Stryker/C-130 Pics

"John Keeney" wrote in message ...
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"John Keeney" wrote in message
...
Most common reply when asking folks working up the Stryker
their opinion: "It tolls real nice."

Tolls?

snicker Excuse me, "It [tows] real nice."

The bad thing is, I knew something was wrong when I wrote it; I just
couldn't figure out what it was.

That was my guess as to the meaning, but I was not sure, having once
observed the results when a Cat 621B scraper humming along at 30-35
MPH clipped a toll/security booth in Honduras...it most definitely did
*not* "toll real nice"! g Looked like a bomb had hit that concrete
structure (luckily it was empty at the time). But hey, if the Stryker
tows well, that is just another advantage over the M1A1 in the early
entry role--'cause the M1A1 is a bitch to tow, straining the
capabilities of even the M88 series recovery vehicles.

Brooks

Greg Hennessy wrote in message . ..
On 20 Sep 2003 20:29:31 -0700, (Kevin Brooks) wrote:


OK, but if it is so great, why again are the Russians dumping this
program that they are a partner in?

FWICS most of w.r.t noise w.r.t dumping it comes from single member of the
russian brass who doesn't like antonov. Given its Russia we are talking
about, one could speculate w.r.t his motivation.

But regardless, it does sound as if it is likely to become a dumpee in
the case of the Russian Air Force.


And how about those engine
problems...?

Compared to something whose power plants and propeller designs haven't left
the drawing board yet. Engines which will have to deliver twice the horse
power of any turbo prop ever put into service in the west, methinks it wont
be the 1st or last time problems have been seen with a new engine design.

Actually, I was not comparing it to the A400 (of which I am no
tremendous fan), just noting that the An-70 has to date been a rather
troublesome project, and not a very realistic option for the Europeans
(despite the past rhetoric out of Germany). Having the prototype go
crunch was bad, continued engine reliability problems are just icing
on the cake. IMO the Euros would have been better off going with a
joint force (similar to the NATO AWACS fleet) of a combination of a
few leased C-17's for oversize hauling, complemented by C-130's/C-130J
stretches, along with a few Airbus passenger/freighter convertables
tossed into the mix. That would have given them a credible short term
capability while the A400 is developed; or alternatively, keep that
force and dump A400 development. Use of proven aircraft (and the An-70
most definitely does not meet that description) for the near-term
would be smart.

Brooks



greg

On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 06:44:11 -0400, "Paul Austin"
wrote:


"Tony Williams" wrote

I understand that basic Stryker is right on the size/weight carrying
limits of the C-130. Any info on how the Herc will cope with the
bigger versions, like the one carrying a 105mm gun?

By buying A400Ms?

Seriously, the Stryker (idiot spelling) sacrifices too much for C-130
compatibility, particularly in the area of protection. The MagicTech
remote sensing/remote fires stuff isn't ready yet, never mind
"electric armor" that's needed to make what amounts to a LAV mounted
army viable. If the Army is to be both rapidly deployable and as
effective on the ground as it currently is, then much more capable
airlift is required. In fact, A300M is too small (only marginally
larger box or payload than a C-130). What's needed is Pelican or LTA
kind of solutions.

It is called the C-17

Al Minyard

On 20 Sep 2003 09:15:57 -0700, (Walt BJ) wrote:

"L'acrobat" wrote in message ...
"Tony Williams" wrote in message
m...
(robert arndt) wrote in message
. com...

http://www.lewis.army.mil/arrowheadl...ryker_C130.htm

I understand that basic Stryker is right on the size/weight carrying
limits of the C-130. Any info on how the Herc will cope with the
bigger versions, like the one carrying a 105mm gun?

SNIP:
Here is where Rumsfeld (not that I have much faith or praise for him)
needs to take the opportunity to can the guys responsible for not
integrating the "Stryker" (sic) with the C130 from the get-go. Makes
one wonder if the master plan was to buy lots of Strykers and then say
"oh, by the way, the 103's too small; now we need a lot more (fill in
the blank) to replace those old obsolete C130s." What an opportunity
to fumigate the Pentagon, brass and civvy alike.
Walt BJ

C-130Js are still in production.

Al Minyard

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"Paul Austin" wrote in message
.. .


According to a RAND study, the limiting factor in deploying a SBCT
is
ramp space at the entry airport. Assuming the ability to process,
unload and turn around 4 C-17s an hour (which RAND considered
heroically optimistic), the 96 hour deployment range for a SBCT
using
a fleet of 60 C-17s is 1325 miles. That puts a SBCT in place with
3
count them 3 days of beans and bullets but no POL. Time to
Kandahar
with 3 days of beans and bullets is 21 days, by which time the
lead
elements have long ago shot out their basic loads and have run out
of
gas.

Gee, I guess Rand discounted the possibility of resupply, huh? Let's
see, 60 C-17's leaves what, some 140 plus unused? Not to mention all
of those C-130's, which do a fine job of hauling beans, bullets, and
even POL. And they can even use other airstrips (like many highways
in
the world, not to mention the minimum FLS's constructed by 20th EN
BDE
assets on a routine basis), which means no challenge to ramp space
at
the principal APOD, right? All those extra C-17's hauling cargo to
an
aerial staging base outside the insertion area, with C-130's doing
the
short hauls (they could even LAPES the resupply packages, meaning an
airstrip is not even required).

You might want to read what RAND had to say
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1606/. They are after all
professional analysts.

Staging and transhipping material from C17s to C130s was analysed and
rejected since the time consumed in off-loading, breaking down and
reloading payloads made the C130s. RAND analysed the entire chain of
deployment and determined that established airport with supporting
road networks would move more material than could ad hoc airfields.
Can you prove different?

As for the size of the force, RAND selected 60 C17s because the USAF
(remember them?) consumes a large number of transport sortees itself.
In addition, there are and will be other commitments besides this one.



....

I'm as in favor of improved strategic mobility as anyone but
Stryker brigades sacrifice too much to that end. You get a force
that
isn't tolerant of the misfortunes of war and which is unable to
sustain a momentary reverse.

You seem to be focused on this as a force that is designed to
aggressively strike into the heart of enemy heavy forces and win,
but
in reality it is an effort to provide early entry forces with more
capability than they now have (no way you can argue that it does not
do that), and to fill that "middle" niche that we currently don't
cover between the light and heavy spectrum.

And you seem to say that if it's an improvement over current light
forces deployments then it's worth having. My position is that the
spectrum of opponents that a SBCT can face that e.g. the 82nd Airborne
cannot is too small to be worth while. It doesn't take much in the way
of armor and artillery to defeat a SBCT. Panama and Afghanistan could
not but there are_lots_of places that could.

I believe that concentrating on an "interim" SBCT which under a more
dovish administration could easily become permanent displaces programs
to develop enough lift so that forces with real puissance can be
inserted. That said, the logistics challenge of battle at the end of
such a slender thread hasn't been addressed. Traditionally, the
tonnage of POL, ammunition and other kit dwarfs the TOE tonnage. Given
that SBCT's only chance of success in more than constabulary
operations is to substitute fires for force size, that's unlikely to
change.

You've waived away logistics loads in using SBCTs far from litterals.
Can you support that?

"phil hunt" wrote in message
. ..
On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 06:44:11 -0400, Paul Austin
wrote:

"Tony Williams" wrote

I understand that basic Stryker is right on the size/weight
carrying
limits of the C-130. Any info on how the Herc will cope with the
bigger versions, like the one carrying a 105mm gun?

By buying A400Ms?

Seriously, the Stryker (idiot spelling) sacrifices too much for
C-130
compatibility, particularly in the area of protection. The
MagicTech
remote sensing/remote fires stuff

What's this? Is it related to the "battlefield Internet" I've head
about?

FCS if the ultimate MagicTech, consisting of ground and airborne recon
platforms, data networks, robotic fire and logistics vehicles and
incidentally, replacements for the current generation mechanized
vehicles for troop carriers, fire support, C&C and direct fire combat.

In the interim, "digital battlefield" electronics, wide distribution
of ubiquitous and persistent recon imagery and analysis and precision
fires from airborne and ground systems help a lot. The USMC completed
a wargame about 6 months ago using all of this stuff and a light
Marine Blue Force did very well against a conventional mech OPFOR.
They also discovered that the Red Force could compensate for the
advantages these technologies give US forces by targeting
communications and fire support elements. If they can be degraded,
then light forces lose the means to stand up to enemy mechanized
forces and are often defeated.

As usual with military affairs, there's no panacea and the guy you're
trying to kill has powerful incentives to circumvent your advantages.


isn't ready yet, never mind
"electric armor"

And this?

Britain has done development on large capacitor banks that pass very
large currents through shaped charge jets hitting an armored vehicle,
melting the jet before it can hit the inner armo(u)r. They say that
scaled up versions might be able to do the same to long-rod
penetrators.


that's needed to make what amounts to a LAV mounted
army viable. If the Army is to be both rapidly deployable and as
effective on the ground as it currently is, then much more capable
airlift is required. In fact, A300M is too small

ITYM A400M.

Yup. The A300M is obviously the two-engined version intented to
replace the G.222

"Alan Minyard" wrote
On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 06:44:11 -0400, "Paul Austin"
wrote:


"Tony Williams" wrote

I understand that basic Stryker is right on the size/weight
carrying
limits of the C-130. Any info on how the Herc will cope with the
bigger versions, like the one carrying a 105mm gun?

By buying A400Ms?

Seriously, the Stryker (idiot spelling) sacrifices too much for
C-130
compatibility, particularly in the area of protection. The
MagicTech
remote sensing/remote fires stuff isn't ready yet, never mind
"electric armor" that's needed to make what amounts to a LAV
mounted
army viable. If the Army is to be both rapidly deployable and as
effective on the ground as it currently is, then much more capable
airlift is required. In fact, A300M is too small (only marginally
larger box or payload than a C-130). What's needed is Pelican or
LTA
kind of solutions.

It is called the C-17

Think bigger. Much bigger. The real problem with insertion of a combat
force by air is in supplying it. Logistical loads dwarf TOE loads.
Right now, the only way to meet logistical tonnage requirements is
with ships.

On 21 Sep 2003 10:04:42 -0700, (Kevin Brooks) wrote:


But regardless, it does sound as if it is likely to become a dumpee in
the case of the Russian Air Force.

Quite possibly, however Putin is said to be in favour of it.

Actually, I was not comparing it to the A400 (of which I am no
tremendous fan), just noting that the An-70 has to date been a rather
troublesome project, and not a very realistic option for the Europeans
(despite the past rhetoric out of Germany).


AFAIK the germans were *very* close to ordering it, but french blackmail
about so called euro 'solidarity' shamed them out of doing so, that's the
reason why the A400 changed from an all jet paper plane to a prop fan one.

Having the prototype go
crunch was bad, continued engine reliability problems are just icing
on the cake. IMO the Euros would have been better off going with a
joint force (similar to the NATO AWACS fleet) of a combination of a
few leased C-17's for oversize hauling, complemented by C-130's/C-130J
stretches,

You'll get no arguments from me on that score, if the A400 is like any
other project to keep french workers in welfare, it'll end up costing as
much as a C17, be a decade late and be completely unsuited for the role.

This wouldn't be the 1st time, IIRC someone in this forum described The
Transall C160 as carrying 2/3rds the payload of a C130, 3/4s the distance
while burning all the fuel for the same unit cost.


That would have given them a credible short term
capability while the A400 is developed; or alternatively, keep that
force and dump A400 development.

See that would make sense, however common sense never ever enters into the
equation for european aircraft procurement. Instead european forces wont
have any form of strategic airlift for at least another decade. If at all.


Use of proven aircraft (and the An-70
most definitely does not meet that description) for the near-term
would be smart.

FWICS given a relatively small amount of more much needed development cash,
the An70 is everything the A400 could be and more.


greg

--
$ReplyAddress =~ s#\@.*$##; # Delete everything after the '@'
Who lives in a pineapple under the sea? Absorbent and yellow and pourous is he!
If nautical nonsense be something you wish! Then drop on the deck and flop like a fish!

"Paul Austin" wrote in message .. .
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"Paul Austin" wrote in message
.. .


According to a RAND study, the limiting factor in deploying a SBCT
is
ramp space at the entry airport. Assuming the ability to process,
unload and turn around 4 C-17s an hour (which RAND considered
heroically optimistic), the 96 hour deployment range for a SBCT
using
a fleet of 60 C-17s is 1325 miles. That puts a SBCT in place with
3
count them 3 days of beans and bullets but no POL. Time to
Kandahar
with 3 days of beans and bullets is 21 days, by which time the
lead
elements have long ago shot out their basic loads and have run out
of
gas.

Gee, I guess Rand discounted the possibility of resupply, huh? Let's
see, 60 C-17's leaves what, some 140 plus unused? Not to mention all
of those C-130's, which do a fine job of hauling beans, bullets, and
even POL. And they can even use other airstrips (like many highways
in
the world, not to mention the minimum FLS's constructed by 20th EN
BDE
assets on a routine basis), which means no challenge to ramp space
at
the principal APOD, right? All those extra C-17's hauling cargo to
an
aerial staging base outside the insertion area, with C-130's doing
the
short hauls (they could even LAPES the resupply packages, meaning an
airstrip is not even required).

You might want to read what RAND had to say
http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1606/. They are after all
professional analysts.

And frequently on-target; but sometimes not.


Staging and transhipping material from C17s to C130s was analysed and
rejected since the time consumed in off-loading, breaking down and
reloading payloads made the C130s.

"made the C-130's" what?

RAND analysed the entire chain of
deployment and determined that established airport with supporting
road networks would move more material than could ad hoc airfields.
Can you prove different?

Whoah. You just told me that the ramp space was the limiting factor,
and when presented with an option that overcomes that problem, all of
a sudden the "ad hoc airfields" are worthless? While cross loading the
cargo to the C-130's would be less efficient than direct throughput,
if the limiting factor really *is* ramp space, then the loss of
efficiency involved in the crossload would be more than made up for by
the increased in total tonnage delivered to the destination. And BTW,
crossloading might not even be required--note that the C-17 is also
capable of using austere FLS's (neat picture out there somewhere of
one landing on Bicycle Lake at Ft Irwin.


As for the size of the force, RAND selected 60 C17s because the USAF
(remember them?) consumes a large number of transport sortees itself.
In addition, there are and will be other commitments besides this one.

Sorry, but when a contingency operation that requires major airlift of
this nature arises, the airframes are diverted from lower priority
missions. Take that as gospel from a guy who saw his milk-run C-141
flight from Charleston to Honduras cancelled when Golden Pheasant went
down in '88. And yes, I remember the USAF; they are the guys fielding
the 210 or so C-17's, of which you and Rand apparently think only
about 20% of which would be tasked to support a high priority
contingency op (not to mention that there are also quite a few
C-5A/B's still out there...). I just see that as another manner of
weighting the data to suit a desired outcome--it does not make it
accurate.



I'm as in favor of improved strategic mobility as anyone but
Stryker brigades sacrifice too much to that end. You get a force
that
isn't tolerant of the misfortunes of war and which is unable to
sustain a momentary reverse.

You seem to be focused on this as a force that is designed to
aggressively strike into the heart of enemy heavy forces and win,
but
in reality it is an effort to provide early entry forces with more
capability than they now have (no way you can argue that it does not
do that), and to fill that "middle" niche that we currently don't
cover between the light and heavy spectrum.

And you seem to say that if it's an improvement over current light
forces deployments then it's worth having. My position is that the
spectrum of opponents that a SBCT can face that e.g. the 82nd Airborne
cannot is too small to be worth while. It doesn't take much in the way
of armor and artillery to defeat a SBCT. Panama and Afghanistan could
not but there are_lots_of places that could.

And if it is a theater that the SBCT is outguned in, then other TTP,
forces, etc., will have to be used, granted. But yes, I do think that
it would be darned nice of us to give our early entry forces another
tool for their bag. Rapidly deployable light armor can greatly enhance
the joint force commander's options, and can mean the difference
between sustaining higher casualties to accomplish the mission. I
think those are *good* things.


I believe that concentrating on an "interim" SBCT which under a more
dovish administration could easily become permanent displaces programs
to develop enough lift so that forces with real puissance can be
inserted. That said, the logistics challenge of battle at the end of
such a slender thread hasn't been addressed.

And just how the hell do you think FCS is going to magically address
that logistics concern? Snap your fingers and have FCS fielded
*today*, and it faces the same logistical challenges. Not to mention
that our *current* early entry force faces the same challenegs--in the
ansence of Stryker, the only way you are going to acheive decent
ground mobility for those guys is to either bring in a bunch of trucks
(which use about the same fuel as Stryker, take up a goodly portion of
the haul assets that Stryker would, and don't offer 8any* degree of
protection or enhanced firepower), or haul helos in to allow air
assault operations--do you *really* think that either of those options
results in a significantly reduced log chain in comparison to the
SBCT?


Traditionally, the
tonnage of POL, ammunition and other kit dwarfs the TOE tonnage.

See above.

Given
that SBCT's only chance of success in more than constabulary
operations is to substitute fires for force size, that's unlikely to
change.

Never heard of substituting greater mobility for fires *and* force
size? Stryker can, in comparison to current capabilities, do that for
the grunts in the early entry force.


You've waived away logistics loads in using SBCTs far from litterals.
Can you support that?

No, I have not. But, unlike you, I realize that the SBCT is not the
*only* force structure design that requires log support. In order for
the current LI force to acheive the same mobility on/over the ground
that Stryker offers, you have to either send in a boatload of soft,
less useful trucks to haul them around in, or helos--care to guess how
much POL those helos will burn? The difference between the two forces,
if you force both to acheive significant ground mobility, will be
insignificant in terms of log requirements. The *only* way the current
force wins in this regard is if you send them in with *no* transport
capability--in which case congrats, you just forced us back to the
same rate of movement that we enjoyed during the Civil War (if that
much, since those poor grunts are going to be carrying about five
times the load that their 1860's counterparts were burdened with).

Now, one more time--given that urban combat scenario that you snipped,
do you want to go in as a naked grunt, or with light armor support?
You *really* don't want to answer that question, do you???

Brooks

"Paul Austin" wrote in message .. .
"Alan Minyard" wrote
On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 06:44:11 -0400, "Paul Austin"
wrote:


"Tony Williams" wrote

I understand that basic Stryker is right on the size/weight
carrying
limits of the C-130. Any info on how the Herc will cope with the
bigger versions, like the one carrying a 105mm gun?

By buying A400Ms?

Seriously, the Stryker (idiot spelling) sacrifices too much for
C-130
compatibility, particularly in the area of protection. The
MagicTech
remote sensing/remote fires stuff isn't ready yet, never mind
"electric armor" that's needed to make what amounts to a LAV
mounted
army viable. If the Army is to be both rapidly deployable and as
effective on the ground as it currently is, then much more capable
airlift is required. In fact, A300M is too small (only marginally
larger box or payload than a C-130). What's needed is Pelican or
LTA
kind of solutions.

It is called the C-17

Think bigger. Much bigger. The real problem with insertion of a combat
force by air is in supplying it. Logistical loads dwarf TOE loads.
Right now, the only way to meet logistical tonnage requirements is
with ships.

Bullcrap. We sustained a significant force in Afghanistan with air
only, if you had not noticed. We (and the Brits) supplied West Berling
by air. We supplied about a two-brigade equivalent force in Grenada by
air (for the most part). We supplied a two-brigade plus force in
Honduras by air in 88. Where on earth do you get this notion that the
SBCT is unsupportable, and just *how* do you think we run support now?
Did the 173rd ABN BDE and the few *heavy* assets from 1st ID(M) that
were air deployed into northern Iraq receive any sea support??

Brooks