VOR Check question

Ah, cool, thank you very, VERY much for posting those references.

The FAA's policy subject to ICAO membership doesn't make it regulatory,
as the ICAO is a standards organization and holds no sovereignty. If a
DOT organinzation outside the FAA, or a department outside the DOT,
adopted those ICAO standards as regulatory, then the FAA would assume
an indirect regulatory role - even so, the equipment requirement would
be arguable (the equipment assumption is for the purpose of determining
minima, not actual navigation, and regulatory equipment requirements
are otherwise very precise). But, as far as I know, this is not the
case.

The second part describes Class I and Class II navigation, but doesn't
spell out an equipment requirement either. On the contrary, it says
that you don't automatically need equipment appropriate for the
corresponding class of navigation.

Stan Gosnell wrote:

wrote in :

Not so. VOR is still the primary means of navigation in the NAS.
Even the latest and greatest airline aircraft with dual GPS sensors,
dual FMSes, triple IRUs, etc, cannot be dispatched without operate VOR
receivers (in their case two).

The presumption is that the GPS system can fail at any time; at least
in a given area. WAAS doesn't mitigate that whatsoever.

Not only airliners - I have to have 2 (not just one, but 2) operable VORs
to dispatch offshore, where there are precisely zero VOR transmitters,
and I'm almost always out of range of any VOR. But both VORs have to be
operable to dispatch IFR.

Ain't bureaucracy wonderful?

I suppose they feel you might need them on the leg back to shore?

"Brien K. Meehan" wrote:

Ah, cool, thank you very, VERY much for posting those references.

The FAA's policy subject to ICAO membership doesn't make it regulatory,
as the ICAO is a standards organization and holds no sovereignty. If a
DOT organinzation outside the FAA, or a department outside the DOT,
adopted those ICAO standards as regulatory, then the FAA would assume
an indirect regulatory role - even so, the equipment requirement would
be arguable (the equipment assumption is for the purpose of determining
minima, not actual navigation, and regulatory equipment requirements
are otherwise very precise). But, as far as I know, this is not the
case.


Indeed, ICAO is not regulatory. What the FAA accepts as navigation policy,
though, is subject to FAA regulation, ala 91.205(d)(2); i.e.
"appropriate." "Appropriate" serves to the benefit of the FAA, not the
pilot.

The second part describes Class I and Class II navigation, but doesn't
spell out an equipment requirement either. On the contrary, it says
that you don't automatically need equipment appropriate for the
corresponding class of navigation.

wrote in message ...


Ron Natalie wrote:

Mark Hansen wrote:


You are also required to have available in the aircraft equipment
necessary
for navigation along your route, in the event GPS goes out. That sounds
like
VOR to me.


Not if you have the right GPS. But an unchecked VOR is technically not
airworthy, so unless you're going to follow the procedures for inop
equipment, it would be easier just to do it.

Not so. VOR is still the primary means of navigation in the NAS. Even
the
latest and greatest airline aircraft with dual GPS sensors, dual FMSes,
triple
IRUs, etc, cannot be dispatched without operate VOR receivers (in their
case
two).

The presumption is that the GPS system can fail at any time; at least in a
given
area. WAAS doesn't mitigate that whatsoever.



I thought that WAAS was approved for sole means of navigation?

Mike
MU-2

wrote in :


I suppose they feel you might need them on the leg back to shore?

For what? Most of our bases have no VOR near them anyway, and no VOR
approach, so they don't do a lot of good.

--
Regards,

Stan

"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary
safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." B. Franklin

"Mike Rapoport" wrote in
nk.net:

I thought that WAAS was approved for sole means of navigation?

Not that I'm aware of. WAAS has nothing to do with reliability, other
than vertical accuracy. Its only function is to give enough vertical
accuracy to allow a semi-precision approach.

--
Regards,

Stan

"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary
safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." B. Franklin

My understanding is that WAAS has an integrety function and is able to
detect an inaccurate signal.

Mike
MU-2

"Stan Gosnell" wrote in message
...
"Mike Rapoport" wrote in
nk.net:

I thought that WAAS was approved for sole means of navigation?

Not that I'm aware of. WAAS has nothing to do with reliability, other
than vertical accuracy. Its only function is to give enough vertical
accuracy to allow a semi-precision approach.

--
Regards,

Stan

"They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary
safety deserve neither liberty nor safety." B. Franklin

wrote in message ...

Not so. VOR is still the primary means of navigation in the NAS. Even
the
latest and greatest airline aircraft with dual GPS sensors, dual FMSes,
triple
IRUs, etc, cannot be dispatched without operate VOR receivers (in their
case
two).

The presumption is that the GPS system can fail at any time; at least in a
given
area. WAAS doesn't mitigate that whatsoever.


So why is it presumed that the VOR system cannot fail?

wrote in message ...

Well, okay, but I work with this stuff all the time.


That doesn't mean you understand it.



Here is from the current FAA Order 8260.19C:

l. Dual Minimums. Enter dual minimums, when authorized. Do not publish
dual minimums unless a 60-foot operational advantage is obtained or a
reduction in visibility can be achieved. To avoid proliferation of dual
minimums, *all IFR aircraft are assumed to have at least one VOR
receiver*. Dual minimums based on a stepdown fix combined with local and
remote altimeter settings could result in four sets of minimums. When two
remote sources are used, treat the source resulting in lower minimums as
the "LOCAL" altimeter setting source in the following paragraphs.
Document only two sets of minimums. The combinations authorized are
minimums with and without a stepdown fix; or minimums with local and
remote altimeter settings.

The words between the asteriks are reflective of FAA Class I navigation
policy, which is a requirement to be a part of ICAO.


FAA Order 8260.19C places no regulatory requirements upon pilots or the
operation of aircraft.

How are you doing with that reference for the timing tables on NACO charts
being IAS?

So why is it presumed that the VOR system cannot fail?

I would assume (and I know the etymology) that VORs fail 1000 square
miles at a time, and GPS fails 3,000,000 square miles at a time. Or,
more to the point, there is more systemic redundancy in the VOR system.

Jose
--
Nothing takes longer than a shortcut.
for Email, make the obvious change in the address.