Australia tries to rewrite history of Vietnam War

"gblack" wrote in message ...
The history of Vietnam is well and truly written from all sides
involved..


But Australian accounts are more one-sided than ours. Let us fill
in what is usually missing. Like a giant, Olive Green tooth fairy,
the US and South Vietnamese forces had to bail out Australia on
several occasions....


1. December 1965-September 1966. Since the Australian 1 RAR was
hardly up to the task, the US 173d Airborne Brigade committed two
battalions to operate against the VC and infrastructure in Phuoc
Tuy province, and to clear areas for an Australian base at Nui Dat.
The US Army provided helicopter lift for the Australian Army which
spent much of its time in Vietnam begging the United States to spare
more rotary wings. The joint force carried out four major operations
in the Phuoc Tuy province, SMASH, HARDIHOOD, HOLLANDIA and TOLEDO.
After that, the MACV hoped that Australia might be able to finish
the job without US assistance. They didn't.

2. August 1966. The Australians fought their best known battle
in at Long Tan. Though the Diggers preened and blustered about their
expertise at "unconventional warfare", they were in fact, rescued by
"conventional artillery" during the action. Some of the fire
support came from the self-propelled guns of US artillery units
based at Nui Dat.

3. February - June 1968. After thumbing their noses at Australia
for two years, the 5th VC Division and parts of D445 VC Battalion
were shattered by US troops around Bien Hoa and Long Binh during Tet
and Mini-Tet. American troops should not have encountered these 2nd-
rate Viet Cong units at all, but unfortunately the Australians could
not handle them and let the buggers get away -- as they often did by
the admission of the Australian General Tim Vincent. The consequences
were that, thanks to US troops, it was quiet in the Phuoc Tuy province
while the enemy licked his wounds and slowly rebuilt 5th VC Division
and D445 VC Battalion.

4. February 1968. Town of Baria (the Phuoc Tuy province capital)
was captured by part of D445 VC Battalion during the Tet Offensive.
The Australians from A/3 RAR and their armored units from 3 Cavalry
could not dislodge them with their own resources and had to rely on
South Vietnamese units to jettison the VC from Baria.

5. May 1968. Part of the Australian TF found themselves besieged
at FSBs CORAL and BALMORAL and American air power was called for help.
US aircraft carried out airstrikes on advancing and retreating NVA
and their supply lines.

6. July 1970 to April 1971. In addition to responsibilities in Long
Khanh and Bien Hoa provinces, 2d Brigade, US 25th Infantry Division
was forced to operate in the Phuoc Tuy province because the Australian
Army could not handle the enemy or pacification program without us.
This is in addition to the fact that US troops guarded the seaport and
other installations at Vung Tau, and provided road convoy security to
and from.

7. April 1971-June 1972. The 2d Brigade, US 25th Infantry Division
was replaced by the 3d Brigade, US 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
Despite the recent and massive withdrawl of Allied forces, the Air Cav
"fire brigade" was responsible for ranging three provinces, Binh Tuy,
Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy. Their air assault training and larger fleet
of helicopter lift and gunships made this possible. Such widespread
coverage was well beyond the capability of any Australian brigade.

8. 1965-1972. Supply flow to Viet Cong units in Phuoc Tuy province
came via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Mekong Delta and ports in Cambodia.
This meant the goods had to pass through areas that were patrolled by
Americans and other Allied units, who often intercepted the supplies.
Captured documents revealed that, thanks to US forces, VC units in the
Phuoc Tuy province complained of shortages in food and other stocks.


Allied participation in the Phuoc Tuy province and against the 5th VC
Division and D445 VC Battalion has been carefully downplayed or lashed
up by Australia. Oz could not fail when their American guardian angels
were running around tweaking circumstance.

(Kevin Brooks) wrote in message . com...
(Evan Brennan) wrote in message om...
snip various rants

We deployed our British and Australian hirelings because no one else
was willing. And because Moe always brings Larry and Curly when he
goes on a road trip.

I had thought Evan to be just rabidly anti-British, but now he has not
only extended that irrational thought process to include the Aussies,
but apparently also our own forces (Moe?!).


Less moral cheerleading, more content please.

And stop waving your MOS at us Brooks. You're turning into a younger
version of Art Kramer.

(Evan Brennan) wrote in message m...
(Kevin Brooks) wrote in message . com...
The posts he writes are factitious -- a lot of what he writes is true,
but strung together so present his targets in the poorest light.

You are probably mostly correct, though he also has demonstrated a
marked ability to ignore reality when it suits him (i.e., his past
violently argued contention that SFOD-Delta was *not* based upon the
SAS when it was formed


I never wrote anything like that. Don't put your words in my mouth.

We had a disagreement about the origins of -ALL- aspects of Delta Force
training and their responsibilities, back then and more recently. Not
just the parts associated with the SAS.

No need to put any words in your mouth...Your words:

"Your claim that Delta Force was solely modeled after the SAS is
easy to discredit..." (April 23, 2002).

Unfortunately, you never were able to actually *do* that discrediting,
instead trotting out examples of folks involved in Delta's founding
who were supposedly *not* influenced by Delta (like Dick Meadows)...

(24 April) "If Beckwith's only goal was to copy the SAS verbatim,
then he certainly would not need the services of Shumate and
Meadows..."

But oops, Meadows was indeed actually another of Beckwith's
SAS-exchange vets. Or the fact that you never could quite get it
through your head that the primary reason SFOD-Delta was founded by
Beckwith, with support from folks like Wilson, Kingston, Meyer, etc.,
was originally as a CT/HRT force, and that its later mission creep
into other areas...

(Your words, 1 May) "Smells like BS to me. You're saying that "back
in the 1970s" Delta Force was formed "for CT operations only" but
later "developed into something else"."

Yep, that was what I was saying, and a read of Beckwith, Haney,
Burrus, etc., will demonstrate that was indeed the original
reason/mission envisioned when Delta was formed, and it had to
complete with the 7th SFG's (COL Bob Mountel) "Blue Light" for that
role as it was first forming. Did you happen to read Haney's book yet?
But hey, like the other guys who were founding members and later wrote
books about Delta and its genesis as a US-form of the SAS, I am sure
you will discount him...

So...you can't get your facts straight about Delta due, apparently, to
myopic vision caused by an irrational hatred for all things
British...and now you continue to demonstrate the same lack of a grasp
of reality by dissing the various Aussie forces, compounded by a
slight directed at US forces to boot. Not a very impressive record you
have going for you there, Evan. If all of these folks, including our
own, are so screwed up, why have you chosen to not join them and
square them away?

Brooks

"Evan Brennan" wrote in message

I don't know where you are getting these "facts" from, so.......

1. December 1965-September 1966. Since the Australian 1 RAR was
hardly up to the task, the US 173d Airborne Brigade committed two
battalions to operate against the VC and infrastructure in Phuoc
Tuy province, and to clear areas for an Australian base at Nui Dat.
The US Army provided helicopter lift for the Australian Army which
spent much of its time in Vietnam begging the United States to spare
more rotary wings. The joint force carried out four major operations
in the Phuoc Tuy province, SMASH, HARDIHOOD, HOLLANDIA and TOLEDO.
After that, the MACV hoped that Australia might be able to finish
the job without US assistance. They didn't.

Fact.... 1RAR was attached to 173rd Air borne during that period

2. August 1966. The Australians fought their best known battle
in at Long Tan. Though the Diggers preened and blustered about their
expertise at "unconventional warfare", they were in fact, rescued by
"conventional artillery" during the action. Some of the fire
support came from the self-propelled guns of US artillery units
based at Nui Dat.

Fact.....The Husky Battery (155mm) could not fire close to D Coy and the
main fire support was provided by Aust 105mm. (plus Aust 9 Sqn and another
Coy with APC support)

3. February - June 1968. After thumbing their noses at Australia
for two years, the 5th VC Division and parts of D445 VC Battalion
were shattered by US troops around Bien Hoa and Long Binh during Tet
and Mini-Tet. American troops should not have encountered these 2nd-
rate Viet Cong units at all, but unfortunately the Australians could
not handle them and let the buggers get away -- as they often did by
the admission of the Australian General Tim Vincent. The consequences
were that, thanks to US troops, it was quiet in the Phuoc Tuy province
while the enemy licked his wounds and slowly rebuilt 5th VC Division
and D445 VC Battalion.

Fact......... The VC units that the US forces encountered did not come from
the Aust AO.
By that period US forces had taken resposibility for the northern and
western approaches to Bien Hoa and Long Binh.

4. February 1968. Town of Baria (the Phuoc Tuy province capital)
was captured by part of D445 VC Battalion during the Tet Offensive.
The Australians from A/3 RAR and their armored units from 3 Cavalry
could not dislodge them with their own resources and had to rely on
South Vietnamese units to jettison the VC from Baria.

Utter frog ****... Fact..... the SVN forces were overwhelmed in the first
attacks.

5. May 1968. Part of the Australian TF found themselves besieged
at FSBs CORAL and BALMORAL and American air power was called for help.
US aircraft carried out airstrikes on advancing and retreating NVA
and their supply lines.

Bull****,...Fact.... The Aust forces called in and directed air and arty
support.
May come as a shock to you but calling in US air support was actually
allowed.
(and you don't repulse ground attacks by "bombing supply lines")

6. July 1970 to April 1971. In addition to responsibilities in Long
Khanh and Bien Hoa provinces, 2d Brigade, US 25th Infantry Division
was forced to operate in the Phuoc Tuy province because the Australian
Army could not handle the enemy or pacification program without us.
This is in addition to the fact that US troops guarded the seaport and
other installations at Vung Tau, and provided road convoy security to
and from.

More Bull****... Fact......Ops during the period 1969/70 so decimated the
VC in Phouc Tuy that D445 ceased to operate as a unit. US troops only
"guarded" their own establishments in Vung Tau and never provided "road
convoy security" for anyone but their own movements, (as we did)

7. April 1971-June 1972. The 2d Brigade, US 25th Infantry Division
was replaced by the 3d Brigade, US 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
Despite the recent and massive withdrawl of Allied forces, the Air Cav
"fire brigade" was responsible for ranging three provinces, Binh Tuy,
Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy. Their air assault training and larger fleet
of helicopter lift and gunships made this possible. Such widespread
coverage was well beyond the capability of any Australian brigade.

What bloody Brigade? Nov 70 saw the withdrawal, and non replacement of 8RAR
plus the gradual planned withdrawal of all Aust troops commence.

8. 1965-1972. Supply flow to Viet Cong units in Phuoc Tuy province
came via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Mekong Delta and ports in Cambodia.
This meant the goods had to pass through areas that were patrolled by
Americans and other Allied units, who often intercepted the supplies.
Captured documents revealed that, thanks to US forces, VC units in the
Phuoc Tuy province complained of shortages in food and other stocks.

More bull****... Fact.... The VC obtained all their food from within Phuoc
Tuy and Aust ops that denied them access to villages caused most of their
food shortages.

Allied participation in the Phuoc Tuy province and against the 5th VC
Division and D445 VC Battalion has been carefully downplayed or lashed
up by Australia. Oz could not fail when their American guardian angels
were running around tweaking circumstance.

Fact... All operations, together with the parts played by *everyone* are
readily available in the various Bn books from the RAR and other Aust Units.
Suggest you read them, and get a less jaundiced view of things in general.

"Evan Brennan" wrote in message
...
"gblack" wrote in message
...
The history of Vietnam is well and truly written from all sides
involved..


But Australian accounts are more one-sided than ours. Let us fill
in what is usually missing. Like a giant, Olive Green tooth fairy,
the US and South Vietnamese forces had to bail out Australia on
several occasions....


Yawn.


1. December 1965-September 1966. Since the Australian 1 RAR was
hardly up to the task, the US 173d Airborne Brigade committed two
battalions to operate against the VC and infrastructure in Phuoc
Tuy province, and to clear areas for an Australian base at Nui Dat.
The US Army provided helicopter lift for the Australian Army which
spent much of its time in Vietnam begging the United States to spare
more rotary wings. The joint force carried out four major operations
in the Phuoc Tuy province, SMASH, HARDIHOOD, HOLLANDIA and TOLEDO.
After that, the MACV hoped that Australia might be able to finish
the job without US assistance. They didn't.


Poor Evan, determined to look stupid again.

Given that the Aust commitment to Vietnam at the time was only 1 Bn is it
any surprise they were attached to a US Bde rather than told to handle a Bde
sized AO alone?

Once the Aust commitment was upped to a TF (Bde) they handled the AO
superbly.

"The Aussies taught us a lot about small unit ops"

Brig General Ellis 'Butch' Williamson (Commander of the US 173d Airborne
Brigade) to David Horner 29 Apr 1986

"When we (the US Paras) found something we shot at it. We did not wait and
establish the patterns, look for opportunities after out thinking the VC
commander. We were just not patient enough - too much too do in too little
time. We did not use reconnaissance enough. Our ambushes were for security
not to kill. Australians were quiet hunters - patient, thorough, trying to
out-think the VC. I would not have liked to operate at night and know there
was a chance of ending up in an Aussie ambush."

Lt Col George Dexter CO of 2/503rd Bn to David Horner 10 May 1986


2. August 1966. The Australians fought their best known battle
in at Long Tan. Though the Diggers preened and blustered about their
expertise at "unconventional warfare", they were in fact, rescued by
"conventional artillery" during the action. Some of the fire
support came from the self-propelled guns of US artillery units
based at Nui Dat.

Long Tan was a conventional encounter battle, where 100 patrolling troops
encountered and defeated an advancing force of 1000 to 2000 enemy.

It's hardly surprising that artillery played a major part in a conventional
battle, you cretin.

"Some of the fire support came from US guns", you are rather grabbing at
straws here, yes some was fired from US 155s - according to 1Fd Regt RAA log
it seems they fired 8 missions out of aprox 63 FMs.



3. February - June 1968. After thumbing their noses at Australia
for two years, the 5th VC Division and parts of D445 VC Battalion
were shattered by US troops around Bien Hoa and Long Binh during Tet
and Mini-Tet.

Thumbing their noses at the Australians from in a US AO were they?

Both Long Binh and Bien Hoa were well outside the Australian AO.

****ing idiot.



American troops should not have encountered these 2nd-
rate Viet Cong units at all,

They were bound to since they were in the US AO, having found the Aust one
too hot.

but unfortunately the Australians could
not handle them and let the buggers get away

Sent them packing is the technical term.

-- as they often did by
the admission of the Australian General Tim Vincent. The consequences
were that, thanks to US troops, it was quiet in the Phuoc Tuy province
while the enemy licked his wounds and slowly rebuilt 5th VC Division
and D445 VC Battalion.

Yawn, you were shown to be a liar and a fool on this one before Evan.


4. February 1968. Town of Baria (the Phuoc Tuy province capital)
was captured by part of D445 VC Battalion during the Tet Offensive.
The Australians from A/3 RAR and their armored units from 3 Cavalry
could not dislodge them with their own resources and had to rely on
South Vietnamese units to jettison the VC from Baria.

Ah yes, D445, heavily reinforced took Baria, A/3RAR with APCs and 24 Hrs
later B/3RAR engaged in street fighting and quickly ejected them and
returned to Nui Dat.

(Abbreviated from D.Horners "Duty First" P.231)

Try again Evan.



5. May 1968. Part of the Australian TF found themselves besieged
at FSBs CORAL and BALMORAL and American air power was called for help.
US aircraft carried out airstrikes on advancing and retreating NVA
and their supply lines.

You do know that that is the point of establishing FSBs don't you? (of
course you don't), give the enemy a target they must engage, then use max
force against them.

That is why the Americans asked 1 ATF to move into the previously US held AO
Surfers, to clear it out, they did and then went back to their own AO.

All the airstrikes and arty in the world is of no use if the Infantry can't
hold the position.



6. July 1970 to April 1971. In addition to responsibilities in Long
Khanh and Bien Hoa provinces, 2d Brigade, US 25th Infantry Division
was forced to operate in the Phuoc Tuy province because the Australian
Army could not handle the enemy or pacification program without us.
This is in addition to the fact that US troops guarded the seaport and
other installations at Vung Tau, and provided road convoy security to
and from.

Yawn, 1 ATF pacified the area quite nicely, in the dates you indicate the
Australian deployment was winding down (like the US one) however -

"the sustained effort against D445 and D440 in the period Sept 1969 - Apr
1970 resulted in those units becoming essentially inactive, and subsequently
they were removed from the province for rest, reinforcement and retraining"
D. Horner "Duty First" P.271


7. April 1971-June 1972. The 2d Brigade, US 25th Infantry Division
was replaced by the 3d Brigade, US 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile).
Despite the recent and massive withdrawl of Allied forces, the Air Cav
"fire brigade" was responsible for ranging three provinces, Binh Tuy,
Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy. Their air assault training and larger fleet
of helicopter lift and gunships made this possible. Such widespread
coverage was well beyond the capability of any Australian brigade.

So?


8. 1965-1972. Supply flow to Viet Cong units in Phuoc Tuy province
came via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Mekong Delta and ports in Cambodia.
This meant the goods had to pass through areas that were patrolled by
Americans and other Allied units, who often intercepted the supplies.
Captured documents revealed that, thanks to US forces, VC units in the
Phuoc Tuy province complained of shortages in food and other stocks.

and do you have a point?

Allied participation in the Phuoc Tuy province and against the 5th VC
Division and D445 VC Battalion has been carefully downplayed or lashed
up by Australia. Oz could not fail when their American guardian angels
were running around tweaking circumstance.

Of course it has, poor sad little Evan, why don't you tell us all about your
military experience and how well you can judge these matters?

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
(Evan Brennan) wrote in message
m...
(Kevin Brooks) wrote in message
. com...
The posts he writes are factitious -- a lot of what he writes is
true,
but strung together so present his targets in the poorest light.

You are probably mostly correct, though he also has demonstrated a
marked ability to ignore reality when it suits him (i.e., his past
violently argued contention that SFOD-Delta was *not* based upon the
SAS when it was formed


I never wrote anything like that. Don't put your words in my mouth.

We had a disagreement about the origins of -ALL- aspects of Delta Force
training and their responsibilities, back then and more recently. Not
just the parts associated with the SAS.

No need to put any words in your mouth...Your words:

"Your claim that Delta Force was solely modeled after the SAS is
easy to discredit..." (April 23, 2002).

Good lord, Evan gets caught lying again!

Who'd a thunk it!

and he seemed so credible....

"L'acrobat" wrote in message
8. 1965-1972. Supply flow to Viet Cong units in Phuoc Tuy province
came via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Mekong Delta and ports in Cambodia.
This meant the goods had to pass through areas that were patrolled by
Americans and other Allied units, who often intercepted the supplies.
Captured documents revealed that, thanks to US forces, VC units in the
Phuoc Tuy province complained of shortages in food and other stocks.


and do you have a point?



Yes, the United States bailed out Austrlalia in more ways than one.


Of course it has, poor sad little Evan, why don't you tell us all about your
military experience and how well you can judge these matters?


Then tell us your real name, your military experience if any, the units
you served with, and when.

"Evan Brennan" wrote in message
m...
: "L'acrobat" wrote in message
: 8. 1965-1972. Supply flow to Viet Cong units in Phuoc Tuy
province
: came via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Mekong Delta and ports in
Cambodia.
: This meant the goods had to pass through areas that were
patrolled by
: Americans and other Allied units, who often intercepted the
supplies.
: Captured documents revealed that, thanks to US forces, VC units
in the
: Phuoc Tuy province complained of shortages in food and other
stocks.
:
:
: and do you have a point?
:
:
:
: Yes, the United States bailed out Austrlalia in more ways than one.
:
Cute misspelling there but what about Australia???????


: Of course it has, poor sad little Evan, why don't you tell us all
about your
: military experience and how well you can judge these matters?
:
:
: Then tell us your real name, your military experience if any, the
units
: you served with, and when.

You go first.....

--
_________________________________________
George Black
ICQ#: 6963409
More ways to contact me: http://wwp.icq.com/6963409
_________________________________________
Home page: http://www.koekejunction.hnpl.net/

"Evan Brennan" wrote in message
m...
"L'acrobat" wrote in message
8. 1965-1972. Supply flow to Viet Cong units in Phuoc Tuy province
came via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Mekong Delta and ports in Cambodia.
This meant the goods had to pass through areas that were patrolled by
Americans and other Allied units, who often intercepted the supplies.
Captured documents revealed that, thanks to US forces, VC units in the
Phuoc Tuy province complained of shortages in food and other stocks.


and do you have a point?



Yes, the United States bailed out Austrlalia in more ways than one.

But the problem is that it was Australian patrolling that denied the VC food
and supplies in Phouc Tuy.

Why is it you think that the US managed to do it in Phuc Tuy yet managed it
in no other province?

Again do you have a point?



Of course it has, poor sad little Evan, why don't you tell us all about
your
military experience and how well you can judge these matters?


Then tell us your real name, your military experience if any, the units
you served with, and when.

11.5 years in the Aust army, most of it in 3 RAR (Para) and you don't think
I am going to give stridently barking loons like yourself the info you need
to send your nonsense to my current employer do you?

Now its your turn Evan, tell us about your experience.

I'm sure that there are plenty here who could ask pertinent questions to
verify it...

"L'acrobat" wrote in message news:belnd6

1. December 1965-September 1966. Since the Australian 1 RAR was
hardly up to the task, the US 173d Airborne Brigade committed two
battalions to operate against the VC and infrastructure in Phuoc
Tuy province, and to clear areas for an Australian base at Nui Dat.
The US Army provided helicopter lift for the Australian Army which
spent much of its time in Vietnam begging the United States to spare
more rotary wings. The joint force carried out four major operations
in the Phuoc Tuy province, SMASH, HARDIHOOD, HOLLANDIA and TOLEDO.
After that, the MACV hoped that Australia might be able to finish
the job without US assistance. They didn't.

"The Aussies taught us a lot about small unit ops"


For once I agree with you. But then again the 173d Airborne was green
in 1965 with no experience in combat, let alone in jungle warfare.
There was no Vietnam recondo schools in 1965. They did too much
shooting since they were not familiar with the sounds of the jungle
and often shot at various animals by mistake. They also made too much
noise, built too many fires, and left garbage laying around outside
of the firebases.

But they learned and improved whereas Australia did not improve much
at all, save for the SAS since they embraced US style airmobility.

The very low number of kills claimed by Oz infantry speaks louder
than your lame attempts at cooking up a cover story.


3. February - June 1968. After thumbing their noses at Australia
for two years, the 5th VC Division and parts of D445 VC Battalion
were shattered by US troops around Bien Hoa and Long Binh during Tet
and Mini-Tet. American troops should not have encountered these 2nd-
rate Viet Cong units at all, but unfortunately the Australians could
not handle them and let the buggers get away -- as they often did by
the admission of the Australian General Tim Vincent. The consequences
were that, thanks to US troops, it was quiet in the Phuoc Tuy province
while the enemy licked his wounds and slowly rebuilt 5th VC Division
and D445 VC Battalion.

6. July 1970 to April 1971. In addition to responsibilities in Long
Khanh and Bien Hoa provinces, 2d Brigade, US 25th Infantry Division
was forced to operate in the Phuoc Tuy province because the Australian
Army could not handle the enemy or pacification program without us.
This is in addition to the fact that US troops guarded the seaport and
other installations at Vung Tau, and provided road convoy security to
and from.

Yawn, 1 ATF pacified the area quite nicely, in the dates you indicate the
Australian deployment was winding down (like the US one) however -


Westmoreland never thanked Australia for "pacifying the Phuoc Tuy
Province" or "destroying the 5th VC Division and D445" because
they never did.

The VC had bunkers and tunnels EVERYWHERE and the Kangaroos-in-denial
could not find all of them. Everytime the Australian weenies thought
they "hunted out the province" the Communists paid them a nice visit.
From David Horner's history of Australian SAS:

April 1969: Lt. General Julian Ewell of the US Army II Field Force
issued a directive to 1st Australian Task Force they should change
their concept of operations to concentrate on pacification;
interdiction of local VC as they entered villages in the east of
the province". Nevertheless, there was no major VC main force activity
in 1969 other than the summer offensive.

May 1969: Elements of 33 NVA Regiment, 274 VC Regiment and local
VC began a month long operation around the villages and hamlets along
Route 15 and provincial Route 2. Their intentions were unknown, but
it was believed they may have wanted to disrupt normal government
administration. The build-up for a VC-NVA assault of this size
should have been obvious to Australian troops but they were taken
by surprise. The SAS failed to detect the staging areas and
Australian officers ignored the warning signs from previous contacts.
In May and June there were several enemy rocket attacks on the
Australian Task Force base at Nui Dat.

June 1969: 3 Squadron of the SAS Regiment conducted eleven patrols
with a total of 157 enemy troops sighted and five contacts resulting
in eight VC killed. Results for July 308 enemy sighted, five killed.

September 1969: As his Vietnam tour ended, Brigadier Pearson halted
operations around Dak Do and since the VC often moved to high ground
between raids, the SAS began patrolling around the May Taos, a VC
mountain stronghold on the border of the Long Khanh province.

April 1970: Task Force began Operation CONCRETE in the Xuyen
Moc district, Phuoc Tuy province, with the aim of destroying
D445 VC Main Force Battalion and its base areas.

September 1970: The SAS began operations in support of Operation
CUNG and CHUNG II in which 7 RAR had the mission of denying
access to Xuyen Moc, Dat Do and Lang Phuoc Hai. Unfortunately,
the successful results achieved were short-lived.

November 1970: Part of D445 VC Battalion supported by elements
of the disbanded D440 VC Battalion successfully attacked district
capital of Xuyen Moc. Nine days later a 7 RAR night defensive
position was mortared, followed by an attack by elements of the
D445 VC Battalion. On the night of 30/31 December elements of
7 RAR ambushed a large part of D445 VC Battalion south of Xuyen
Moc. In these incidents the enemy displayed classic VC tactics
and fought with a tenacity thought long dead in Phuoc Tuy.

March 1971: A 6-man patrol led by Sgt. Terry O' Farrell was inserted
twelve kilometers northeast of Xuyen Moc. While establishing a night
LUP, they heard a large force of enemy moving north east along a
track, to the west of their LUP. Four days later 3 RAR, which had
relieved 7 RAR, contacted a company of D445 VC Battalion about
4 kilometers northwest of Xuyen Moc. In an operation that lasted
well into April, 3 RAR and elements of the 2 RAR/NZ located and
attacked a bunker system recently occupied by the D445 VC Battalion.

April 1971: The month had been frustrating for the Australian SAS
and the overall situation had not changed appreciably. In 23 patrols
they had sighted three enemy and claimed two killed. Lt. B.R.A. Jones
was killed by Friendly Fire -- shot and fatally wounded by a member
of his own patrol. Contacts were still required but the enemy remained
elusive, once he realized ATF troops are looking for him he became
very careful in his daily routine and movement. He continued to move
freely about the province from bunker system to bunker system.

August 1971: Sgt. Frank Cashmore's SAS patrol observed some VC
troops hit by an airstrike and in the debris they found the dead
body of the assistant chief of staff, 274 VC Regiment. He was
carrying a satchel containing money, maps and documents that
provided an accurate and up-to-date picture of the 274 Regiment's
condition and intentions. The VC were moving into position to
attack populated areas in northern Phuoc Tuy to disrupt the
local elections.

September 1971: Because of a snafu, the Australian SAS was unable
to provide adequate coverage and screening for the Task Force and
they failed to detect that 33 NVA Regiment re-entered Phuoc Tuy
province. The SAS was not involved in Operation IVANHOE, the
Australian Task Force's last operation in which 4 RAR was engaged
in "heavy contacts with the North Vietnamese north of Binh Gia".

October 1971: The Australian SAS pulled out of Vietnam for good
and returned home to an openly hostile reception from their own
Army. Although the mission record of the SAS Regiment suggested
impressive statistics for a small unit, not everyone felt that
the SAS performed well in Vietnam.

January 1972: Ian McFarlane took over the regiment from Lawrie
Clark, at a time when "SAS" was considered "a dirty word" in the
Army. Officers were warned that a posting to the SAS could curtail
their careers and the regiment tried to find new roles to avoid the
possibility of being disbanded. It would be some time before the
SAS Regiment was widely accepted as a permanent part of the
Australian Army. One thing that saved them was working with US
Navy SEALs and the US Army Special Forces in Vietnam. The
members who served with the AATTV had a front row seat to a
wide variety of missions and concluded the potential special
ops extended far beyond the reconnaissance patrols that were
the focus of SAS operations in Vietnam.


5. May 1968. Part of the Australian TF found themselves besieged
at FSBs CORAL and BALMORAL and American air power was called
for help. US aircraft carried out airstrikes on advancing and
retreating NVA
and their supply lines.

You do know that that is the point of establishing FSBs don't you? (of
course you don't), give the enemy a target they must engage, then use max
force against them. That is why the Americans asked 1 ATF to move into the
previously US held AO Surfers, to clear it out, they did and then went back
to their own AO.



They never cleared it out, and were sent packing back to the Phuoc Tuy
province where they obviously failed to clear out the enemy there
as well.


All the airstrikes and arty in the world is of no use if the
Infantry can't hold the position.


Your infantry would have been dead meat without the airstrikes
and artillery. Being dead always makes it difficult to hold
a position.

Of course the enemy understood the real threats better than
you ever will. A Viet Cong officer spelled that out for us
with his thoughts on US Airmobility:


" The South Vietnamese government troops
did not pose too much of a problem to the
Viet Cong, but the Americans with their
helicopters and artillery changed the
face of the war overnight "
~ Hai Chua, PLAF