Best dogfight gun?

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 19:00:14 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:

In message , Chad Irby
writes

Comments nearly identical to the one above were very popular in the
early 1960s. And then we got into a real shooting war, and pilots
suddenly needed guns again.

It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

While numbers tell a story, they can occasionally mislead. USAF to USN
comparisons offer some insight, but strict stats can lead to bad
conclusions. To compare sortie count/MiG engagement percentages you
would need to consider the various missions, the allocation of the
resource, the philosophy of engagement, etc.

With large composite strike packages, the AF tended toward lots of
specialization. Chaff droppers, SEAD, escorts (that often were used to
herd MiGs rather than engage them) and only a few dedicated shooters
on TEABALL frequency meant that the numbers could be skewed.

Sounds abstract? The services were using the same aircraft,
near-identical missiles (Sparrows and different models of Sidewinder),
but the USAF's F-4Ds and F-4Es had guns (pods for the Ds, internal for
the Es) supposedly as a solution to the problems encountered during
Rolling Thunder.

I don't know of any instances in which F-4Ds were carrying gun pods
into RP VI during Linebacker. There were lots of external gun sorties
flown in Rolling Thunder.

Yet they were twice as likely to be shot down and
barely half as likely to kill, as the gunless Navy fighters. (Only seven
of the forty-eight USAF Linebacker kills were achieved with guns,
despite the efforts made to fit them)

It would be helpful to consider the USN fighter-vs-attack philosophy
as well as the level of experience of the multiple tour carrier force.
The USAF "universal pilot" concept and the "no involuntary second
tour" policy impacted the competence level.

The parenthetical conclusion is a poor one. With TEABALL, the 555th
TFW specialists, and the accompanying GCI support, it was possible for
the USAF fighters who DID engage, to use their longer range weapons
and negate the requirement to close to gun range.

Yep, McNamara is still influencing military thought. I was sure we'd
gotten over that, but what goes around, comes around.

"We're not training our crews properly, aren't using our weapons
correctly, and are employing poor tactics that make us very vulnerable"
is much less palatable than "the only problem is the aircraft imposed on
us doesn't have a gun!"

Amen! It's much easier to write off a combat loss than to suffer
accidents in training.

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 16:36:08 GMT, Chad Irby wrote:

In article ,
Alan Minyard wrote:

Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into
gun range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last
ditch, desperation weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight
on a honking great, slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.

Comments nearly identical to the one above were very popular in the
early 1960s. And then we got into a real shooting war, and pilots
suddenly needed guns again.

Yep, McNamara is still influencing military thought. I was sure we'd
gotten over that, but what goes around, comes around.

It's funny to hear someone call a gun "unreliable," since the failure
rate for modern aircraft guns is *miniscule*...

I did not mean "no gun", I meant that the M-61 is quite adequate for the
scenarios that are likely to occur in ACM.

Al Minyard

"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
...
On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 17:49:17 GMT, "Kevin Brooks"
wrote:


"Ed Rasimus" wrote in message
.. .


The more things change, the more they remain the same. I've only
opined once in this long thread, but thought I'd jump in again after
this.

Some points:

snip good info


3. The final insert by Brooks is irrelevant to the discussion.

When the comment is made quite emphatically that no gun should be
included
in the newer aircraft, by more than one poster, I disagree with your
conclusion of irrelevance.

The thread title is "Best Dogfight Gun". The relevance of the comment
is to tactical aircraft employment in support of ground forces, and I
freely conceded the importance in follow-on comments.

Threads drift. FYI, the introduction of the air-to-ground issue was from
another poster.


The
question has been about guns and air/air. The question of optimum CAS
weapon isn't trivial and my reply shouldn't be taken as one more
evidence of the AF aversion to support of ground troops. There is
NOTHING more important. But:

A.) First, support of ground troops involves keeping enemy
aircraft from being a player. We've done that successfully in every
conflict since WW II.

That is only one aspect of support of ground troops. And if anything an
increasingly *less* important one at that--note that we have not faced a
significant air threat to our ground troops since WWII, Ed.

The prosecution should rest with that acknowledgement. It is my point
exactly. The historic result should not be attributed to wishing and
hoping. It's a result of proper allocation of resources.

Uhmmm...do you or do you not agree that the air-to-ground role has consumed
the vast majority of USAF (and for that matter USN aviation) missions since
WWII?



B.) CAS does not have to be fifty feet overhead with
snake/nape on "enemy in the wire". It can evolve to that scenario but
doesn't happen as often as common perception would think.

But it does happen, period. Did it happen during Anaconda or not? The
reports I read said it did--feel free to correct that representation.

It happened. But, anecdotal evidence does not necessarily lead to good
conclusions.

I'd consider disparate and repeated "anecdotal evidence" of the sort
provided below to be rather compelling. According to what our resident
current Strike eagle driver has posted in a similar thread, the USAF
apparently agrees.



C.) Modern stand-off weapons provide equal or greater
accuracy than close-in laydown and without either jeopardizing the
delivery aircraft or warning the target to hunker down.

And what about when the threat you are engaging is well within the danger
close margin? If it comes down to the gun as the best available support
option versus having the CAS folks say, "Sorry, we can't do anything
since
we don't have guns, but we wish you the best of luck and will be thinking
kind thoughts of you...", I'd take the former, thank you. Luckily, the
USAF
seems to share that view.

Modern warfare is a mix of sophistication and crudity. Can you say
"Claymore"? Seriously, I'm not belittling nor minimizing. There's a
mix of weapons. Some you have available, some you don't. Some are
better than others. CAS strafe is exhilarating to say the least. But,
it isn't the only weapon for danger close situations. Mortars, proper
fortifications, Army aviation assets, etc. all can be considered in
the right time and the right place.

Mortars have to have a dedicated logistics effort behind them--during
Anaconda that feature was somewhat stretched, from what I have read.
Fortifications in an offensive operation? Hey, survivability enhancement was
one of our primary considerations as combat engineers, but we rarely plan
for such near the LC during an offensive operation--that sort of went out
with the days of scientific seige warfare with its "circumvalation" and what
not. Army aviation assets are great, but as we saw in Anaconda (and during
OIF as well) there are environments where its capabilities are challenged
such that fixed wing CAS provides a better alternative. Yes, we plan for the
use of all of these whenever possible--but maintaining the strafe capability
in the collective bag of tricks can still come in handy.


I'm a believer in guns in airplanes. But, I'll freely acknowledge that
the gun isn't the best choice in a lot of scenarios.

Agreed. My argument is not that the gun is the paramount, or in most cases
even an "equally important" component of the overall weapons suite, but that
it can be of valuable use in the CAS arena in some circumstances, and that
deletion of gun armament accomplishes little for the loss of some valuable
flexibility.

I'm not willing
to forego the gun in current or future tactical aircraft. However,
I've seen a lot of airplanes lost while shooting trucks. Modern jets
cost a lot more than trucks. Going nose to nose with superior weapons
with a pea-shooter isn't always prudent. It may be necessary, but not
wise.

Agreed again. Taking the fight into the other guy's "backyard", so to speak,
should only be done when the gain is assessed as being worth the additional
risk. During Anaconda that was a no brainer--the Taliban/AQ folks had not
demonstrated any capability with MANPADS (and there had always been
significant doubt as to the viability of those Stingers we heard so much
about due to the storage limits on their batteries, not to mention their
cooling system for the seeker), so the additional risk was marginal, while
the payoff was reportedly quite valuable, in terms of actual target effects
and, likely just as important, I'd imagine the morale of those guys pinned
down in some shallow wadi under close engagement proabably improved every
time one of the fast movers passed overhead.



D.) While no one can put a value on the life of one American
soldier, a cost/benefit analysis of what strafe can do compared to the
risk involved usually mitigates against strafe being a primary tactic.

Nobody has said it should be a *primary* tactic.

Prosecution rest time again.


E.) While the guy on the ground may be firmly (and rightly)
convinced that his battle is the most important, the commanders must
allocate resources based on priorities which often don't have as much
emotion attached. Getting strafe to the troops in Anaconda wasn't a
readily available option.

It wasn't?! Reports I read indicated it actually occurred, so I wonder
how
you determine it "wasn't a readily available option"?

It wasn't a readily available option when initially called for.
Remember that Afghanistan is a long way from anywhere. At the time of
Anaconda, the primary tactical assets were carrier based and flying
extremely long duration, multiple refueling sorties. The flexibility
for immediate on-call CAS was not available.

I have not gotten that impression. Yeah, there was a distance to be covered
(not sure it applied to all CAS assets, as IIRC there were A-10's forward
based in Afghanistan proper rather early, and a couple of airfields located
just north of Afghanistan in one of the other -stans). But there was
apparently a CAS stack of sorts available, which is why these examples of
timely support are evident. I'd be careful about using MG Hagenbach's after
action criticisms of CAS in such a vein.



"I had an aircraft overhead carrying 500-pound bombs, but the 'bad guys'
were too close to our position to drop that much ammo without risking our
lives. I waved the pilot off the bomb run. I had him come around and
strafe
the area with guns," said the sergeant.
(www.af.mil/news/May2002/n20020529_0868.shtml )

The sergeant has an extremely optimistic view of the strafing accuracy
of the average F-15/16/18 operator, and extremely pessimistic one of
the reliability of PGMs.

Interestingly, the report you cite says the fighters fired til
"winchester" but the enemy continued to operate and then...drum roll,
please...he targeted the bunker with the 500 pound bombs. Which took
out the bunker.

Might I suggest that the sergeant's account might be sensationalized
for effect and that he was not an experienced forward air controller.
I don't know.

From reading the full account (see
http://www.robins.af.mil/pa/revup-on...y31-02-all.pdf ), it
is apparent that they went to a rather nasty danger-close bomb effort only
when things were even worse in terms of their situation. What about the
other account? Can you discount it as readily? Or...

"According to the citation, Captain Russell's flight, call sign Twister 52,
made contact with an American ground forward air controlling team that was
taking fire from enemy troops 75 meters away. The ground team restricted
Twister flight to strafe passes due to a "danger close" condition. This
condition meant friendly troops were within minimal risk distances of injury
or death from friendly weapons on enemy locations...Twister flight made six
strafe passes while firing 20-mm rounds from an altitude of 1,500 feet over
the target area. This was well within the threat zone of small arms fire and
surface to air missiles. The ground team reported enemy fire was suppressed
on each pass, but requested more passes to kill steadily increasing numbers
of reinforced Taliban and al Qaeda forces. Out of 20-mm ammunition, Twister
51, the aircraft manned by Maj. Chris Short and Lt. Col. Jim Fairchild,
became the airborne forward air controller and targeted Captain Russell's
jet on four additional low-altitude strafe passes. Due to radio failure,
Twister 51 then passed the tactical lead to Captain Russell's aircraft. With
the ground team's concurrence, Twister flight began employing laser-guided
bombs. The two aircrews attempted to guide each successive bomb closer to
enemy forces without injuring American service members. The aircrews were
able to drop bombs as close as 200 meters from friendly forces."

www2.acc.af.mil/accnews/dec02/02414.ht


Then there is the following from an F-16 pilot who flew some of these
missions during Anaconda:

"When Burt and his wingman arrived, the first words they heard from Slick
01, the ground controller on the scene, were "Danger close, seventy-five
meters." The words sent a chill down Burt's spine. The ground controller
relayed they had two casualties and two critically wounded. Burt made two
passes over the enemy position and emptied all 500 rounds. His wingman then
came in and emptied all his 500 rounds. "We realized how close we were
firing to the helicopter on the ground when we reviewed the cockpit tapes,"
Burt said. Though the F-16 pilots couldn't see exactly where their rounds
were hitting, the troops on the ground indicated that they were getting good
results. With their ammunition spent and the soldiers on the ground still
coming under enemy fire, Burt talked to Slick 01 about bringing in some
heavy ordnance. The enemy's close proximity, however, made a strike
dangerous, even with laser-guided munitions. Burt had to be extremely
careful not to drop his 500-pound bombs too close to the ground troops." [It
goes on to describe how they did subsequently bring the bombs in by walking
them ever closer, but not without at least one close call that caused the
CCT to admonish them for having almost hit their own location]

http://www.codeonemagazine.com/archi.../jul_02/354th/

So it appears there were numerous occasions of strafe missions being
requested from the ground folks.



F.) Good Forward Observers (FACs or AOs) should be calling
early for support. Good FOs should be GPS and Laser equipped and
getting the job done well before the more spectacular troops in the
wire scenario occurs. JDAMs et. al. are a much better choice. Bigger
payload, greater effect, better accuracy than strafe, more economical,
etc.

That is all great and is what we'd *like* to see happen--but as we saw in
Anaconda, it doesn't always flesh out that way. One of the best qualities
of
a first-class military is recognition of the importance of
flexibility--taking the strafe capability away from the aircraft that
perform most of the CAS does little to enhance that quality. I hope you
are
not arguing that would be the way to go.

Not at all, but I argue regularly that strafe is a weapon of last
resort in modern aircraft.

No disagreement there.

Brooks

"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
In message , Chad Irby
writes
In article ,
Alan Minyard wrote:
Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into
gun range you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last
ditch, desperation weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight
on a honking great, slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.

Comments nearly identical to the one above were very popular in the
early 1960s. And then we got into a real shooting war, and pilots
suddenly needed guns again.

It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

Ugh! That all sounds dangerously like the "operations research", or systems
analysis, kind of numeric mumbo-jumbo so characteristic of the McNamara
era---PLEASSSE don't go there! It took us a generation to rid ourselves of
the most of the "mantle of the number crunchers" (and we were only partially
succesful--witness the continued use of the POM process in budgeting) as it
was...

Brooks

snip

Alan Minyard wrote in message . ..
On 9 Dec 2003 13:40:45 -0800, (Tony Williams) wrote:

Alan Minyard wrote in message . ..
And who out there is going to use significant numbers of unreliable, heavy, slow
cannon to oppose a US Force? The rate of fire of the .50 was not enough to
make up for the somewhat smaller calibre, that is not the case with the M-61.

Possibly, possibly not. The bigger the target is, the more damage you
have to inflict to down it. A MiG-15 weighed under 3,800 kg empty, a
Su-27 around 18,000 kg - nearly five times as much. A 20mm shell
weighs only just over twice as much as a .50 bullet. You can double
its effectiveness in recognition of the HEI content, but even so you
are still left with a pretty even match between the .5/MiG-15 and
20mm/Su-27 in terms of destructive effect compared with target weight.

Are you familiar with the concept of guided missiles? If you get into gun range
you have already screwed the pooch. The gun is a last ditch, desperation
weapon in ACM, wasting airframe volume and weight on a honking great,
slow, unreliable gun is not a wise trade off.

Guided missiles? Now that you mention it, I have heard something about
them - but IIRC this thread is all about guns.

Your post seems to imply that you think that anything bigger than a
20mm is by definition bulky, heavy, slow-firing and unreliable. Well,
lets take the M61A1 as the standard, shall we? It weighs 114 kg, and
is very bulky because there are six barrels which all need room to
spin. Then, because it fires its little shells so fast (and you need
to hit with a lot of them to have the desired effect) it needs a big
ammunition capacity, with a big magazine - much more space and weight.
In fact, the magazine and ammo feed weigh about as much as the gun,
and the full load of ammo typically weighs the same again.

Now let's look at the opposition. The 'European standard' 27mm Mauser
BK 27, selected over any US gun by the JSF contenders, weighs 100 kg
and uses much less space (only one barrel). The ammo is bigger, but
less of it is needed because it's much more effective. For a bit more
weight (120 kg) you can get a GIAT 30M791 which is equally powerful
and can fire up to 2,500 rpm. Both of these guns hit their top speed
instantly, unlike the M61. Look to Russia and things get even more
interesting: the GSh-30 weighs 105 kg and fires powerful 30mm ammo at
up to 3,000 rpm (again, instantly). The little GSh-301 used in the
MiG-29 and Su-27 only fires at 1,500-1,800 rpm (instantly) but weighs
a trivial 45 kg and is tiny by comparison with the M61. If you really
want firepower, then there's the GSh-6-30 which fires the same,
powerful, 30mm ammo at around 5,000 rpm for just 160 kg. I admit that
is heavier than an M61, but it's hardly any bigger and has several
times the firepower.

There is a legitimate debate about whether fighter guns are needed
anymore, given the much improved performance of guided missiles. I am
willing to argue that on several grounds, and am supported by the fact
that despite all the high-tech gee-whizz weaponry used recently in
Afghanistan and Iraq, US fighters were still using their guns in
circumstances where nothing else was suitable. If you're going to
retain a gun, it might as well be the best you can get. The price,
space and weight costs are negligible as a fraction of a modern
fighter.

Tony Williams
Military gun and ammunition website: http://www.quarry.nildram.co.uk
Discussion forum at: http://forums.delphiforums.com/autogun/messages/

In article ,
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:

In message , Chad Irby
writes

It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

Sounds abstract? The services were using the same aircraft,
near-identical missiles (Sparrows and different models of Sidewinder),
but the USAF's F-4Ds and F-4Es had guns (pods for the Ds, internal for
the Es) supposedly as a solution to the problems encountered during
Rolling Thunder. Yet they were twice as likely to be shot down and
barely half as likely to kill, as the gunless Navy fighters. (Only seven
of the forty-eight USAF Linebacker kills were achieved with guns,
despite the efforts made to fit them)

Yep, McNamara is still influencing military thought. I was sure we'd
gotten over that, but what goes around, comes around.

....and you're quoting the same sort of logic they used back then.
You're comparing planes and equipment, but not *missions*.

For example, the Navy planes flew sorties against coastal areas, which
meant that they were flying over relatively undefended airspace on the
run in, as compared to the large number of SAMs that the Air Force
fighters and bombers went over.

One other note: of the 21 MiG kills by the F-4E during Vietnam, five
were gun kills... pretty good for something so useless.

--
cirby at cfl.rr.com

Remember: Objects in rearview mirror may be hallucinations.
Slam on brakes accordingly.

In message , Kevin
Brooks writes
"Paul J. Adam" wrote in message
...
Sure, but insisting on keeping kit because it used to be essential and
still might be useful is equally risky: especially when it can't be
jettisoned.

And I suppose designing that feature in and then doing away with it because
of its (relatively slight) increase in unit cost, as was done with the RAF
Typhoon, is not risky?

Risky, perhaps. Indicative of serious pressure on the EP budget,
certainly. Personally I'd be a little less inclined to abandon a
capability that was actually built in, but it is more expensive than it
seems to maintain (it's not just guns, or even ammunition, but the
training burden)

Are there no gun pods? This has always been a capability that can be
bolted onto aircraft as necessary.

Let's see, which would I rather have orbiting about in the CAS stack,

How much of a CAS stack existed that far from the nearest airbase?

aircraft that are capable of both without requiring special ordinance
request, or a requirement for the FSE and ALO to put their heads together
and route a request for such specialized ordnance to be fitted...? I believe
the former wins.

How effective were the anecdotal strafing runs? It's a tough problem to
judge. For sure nobody's going to stand up and say "the CAS birds came
in and strafed, but it didn't seem to do much good against the scattered
and dispersed enemy we were fighting" - when someone takes a risk to
help you, you _don't_ go public saying they endangered themsevles for
little result.

More like issuing lances to tankers so they can run down enemy
soldiers...

No, you were arguing that use of the gun is dumb because it brings the CAS
platform down lower into the MANPADS envelope.

As well as getting into ricochet hazard, bringing up problems of target
fixation, all to employ a very limited weapon system. (Actual
effectiveness data is hard to come by for strafing, except that many
aircraft doing it seem to have shot themselves dry... suggests they ran
out of ammunition before their guns killed all the targets)

Where's the evidence of serious effectiveness to compensate? "This was
available, it was used, therefore it must be hugely lethal and vitally
necessary" is a shaky proposition.

That is not something we
would prefer to have happen, but when the situation requires it, the risk
may have to be accepted.

Alternatively, you may want to investigate more capable options for
"really close support", with particular attention to target acquisition
and IFF (it's awkward to accidentally strafe your own side, or to make a
low pass but not be able to find the dust-coloured dust-covered targets
on the dusty mountainside) rather than insist that a given weapon system
is now and forever a fixture.

What is the real requirement, what is the real target, and is a M61
Gatling really the best solution? How about a different gun? How about a
different type of munition? Is air-launched weaponry really the best
option for danger-close or should some other option be pursued?

Remember, we (or at least I) am not talking about ripping guns out of
existing aircraft and plating over the ports; the issue is what to
procure in the future.


If you are going to argue the necessity of CAS
*always* staying outside the bad guys response envelope, then the "can't
issue rifles to grunts because they will have to get within the bad guy's
engagement range" is the groundpounder's equivalent solution. Neither of
them makes much sense to me.

What happens when the Bad Guys have a SA-11 parked out of sight? That's
serious trouble for anything flying within ten miles... bye-bye CAS
unless someone's willing to take some risks.

The idea is to stay out of as much avoidable predictable grief as
possible, and MANPADs and light AAA are known and hugely proliferated.
They're also most effective against an opponent flying a predictable
straight-line path... like a strafing run.

Keeping a capability to strafe is worthwhile, but permanently giving up
a half-ton of useful payload while wearing a "Shoot Me!" sign is perhaps
not the best solution to the problem.

But the knife bayonet is a small, light, handy item that can replace
what a soldier would carry anyway (not many of us carried knives to
fight with, certainly not in peacetime, and I'd certainly not have
bothered with both bayonet and K-bar-clone). The analogy for air combat
is nearer to a full-size sword, lance or pike: a large, hefty item that
weighs as much as several magazines for your rifle or a day or two's
rations, even if it's more lethal in hand-to-hand combat.

And can you _guarantee_ that soldiers will never find themselves in
close-quarter battle? Would you have them carry puny knives, or would
you give them mighty swords, spears and/or axes to smite their foes with
as a permanent addition to their CEFO? Okay, they don't fight like that
too often... and it's more weight for them to carry... but there will
always be cases where soldiers find themselves fighting at arm's length,
so wouldn't issuing everyone a sword or axe be useful then?

Well, you always have that nifty wire-cutting feature for the latest US
bayonet in combination with its scabbard (though I am not sure how effective
it really is in that role)...

Our SA80 bayonet even has a saw in the scabbard as well as wire-cutting
capability. Like you, I'm dubious about its actual utility. How many
saws does a rifle section need? Why not issue one or two proper saws per
section, if there's a real requirement, rather than give everyone a
folding saw on a bayonet scabbard?

But the air-combat equivalent for a bayonet would be something on the
line of permanently issuing a halberd or bill, or at least a Bloody Big
Sword to every soldier and insisting it be carried everywhere they take
a rifle: it might be useful for those occasions where troops find
themselves at arm's length from the enemy, but it displaces a
significant amount of beans, bullets or batteries from the basic combat
load. A worthwhile tradeoff, or would the troops be better off with more
of their main armament?

Depends on a lot of factors. For instance, the F-15E both kept a gun
that isn't ideal for its primary mission of ground attack (shell too
light, slant range on the short size, rate of fire derated for strafing)
and halved the ammunition supply. It's not a bad decision because it's
quick and saves money, but it reflects the low priority.

Low priority and outright elimination are two different things. ISTR reading
that those 10th LID guys in Anaconda were *very* happy to have strafe
support from F-15E's, A-10's, and even AH-64's.

The AH-64s got badly hammered (seven of eight badly damaged and IIRC
five were so shot up they never flew again...), and again IIRC the A-10
was pulled out early on because it struggled to cope with the
hot-and-high conditions.

The question is not "did they want strafe" but "did they want effective
fire support even at close range"? Not the same thing, not at all.

I doubt you'll find a soldier there who insisted on the support fire
coming from a given asset or weapon now and forever... provided it was
available and turned Bad Guys into Dead Guys (or at least Hiding Guys)
without creating blue-on-blue then it will be considered Good..

If you were designing the capability from scratch, would you insist on
the M61? Consider a larger-calibre weapon with more A/G punch like a
KCA? Or go for fuel and/or lightness, and hang a podded gun for 'danger
close' missions?

That depends. Since cost is always a factor at some point, the use of the
M61 may be the best solution (you still retain an inherent marginal strafe
capability at minimal cost, and if you want more punch you can still *add*
those pods you keep talking about).

Trouble is, when you've got an internal gun you've eaten up weight:
tending to, if you're using guns you're stuck with what you've fitted.
Remember, we're not discussing a major frontline capability here, but an
emergency reversion. Can you justify _more_ guns when you have one built
into the airframe anyway and crews expensively trained in its use?

Or maybe use a 25mm weapon, or the
Mauser 27mm.

Interestingly, the F-35 took this approach for some versions. So did the
AV-8B.

Details are rather unimportant to the current question at hand
(courtesy thread drift), which is, "Gun versus no gun". You say no gun, I
say if possible retain the gun and remain more flexible by doing so.

Then explain the STOVL JSF, which opted for a gun pod rather than an
internal solution despite CAS being high on its priority list.

Trouble is, stories of "F-15E bravely makes strafing passes" deservedly
get headlines. "F-15E really regrets having to call skosh fuel and leave
station" don't: but an internal gun is getting on for a thousand pounds
of fuel, which translates to more loiter time or range. And it isn't
negotiable.

We have KC's that refuel TACAIR.

If the US can claim it's never run short of tanking assets in-theatre,
I'll call them liars, because they're the only force to achieve that.

And unless the tankers are flying low orbits over the firefights,
breaking off to refuel still means "not on station". More fuel means
more time between those absences.

If you are talking the CAS mission, which
we are now doing, then it is reasonable to accept that those assets will be
doing their thing relatively close to the EA. And stop acting as if a
thousand pounds of fuel is the end of the world--that works out to what, a
whopping 125 gallons? If your CAS effort is dependent upon a 125 gallon fuel
margine you are likely in deep do-do already.

How much flying time does that get you, loitering in a notional 'CAS
stack'? When you're a long way from home, time on station gets to be
important, because so much of the sortie and your fuel load gets eaten
up in "getting there" and "getting home". (CAP experience in the
Falklands comes to mind, where that sort of fuel could double on-station
time)

I'd suggest that if your CAS effort is so short of usable ordnance, or
so badly co-ordinated and equipped, that you're depending on guns...
you've also got something badly wrong.

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

In message , Chad Irby
writes
In article ,
"Paul J. Adam" wrote:
...and you're quoting the same sort of logic they used back then.
You're comparing planes and equipment, but not *missions*.

Okay, so let's get to the bottom line: how many F-4 sorties were *not*
intended to kill the enemy and break his stuff or directly support that
aim?

(Or to photograph it before and after being broken, or to keep fighters
off the breakers, or to stop his SAMs and AAA interfering, or...)

If your chosen tactic hauls sixty aircraft in rigid formation along a
predictable course and is vulnerable to a slashing attack by one or two
MiGs on a vulnerable element, then that's bad... unless it gets two
dozen strikers on-target and stops you losing half-a-dozen aircraft to
SAMs.

Trouble is, all the guns you like won't stop #4 of one of the escort
sections getting an unseen Atoll up the tailpipe and won't help you
chase that MiG-21 down and kill him.

For example, the Navy planes flew sorties against coastal areas, which
meant that they were flying over relatively undefended airspace on the
run in, as compared to the large number of SAMs that the Air Force
fighters and bombers went over.

So produce some numbers. Relative SAM losses per sortie, for instance?
I'm open to data, I just get wary about assertion and anecdote.

One other note: of the 21 MiG kills by the F-4E during Vietnam, five
were gun kills... pretty good for something so useless.

This aircraft has Sparrow and Sidewinder, and by the time the F-4E is
flying they're demonstrating performance (the Sidewinder was up to 50%
Pk in its AIM-9G form). Yet it's making a quarter of its kills with
guns? Where did that battery of AAMs go in those engagements?

--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

In message , Ed Rasimus
writes
On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 19:00:14 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:
It's an interesting area to actually analyse, particularly when
comparing USAF and USN performance: in Linebacker the USAF shot down
forty-eight MiGs for twenty-four air-to-air losses, while the USN lost
four and scored 24 kills. More interesting yet, the Navy's fighters met
MiGs twenty-six times, for a .92 probability of killing a MiG and a .15
chance of losing one of their own; the USAF had eighty-two engagements,
for .58 kills per engagement but .29 losses.[1]

While numbers tell a story, they can occasionally mislead.

Of course - these are broad strokes, and I know enough to know there's a
lot of detail I've missed.

USAF to USN
comparisons offer some insight, but strict stats can lead to bad
conclusions. To compare sortie count/MiG engagement percentages you
would need to consider the various missions, the allocation of the
resource, the philosophy of engagement, etc.

I would argue that the numbers given have some utility, but there are
very clear questions.

With large composite strike packages, the AF tended toward lots of
specialization. Chaff droppers, SEAD, escorts (that often were used to
herd MiGs rather than engage them) and only a few dedicated shooters
on TEABALL frequency meant that the numbers could be skewed.

True, but if the end result was to triple the effectiveness of the
enemy's air defence then there appears to be a problem.

However, I don't have the comparative loss figures for ground fire, or
any data for results; it's quite possible that the USAF's relative
vulnerability to MiGs was balanced by lower losses to SAMs/AAA, and/or
by greater effects achieved to the targets. To date this remains a
personal interest rather than a funded study

Yet they were twice as likely to be shot down and
barely half as likely to kill, as the gunless Navy fighters. (Only seven
of the forty-eight USAF Linebacker kills were achieved with guns,
despite the efforts made to fit them)

It would be helpful to consider the USN fighter-vs-attack philosophy
as well as the level of experience of the multiple tour carrier force.
The USAF "universal pilot" concept and the "no involuntary second
tour" policy impacted the competence level.

Not at all, Ed. The only problem is that the USAF didn't have guns in
its fighters! USAF policy was completely correct in every detail, apart
from the unfortunate imposition of a flawed naval aircraft by McNamara.

(Smiley for the humour impaired)

Seriously... if the USAF had accepted the political cost of maintaining
a similar core cadre of specialist pilots as the USN (the Navy had the
justifiable shibboleth of carrier landing, the USAF lacked that and
chose to spread the pain) then would their results have been better? I'd
certainly guess so. There was much, much more going on than "our
fighters don't have guns".

The parenthetical conclusion is a poor one. With TEABALL, the 555th
TFW specialists, and the accompanying GCI support, it was possible for
the USAF fighters who DID engage, to use their longer range weapons
and negate the requirement to close to gun range.

Actually, I'd continue to claim it was correct. Why bother with Teaball,
Combat Tree, GCI, et al in order to get more performance from those
nasty useless missiles, when gun-armed F-4Es are arriving? If "lack of
guns" is the real problem, surely gun-armed fighters are a complete and
satisfactory answer?

The reality seems to me to be a damn sight more complex, and while
having a gun makes for a nice-to-have for the pilot (I'd want one if I
were flying...) it doesn't seem to be too significant in terms of
results achieved, compared to the other variables..


--
When you have to kill a man, it costs nothing to be polite.
W S Churchill

Paul J. Adam MainBoxatjrwlynch[dot]demon{dot}co(.)uk

On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 22:40:10 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:

In message , Ed Rasimus
writes
On Wed, 10 Dec 2003 19:00:14 +0000, "Paul J. Adam"
wrote:

USAF to USN
comparisons offer some insight, but strict stats can lead to bad
conclusions. To compare sortie count/MiG engagement percentages you
would need to consider the various missions, the allocation of the
resource, the philosophy of engagement, etc.

I would argue that the numbers given have some utility, but there are
very clear questions.

With large composite strike packages, the AF tended toward lots of
specialization. Chaff droppers, SEAD, escorts (that often were used to
herd MiGs rather than engage them) and only a few dedicated shooters
on TEABALL frequency meant that the numbers could be skewed.

True, but if the end result was to triple the effectiveness of the
enemy's air defence then there appears to be a problem.

I'd say that the effectiveness of the enemy defenses greatly reduced
by the AF specialization and packages. The losses/sortie difference
between '66/'67 and '72 were significant. Let's not get too tightly
wrapped around the MiG axle. The core of the defense was integrated
AAA and SA-2. MiGs were a factor, but relatively a small one. In
Linebacker, if MiGs got airborne, they generally died. (Or, they never
engaged.)

However, I don't have the comparative loss figures for ground fire, or
any data for results; it's quite possible that the USAF's relative
vulnerability to MiGs was balanced by lower losses to SAMs/AAA, and/or
by greater effects achieved to the targets. To date this remains a
personal interest rather than a funded study

The "relative vulnerability" to MiGs isn't demonstrated by loss
ratios, because the mission wasn't to sweep the skies of enemy
aircraft. Our mission was to deliver iron on targets. The MiGs mission
was to prevent that. While we all wanted to get a MiG, there weren't
enough to go around. And while the MiG pilots had the more agile
aircraft, their mission was to deter the bomb droppers.

Yet they were twice as likely to be shot down and
barely half as likely to kill, as the gunless Navy fighters. (Only seven
of the forty-eight USAF Linebacker kills were achieved with guns,
despite the efforts made to fit them)

It would be helpful to consider the USN fighter-vs-attack philosophy
as well as the level of experience of the multiple tour carrier force.
The USAF "universal pilot" concept and the "no involuntary second
tour" policy impacted the competence level.

Not at all, Ed. The only problem is that the USAF didn't have guns in
its fighters! USAF policy was completely correct in every detail, apart
from the unfortunate imposition of a flawed naval aircraft by McNamara.

Sorry, not true. During the period of Rolling Thunder, the greater
number of sorties were flown into MiG country by gun-equipped F-105s
(and on the Navy side, A-4, A-7 and F-8). By the time of Linebacker,
there were more F-4Es involved in the Pack VI missions than D's. If
anyone was hampered by lack of guns in their fighters, it should have
been the USN, but the initial stats offered in this discussion,
indicate that the USN had better ratios in LB when they had no guns.

Seriously... if the USAF had accepted the political cost of maintaining
a similar core cadre of specialist pilots as the USN (the Navy had the
justifiable shibboleth of carrier landing, the USAF lacked that and
chose to spread the pain) then would their results have been better? I'd
certainly guess so. There was much, much more going on than "our
fighters don't have guns".

Personnel policies and the related errors in applying them, are
background to the tactics issues. Clearly the issue can be traced in
USAF all the way back to the decision in the late '50's to go with
single-track "all jet" pilot training and the assumption of a
universally assignable pilot. The Navy used prop aircraft for primary
training continually and multi-tracking to get dedicated F/A, heavy
and helo pilots. Check USAF today---introducing a prop for primary and
multi-tracking. Sco USN 1/USAF 0!!

The parenthetical conclusion is a poor one. With TEABALL, the 555th
TFW specialists, and the accompanying GCI support, it was possible for
the USAF fighters who DID engage, to use their longer range weapons
and negate the requirement to close to gun range.

Actually, I'd continue to claim it was correct. Why bother with Teaball,
Combat Tree, GCI, et al in order to get more performance from those
nasty useless missiles, when gun-armed F-4Es are arriving? If "lack of
guns" is the real problem, surely gun-armed fighters are a complete and
satisfactory answer?

I argue that "lack of guns" is not the reason for poor kill ratios.
The F-4E "arrived" in 1968--nearly four full years before Linebacker
commenced. In 150 missions into North Vietnam, I only went twice
without a gun (flying a deployed F-4D from the 35th TFS in Korea
during September of '72.) Every other time I had a gun, either in the
F-105D or F-4E. I should note that in all of those sorties, I never
once had an occasion to fire the gun at another aircraft. Never came
close. Never dispatched an A/A missile either. Several times came
close.

The reality seems to me to be a damn sight more complex, and while
having a gun makes for a nice-to-have for the pilot (I'd want one if I
were flying...) it doesn't seem to be too significant in terms of
results achieved, compared to the other variables..

Ahh, total agreement at last. The issue is complex. It extends well
beyond stats and kill rates or calibers and fire rate. I still argue
for guns on fighters.