Calibrated EyeBall). Ask the
LBFs to stay away from MTRs, or know the altitudes of the MTR (yes there is
a "top" to it, if you need to cross it), cross at 90 degrees and know from
which way the fast mover is coming and keep your eyes out. Normal low level
routes are 500-1000ft AGL, fly higher than that. The MTRs are charted, but
altitudes are not provided. Min and Max altitudes are found in FLIP General
Planning AP/1B. I will also agree that the LBF in this instance was "away"
from the MTR and the F-16s were not where they should have been.

I've had a Cessna cross under me in the Nebraska cornfields, he must have
known we fly that area at 500AGL, he was below that, or he was just lucky.
We've gotten NOTAMs for crop dusters in the known MTRs asking us to bump the
min altitude up from 400ft to 1000ft AGL in their areas during dusting
season. No problem, happy to oblige.

TCAS was not available then, it was not even a consideration, now only the
"military cargo" aircraft have TCAS capability, but it is spreading to more
cockpits.,It is a "space" issue on the panel and software revision issue in
most installations. TCAS "may" have helped in your F-16 scenario, but one
can never be sure. Most fighter/bomber aircraft did not have TCAS. I've been
retired a few years, so they may have something now.

What can be said, accidents happen, we train every day to mitigate and
reduce the risk. If you stop to consider the number of military aircraft
flying low level in MTRs in the US every day, we have an excellent safety
record. Granted one "ah sh%^" can ruin the whole day.

As a warfighter, I'd rather be learning how to fly low fast and tactical in
"friendly airspace" then doing it for the first time in combat. That's why
we have big airspace areas out west, Red Flags in a MOA. But not everyone
can get out west on a regular basis for training, and still keep the fighter
coverage on the east coast for that next Terrorist event.

You would be surprised at the number of civil aircraft that will cross a MOA
without talking to anyone, and you've got a 100 aircraft combat practice
going on, and the safety officer calls "knock it off" when the LBF
penetrates the MOA and goes blindly across at 120knts. Meanwhile 100
aircraft spin to safety zones waiting for the LBF to clear.

Yes, MOAs are "joint use", but at least call up the controlling agency and
find out if its HOT!!
BT (stepping down from soap box)
"Larry Dighera" wrote in message
...
On Wed, 3 Jan 2007 16:51:11 -0800, "BT" wrote
in :

I routinely flew in MTRs at 540KTAS or greater, (but not over .95M),
540knts was the "programmed training speed" for the B-1, program speed for
the B-52 was 340KTAS.

Many thanks for your input. At last, someone who has firsthand MTR
experience.

What would you suggest to keep the fast-movers from splattering the
low-level civil flyers?

Do any of the suggestions I proposed in this message thread make any
sense to you?

Your proposal for "deconflicting" this airspace takes away key training
options and makes it harder to give military pilots realistic training.
Combat missions are not often flown with active radar to avoid alerting the
enemy so requiring pilots training here to always use radar takes away
combat realism.

Combat missions are also not usually flown over friendly airspace. They
are flown in wartime. IF they want to train over friendly airspace (and
I agree that they should), they must make some accomodations. The
military is not there for their own amusement, they are there to protect
us, and they should do so here as well as there.

[MTRs] constitute a tiny percentage of the US NAS.

Yes, but they carve it up.

Jose
--
He who laughs, lasts.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

BT, thank you for your firsthand input on this issue.

My comments in-line below:


On Wed, 3 Jan 2007 20:30:12 -0800, "BT" wrote
in :

Larry, the idea of a MAP or Missed Abort Procedure (or what ever) does not
make sense.
I have flown as instructor and evaluator on many MTRs and have had to abort
more than a few, either for hazardous weather (TRW) or an aircraft system
problem. There is already a standard procedure used to abort a low level
run. (climb, avoid weather if possible, call ATC)

Okay. I was hoping the designers of the MTR system addressed the
issue of how to proceed if the MTR entry point was not acquired, and
from the information you have provided, it appears that is currently
in place.

Isn't this what Ninja Flight Lead Parker should have done instead of
descending into terminal airspace without the required ATC clearance?
If not, what do you think would have been appropriate for him to have
done?

In the instance you
describe (I believe it was the F-16s in Florida) it would have made no
difference on the abort procedure, the abort procedure would be predicated
on knowing where you are to begin with. And in this instance the F-16s did
not know where they were, so they would not know to avoid certain airspace
if they did not already know they were close to it.

First let me say, I'm not angry nor disrespectful, but I do speak with
complete candor, so please don't take my words personally.

My motivation in addressing this subject is to reduce the hazard to
civil aviation caused by MTR operations, and place the responsibility
for safety on those who cause the hazard. That's not to say that the
slower GA pilot should not scan for conflicting traffic, but if a MAC
should occur, placing full see-and-avoid responsibility for the mishap
on the PIC who caused the hazard to exist, by virtue of taking
exception to the 250 knot speed limit below 10,000', is the only
equitable remedy for that issue in my opinion.

With regard to Parker's alleged loss of positional awareness, I find
it difficult (if not impossible) to believe, that a highly trained and
experienced military flyer who had just, immediately before, attempted
to contact ATC for clearance to descend into Class B airspace, with
10 mile meteorological visibility, could possibly be unaware that his
descent would place him within congested terminal airspace.

All airman are aware that Class B areas are 60 miles in diameter, and
Parker must have been able to see Miami International below him from
his position at that time. I therefore must conclude that Parker
consciously chose to descend without regard for the hazard to civil
air traffic he and his wingman would cause.

You have stated that you disagree with that conclusion. Other than
the Parker's statement about loss of situational awareness contained
in the AIB report, how do _you_ account for his decision to descend?

Please, before you blame the navigational equipment error, and
Parker's erroneous navigational input errors, do plot the positions of
the aircraft and the MTR entry point. (You'll find on-line charts
available he http://www.skyvector.com)

Here is some of what is contained in the accident reports that
pertains to the navigation equipment errors:


(2) Ninja flight took off for their second sortie at 1513
The takeoff, rejoin, and climbout to 25,000 ft mean sea level (MSL)
were uneventful. Ninja 2 accomplished a targeting pod check on the
Taylor TACAN and confirmed that the flight was navigating correctly
to that steer point. With the exception of Ninja 2’s check on the
Taylor TACAN, neither flight member recalled confirming their INS
system accuracy with ground based navigational aids. Enroute to
the Lakeland TACAN, Ninja flight was cleared direct to the VR-1098
start route point by Miami Center. The flight then received
step-down altitude clearances for their descent to low level.


(3) At some time, between when Ninja 1’s aircraft tape
recorder was turned off on the first sortie to when the aircraft
tape was turned on during the second sortie, Ninja 1’s Inertial
Navigation System (INS) had developed a 9-11 NM error. The true
extent of the INS position error could only be determined in
post-mishap flight review of aircraft components and tapes.
The error was such that following INS steering to a selected point
would place the aircraft 9-11 NM south of the desired location.
Ground radar plots of the flight’s ground track during the medium
altitude cruise revealed no significant course deviations. Ninja 1
pointed out landmarks to Ninja 2 during the medium altitude
portion of the flight, reinforcing the fact that Ninja flight
seemed to be navigating properly.


(4) Also during this time period, a cursor slew of
approximately 26 NM and 20-30 degrees of right bias had been input
to the General Avionics Computer. In certain ground-attack
steering modes, this cursor bias is added to the current INS steer
point and repositions various avionics symbology, including the
Heads Up Display (HUD) steering cues. In short, the cursor bias
adjusts navigation symbology. Normally, cursor inputs are used to
correct for small position errors, refine attack steering, and aid
in target acquisition. It is possible, however to inadvertently
enter cursor biases. The cursor switch is a multifunction switch
dependent on the specific avionics mode and location of the sensor
of interest. Therefore, it is possible to enter unintentional
cursor slews when changing between modes and sensors. A
crosscheck of system indications is required so that
unintentional slews are recognized and zeroed out. These errors
came into play later when Ninja flight began maneuvering for
low-level entry.


(5) Miami Center cleared Ninja flight to 13,000 ft and
directed them to contact Tampa Approach on radio frequency 362.3.
The use of this frequency for Tampa Approach was discontinued in
August 2000. Ninja 1 thought he was given frequency 362.35 and
attempted contact there. In either case, Ninja 1 would have been
on the wrong frequency for Tampa Approach. After his unsuccessful
attempt to contact Tampa Approach, Ninja 1 returned to the
previous Miami Center frequency. Ninja 1 then determined that the
flight was rapidly approaching the low-level route start point and
they needed to descend soon for low-level entry. At 1544:34,
Ninja 1 cancelled IFR with Miami Center. Miami Center
acknowledged the IFR cancellation and asked if he wanted flight
following service, which Ninja 1 declined. Miami Center then
terminated radar service and directed Ninja 1 to change his Mode
III transponder code to a VFR 1200 code. Miami Center also gave
Ninja flight a traffic advisory on a Beech aircraft 15 NM away at
10,000 ft MSL, which Ninja acknowledged. Ninja flight started a
descent and maneuvered to the west in order to de-conflict with
that traffic. Ninja 1 was above the Class B airspace at the time
he cancelled IFR.


(6) At 1540:59, Sarasota Tower cleared Cessna 829 for
takeoff. The pilot, Mr. Jacques Olivier, was the only person
onboard the aircraft. The Cessna’s planned profile was a VFR
flight at 2,500 ft MSL to Crystal River Airport. Shortly after
departure, Cessna 829 contacted Tampa Approach, and the
controller called Cessna 829 radar contact at 1545:23.


(7) At 1545:42, Ninja flight descended into Tampa Class B
airspace, approximately 15 NM northeast of Sarasota-Bradenton
International Airport, without clearance from Tampa Approach.
Since Ninja 1 had already cancelled IFR and was unaware that he
was in Tampa airspace, he directed the flight to change to UHF
channel 20 (frequency 255.4, Flight Service Station) in
preparation for entry into VR-1098). Ninja flight then
accomplished a G-awareness exercise. This exercise involves
maneuvering the aircraft under moderate gravitational (G)
loads for 90-180 degrees of turn to ensure pilots are prepared to
sustain the G forces that will be encountered during the tactical
portion of the mission . Ninja flight accelerated to
approximately 440 knots calibrated airspeed (KCAS) and
accomplished two 90-degree turns while continuing their
descent. Following the G-awareness exercise, Ninja 1
directed his wingman to a fighting wing position.


(8) At 1547, Ninja 1 turned the flight to center up the INS
steering cues for the low-level start route point. As previously
mentioned, the INS had a 9-11 NM position error. Ninja 1’s
airspeed was decreasing through approximately 390 KCAS. Ninja 1
thought he was due north and within 9 NM of the start route point,
which was Manatee Dam. In reality, he was approximately 5 NM west
of the steer point. Also at 1547, Tampa Approach directed Cessna
829 to turn left to a heading of 320-degrees and then follow the
shoreline northbound. Tampa also directed a climb to 3,500 ft MSL.
Cessna 829 acknowledged and complied with the instructions.


(9) Ninja 1 next called for a “fence check,” directing the
flight to set up the appropriate switches and onboard avionic
systems for the tactical phase of the mission. Shortly after
calling “fence check,” Ninja 1 entered Sarasota Class C airspace
in a descent through 4,000 ft MSL. During the descent, Ninja 1
called “heads up, birds,” alerting his wingman of birds flying in
their vicinity. As part of his “fence check,” Ninja 1 changed
from a navigational mode to an air-to-ground attack mode. This
mode adjusted the system steering 20 degrees right, commanding a
new heading of approximately 180-degrees. This steering was the
result of the cursor slew bias that had previously been input to
the system. The HUD also displayed a range of approximately 35
NM. Ninja 1 turned to follow the steering cues .


(10) In addition, this air-to-ground mode displays a metric of
navigational system accuracy when the system determines anything
less than “high” accuracy. When Ninja 1 switched to this mode,
the system showed a navigational system accuracy of “medium”,
which eventually degraded to “low” prior to the collision. Ninja
1 did not notice this degradation in system accuracy. Ninja 2
thought they were on course and close to the start route
point. However, he did not recall specifically checking his own
INS steering to confirm they were on track to the point.


(11) At 1547:39, approximately 30 seconds prior to the
midair collision, the Tampa Approach radar system generated an
initial Mode C Intruder (Conflict) Alert between Cessna 829 and
Ninja 1’s 1200 code. Between 1547:55 and 1548:05, Tampa Approach
communicated with Miami Center and discussed the altitude of Ninja
1. No safety alert was ever transmitted to Cessna 829.


(12) At 1548:09, Ninja 2 and Cessna 829 collided near
Bradenton, Florida. The collision happened approximately 6 NM
from the Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport at approximately
2000 ft, within the confines of the Sarasota Class C airspace.
Ninja 1 was not aware that the flight was in Class C airspace when
the collision occurred. Ninja 1’s displayed airspeed at the time
of the midair was 356 KCAS with a heading of 178 degrees. Ninja
1’s attention was focused on finding the start route point and
looking where the HUD steering was pointed. Again, these
indications were incorrect due to the INS position error and
cursor slew, neither of which was recognized by the pilot. Ninja
1 was unable to find the start route in front of his aircraft
because it was actually about 5 NM at his left eight-o’clock.
Ninja 1 looked over his left shoulder at approximately one
second prior to impact and saw the Cessna in a turn just in front
of his wingman.


(13) Ninja 2 was looking in the direction of Ninja 1,
anticipating a left turn for entry into the low-level route. He
was clearing his flight path visually, primarily looking for
birds. He was flying about 60-degrees aft of his flight lead and
3,000-5,000 feet in trail. Ninja 2 saw a white flash that
appeared to travel from low left ten- to eleven-o’clock and
simultaneously felt a violent impact. There are conflicting
witness statements about the flight attitude of Cessna 829
immediately prior to the midair. The nearest witnesses on the
ground stated that they saw no evasive maneuvering by the Cessna
immediately prior to the collision. Other witnesses, including
Ninja 1, perceived that Cessna 829 turned or banked immediately
prior to the collision.


(14) Also at 1548:09, Tampa Approach issued Cessna 829 a
traffic advisory on Ninja 1’s position. Ninja 1’s INS was steering
him 9-11 NM south of the actual turn point so Manatee Dam was, in
reality, several miles to his left.

-----------------

Lockheed Martin examined the download data from the crash
survivable flight data recorder (CSFDR), the SDR, data printouts
from the general avionics computer (GAC), the global positioning
system (GPS), the inertia navigation system (INS) and the AVTR
tapes from the flight lead's airplane. Lockheed Martin's
examination report stated that M Aero stated that GPS "was removed
from the navigation solution at some time prior to the midair. It
cannot be determined from the data why the GPS was removed from
the navigation solution." The report added: "A position error of
approximately 9-11 nm was entered into the navigation system at
some time on the mishap flight prior to the video recording. It
can not be determined from the data what caused this position
error."

The flight lead stated during an interview conducted by the Air
Force Accident Investigation Board that he did not perform an INS
update before the accident flight. He stated that navigation along
their planned route was conducted in the NAV mode and that they
were steering off INS steer points. He added that no INS en route
updates were accomplished. The flight lead stated that he not
detect any NAV problems on the return flight to Moody Air Force
Base after the accident. He stated that he thought the navigation
system was functioning correctly and giving him accurate
information. He stated, "I had no suspicion at all that there was
a navigation system problem."


Based on radar data in the official accident reports, my understanding
is that the Ninja flight was southbound north of Miami when Parker
chose to descend. His navigation equipment was indicating his
position as being about 10 miles _north_ of his true position, so if
the navigational display depicted him and Miami International on its
screen, he could not have thought he wouldn't bust terminal airspace
by descending. I have no idea what the navigational display looks
like nor the information it displays, but If it doesn't show airports
and the location of the aircraft relative to them, I doubt it would be
very useful.

So Please enlighten me about those factors I may have overlooked that
may mitigate Parker's choice of action.

Remember, when I aborted low level, it was pitch to 30degrees nose high,
starting at 540KTAS and going to full AB, we would punch above 10K MSL in a
heart beat and have to push over to remain below Class A while we tried to
get ARTCC to answer up. If we hit VMC on the way up we tried to maintain VMC
until back with ATC.

I suppose that abort procedure is reasonable for IFR flights;
presumably ATC was familiar with the MTR abort procedure, and was able
to track your flight (once it was high enough for radar coverage) and
was in radio contact, as it would be with any civil IFR flight, so ATC
could vector known traffic around your flight. And unless you were
within Class G airspace in IMC, there shouldn't be any other IFR
traffic that posed a collision hazard (as is normal). In VMC, of
course, the MkI CEBs would provide see-and-avoid separation as usual.
Some times we had to climb higher because ATC had poor
coverage in our area. (Out West)

I presume you are referring to radar coverage, not communications
coverage. Wouldn't climbing into Class A airspace without benefit of
the required clearance be a violation of regulations? Or am I
overlooking something?

Out of curiosity, where "out west" was that?

An abort out of low level was an emergency procedure.

So you invoked the PIC's right to deviate from regulations in
emergency situations?

Remember, I flew MTR (IR routes) in actual IMC and with TF
engaged. No, my radar was not good at picking out LBFs from the ground
clutter.

Yes. Other military flyers have also voiced that lamentable fact
regarding the on-board radars' inapplicability for deconfliction.

[I am aware of the meaning of the LBF acronym. It is unfortunate that
military personnel have chosen to dub us GA flights with that LBF
sobriquet, as it would seem to foster disrespect or contempt for
fellow (civil) airmen.]

How to avoid slow moving LBFs? Before we go "Flame on", I fly LBFs and
Gliders. Primary method is the Mk-1 CEB (Mark-1 Calibrated EyeBall).

I have no intention of going "flame on", so please don't infer my
comments as personal remarks.

It would seem you are ideally qualified to comment on this issue given
your broad civil and military flight experience.

With regard to employing visual deconfliction methods at high closing
speeds, please see my comments below.

Ask the LBFs to stay away from MTRs, or know the altitudes of the MTR

That's is the present situation as I understand it. The MTRs are
charted, and GA pilots should be aware of the hazard created there
when MTRs are active. The problem is, there is no regulation that
_requires_ this, and it is not easy to _accurately_ determine the
activity status of MTR routs for a number of reasons:

* The military will often erroneously inform FSS that MTRs are hot
continuously when in fact they are not. This abuse fosters distrust
of the system among GA flyers.

* FSS personnel are inexperienced with MTR NOTAMS, and can't find
the current data.

* Contacting the military person responsible for scheduling MTR
activity is often very difficult. There is the issue of finding what
authority is responsible, locating the correct telephone number, etc,
and it often requires several calls, and transfers among military
personnel.

* It may be necessary to contact several such military personnel if
many MTR routs are to be penetrated on a given mission. That can be
very cumbersome.

* Military operations on MTRs may fall outside the NOTAMED hot time
given to FSS.

* ...

(yes there is a "top" to it, if you need to cross it), cross at 90 degrees
and know from which way the fast mover is coming and keep your eyes out.

Right.

I presume the suggestion for crossing the MTR at right angles is to
reduce the exposure time to a minimum.

Keeping a sharp lookout may not be very effective for separating slow
moving aircraft with PICs trained to civil flight standards and tested
to civil medical standards. More about this below.

What is the best way for a GA airman to determine from which way to
expect MTR traffic to be headed? The sole bit of MTR information
contained within the Airport/Facilities Directory is this Special
Notice:

MILITARY TRAINING ROUTES
The DOD Flight Information Publication AP/1B provides textural and
graphic descriptions and operating instructions for all military
training routes (IR, VR, SR)and refueling tracks/anchors.
Completed and more comprehensive information relative to policy
and procedures for IRs and VRsis published in FAA Handbook 7610.4
(Special Military Operations) which is agreed to by the DOD and
therefore directive for all military flight operations. The AP/1B
is the official source of route data for military users.

FAA Handbook 7610.4 is available on-line he
http://www.faa.gov/airports_airtraff.../media/mil.pdf


The Aeronautical Information Manual advises the following:

AIM 3-5-2 (b): The routes at 1,500 feet AGL and below and
generally developed to be flown under VFR.

(c) Generally, MTR's are established below 10,000 feet MSL for
operations at speeds in excess of 250 knots.

(2) VFR Military Training Routes (VR): Operations on these routes
are conducted in accordance with VFR except flight visibility
shall be 5 miles or more; and flights shall not be conducted below
a ceiling of less than 3,000 feet AGL.

d. Military training routes will be identified and charted as
follows:

1. Route Identification
(a) MTR's with no segment above 1,500 feet AGL shall be identified
by four number characters; e.g. IR206, VR207.

(b) MTR's that include one or more segments above 1,500 feet shall
be identified by number characters; e.g. IR206, VR206.

2. (f) Nonparticipating aircraft are not prohibited from flying
within an MTR, however, extreme vigilance should be exercised when
conducting flight through or near these routes. Pilots should
contact FSSs within 100 NM of a particular MTR to obtain current
information or route usage in their vicinity. Information
available includes times of scheduled activity, altitudes in use
on each route segment, and actual route width. Route width varies
for each MTR and can extend several miles on either side of the
charted MTR centerline. Route width information for IR and VR
MTR's is also available in the FLIP AP/1B along with additional
MTR (SR/AR) information. When requesting MTR information, pilots
should give the FSS their position, route of flight, and
destination in order to reduce frequency congestion and permit the
FSS specialist to identify the MTR which could be a factor.


Normal low level routes are 500-1000ft AGL, fly higher than that.
The MTRs are charted, but altitudes are not provided. Min and Max
altitudes are found in FLIP General Planning AP/1B.

Unfortunately, I've never seen FLIPs available for sale in civilian
pilot shops, and they were not even mentioned during my flight
training. I purchase my charts here http://www.avshop.com/category/58
but I don't see FLIPs offered there either. Indeed, it appears that
civilians can't be trusted with FLIPs:

http://avn.faa.gov/index.asp?xml=naco/ecom
Notice: On November 18, 2004, the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency announced in the Federal Register their intent to remove
Department of Defense (DoD) Flight Information Publications
(FLIPs), Digital Aeronautical Flight Information File (DAFIF), and
related aeronautical safety of navigation digital and hardcopy
publications from public sale and distribution. When this action
is implemented, the Federal Aviation Administration will no longer
be permitted to sell and distribute DoD aeronautical charts and
publications to the public. The proposed implementation date is
October 1, 2005. See the Special Notice and Federal Register
Excerpt for complete information.

The FAA, National Aeronautical Charting Office http://naco.faa.gov
doesn't sell FLIPs. And indeed, there is a notice in the Federal
Register:

http://avn.faa.gov/content/naco/Spec...R-04-25631.pdf
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary
Announcement of Intent To Initiate the
Process To Remove Aeronautical
Information From Public Sale and
Distribution
AGENCY: National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA), Department
of Defense.
ACTION: Notice.
SUMMARY: The National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency (NGA) intends to
remove its Flight Information
Publications (FLIP), Digital Aeronautical
Flight Information File (DAFIF), and
related aeronautical safety of navigation
digital and hardcopy publications from
public sale and distribution. ...

I guess there's no good way for civil airmen to know which way the MTR
aircraft are going along the route anymore. Perhaps the charting
office should start putting little arrow heads along the charted MTR
routes.

I will also agree that the LBF in this instance was "away"
from the MTR and the F-16s were not where they should have been.

This brings up a few issues:

1. The VR-1098 MTR entry point is located approximately 12 NM
northeast of the Sarasota-Bradenton International Airport at an
altitude between 500 ft above ground level (AGL) and 1,500 ft AGL. At
Point A, the route extends 3 NM southwest (right) of centerline,
slightly penetrating the Sarasota Class C airspace, and 8 NM northeast
(left) of centerline, underlying the Tampa Class B airspace.

This would seem to violate Air Force Instruction 11-202 5.7.5.1.5:

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 11-202, VOLUME 3
16 FEBRUARY 2005
Flying Operations
GENERAL FLIGHT RULES

5.7.5.1. When the Authorization Applies. Air Force pilots may
operate their aircraft below 10,000 ft. MSL, within US airspace,
in excess of 250 KIAS only under the following conditions:

5.7.5.1.5. Within published VFR MTRs.


How is it possible for a military airman intending to enter the
VR-1099 MTR to comply with the above AF Instructions if they must
accelerate _BEFORE_ entering the MTR? They are not considered "within
published VFR MTR" until they pass the entry point, right?

2. The AIB report states:

Ninja flight did, in fact, accelerate to 441 KCAS to start their
G-awareness exercise in Class B airspace ...

I presume Parker did the G-awareness exercise as prescribed by USAF
policy/regulations. Doesn't this practice also violate the above AF
Instructions? Shouldn't the G-awareness exercise, that requires
high-speed to be effective, have been performed above 10,000' to
comply with AF Instructions?

But apparently it is military practice to accelerate well beyond the
minimum for the military aircraft well before actually entering the
MTR; this practice violates the military exception to the 250 knot
speed limit, doesn't it?

[snip good information]

TCAS "may" have helped in your F-16 scenario, but one can never be sure.

If there's no room in the F-16 cockpit to install TCAS equipment, it's
moot.

Perhaps the best method or preventing MTR MACs is some sort of
AWACSlike radar orbiting the flight, and advising the MTR flight of
conflicting traffic. It may be expensive, but I'll bet it's cheaper
than the court settlements and loss of military aircraft from MTR
MACs.

Most fighter/bomber aircraft did not have TCAS. I've been retired a few
years, so they may have something now.

It seems that the training aircraft at Moody AFB (coincidentally, the
Ninja flight was based there) are about to be equipped with TCAS. And
another airman said:

The T1's at Columbus AFB, MS have TCAS - I would assume all of the
T1 airframes have TCAS installed.

So apparently the USAF is aware of the issue, and attempting to
respond by equipping some of their aircraft with TCAS.

What can be said, accidents happen, we train every day to mitigate and
reduce the risk.

I'm sorry, but, with all due respect, the "accident's happen"
dismissal of the issues raised by the Ninja MAC seems to be a lazy
attempt to dodge the work of gleaning useful safety information from
this mishap. Certainly the phrase is true, but implicit in such
utterances is the notion that nothing can be learned and/or done to
reduce the hazard caused by MTRs. I don't believe that is true.

If you stop to consider the number of military aircraft
flying low level in MTRs in the US every day, we have an excellent safety
record. Granted one "ah sh%^" can ruin the whole day.

Agreed; the incidents of military/civil MACs is low, but I believe the
hazard can be reduced through analysis, systems re-design, reformed
regulations, and implementation of them. Isn't it worth a little
effort to save the life of a fellow airman?

As a warfighter, I'd rather be learning how to fly low fast and tactical in
"friendly airspace" then doing it for the first time in combat.

I don't question the benefits and necessity of MTR training. I just
think there are a number of ways the hazards it poses to the public
can be mitigated with a little thought. For example, installing a
forward facing bright strobe light on, or other conspicuity
enhancements, to aircraft operating on MTRs might help. The FAA
instructs GA flyers to burn a landing light in congested airspace to
increase conspicuity. Certainly _something_ can be done to increase
military aircraft conspicuity while operating on MTRs.

But there are some fundamental flaws in the MTR system as it is
currently implemented that need to be brought to light. I personally
believe that it is virtually impossible for the average GA pilot to
see-and-avoid fast-movers. Relying on see-and-avoid for air traffic
separation is unreasonable for non military trained pilots at the
speeds Parker's flight was moving. The AOPA has this to say:

"An experimental scan training course conducted
with military pilots found the average time
needed to conduct the operations essential
to flying the airplane was 20 seconds –- 17 seconds
for the outside scan, and three seconds for
the panel scan. Without the benefit of intensive
military training, most [civil] pilots will need more time than
this. But as demonstrated by the military pilots,
considerably more time should be spent on the external
scan than the panel scan."

As you can doubtless appreciate, the pilot of a 130 knot airplane must
scan much more of the sky than the fast-movers to effectively see
conflicting traffic in time to avoid it. Fighter aircraft are painted
to camouflage them, and their frontal area is small, but they must be
spotted a long distance off for see-and-avoid to work for the GA
flyer. For these reasons and others, it is unreasonable to expect GA
aircraft to successfully comply with the see-and-avoid regulations in
the case of high-speed MTR operations. It's just not physically
possible in most instances, IMO.

For that reason, I believe the military (and ATC where applicable)
should shoulder _ALL_ the responsibility of traffic separation for MTR
operations. This might prompt the military and FAA to enhance the
conspicuity of MTR participants, find a way to equip MTR aircraft with
collision avoidance systems, restrict the hazard caused by MTR
operations to fewer more distant routs, etc.

That's why we have big airspace areas out west, Red Flags in a MOA.
But not everyone can get out west on a regular basis for training,
and still keep the fighter coverage on the east coast for that next
Terrorist event.

For the next terrorist event?

I'm not sure I follow that line of reasoning. Surely you're not
suggesting that nap-of-the-earth military operations would be required
to down a hijacked airliner, or other terrorist occupied aircraft, are
you?

You would be surprised at the number of civil aircraft that will cross a MOA
without talking to anyone, and you've got a 100 aircraft combat practice
going on, and the safety officer calls "knock it off" when the LBF
penetrates the MOA and goes blindly across at 120knts. Meanwhile 100
aircraft spin to safety zones waiting for the LBF to clear.

I'm glad you brought that up.

I can understand your frustration with inconsiderate GA pilots failing
to coordinate their transition with the MOA controlling authority.
They place themselves and those participating in military exercises at
risk with seemingly little regard for the hazard they create. While
such mindless operation conforms to the letter of federal regulations,
it is just plane dumb.

However, it is not a violation of regulations, and if the military
doesn't want it to continue, they should take official action to
change the regulations. Personally, I see no reason why regulations
couldn't require the military controller on duty for the MOA to
coordinate the GA aircraft's transition via radio communications; but
the aircraft not equipped with electrical systems would be barred from
operating in vast chunks of airspace (probably as it should be) if
such a regulation were implemented.

Yes, MOAs are "joint use", but at least call up the controlling agency and
find out if its HOT!!
BT (stepping down from soap box)

I agree completely.

Can you provide a good procedure for determining how to contact the
controlling agency? I would just contact the closest ARTC Center, and
hope they know what to do.

I know I've covered a lot more than either one of us probably wanted
to in this post, but it's not an easy issue. Please feel free to take
as long as you like compose responses to those parts you feel will be
most helpful, and post them in individual messages if you like. I know
it's a lot of work, but rest assured that I and many others reading
this message thread will be most grateful for your knowledgeable
input.



PS:

There is a MTR issue I'd prefer to discuss with you privately. Can
you send me an e-mail message so that we can make
contact that way? I'll e-mail a copy of this to you, but I'm not
exactly sure how to decode your munged e-mail address, so you may not
receive it. Thanks.

Jose wrote:

Combat missions are also not usually flown over friendly airspace. They
are flown in wartime.

As you mention in your following comment, we're discussing training and the
training we're discussing is for combat. I suspect anybody who's served in
the armed forces has heard the phrase "train like you fight, fight like you
train". Translated, this means the training needs to be as close to combat
as possible without actually firing weapons. (The phrase is closely related
to a civilian counterpart: The Law of Primacy.)

IF they want to train over friendly
airspace (and I agree that they should), they must make some
accomodations. The military is not there for their own amusement,
they are there to protect us, and they should do so here as well as
there.

No doubt. However, there are systems in place to handle this accomodation.
MTRs are charted for all to see. Their bounds are known by trained pilots.
VFR rules apply to military pilots (when operating VFR). While not
necessarily efficient (and gets my vote for improvement area with the
highest "bang/buck ratio"), procedures exist to inform FSS of the status of
these routes which can be queried by pilots near them.

I want to avoid reducing combat realism in military training.

[MTRs] constitute a tiny percentage of the US NAS.

Yes, but they carve it up.

True, but only within certain vertical and horizontal limits (typically
1500 AGL). Is it asking too much for GA aircraft to climb to 3000 AGL near
MTRs (adding a 1500' safety margin)? I submit this is not burdensome in most
cases. I'm sure there are several cases where it isn't practical - like
landing/departing under an MTR - but I expect most aircraft/flights have no
problem achieving 3K AGL.

The next best option I see is to make MTRs restricted, but this option would
carve up the NAS much more than they do now and, frankly, with having to
deal with the DC ADIZ on every flight I make, I'm not much of a proponent of
more restricted airspace.

--
John T
http://sage1solutions.com/TknoFlyer
Reduce spam. Use Sender Policy Framework: http://spf.pobox.com
____________________

While not
necessarily efficient (and gets my vote for improvement area with the
highest "bang/buck ratio"), procedures exist to inform FSS of the status of
these routes which can be queried by pilots near them.

It's not a question of efficiency. It's a question of effectiveness. I
am often unable to determine the status of a route or area by calling
the FSS, or Center, or whatever is printed on my charts. IN fact, I
often get a response that they know nothing about it. Lots of good that
does me crossing a mountainous area with an overcast crossed by an MTR
filled with camoflauged fast aircraft backed by military lawyers who, if
"contact" occurs, will be sure to blame me for "not looking", and to
smear my reputation as surely as my airplane.

I want to avoid reducing combat realism in military training.

I don't.

I want to avoid UNNECESSARILY reducing combat realism. I think that
this reduction in realism is necessary.

Is it asking too much for GA aircraft to climb to 3000 AGL near
MTRs (adding a 1500' safety margin)?

Yes. Sometimes the aircraft cannot climb that high. Sometimes there
are clouds or ice in the way. And sometimes the route is empty but we
can't tell. Then we have to unnecessarily alter our operations, just
like you folks don't like to unnecessarily alter yours when a pilot
transits an MOA uncoordinated.

Jose
--
He who laughs, lasts.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

In article ,
Jose wrote:

I want to avoid reducing combat realism in military training.

I don't.

I want to avoid UNNECESSARILY reducing combat realism. I think that
this reduction in realism is necessary.

You base your conclusion on what?

You have evidence to show the decrease in combat effectiveness is
worth it?

--
Bob Noel
Looking for a sig the
lawyers will hate

You base your conclusion on what?

My desire to not be skewered by a camoflauged F-16, and blamed for it.

Jose
--
He who laughs, lasts.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.

Wow.. Larry.. a lot of information there... you have obviously done your
research,
I'll only comment on a few areas..

INS 26nm off and the did not know it? It happens.. people bust check rides
for that. We have to take one every 18 months. I've busted people on check
rides for missing the IR entry point by 5nm. They did not know where they
are.

Flying in an IR Route (MTR) is an IFR Clearance and provides IFR seperation
from other IFR operations. Having to abort out of an IR Route is an
emergency proceedure, and I envoke all rights entitled to deviate from an
IFR clearance, and when finding VMC will maintain VMC until I can get back
with ATC.

No, We do not "bust" Class A, we can normally contact ATC anywhere in the
continental US at 17,500.
Radar and Communication coverage with ATC in the IR Route structure is
spotty.

Out "West" is anywhere west of the Mighty Mississipi. Mostly Kansas,
Nebraska, Texas, Wyoming, Montana, Colorado, Idaho, Nevada, Arizona, Texas
and New Mexico. I have also flown IR Routes in the Applilacians (IR-075)

I need to run off for a flying meeting, I'll look at the rest of your post
later.

BT