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#12
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"Stephen Harding" wrote in message ... Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who were members of the real thing. Quite interesting. However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual "Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was doing by 1944. History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing to be doing! History wasnt flying a bomber The bombers served as much as "incentive" for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th. I rather supect different orders applied depending on the importance of the mission and the roleof the unit concerned. Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of "never losing a bomber"? The command at the time seems to have been happy with them else they doubtless have issued other orders. Keith |
#13
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In article ,
says... Stephen Harding wrote: Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who were members of the real thing. Quite interesting. However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual "Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was doing by 1944. Try this page for one; http://nasaui.ited.uidaho.edu/nasasp...tory/tusk.html Interesting web site and explains why they did use them. But it does not answer the question put forward by Stephen Harding. Were these tactics correct? This question had been answered not so long ago that I'd thought there'd at least be an FAQ somewhere ? Please. Richard. -- A department of the government runs itself. In that it is run for its employees benefit first. Observations of Bernard - No 43 |
#14
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Hardly. You would be blaming a unit for decisions made at a higher level.
The Tuskeegee Airmen were following orders. If it was the wrong tactic then 15th AF was to blame. Jimmy Doolittle, who changed the tactics in the 8th, pointed out in his autobiography that he was willing to accept more bomber losses in the short term for greater gains and lower losses in the long term. (Patton had the same philosophy on the ground.) He was proven correct but it was a hard sell to the bomber crews. The ultimate goal was to destroy the enemy. One way was to ensure the bombers made it through, using fighters to protect them. Another way was to turn those escorting fighters into offensive weapons. The learning curve was pretty steep at the time. Using single-seat single-engine fighters as an offensive weapon in a strategic arena was still new. What works in one theater at one time may not work in another. Curt "Stephen Harding" wrote in message ... Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who were members of the real thing. Quite interesting. However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual "Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was doing by 1944. History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive" for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th. Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of "never losing a bomber"? SMH |
#15
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Henry Bibb wrote:
Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of "never losing a bomber"? Seems like the answer to that might depend on whether you were flying in the bomber, or armchair quarterbacking in the 21st century... sigh Here we go again. SMH |
#16
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Krztalizer wrote:
Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of "never losing a bomber"? I know more revelevent people will chime in here, but that accolade is not at all hollow. Their tactics meant that they followed the tactical definition of Escort Fighter far more accurately than some of the other groups, who were somewhat famous among bomber crews for failing to show up to cover their assignments. Bomber guys talk with literal dread when they mention missions where the escorts never arrived - the 303rd (?) BG was shredded after one such event and it happened to other heavy bomber groups as well. How could 'provided excellent coverage and defense against all enemy comers' be considered a hollow accolade? If you've come to the show to win the war, it's a "hollow accolade" in pointing to being adept at using the wrong tactics. It's one thing if you don't know better, like trying to dogfight Zeros in early 1942, but by 1944, weren't "the right" tactics in bomber "escort" known? Have I jumped the gun on what was known in the context of the times? SMH |
#17
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ArtKramr wrote:
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of "never losing a bomber"? Doesn't sound hollow to me. I guess you had to have been there.((:-)) If I had been there, I'd probably have been baking your bread! SMH |
#18
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George Z. Bush wrote:
Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of "never losing a bomber"? 12th AF was in Italy.....13th AF in the Pacific, I believe. Knew that didn't quite sound right. Thanks George. BTW, was that "your" AF? SMH |
#19
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Keith Willshaw wrote:
"Stephen Harding" wrote in message Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of "never losing a bomber"? The command at the time seems to have been happy with them else they doubtless have issued other orders. No doubt true. I will presume that other fighter groups in the 12th were doing precisely the same thing (sticking with the bombers). In this case, and assuming going after the fighters to destroy them rather than sticking, *was the correct thing to do*, then someone higher up was responsible for escort implementation "error", at a time the 8th AF "knew better" (say early 1944). Guess this all boils down to "what did leadership know and when did they know it?". Some things never change. SMH |
#20
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Pete wrote:
What was the mission they were given? Bomber escort, ground attack, or air superiority? Leaving the bombers exposed leaves them vulnerable to other enemy fighters. They flew their missions they were tasked with, did the job (exceptionally well) and most came home. Actually, I'd say they did more than their mission. They moved American race relations ahead, towards the eventual goal of a color blind nation. But that wasn't the question. The question is was their mission the wrong one, or improperly implemented by command? Was B Davis the one who would dictate that fighters under his command would implement bomber escort by sticking with the bombers or was it an AF wide implementation order, done at a higher level than Group or Wing? SMH |
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