Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?

Stephen Harding wrote in message ...
Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.

However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
"Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
doing by 1944.

History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

Is it a hollow accolade? No. Was their's the best tactics to use?
I'm sure the bomber crews thought so. IMO, it wasn't. The fighter
group that hunts down the enemy, shoots down 300-600 enemy aircraft,
and goes looking for more planes on the ground to shoot up does more
to win the war and protect bombers overall, than the group that sticks
with the bombers and shoots down 111 of the enemy. The Tuskegee
Airman would not have been successful with their tactics if the other
groups weren't out there seriously weakening the Luftwaffe.

~Michael

ArtKramr wrote:

As far as I know no other squadron in the ETO in WW II could make that claim.
And it is a claim that I personally find meritorious. Can anyone find anyone
who flew bombers in WW II that finds the claim "Hollow"?

OK I guess I've used the wrong terminology, "hollow claim".

But...

Let's say some general felt lining everyone up, elbow to elbow,
and marching the unit in nice lines straight across the field at
the entrenched enemy (actually, that's exactly what was being
done through a good part of WWI, and that's pretty close to what
the heavy day bombers of WWII were doing) was a valid tactic.

Would having a unit claim to have the straightest marching
lines in the Army be something to be put down in the unit history?
During the Civil War, there *were* units well known for their smart
changes in formation and straight line advances (something useful
in maintaining frontal cohesion and hitting power against enemy over
broken ground). Of course totally inappropriate by WWI.

I know using such inappropriate tactics during WWII isn't the same
as sticking close to a bomber formation you have been tasked to
protect. But *if* such a method of bomber escort was "inappropriate",
then the usefulness of the unit in winning the war was reduced.

The bravery of the people involved isn't in question, nor lowered
because of the possible lack of validity of methods used.

Probably better to switch the focus of my question, as it seems
people are getting personally offended by some implications of my
wording.

Rephrased...

Was "going after the LW and destroying it" a known "better" tactic
in winning WWII in the air, than the previously implemented "stick
with the bombers" paradigm (for the 8th AF)?

If so, was this "correct tactic" recognized by leadership by 1944?

Why would this "correct tactic" not be universally applied to all
theaters of the ETO by 1944? (I'm assuming the distances to/from
targets aren't especially longer than from England, nor the supply
of escorts significantly different for Italian versus English
based AFs).


SMH

"Stephen Harding" wrote in message
...
ArtKramr wrote:



Why would this "correct tactic" not be universally applied to all
theaters of the ETO by 1944? (I'm assuming the distances to/from
targets aren't especially longer than from England, nor the supply
of escorts significantly different for Italian versus English
based AFs).


I'm not convinced they are good assumptions and I'd be
grateful if anyone has a few facts that we can examine
before making that judgement

What were the relative strengths of the bomber and fighter forces ?

How strong was the Luftwaffe in each region ?

What were the typical targets ?

How strong were the defenses in comparison ?

Keith

I know using such inappropriate tactics during WWII isn't the same
as sticking close to a bomber formation you have been tasked to
protect. But *if* such a method of bomber escort was "inappropriate",
then the usefulness of the unit in winning the war was reduced.

Everyone plays a role, and the Tuskeegee Airmen played theirs to a very high
standard. Tactics were not static - there was no "right tactic" for the period
of "1944-1945" - any set-piece attempts at tactics were bound to get you in a
world of trouble in a modern war, so what was tried and used to great advantage
in some places would not have been as advantageous in others. There isn't a
point in refighting the strategic planning conferences of units long gone to
dust - the central contention of your original question was, basically, did the
Tuskeegee Airmen have a reason to crow about their 'no bomber lost due to enemy
fighters' accolade. I think the answers from the mob made it clear.


The bravery of the people involved isn't in question, nor lowered
because of the possible lack of validity of methods used.


Same can be said of many other aircraft types and military units - USN Torpedo
Bomber crews, sacrificed in droves while proving they could follow current
attack doctrine comes straight to mind.

Was "going after the LW and destroying it" a known "better" tactic
in winning WWII in the air, than the previously implemented "stick
with the bombers" paradigm (for the 8th AF)?

These are elements of the same strategy, such as a boxer using a one-two punch.
If every time the fighters broke away to pursue the Luftwaffe, then (as
happened), the LW mustered a large force of rocket-armed heavy fighters to make
a nearly unmolested attack on the bomber stream with predictably bad results
for our side. Now, those fighters of ours that were chasing single seat
fighters all the way to Linz were following that "better tactic", but it wasn't
'better' that day.

If so, was this "correct tactic" recognized by leadership by 1944?


Good tactics are arrows in a quiver, not a Holy Unbroken Rule that applies to
all situations, days, and units.



Why would this "correct tactic" not be universally applied to all
theaters of the ETO by 1944?

Because universal tactics are Maginotesque.

v/r
Gordon
====(A+C====
USN SAR

Donate your memories - write a note on the back and send your old photos to a
reputable museum, don't take them with you when you're gone.

Thanks George. BTW, was that "your" AF?

12th, and before you have to ask, I was in Troop Carrier flying goonies,
which
is why I stayed out of the discussion about the Tuskegee Airmen.

George Z.


My grandfather was in the 17th TCS as a gooney pilot.




Ron
Pilot/Wildland Firefighter

Ron wrote:
Thanks George. BTW, was that "your" AF?

12th, and before you have to ask, I was in Troop Carrier flying goonies,
which
is why I stayed out of the discussion about the Tuskegee Airmen.

George Z.


My grandfather was in the 17th TCS as a gooney pilot.

Your granddad was in the 64th TCGp....I was in the 4th TCSq, 62nd TCGp. Your
granddad's outfit was mostly involved in servicing the Yugoslav part of the
theater, whereas we mostly worked the NW part of Italy (up around Genoa and
Milan, etc.). The third TCGp (the 60th) was based around Naples and did mostly
intra-theater stuff. Small world!

George Z.




Ron
Pilot/Wildland Firefighter

my understanding is that a wing or squad or whatever you guys call it, stays
with the bombers, and other groups are assigned the straffing, and chasing
off, and aerial combat with the huns, i have read many books by different
guys who were there, and this is what i'm led to believe happens.
If a group was there to stay with the bombers then thats what they were
ordered to do, there was top cover, low cover, sweeping missions, and the
like, each group assigned to do a particular part in that mission.
"Stephen Harding" wrote in message
...
Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.

However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
"Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
doing by 1944.

History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?


SMH

John S. Shinal wrote:

Stephen Harding wrote:

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

None other than ace Robert S. Johnson spoke about how they
made sure they were not drawn away from escort position in order to
chase easy kills. In many instances the 56th FG would dispatch a
single squadron or pair of flights in order to engage targets of
opportunity (Luftwaffe fighters) while the rest of the group continued
escorting the bombers along their route.

This would have been before the loosening of regulations on escort
correct? At this time, the numbers of escorts available were still
small and the opposition fairly high (and skilled) in number. This
would also have been a shorter escort run, since Johnson was a P-47
pilot.

The key is really not to get drawn away from the bombers you
are charged with escorting, since catching up is sometimes not
possible, and other times may be too late.

ONLY after significant numbers of long range fighters were
available were tactics changed to a roaming cover (Zemke fan, or
Roving High Cover are two of the names used for this technique). All
the first-hand accounts I have read stated that the suggestion was put
forth by squadrons & groups, but was made policy by the major AF
command. I don't know if their particular AF implemented it, or merely
the 8th AF.

It has sometimes been said that the PTO was more a "fighter pilot's
war", meaning that groups were more free to improvise. Tactics
were discussed in more informal manner and less a "top down" command
type of approach.

Certainly in the Pacific, fighter groups were less tightly attached
to the bombers they were escorting, allowing for fighters roaming
ahead of the bomber formations in order to break up on coming enemy.

I understand at one point, the 8th AF dictated escorts be no farther
than about 100 feet of an escorted bomber! Don't know if that is
actually true, but I believe during 1943 and very, very early 1944,
the fighters were not allowed much leeway in how they did their escort.

I'd say that the Tuskeegee Airmen sacrificed their personal
scores (only one pilot made ace, IIRC) in order to protect the
bombers. Ultimately, it was the strategic bomber that made the
difference instead of the fighter escort mission.

I'd say it was the right move, although not a choice that was
correct by a huge and obvious margin. Credit to them for their
devotion.

Absolutely true, especially when one throws in what those fellows
had to endure just getting to the fight.


SMH

Michael wrote:

Stephen Harding wrote in message ...

Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.

However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
"Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
doing by 1944.

History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?


Is it a hollow accolade? No. Was their's the best tactics to use?
I'm sure the bomber crews thought so. IMO, it wasn't. The fighter
group that hunts down the enemy, shoots down 300-600 enemy aircraft,
and goes looking for more planes on the ground to shoot up does more
to win the war and protect bombers overall, than the group that sticks
with the bombers and shoots down 111 of the enemy. The Tuskegee
Airman would not have been successful with their tactics if the other
groups weren't out there seriously weakening the Luftwaffe.

I agree with you overall, but do not know that the other groups were
using any different tactics than the black fighter squadrons. It would
seem likely all the groups in the AF were told to do escort the same
way.


SMH

Your granddad was in the 64th TCGp....I was in the 4th TCSq, 62nd TCGp. Your
granddad's outfit was mostly involved in servicing the Yugoslav part of the
theater, whereas we mostly worked the NW part of Italy (up around Genoa and
Milan, etc.). The third TCGp (the 60th) was based around Naples and did
mostly
intra-theater stuff. Small world!

George Z.

He told me stories of being in Italy when Mussolini was killed and they drove
thru the city and saw the body hanging.

Another time they were flying some weapons to some partisans, and there was not
enough straight distance to land and take off because it was in a mountain
valley, even in the C-47, so the takeoff and landing was all done in a turn.


Ron
Tanker 65, C-54E (DC-4)