Aircrew casualities

Subject: Aircrew casualities
From: Steve Hix NVALID
Date: 9/26/03 7:43 PM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

In article ,
(ArtKramr) wrote:

You are only saying that because you never had to fly the Schweinfort
mission.
If you had there would be no way in hell you would call it typical. Find
me
one guy who went to Schweinfort and said it was just another mission like
all
others. No big deal. Nothing special. Find me just one such guy.

Wouldn't be my high school algebra/woodshop teacher. He was a
B-17 navigator shot down over Rengensberg. Spent the rest of
the war as a guest of the German government, including time
working on tunnel support for the "Great Escape". (He spent
time mostly at Sagan and Mooseburg, IIRC.)

He did make a point in mentioning that there were some very
good surgeons who worked on him after the shootdown, else he
would not have been there to teach us.


Only guys who never flew anything but an armchair would call Schweinfurt
"typical".

..

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Art Kramer
blurted out:

You are only saying that because you never had to fly the Schweinfort mission.
If you had there would be no way in hell you would call it typical.

Begging your pardon Art, this is what Guy posted:

As far as tactics, techniques, and weapons used, Regensburg/Schweinfurt was
quite typical of deep penetration missions to Germany in the summer and fall of
1943, well beyond fighter cover.

So how Regensburg/Schweinfurt was atypical...besides the losses
incurred. What was done differently (tactics/techniques) or what new
weapons were used? 8th AF Bomber Command had hit targets beyond the
range of fighter escort before (and would again). The mission was in
daylight, a max effort, doesn't that seem typical? The mission prep
and execution were typical...the results (big losses) not so typical.

Art states further:
Find me one guy who went to Schweinfort and said it was just
another mission like all others. No big deal. Nothing special.

Art you're framing that remark based upon already knowing the results,
i.e. "Black Thursday." Just suppose you asked any B-17 crewman that
morning what was "special" about that day. Nobody can accurately
predict casualties, or random events.

Guy you post a lot of good stuff here, but sometimes you
just slip away from reality.

Art your singular distinction (WWII aviator) is a welcomed addition,
but you find nit-noys to take offense with. Continued good health to
you sir.

Juvat

Subject: Aircrew casualities
From: Juvat
Date: 9/26/03 10:15 PM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Art Kramer
blurted out:

You are only saying that because you never had to fly the Schweinfort
mission.
If you had there would be no way in hell you would call it typical.

Begging your pardon Art, this is what Guy posted:

As far as tactics, techniques, and weapons used, Regensburg/Schweinfurt was
quite typical of deep penetration missions to Germany in the summer and
fall of
1943, well beyond fighter cover.

So how Regensburg/Schweinfurt was atypical...besides the losses
incurred. What was done differently (tactics/techniques) or what new
weapons were used? 8th AF Bomber Command had hit targets beyond the
range of fighter escort before (and would again). The mission was in
daylight, a max effort, doesn't that seem typical? The mission prep
and execution were typical...the results (big losses) not so typical.

Art states further:
Find me one guy who went to Schweinfort and said it was just
another mission like all others. No big deal. Nothing special.

Art you're framing that remark based upon already knowing the results,
i.e. "Black Thursday." Just suppose you asked any B-17 crewman that
morning what was "special" about that day. Nobody can accurately
predict casualties, or random events.

Guy you post a lot of good stuff here, but sometimes you
just slip away from reality.

Art your singular distinction (WWII aviator) is a welcomed addition,
but you find nit-noys to take offense with. Continued good health to
you sir.

Juvat


Black Thursday typical??? The term BlackThursday in itself reveals just how
atypical it was. It was called black Thursday to separate it from all other
missions so it would never be confused with any oridinary mission. They used
the term black to indicate it was a worst of missions with losses that far
exceeded the norm. Understand now? And to say Schweinfort was not typical is
hardly a nit. And may you enjoy a long and prosperous life enjoying the details
of the air war over Europe. And may I thank you for your recognising my
"singular distinction" as a WWII aviator. All kind words are always
appreciated. May you never experience a Schweinfort in your life.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Art Kramer
blurted out:

Black Thursday typical??? The term BlackThursday in itself reveals just how
atypical it was. It was called black Thursday to separate it from all other
missions so it would never be confused with any oridinary mission. They used
the term black to indicate it was a worst of missions with losses that far
exceeded the norm. Understand now?

Art...the cost in terms of airframes and lives was indeed at that
point atypical. But...please consider this carefully...the expression
Black Thursday was used after the mission ended.

However...whether the planets aligned perfectly, or the Luftwaffe
really got their **** in one sock that day, the 8th AF Bomber Command
was conducting a "typical" daylight, max effort, beyond fighter escort
raid over Germany. Understand?

None of those men (casualties or survivors) were briefed to the
effect,"Gentlemen today is Black Thursday...oh yeah the target is
Schweinfurt."

And to say Schweinfort was not typical is hardly a nit.

We'll agree to disagree. The mission was IMO a typical 8th AF, the
degree of coordinated Luftwaffe defense and the result, i.e.
staggering losses were atypical.

Juvat

Subject: Aircrew casualities
From: Juvat
Date: 9/27/03 5:45 AM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

the
degree of coordinated Luftwaffe defense and the result, i.e.
staggering losses were atypical.

Juvat

I think you are getting the point.

Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Juvat wrote:

After an exhausting session with Victoria's Secret Police, Art Kramer
blurted out:

You are only saying that because you never had to fly the Schweinfort mission.
If you had there would be no way in hell you would call it typical.

Begging your pardon Art, this is what Guy posted:

As far as tactics, techniques, and weapons used, Regensburg/Schweinfurt was
quite typical of deep penetration missions to Germany in the summer and fall of
1943, well beyond fighter cover.

So how Regensburg/Schweinfurt was atypical...besides the losses
incurred. What was done differently (tactics/techniques) or what new
weapons were used? 8th AF Bomber Command had hit targets beyond the
range of fighter escort before (and would again). The mission was in
daylight, a max effort, doesn't that seem typical?

Normal procedure was to only fly 3 out of a group's 4 squadrons on a mission; indeed,
that seems to have been the reason that American bomber groups were given a four
squadron organization (late war, the B-29 groups only had three squadrons,
individually larger than the earlier squadrons). On the Regensburg/Schweinfurt
mission, the 9 Groups in the 1st BW (the Schweinfurt force), who would normally make
up 3 combat wings each consisting of three 18 a/c "groups", used their fourth
squadrons and extra crews and a/c to form an additional 3 composite groups, i.e. the
equivalent of one more combat wing. At that time, the combat wings were still
provisional; they didn't become official organizations until September, when the 1st,
2nd and 4th Bomb Wings were redesignated the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Bomb Divisions,
respectively.

Middlebrook, referring to Regensburg/Schweinfurt, writes:

"The true 'maximum effort' was a very rare event [Guy note: at least at that time]
and this was probably the first time it had been used. The result was that
individual planes were added to formations wherever possible [Guy note: This was in
addition to the composite groups mentioned above]. The availability status of the
1st Bombardment Wing for the evening of 16th August shows that 238 B-17s were
operational and capable of being prepared for the raid next morning. The groups
planned to dispatch 231 of these, while several more were to be sent up as 'air
spares' to replace a/c which had to turn back because of operational difficulty."

So, instead of the standard three combat wings each of 54 a/c, the Schweinfurt force
(as dispatched) consisted of the following (in order, lead/high/low group)

101st CW: 91st BG, 18 aircraft / 101st Comp. Group, 19 acft. of 91st, 351st and 381st
BGs / 381st BG, 20 acft.

Composite CW: 351st BG, 21 acft. / 306th Comp. Gp., 20 acft. of 92nd, 305th and 306th
BGs / 384th BG, 19 acft.

102nd CW: 306th BG, 21 acft. / 305th BG, 20 acft. / 92nd BG, 20 acft.

103rd CW: 379th BG, 18 acft. / 103rd Comp. Gp., 17 acft. of 303rd and 379th BGs /
303rd BG, 18 acft.

The 4th Bomb Wing (Regensburg force) only had 7 Groups in it at the time, making it
difficult to form three full combat wings, each of three groups. LeMay, the 4th BW
commander, arranged the force a bit differently. LeMay didn't like ad hoc composite
wings, so organized his 7 groups into one wing of three groups and two wings of 2
groups. However, he had each group attach an extra three a/c element to the high
squadron, more as combat attrition spares than to boost the total bomb tonnage. So,
each group dispatched 21 a/c vice the normal 18, plus air spares for aborts prior to
crossing the occupied coast. The 4th BW had 189 a/c operational the evening before,
but only planned to dispatch 147 of them plus spares, well short of a 'maximum
effort.'

The mission prep
and execution were typical...the results (big losses) not so typical.

snip

The scale of losses was a record at that time, but percentage-wise (16% total, 16.4%
for Regensburg, 15.7% for Schweinfurt) it wasn't all that much greater than the
losses for un-escorted deep penetration missions in the next two months.
Regensburg/Schweinfurt was the deepest penetration mission into Germany at that time,
but succeeding missions in September and the week of October 8-14th 1943, culminating
in Second Schweinfurt ("Black Thursday"), showed that losses equal or greater than
10% could be _expected_ on un-escorted deep-penetration missions into Germany. For
example, the mission to Stuttgart on 6th September suffered 45 losses out of 338
dispatched (I need to check this; one source says 407 dispatched, but only 262
arrived in the target area owing to lousy weather), i.e at least 13.3% losses.
October 8th - Bremen (relatively shallow penetration) 30 out of 378 dispatched (357
effective), or 7.9%. October 9th, 378 a/c dispatched to targets in Poland and East
Prussia, fortunately most of the trip was over the North Sea and Baltic to points
well beyond the main fighter and flak defenses; even so the defenses were able to
shoot down 28 out of 378 (352 effective sorties), or somewhere between 7.5 and 8%.
October 10th, Munster (relatively shallow), 30 out of 274 dispatched, 10.9%. And
then Second Schweinfurt on October 14th, 60 out of 291 that actually crossed the
defended coast, 20.6% (less if you count the aborts, but I don't have that figure
handy.

Guy

Subject: Aircrew casualities
From: Guy Alcala
Date: 9/29/03 8:36 PM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id: 3F78FB42.14031EFC@junkpo

The scale of losses was a record at that time,

Guy


Yeah.. No way in hell a typicle mission. Those of us who flew missions in the
ETO the word Schweinfort sent shivers down our spines. Does your historical
research allow for shivers down the spine on that never to be forgotten "black"
mission which along with Ploesti defined missions that were pure hell.?


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr wrote:

Subject: Aircrew casualities
From: Guy Alcala
Date: 9/26/03 3:15 PM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

ArtKramr wrote:

snip

If I think back to the
missions I flew with the 344th and had to name a "typical" mission, I
couldn't
do it. We had no typical mssions.. Each one was unique, except of course
for
the milk runs, which in themselves were not typical.

Sure, but we're looking for statistical data on survival rates, and so far
the
only such data presented in the course of this thread is that which I
provided in
that post. Everything else has been perceptual or anecdotal. We now have
some
actual data (limited to a single mission though it is, and only 60 B-17
combat
losses out of the 4,688 B-17s combat losses in the European war as a whole),
which
is more than we've had otherwise.

Guy

You are only saying that because you never had to fly the Schweinfort mission.
If you had there would be no way in hell you would call it typical.

Juvat has already pointed out that I specifically stated that my comments referred
to the mission tactics, techniques, and weapons employment. As he says, the losses
were unheard of _to that time_, but as I pointed out in my reply to one of his
posts, not all that un-representative of subsequent similar missions.
Regensburg/Schweinfurt was the deepest penetration of Germany to date, but the
results were similar on other missions, if not quite so extreme. In the case of
first Schweinfurt, the German fighter controllers guessed right for the wrong
reasons; they'd re-positioned much of their fighter force to hit the Regensburg
force when it returned to England. That force continued on to Africa, but the
Schweinfurt force came in and returned on virtually the same track (neither force
had the range to take anything other than the most direct route to the target), so
the fighters hit them instead, both coming and going. The only reason they were
able to do so in that case was owing to English weather, and the decision by BG
Anderson to delay the takeoff of the Schweinfurt force for several hours as a
consequence. Sometimes things don't break your way.

Find me
one guy who went to Schweinfort and said it was just another mission like all
others. No big deal. Nothing special. Find me just one such guy. Guy you post a
lot of good stuff here, but sometimes you just slip away from reality.

How about several guys who went to Regensburg, who Middlebrook interviewed (and he
interviewed crew from every single U.S. bomb and fighter group that took part in
the mission, as well as German crew from every single fighter gruppe, and RAF
pilots from all the RAF fighter squadrons)? It really all depends on where you
were in the formation, and your perspective.
Middlebrook wrote:

"Two of the groups in the leading combat wing - the 96th and 388th - had never been
under serious attack and had so far suffered no casualties [Guy note: on the way in
to Regensburg; the 388th subsequently lost one a/c that ditched short of Africa
after being damaged by flak over the target). Several men in these groups refer to
the Regensburg mission as 'almost like a milk run'. But the officer observing from
the tail turret of the leading plane had been sending a steady stream of reports
about the action which had been taking place further back in the force and
reporting those losses which he could see. LeMay was well aware that his force had
taken heavy casualties."

So, several of the crews who Middlebrook interviewed considered Regensburg "almost
like a milk run," despite the fact that the percentage losses were actually higher
(16.4% vs. 15.7%) than the Schweinfurt force suffered. There were also units on
the First Schweinfurt mission who suffered no or low casualties, and may not have
even seen a German fighter. For those units and crews it was a milk run _for them
personally_. The 303rd and 306th BGs didn't suffer a single loss on First
Schweinfurt, just because the fighters didn't hit them. Other groups got hammered
- the 91st lost 9 of 24 dispatched, the 381st 11 of 26. Both of these groups were
in the lead wing, which took heavy damage. Wings further back in the stream
received much less attention.

Just the opposite was the case with Regensburg, where the lead wing encountered
little opposition, but the trailing wings got hit. Luck of the draw. The main
reason that crews on first Schweinfurt were aware of the heavy losses as a whole
was because they returned over virtually the same route as the way in, so they
could see all the ground fires from crashed a/c. Second Schweinfurt was another
matter; they expected to get hammered, with the experience of the preceding two
months and especially the preceding week as an indication of just what they were
facing. Even so, some units came through Second Schweinfurt without losing an a/c,
including the "Bloody 100th". Of course, the 100th was only able to put up 8 a/c
for that mission, owing to the heavy losses suffered on the Bremen (7) and Munster
(12 of 13!) raids on the 8th and 10th.

Guy

Subject: Aircrew casualities
From: Guy Alcala
Date: 9/29/03 9:27 PM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

ArtKramr wrote:

Subject: Aircrew casualities
From: Guy Alcala
Date: 9/26/03 3:15 PM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

ArtKramr wrote:

snip

If I think back to the
missions I flew with the 344th and had to name a "typical" mission, I
couldn't
do it. We had no typical mssions.. Each one was unique, except of
course
for
the milk runs, which in themselves were not typical.

Sure, but we're looking for statistical data on survival rates, and so far
the
only such data presented in the course of this thread is that which I
provided in
that post. Everything else has been perceptual or anecdotal. We now have
some
actual data (limited to a single mission though it is, and only 60 B-17
combat
losses out of the 4,688 B-17s combat losses in the European war as a
whole),
which
is more than we've had otherwise.

Guy

You are only saying that because you never had to fly the Schweinfort
mission.
If you had there would be no way in hell you would call it typical.

Juvat has already pointed out that I specifically stated that my comments
referred
to the mission tactics, techniques, and weapons employment. As he says, the
losses
were unheard of _to that time_

That alone makes it atypical.


, but as I pointed out in my reply to one of
his
posts, not all that un-representative of subsequent similar missions.
Regensburg/Schweinfurt was the deepest penetration of Germany to date

Again. atypical.

but
the
results were similar on other missions, if not quite so extreme.

Not so extreme?. Hardly typical.

In the case
of
first Schweinfurt, the German fighter controllers guessed right for the wrong
reasons;

Irrelevant to the guys who got hammered and those who were lost.

they'd re-positioned much of their fighter force to hit the
Regensburg
force when it returned to England. That force continued on to Africa, but
the
Schweinfurt force came in and returned on virtually the same track (neither
force
had the range to take anything other than the most direct route to the
target), so
the fighters hit them instead, both coming and going. The only reason they
were
able to do so in that case was owing to English weather, and the decision by
BG
Anderson to delay the takeoff of the Schweinfurt force for several hours as a
consequence. Sometimes things don't break your way.

Tell me about it.

Find me
one guy who went to Schweinfort and said it was just another mission like
all
others. No big deal. Nothing special. Find me just one such guy. Guy you
post a
lot of good stuff here, but sometimes you just slip away from reality.

How about several guys who went to Regensburg, who Middlebrook interviewed
(and he
interviewed crew from every single U.S. bomb and fighter group that took
part in
the mission, as well as German crew from every single fighter gruppe, and RAF
pilots from all the RAF fighter squadrons)? It really all depends on where
you
were in the formation, and your perspective.

Y'mean if we put up 56 aircraft and 55 were lost but one got back unscathed we
could write the mission off as a milk run due toi that one plane?


Middlebrook wrote:

"Two of the groups in the leading combat wing - the 96th and 388th - had
never been
under serious attack and had so far suffered no casualties [Guy note: on the
way in
to Regensburg; the 388th subsequently lost one a/c that ditched short of
Africa
after being damaged by flak over the target). Several men in these groups
refer to
the Regensburg mission as 'almost like a milk run'. But the officer
observing from
the tail turret of the leading plane had been sending a steady stream of
reports
about the action which had been taking place further back in the force and
reporting those losses which he could see. LeMay was well aware that his
force had
taken heavy casualties."

Hardlly typical or a milk run in spite of what one flight had experienced


So, several of the crews who Middlebrook interviewed considered Regensburg
"almost
like a milk run," despite the fact that the percentage losses were actually
higher
(16.4% vs. 15.7%) than the Schweinfurt force suffered.


Looks like those "several crews " got it wrong.

There were also units
on
the First Schweinfurt mission who suffered no or low casualties, and may not
have
even seen a German fighter. For those units and crews it was a milk run _for
them
personally_.

Why do you keep evaluating based on "several crews" We evaluate by overall
losses, not by "several crews" To those who never flew a mission. all missions
are milk runs. It all depends on who's ox is gored.






Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

ArtKramr wrote:

Subject: Aircrew casualities
From: Guy Alcala
Date: 9/29/03 9:27 PM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

ArtKramr wrote:

Subject: Aircrew casualities
From: Guy Alcala
Date: 9/26/03 3:15 PM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

ArtKramr wrote:

snip

If I think back to the
missions I flew with the 344th and had to name a "typical" mission, I
couldn't
do it. We had no typical mssions.. Each one was unique, except of
course
for
the milk runs, which in themselves were not typical.

Sure, but we're looking for statistical data on survival rates, and so far
the
only such data presented in the course of this thread is that which I
provided in
that post. Everything else has been perceptual or anecdotal. We now have
some
actual data (limited to a single mission though it is, and only 60 B-17
combat
losses out of the 4,688 B-17s combat losses in the European war as a
whole),
which
is more than we've had otherwise.

Guy

You are only saying that because you never had to fly the Schweinfort
mission.
If you had there would be no way in hell you would call it typical.

Juvat has already pointed out that I specifically stated that my comments
referred
to the mission tactics, techniques, and weapons employment. As he says, the
losses
were unheard of _to that time_

That alone makes it atypical.

High percentage losses had been suffered prior to that mission, albeit with
smaller forces dispatched (which is why I left them out). For instance, the
mission to Bremen on 17th April 1943 lost 16 out of 115 dispatched (107
effective), or 13.9%. The mission to Kiel (among several targets; a total of 228
bombers were dispatched) on 13th June lost 22 of 60, which is to say, 36%, far
exceeding the loss rate at Regensburg/Schweinfurt or Second Schweinfurt.


, but as I pointed out in my reply to one of
his
posts, not all that un-representative of subsequent similar missions.
Regensburg/Schweinfurt was the deepest penetration of Germany to date

Again. atypical.

And again, to that date. Stuttgart on September 6th was about as deep as
Schweinfurt, with similar results (45 losses, 13.3%). As I said, this level of
losses could be expected on such deep penetrations.

but
the
results were similar on other missions, if not quite so extreme.

Not so extreme?. Hardly typical.

See above.



In the case
of
first Schweinfurt, the German fighter controllers guessed right for the wrong
reasons;

Irrelevant to the guys who got hammered and those who were lost.

Sure. As it happens, the German controllers gambled that we wouldn't dispatch a
second force to targets in northern Germany, as they'd moved all those Gruppes
south, leaving the north unprotected. They were aware that the Regensburg force
was less than half of the available bombers, so were taking a big chance.

they'd re-positioned much of their fighter force to hit the
Regensburg
force when it returned to England. That force continued on to Africa, but
the
Schweinfurt force came in and returned on virtually the same track (neither
force
had the range to take anything other than the most direct route to the
target), so
the fighters hit them instead, both coming and going. The only reason they
were
able to do so in that case was owing to English weather, and the decision by
BG
Anderson to delay the takeoff of the Schweinfurt force for several hours as a
consequence. Sometimes things don't break your way.

Tell me about it.

Find me
one guy who went to Schweinfort and said it was just another mission like
all
others. No big deal. Nothing special. Find me just one such guy. Guy you
post a
lot of good stuff here, but sometimes you just slip away from reality.

How about several guys who went to Regensburg, who Middlebrook interviewed
(and he
interviewed crew from every single U.S. bomb and fighter group that took
part in
the mission, as well as German crew from every single fighter gruppe, and RAF
pilots from all the RAF fighter squadrons)? It really all depends on where
you
were in the formation, and your perspective.

Y'mean if we put up 56 aircraft and 55 were lost but one got back unscathed we
could write the mission off as a milk run due toi that one plane?

Nope, but if your group and wing suffered no or minimal casualties, and you never
saw other groups/wings taking major losses, you'd certainly think it was an easy
mission, now wouldn't you? The higher commanders would think otherwise, but
that's due to the difference in their and your perspective.

Middlebrook wrote:

"Two of the groups in the leading combat wing - the 96th and 388th - had
never been
under serious attack and had so far suffered no casualties [Guy note: on the
way in
to Regensburg; the 388th subsequently lost one a/c that ditched short of
Africa
after being damaged by flak over the target). Several men in these groups
refer to
the Regensburg mission as 'almost like a milk run'. But the officer
observing from
the tail turret of the leading plane had been sending a steady stream of
reports
about the action which had been taking place further back in the force and
reporting those losses which he could see. LeMay was well aware that his
force had
taken heavy casualties."

Hardlly typical or a milk run in spite of what one flight had experienced

Again, depends on your perspective. It was a milk run for those groups, and not
for others further back. To LeMay, it certainly wasn't a milk run for the 4th
Bomb Wing, although it was a milk run for him personally (he flew in the lead
plane of the 96th BG, leading the first combat wing to Regensburg. As mentioned,
the 96th suffered no casualties, a/c or personnel, at all, one other group in the
combat wing lost one a/c and the high group lost 6 of 21, although one of those
made it to Switzerland and two others ditched out of gas (there'd been a snafu in
the field order, which caused that group, the 390th, to take off well before the
rest of the force).

So, several of the crews who Middlebrook interviewed considered Regensburg
"almost
like a milk run," despite the fact that the percentage losses were actually
higher
(16.4% vs. 15.7%) than the Schweinfurt force suffered.

Looks like those "several crews " got it wrong.

Not for them, they didn't. For an individual crew, which is harder, a mission
where the force as a whole takes heavy casualties but they themselves are
untouched and unaware of any attacks in their area, or one where the rest of their
unit is undamaged, but they themselves take casualties/are shot down? The latter
would be a milk run from the command perspective, a disaster for them personally.

There were also units
on
the First Schweinfurt mission who suffered no or low casualties, and may not
have
even seen a German fighter. For those units and crews it was a milk run _for
them
personally_.

Why do you keep evaluating based on "several crews"

I'm doing no such thing. You were the one who asked me to find, "one, just one
guy who went to Schweinfurt and said it was just a mission like all the others.
No big deal. Nothing special." I then provided you with evidence that several
crews going to Regensburg (on the same mission, and suffering higher percentage
losses than the Schweinfurt task force) thought the mission was indeed fairly
quiet, albeit obviously unusual in that it was going so deep and then on to
Africa.

We evaluate by overall
losses, not by "several crews" To those who never flew a mission. all missions
are milk runs. It all depends on who's ox is gored.

And that's the point, it all depends on the perspective of the observer. If
you're commanding an army, you may report your front "quiet, little enemy activity
except patrols," and from your perspective you'd be right; if you happen to be a
private in a squad that ran into an enemy patrol, had a vicious little firefight
lasting several hours and lost two dead and six wounded (including yourself), from
your perspective the war is anything but "quiet, little enemy activity" as your
unit has just suffered somewhere between 66 to 100% casualties, and you'd also be
right.

Guy