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Stryker/C-130 Pics



 
 
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  #21  
Old September 20th 03, 03:32 PM
Kevin Brooks
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

"Paul Austin" wrote in message . ..
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"Paul Austin" wrote in message

. ..
"Tony Williams" wrote

I understand that basic Stryker is right on the size/weight

carrying
limits of the C-130. Any info on how the Herc will cope with the
bigger versions, like the one carrying a 105mm gun?

By buying A400Ms?

Seriously, the Stryker (idiot spelling)


Maybe because it was named for a fellow (MoH winner IIRC) named
Stryker?

sacrifices too much for C-130
compatibility, particularly in the area of protection.


How can you support that? The amount of protection required is
dependent upon a number of factors, including specific threat,
operational terrain, etc. And applique/bolt-on armor is an option if
required. Not to mention that *some* deployable protection is a bit
better than what we have now, which is pretty much limited to the
kevlar vest and helmet mounted on the crunchies.

The MagicTech
remote sensing/remote fires stuff isn't ready yet, never mind
"electric armor" that's needed to make what amounts to a LAV

mounted
army viable.


Huh? Why is this required to make it "viable"? The USMC has found
their LAV's to be very much "viable" in places like Panama,
Afghanistan, and Iraq--ISTR that the Army folks were quite jealous

of
the LAV in Panama.


And the Marines augmented their LAVs with what? As an adjunct to a
heavy armor core, LAVs have great mobility and reliability (a lot more
than the LVTP7s which had serious electronics reliability problems for
lack of water cooling on the hull).


Calling the LVTP 7 "heavy armor" is quite a stretch if you are
considering the survivability/protection issue. Fact is that the LAV
affords Army early entry forces with a level of protection and ground
mobility, not to mention firepower, that they do not now enjoy;
therefore its use on an interim basis is of benefit to those forces.



If the Army is to be both rapidly deployable and as
effective on the ground as it currently is, then much more capable
airlift is required. In fact, A300M is too small (only marginally
larger box or payload than a C-130). What's needed is Pelican or

LTA
kind of solutions.


That would presumably be "A400" which you are referring to. I

believe
you are ignoring the fact that we currently have *no* airborne armor
deployment capability to speak of, and the Stryker will provide
additional versatility to an Army that is currently capable of

either
light or heavy operations, but lacks the ability to deploy *more*
survivable, and lethal, assets into an AO by air to fill that large
void that exists between "light" and "heavy". Not to mention that

the
ever improved ISR and attendant targeting capabilities make the
LAV-based force more lethal than you give them credit for.

Take a simple scenario where an early entry ground force is tasked

to
provide an urban cordon/containment/evac element to support a SOF

raid
(sounds a bit like Mogadishu, huh?). What method would you
prefer--travel by HMMWV or foot, or travel and support from

Strykers?
Kind of a no-brainer.


The Army and the Marines have gamed light and medium forces augmented
by sophisticated communications and fire support significantly in
advance of the Stryker brigades fought conventional mech opponents.
What got found was that if _everything_went right, the US forces did
OK. If_anything_went wrong, the US forces lacked the resilience to
recover and prevail. In particular, the Marine games found that if the
opponents targeted communications and fire support nodes that
defeating the US forces was pretty easy.


Kind of hard to target mobile fire support assets. How easy would it
be for an enemy lacking even air parity to target HIMARS? But the real
question is, how would those same games have played out if it was our
*current* early entry force (i.e, light infantry only) that had to
deal with that same threat? Much worse, that's how.

And you never answered the question--do you want those air deployable
LAV's in this scenario, or do you want depend upon bootleather and a
few HMMWV's? How about during the urban fight in general--do you want
to be solely dependent upon helos and unarmored vehicles, or do you
want that added capability that the moderate protection afforded by
the LAV gives your assaulting infantry force? These appear to be
no-brainers to me.



As far as deployability is concerned, as usual people forget
logistics. The Stryker brigades have a smaller logistics footprint
than a heavy mech brigade because of reduced POL requirements but the
remaining beans and bullets have to come by boat. If that's the case,
then send the heavy mech units the same way


No, they don't *have* to come by boat, especially in the early stages,
which is after all when the SBCT's are going to be most valuable. The
Marines deployed LAV's into Afghanistan--how many boat docks in Afghan
land? Just how would you have sent those heavy mech units into that
country? Roll through Pakistan first? I don't think so... And even
when port facilities can be seized, there is no assurance that they
will be usable in the short term--witness the time required to open
that Iraqi port to friendly shipping? The SBCT fills a niche; no, it
can't do everything, but by golly it is better than having to depend
upon the poor bloody light infantry for *everything* during the early
entry phase, too. The Stryker is an interim vehicle, to be fielded to
no more than what, three to five brigades in the total force? Sounds
like it has a lot to offer to the current mix of available forces,
which are either too heavy for rapid deployment, or too light to
survive in higher intensity scenarios.

Brooks
  #22  
Old September 20th 03, 03:34 PM
Kevin Brooks
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

"John Keeney" wrote in message ...
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"Paul Austin" wrote in message

. ..
"Tony Williams" wrote

I understand that basic Stryker is right on the size/weight carrying
limits of the C-130. Any info on how the Herc will cope with the
bigger versions, like the one carrying a 105mm gun?

By buying A400Ms?

Seriously, the Stryker (idiot spelling)


Maybe because it was named for a fellow (MoH winner IIRC) named
Stryker?

sacrifices too much for C-130
compatibility, particularly in the area of protection.


How can you support that? The amount of protection required is
dependent upon a number of factors, including specific threat,
operational terrain, etc. And applique/bolt-on armor is an option if
required. Not to mention that *some* deployable protection is a bit
better than what we have now, which is pretty much limited to the
kevlar vest and helmet mounted on the crunchies.


Most common reply when asking folks working up the Stryker
their opinion: "It tolls real nice."


Tolls?

Brooks
  #23  
Old September 20th 03, 05:15 PM
Walt BJ
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

"L'acrobat" wrote in message ...
"Tony Williams" wrote in message
m...
(robert arndt) wrote in message

. com...

http://www.lewis.army.mil/arrowheadl...ryker_C130.htm

I understand that basic Stryker is right on the size/weight carrying
limits of the C-130. Any info on how the Herc will cope with the
bigger versions, like the one carrying a 105mm gun?


SNIP:
Here is where Rumsfeld (not that I have much faith or praise for him)
needs to take the opportunity to can the guys responsible for not
integrating the "Stryker" (sic) with the C130 from the get-go. Makes
one wonder if the master plan was to buy lots of Strykers and then say
"oh, by the way, the 103's too small; now we need a lot more (fill in
the blank) to replace those old obsolete C130s." What an opportunity
to fumigate the Pentagon, brass and civvy alike.
Walt BJ
  #25  
Old September 20th 03, 11:12 PM
Paul Austin
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"Paul Austin" wrote in message

. ..
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"Paul Austin" wrote in message

. ..
"Tony Williams" wrote

I understand that basic Stryker is right on the size/weight

carrying
limits of the C-130. Any info on how the Herc will cope with

the
bigger versions, like the one carrying a 105mm gun?

By buying A400Ms?

Seriously, the Stryker (idiot spelling)

Maybe because it was named for a fellow (MoH winner IIRC) named
Stryker?

sacrifices too much for C-130
compatibility, particularly in the area of protection.

How can you support that? The amount of protection required is
dependent upon a number of factors, including specific threat,
operational terrain, etc. And applique/bolt-on armor is an

option if
required. Not to mention that *some* deployable protection is a

bit
better than what we have now, which is pretty much limited to

the
kevlar vest and helmet mounted on the crunchies.

The MagicTech
remote sensing/remote fires stuff isn't ready yet, never mind
"electric armor" that's needed to make what amounts to a LAV

mounted
army viable.

Huh? Why is this required to make it "viable"? The USMC has

found
their LAV's to be very much "viable" in places like Panama,
Afghanistan, and Iraq--ISTR that the Army folks were quite

jealous
of
the LAV in Panama.


And the Marines augmented their LAVs with what? As an adjunct to a
heavy armor core, LAVs have great mobility and reliability (a lot

more
than the LVTP7s which had serious electronics reliability problems

for
lack of water cooling on the hull).


Calling the LVTP 7 "heavy armor" is quite a stretch if you are
considering the survivability/protection issue. Fact is that the LAV
affords Army early entry forces with a level of protection and

ground
mobility, not to mention firepower, that they do not now enjoy;
therefore its use on an interim basis is of benefit to those forces.


Read a little closer. The Marine combat teams had M1A1s to provide the
heavy armor I was refereing to. With that backup (which will be
missing with the Stryker units), the Marines could manuever
aggressively when faced with enemy armor. Without that backup, doing
so would be suicide.

I mentioned the LVTP 7 only as a comparison to the Marines' LAVs. The
LAVs showed much higher reliability than the LVTPs especially in
reliability areas. LVTPs have much of their electronics in the bilge,
in direct contact with the belly, assuming (most of the time) water
cooling of the skin. Because of the prolonged operation away from
water, the LVTPs suffered a lot of reliability failures in their
mission electronics. The GDLS factory in Tallahassee is full of boxen
back in the shop for repair.

Your enthusiasm for Strykers is misplaced. While usually, I'll take
good enough and now over better in the indefinite future, I can't in
this case. Stryker Brigade Combat Teams are too heavy to deploy and
too light to fight.

According to a RAND study, the limiting factor in deploying a SBCT is
ramp space at the entry airport. Assuming the ability to process,
unload and turn around 4 C-17s an hour (which RAND considered
heroically optimistic), the 96 hour deployment range for a SBCT using
a fleet of 60 C-17s is 1325 miles. That puts a SBCT in place with 3
count them 3 days of beans and bullets but no POL. Time to Kandahar
with 3 days of beans and bullets is 21 days, by which time the lead
elements have long ago shot out their basic loads and have run out of
gas.

What do you get with your rapid deployment force? You get very little
organic anti-armor, good mobility and vehicles proof against 14.5mm
fire. I'm as in favor of improved strategic mobility as anyone but
Stryker brigades sacrifice too much to that end. You get a force that
isn't tolerant of the misfortunes of war and which is unable to
sustain a momentary reverse.







If the Army is to be both rapidly deployable and as
effective on the ground as it currently is, then much more

capable
airlift is required. In fact, A300M is too small (only

marginally
larger box or payload than a C-130). What's needed is Pelican

or
LTA
kind of solutions.

That would presumably be "A400" which you are referring to. I

believe
you are ignoring the fact that we currently have *no* airborne

armor
deployment capability to speak of, and the Stryker will provide
additional versatility to an Army that is currently capable of

either
light or heavy operations, but lacks the ability to deploy

*more*
survivable, and lethal, assets into an AO by air to fill that

large
void that exists between "light" and "heavy". Not to mention

that
the
ever improved ISR and attendant targeting capabilities make the
LAV-based force more lethal than you give them credit for.

Take a simple scenario where an early entry ground force is

tasked
to
provide an urban cordon/containment/evac element to support a

SOF
raid
(sounds a bit like Mogadishu, huh?). What method would you
prefer--travel by HMMWV or foot, or travel and support from

Strykers?
Kind of a no-brainer.


The Army and the Marines have gamed light and medium forces

augmented
by sophisticated communications and fire support significantly in
advance of the Stryker brigades fought conventional mech

opponents.
What got found was that if _everything_went right, the US forces

did
OK. If_anything_went wrong, the US forces lacked the resilience to
recover and prevail. In particular, the Marine games found that if

the
opponents targeted communications and fire support nodes that
defeating the US forces was pretty easy.


Kind of hard to target mobile fire support assets. How easy would it
be for an enemy lacking even air parity to target HIMARS? But the

real
question is, how would those same games have played out if it was

our
*current* early entry force (i.e, light infantry only) that had to
deal with that same threat? Much worse, that's how.


Light infantry is just about useless today and Stryker units not a lot
better. How many rounds are available for the HIMARS? As far as
targeting those assets, the Red force managed as the real enemy will,
given the incentives. How would I do it today? With a MEU or if
necessary, a MEB. What's needed if the ability to move_much_greater
tonnage by air to give the equivalent capability for land locked
locations.


And you never answered the question--do you want those air

deployable
LAV's in this scenario, or do you want depend upon bootleather and a
few HMMWV's? How about during the urban fight in general--do you

want
to be solely dependent upon helos and unarmored vehicles, or do you
want that added capability that the moderate protection afforded by
the LAV gives your assaulting infantry force? These appear to be
no-brainers to me.



As far as deployability is concerned, as usual people forget
logistics. The Stryker brigades have a smaller logistics footprint
than a heavy mech brigade because of reduced POL requirements but

the
remaining beans and bullets have to come by boat. If that's the

case,
then send the heavy mech units the same way


No, they don't *have* to come by boat, especially in the early

stages,
which is after all when the SBCT's are going to be most valuable.

The
Marines deployed LAV's into Afghanistan--how many boat docks in

Afghan
land? Just how would you have sent those heavy mech units into that
country? Roll through Pakistan first? I don't think so... And even
when port facilities can be seized, there is no assurance that they
will be usable in the short term--witness the time required to open
that Iraqi port to friendly shipping? The SBCT fills a niche; no, it
can't do everything, but by golly it is better than having to depend
upon the poor bloody light infantry for *everything* during the

early
entry phase, too. The Stryker is an interim vehicle, to be fielded

to
no more than what, three to five brigades in the total force? Sounds
like it has a lot to offer to the current mix of available forces,
which are either too heavy for rapid deployment, or too light to
survive in higher intensity scenarios.


Take a look at the logistical requirements for a single SBCT, just to
get it in place. The lift doesn't exist to get the consumables there
for intense combat. You should be unwilling to insert troops that we
can't support unless we end up being limited to constabulary
operations.


  #26  
Old September 21st 03, 04:27 AM
Kevin Brooks
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

"Paul Austin" wrote in message .. .
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"Paul Austin" wrote in message

. ..
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"Paul Austin" wrote in message

. ..
"Tony Williams" wrote

I understand that basic Stryker is right on the size/weight

carrying
limits of the C-130. Any info on how the Herc will cope with

the
bigger versions, like the one carrying a 105mm gun?

By buying A400Ms?

Seriously, the Stryker (idiot spelling)

Maybe because it was named for a fellow (MoH winner IIRC) named
Stryker?

sacrifices too much for C-130
compatibility, particularly in the area of protection.

How can you support that? The amount of protection required is
dependent upon a number of factors, including specific threat,
operational terrain, etc. And applique/bolt-on armor is an

option if
required. Not to mention that *some* deployable protection is a

bit
better than what we have now, which is pretty much limited to

the
kevlar vest and helmet mounted on the crunchies.

The MagicTech
remote sensing/remote fires stuff isn't ready yet, never mind
"electric armor" that's needed to make what amounts to a LAV

mounted
army viable.

Huh? Why is this required to make it "viable"? The USMC has

found
their LAV's to be very much "viable" in places like Panama,
Afghanistan, and Iraq--ISTR that the Army folks were quite

jealous
of
the LAV in Panama.

And the Marines augmented their LAVs with what? As an adjunct to a
heavy armor core, LAVs have great mobility and reliability (a lot

more
than the LVTP7s which had serious electronics reliability problems

for
lack of water cooling on the hull).


Calling the LVTP 7 "heavy armor" is quite a stretch if you are
considering the survivability/protection issue. Fact is that the LAV
affords Army early entry forces with a level of protection and

ground
mobility, not to mention firepower, that they do not now enjoy;
therefore its use on an interim basis is of benefit to those forces.


Read a little closer. The Marine combat teams had M1A1s to provide the
heavy armor I was refereing to.


I was discussing the use in Panama; care to guess how many M1A1's the
USMC had there?

With that backup (which will be
missing with the Stryker units), the Marines could manuever
aggressively when faced with enemy armor. Without that backup, doing
so would be suicide.


They maneuvered rather aggressively in Panama, and in Afghanistan,
without them. How many M1A1's were deployed into Afghanistan?
Again--zero. As to facing enemy armor, which would you rather have in
hand during the early entry phase if facing an enemy armored threat--a
bunch of crunchies with no protected mobility, as we now have, or a
SBCT with its (albeit limited) armor protection for the crunchies,
some TOW launchers mounted, and those 105mm versions?


I mentioned the LVTP 7 only as a comparison to the Marines' LAVs. The
LAVs showed much higher reliability than the LVTPs especially in
reliability areas.


???

LVTPs have much of their electronics in the bilge,
in direct contact with the belly, assuming (most of the time) water
cooling of the skin. Because of the prolonged operation away from
water, the LVTPs suffered a lot of reliability failures in their
mission electronics. The GDLS factory in Tallahassee is full of boxen
back in the shop for repair.

Your enthusiasm for Strykers is misplaced. While usually, I'll take
good enough and now over better in the indefinite future, I can't in
this case. Stryker Brigade Combat Teams are too heavy to deploy and
too light to fight.


They are much easier to deploy than their counterpart heavy force
assets by air--there is no way you can argue otherwise. How much heavy
armor was CENTCOM able to get into northern Iraq during OIF by air? As
to being too light to fight, one can only imagine that you prefer the
status quo for the early entry forces, which is even lighter--seems a
bit illogical to me.


According to a RAND study, the limiting factor in deploying a SBCT is
ramp space at the entry airport. Assuming the ability to process,
unload and turn around 4 C-17s an hour (which RAND considered
heroically optimistic), the 96 hour deployment range for a SBCT using
a fleet of 60 C-17s is 1325 miles. That puts a SBCT in place with 3
count them 3 days of beans and bullets but no POL. Time to Kandahar
with 3 days of beans and bullets is 21 days, by which time the lead
elements have long ago shot out their basic loads and have run out of
gas.


Gee, I guess Rand discounted the possibility of resupply, huh? Let's
see, 60 C-17's leaves what, some 140 plus unused? Not to mention all
of those C-130's, which do a fine job of hauling beans, bullets, and
even POL. And they can even use other airstrips (like many highways in
the world, not to mention the minimum FLS's constructed by 20th EN BDE
assets on a routine basis), which means no challenge to ramp space at
the principal APOD, right? All those extra C-17's hauling cargo to an
aerial staging base outside the insertion area, with C-130's doing the
short hauls (they could even LAPES the resupply packages, meaning an
airstrip is not even required).


What do you get with your rapid deployment force? You get very little
organic anti-armor,


But much better than what we have now, which is a few HMMWV's with
TOW.

good mobility and vehicles proof against 14.5mm
fire.


Let's see, how does that compare to the current alternative?
Footmobility and proof against 7.62x39mm (as long as it hits one of
those kevlar plates)? Looks like the SBCT is significantly better in
both regards.

I'm as in favor of improved strategic mobility as anyone but
Stryker brigades sacrifice too much to that end. You get a force that
isn't tolerant of the misfortunes of war and which is unable to
sustain a momentary reverse.


You seem to be focused on this as a force that is designed to
aggressively strike into the heart of enemy heavy forces and win, but
in reality it is an effort to provide early entry forces with more
capability than they now have (no way you can argue that it does not
do that), and to fill that "middle" niche that we currently don't
cover between the light and heavy spectrum.


If the Army is to be both rapidly deployable and as
effective on the ground as it currently is, then much more

capable
airlift is required. In fact, A300M is too small (only

marginally
larger box or payload than a C-130). What's needed is Pelican

or
LTA
kind of solutions.

That would presumably be "A400" which you are referring to. I

believe
you are ignoring the fact that we currently have *no* airborne

armor
deployment capability to speak of, and the Stryker will provide
additional versatility to an Army that is currently capable of

either
light or heavy operations, but lacks the ability to deploy

*more*
survivable, and lethal, assets into an AO by air to fill that

large
void that exists between "light" and "heavy". Not to mention

that
the
ever improved ISR and attendant targeting capabilities make the
LAV-based force more lethal than you give them credit for.

Take a simple scenario where an early entry ground force is

tasked
to
provide an urban cordon/containment/evac element to support a

SOF
raid
(sounds a bit like Mogadishu, huh?). What method would you
prefer--travel by HMMWV or foot, or travel and support from

Strykers?
Kind of a no-brainer.

The Army and the Marines have gamed light and medium forces

augmented
by sophisticated communications and fire support significantly in
advance of the Stryker brigades fought conventional mech

opponents.
What got found was that if _everything_went right, the US forces

did
OK. If_anything_went wrong, the US forces lacked the resilience to
recover and prevail. In particular, the Marine games found that if

the
opponents targeted communications and fire support nodes that
defeating the US forces was pretty easy.


Kind of hard to target mobile fire support assets. How easy would it
be for an enemy lacking even air parity to target HIMARS? But the

real
question is, how would those same games have played out if it was

our
*current* early entry force (i.e, light infantry only) that had to
deal with that same threat? Much worse, that's how.


Light infantry is just about useless today and Stryker units not a lot
better.


Sounds like you are dodging the question. Which would you prefer, an
all light early entry force, or one that also includes the SBCT? Not a
hard choice to make IMO.

How many rounds are available for the HIMARS?


Probably the same UBL as what they would carry when accompanying the
XVIII ABN Corps light assets into the theater. So what is the drawback
to their support of the SBCT...?

As far as
targeting those assets, the Red force managed as the real enemy will,
given the incentives. How would I do it today? With a MEU or if
necessary, a MEB. What's needed if the ability to move_much_greater
tonnage by air to give the equivalent capability for land locked
locations.


So, you seem to think that the answer lies solely in drastically
increasing air transport capability? And this would take how long??
Not to mention that you, or more accurately Rand, has claimed that
ramp space is the limiting factor--how are you making that problem go
away, or are you now saying that it was never the severe problem that
your earlier quote was based upon?



And you never answered the question--do you want those air

deployable
LAV's in this scenario, or do you want depend upon bootleather and a
few HMMWV's? How about during the urban fight in general--do you

want
to be solely dependent upon helos and unarmored vehicles, or do you
want that added capability that the moderate protection afforded by
the LAV gives your assaulting infantry force? These appear to be
no-brainers to me.


Your failure to answer this one again leaves me wondering if you have
thought this all the way through.




As far as deployability is concerned, as usual people forget
logistics. The Stryker brigades have a smaller logistics footprint
than a heavy mech brigade because of reduced POL requirements but

the
remaining beans and bullets have to come by boat. If that's the

case,
then send the heavy mech units the same way


No, they don't *have* to come by boat, especially in the early

stages,
which is after all when the SBCT's are going to be most valuable.

The
Marines deployed LAV's into Afghanistan--how many boat docks in

Afghan
land? Just how would you have sent those heavy mech units into that
country? Roll through Pakistan first? I don't think so... And even
when port facilities can be seized, there is no assurance that they
will be usable in the short term--witness the time required to open
that Iraqi port to friendly shipping? The SBCT fills a niche; no, it
can't do everything, but by golly it is better than having to depend
upon the poor bloody light infantry for *everything* during the

early
entry phase, too. The Stryker is an interim vehicle, to be fielded

to
no more than what, three to five brigades in the total force? Sounds
like it has a lot to offer to the current mix of available forces,
which are either too heavy for rapid deployment, or too light to
survive in higher intensity scenarios.


Take a look at the logistical requirements for a single SBCT, just to
get it in place. The lift doesn't exist to get the consumables there
for intense combat.


Yes it does. We have a heck of a lot more than 60 C-17's making up our
air transport capability.

You should be unwilling to insert troops that we
can't support unless we end up being limited to constabulary
operations.


So your answer is, "sorry, Mr. president, but we can't go"? I don't
think that alternative is acceptable to *either* side in this debate.

FYI, I published an article a couple of years ago decrying the lack of
emphasis on keeping our heavy force viable until the FCS does (if it
ever does) enter full scale service, so I am no screaming Stryker
fanatic. But it does indeed fill a niche that is completely unfilled
without it, and all of the money you care to drop into airmobility is
not going to change that in the near term--and the near-term is what
Stryker is all about. Add in the fact that these "interim" vehicles
will have a very long life serving with RC units even after they have
been supplanted by FCS, and I see Stryker as a rather smart move on
the part of the Army.

Brooks
  #28  
Old September 21st 03, 04:48 AM
phil hunt
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default

On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 06:44:11 -0400, Paul Austin wrote:

"Tony Williams" wrote

I understand that basic Stryker is right on the size/weight carrying
limits of the C-130. Any info on how the Herc will cope with the
bigger versions, like the one carrying a 105mm gun?


By buying A400Ms?

Seriously, the Stryker (idiot spelling) sacrifices too much for C-130
compatibility, particularly in the area of protection. The MagicTech
remote sensing/remote fires stuff


What's this? Is it related to the "battlefield Internet" I've head
about?

isn't ready yet, never mind
"electric armor"


And this?

that's needed to make what amounts to a LAV mounted
army viable. If the Army is to be both rapidly deployable and as
effective on the ground as it currently is, then much more capable
airlift is required. In fact, A300M is too small


ITYM A400M.

--
A: top posting

Q: what's the most annoying thing about Usenet?

  #29  
Old September 21st 03, 06:32 AM
John Keeney
external usenet poster
 
Posts: n/a
Default


"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"John Keeney" wrote in message

...
Most common reply when asking folks working up the Stryker
their opinion: "It tolls real nice."


Tolls?


snicker Excuse me, "It [tows] real nice."

The bad thing is, I knew something was wrong when I wrote it; I just
couldn't figure out what it was.


 




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