Long-range Spitfires and daylight Bomber Command raids (was: #1

John Halliwell wrote:

In article , Guy Alcala
writes
And you missed the essential difference that I pointed out, that RAF BC was able
to
fly fairly long missions at night with a single pilot, because the majority of
time
the autopilot was flying the a/c, and they had no need to fly in formation at
all.
Fly in formation and you can't let the autopilot fly the plane; the pilot has
to.
Now, with some autopilots it's is possible for the pilot to fly the a/c through
the
autopilot, giving him in effect power steering (this was the case with later B-
24s,
which were considered much ehavier on the controls than the B-17). That
decreases
the physical effort required, but not the stress from having to maintain
position for
hours. If you're a wingman, all of your attention has to be concentrated
maintaining
position on the lead a/c.

I appreciate your point, and agree with it, my point is that BC may not
have had the extra resources to hand to provide a 2nd pilot in large
numbers of aircraft.

Increasing the numbers of pilots in training was one of the changes that we knew had
to be made. OTOH, during the transition squadrons and groups would be off ops,
decreasing the loss rate somewhat, and flying by day would also tend to decrease the
operational loss rate somewhat. The combat loss rates at that time were roughly
comparable, although by 1944 BC was actually safer operating by day.

The aircraft themselves didn't have accommodation
for a second pilot and FE, so you'd lose him as well (or you train him
the rudiments of flight training as many pilots did unofficially).

Or the FE would also become a gunner, as with American heavies. We presumed that
we'd need to add more guns (ventral almost certainly, and/or nose/waist, depending on
the type), so the FE would undoubtedly do double-duty with that job. Unfortunately,
unlike the American heavies all turrets were located well away from the cockpit,
meaning the FE would be further away in emergencies. Inconvenient, but not a
crippling handicap.

They
may have decided that for these reasons daylight ops with tight
formations, and therefore daylight ops would be too dangerous to fly, or
may have tried it anyway (with or without complaints from pilots).

Could be. We know that they did fly daylight ops single pilot, flying looser
formation than the U.S. used. We assumed that initial day ops would be flown single
pilot, while a/c were given dual-controls and other modifications to make them more
suitable for daytime ops. And I'm attracted to Gavin's suggestion that at first
Stirlings could be used by day against lightly defended French and other targets, as
they already had dual controls, radial engines, and had been given at least waist
guns in the past.

Once air superiority had been won tight formations weren't as necessary in any case,
except for bombing. And if nothing else, by day a much higher proportion of crews
should survive being shot down. The crew survival rate at night was horrible, about
17% in the Battle of Berlin period, while the U.S. heavies typically had rates that
were roughly the inverse. Some of the difference was undoubtedly due to design and
armor, but a lot has to go to being more aware of attacks in the first place and thus
defend themselves, and being better able to find their parachutes and the exits if
they had to abandon.

You missed my point again. I posted that sortie length info (_including_ time
taken
to form up, which the night bombers didn't have to do) to show that 8-12 hour
Bomber
Command missions, day or might, would be the exception rather than the rule.
The RAF
heavies cruised at about the same TAS as the B-17, slightly slower than the B-
24, but
the RAF night missions don't have all that extra time due to forming. So,
unless the
RAF was deliberately wasting time on their missions (i.e. other than evasive
routing), there's no way that most missions would run 8-12 hours. Indeed, there
are
numerous accounts of of individual BC a/c returning to base well before they
should
have been able to, by cutting the corners of the planned flight path, and
'adjusting'
the navigator's logs to show that they'd managed to find some truly miraculous
winds
(that no one else encountered).

I'm going off figures from 'Enemy Coast Ahead' by Guy Gibson V.C. Early
in the war the Hampdens were flying long trips over the North Sea and
into Germany. When they got to their allotted target they were to drop a
bomb every half hour, orbiting away from the target in between. This is
before the maximum effort raids later in the war, but those single
pilots were expected to fly for 8-12 hours.

Ah, I see, harassment missions not representative of main force ops, and behavior
that would be suicidal a year or two later. While I'm not familiar with the
Hampden's equipment fit, I'd assume it would also have an autopilot.

Guy

In article , Guy Alcala
writes
Ah, I see, harassment missions not representative of main force ops, and
behavior
that would be suicidal a year or two later. While I'm not familiar with the
Hampden's equipment fit, I'd assume it would also have an autopilot.

No idea whether they had auto pilots, I'd always assumed they were 'new'
kit when the heavies appeared and therefore probably not on the Hampden.
I haven't heard any references to Hampdens and auto pilots, have to see
if Gibson mentions anything.

--
John