Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?

I think you'll find that all the groups did this, wether they were assigned
to escort, high cover, withdrawal support; an element would break away to
attack targets of opporchancity, some would even go straffing if there was
no show by the luftwaffe.
This as i have said before is a result of reading many books by many of the
guys who were there, i am in no way an expert.
"John S. Shinal" wrote in message
...
Stephen Harding wrote:

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

None other than ace Robert S. Johnson spoke about how they
made sure they were not drawn away from escort position in order to
chase easy kills. In many instances the 56th FG would dispatch a
single squadron or pair of flights in order to engage targets of
opportunity (Luftwaffe fighters) while the rest of the group continued
escorting the bombers along their route.

The key is really not to get drawn away from the bombers you
are charged with escorting, since catching up is sometimes not
possible, and other times may be too late.

ONLY after significant numbers of long range fighters were
available were tactics changed to a roaming cover (Zemke fan, or
Roving High Cover are two of the names used for this technique). All
the first-hand accounts I have read stated that the suggestion was put
forth by squadrons & groups, but was made policy by the major AF
command. I don't know if their particular AF implemented it, or merely
the 8th AF.

I'd say that the Tuskeegee Airmen sacrificed their personal
scores (only one pilot made ace, IIRC) in order to protect the
bombers. Ultimately, it was the strategic bomber that made the
difference instead of the fighter escort mission.

I'd say it was the right move, although not a choice that was
correct by a huge and obvious margin. Credit to them for their
devotion.



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i think we have to stay in context here; the bombers were assigned targets,
primary, secondary, or targets of opportunity, i.e. the nearest strategic
target to their intended mission. They were assigned the destruction of a
particular target such as the oilfields, aircraft production, industrial
targets, these cannot be destroyed by straffing; bombs are much more
effective.
The were some times hitting airfields, but you'll find that the medium
bombers would do most of the bombing of airfields as part of support of a
larger mission, to soften up the defences, and the fighters would straffe
them, straffing was effective if a target of opportunity was in their area,
they would even follow the enemy down, and attack the landing patterns at
the airfields, they could destroy many planes this way, because of their
speed and the abilty to get low and their aglity, bombers were not really
designed to do this, thats why the medium bombers would attack them, other
targets of opportunity for them being ghost fields, (not officially
designated as an airfield, but an ordinary field suitable to be used to
avoid their detection, and used as a forward operating fighter field). They
would stumble on these and they had the chance to do something about it.
Each force had a perticular part to play in a mission, wether it be the
fighters on bomber escort, withdrawal support, top cover, etc, the medium
bombers hitting smaller targets in support, softening defences, airfields
etc, and the heavies attacking ussually a few targets at one time with
various groups, including a diversionary raid, to fool the enemy as to the
intended target.
Each group, combat wing, etc contributing to the overall picture until the
ultimate defeat of the enemy.
The bombers did major work on hitting hitlers oil supplies, ultimately
grounding his airforce for lack of fuel.
....Each had a part to play!!
"Michael" wrote in message
om...
Stephen Harding wrote in message
...
Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where
intermission had discussions with a couple fellows who
were members of the real thing. Quite interesting.

However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that
they never lost a bomber to enemy fighters that they
escorted. One reason, according to one of the actual
"Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than
follow the German fighters to the ground as the 8th was
doing by 1944.

History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

Is it a hollow accolade? No. Was their's the best tactics to use?
I'm sure the bomber crews thought so. IMO, it wasn't. The fighter
group that hunts down the enemy, shoots down 300-600 enemy aircraft,
and goes looking for more planes on the ground to shoot up does more
to win the war and protect bombers overall, than the group that sticks
with the bombers and shoots down 111 of the enemy. The Tuskegee
Airman would not have been successful with their tactics if the other
groups weren't out there seriously weakening the Luftwaffe.

~Michael

Stephen Harding wrote:
This would have been before the loosening of regulations on escort
correct? At this time, the numbers of escorts available were still
small and the opposition fairly high (and skilled) in number. This
would also have been a shorter escort run, since Johnson was a P-47
pilot.

Correct. It was not too long after the 56th FG became fully
operational. Johnson, Gabreski, Schilling and Zemke all had relatively
low scores at this point (compared to their later tallies).



It has sometimes been said that the PTO was more a "fighter pilot's
war", meaning that groups were more free to improvise. Tactics
were discussed in more informal manner and less a "top down" command
type of approach.

Absolutely. John Blackburn in VF-17 developed the Roving High
Cover tactic in the Solomons at a squadron meeting, and got approval
from their next higher command relatively quickly. It was pretty much
done on a handshake, and as long as it was successful, the brass were
willing to let them improvise with minor limitations (only the most
experienced pilots, no lower than a particular altitude, etc.).

I understand at one point, the 8th AF dictated escorts be no farther
than about 100 feet of an escorted bomber! Don't know if that is
actually true, but I believe during 1943 and very, very early 1944,
the fighters were not allowed much leeway in how they did their escort.

I've seen this described by members of the 95th BG and in
short stories about John Godfrey and Gabreski.




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362436 (Ron) wrote:

[snip]

Ron
Tanker 65, C-54E (DC-4)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Ya' landed the job eh? Congrats!

Ron
Tanker 65, C-54E (DC-4)
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Ya' landed the job eh? Congrats!

Yes, got the phone call a little bit ago. Turns out this plane was Adm Nimitz
personal transport during WW2, so I will actually be flying a plane with some
real military history to it.

I will be based in Silver City tanker base for apr-jul, then Oregon at a tanker
base there for jul-oct






Ron
Tanker 65, C-54E (DC-4)

362436 (Ron) wrote:
Mike Marron wrote:

Ya' landed the job eh? Congrats!

Yes, got the phone call a little bit ago. Turns out this plane was Adm Nimitz
personal transport during WW2, so I will actually be flying a plane with some
real military history to it.

I will be based in Silver City tanker base for apr-jul, then Oregon at a tanker
base there for jul-oct

Cool. Maybe you can also moonlight with that 135 charter outfit in
Silver City during the off-season.

Subject: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
From: "Emmanuel Gustin"
Date: 2/12/04 3:54 PM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

"Stephen Harding" wrote in message
...

History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing
to be doing! The bombers served as much as "incentive"
for the LW to come up to fight, as they were in destroying
German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.

I think there are two separate issues involved, related but
not identical.

One is the use of correct escort tactics. Many airforces,
including the USAAF, started the war with faulty escort
tactics. They put the fighters very close to the bombers,
which was good for the morale of the bomber crews, but
gave the enemy the opportunity to set up his attacks unhindered
and put the escort fighters in a disadvantageous position.
Later it was recognized that the escort fighters needed more
freedom and a better position, so that they could control the
airspace around the bomber formation more effectively. This
also allowed them to disrupt enemy interceptor formations
before they could align for their attacks. This was probably
the best way to cope with Luftwaffe tactics such as head-on
attacks or attacks from the rear in close formation, which
needed careful preparation. Establishing a presence over
enemy airfields was an unorthodox 'escort' method, but it
worked by attacking enemy fighters when they were most
vulnerable.

The other choice is one of air force strategy. Initially the 8th
AF relied on its bombers to destroy the Luftwaffe, by halting
aircraft production. But attacks on aircraft factories achieved
much less than hoped for and the bombers were suffering heavy
losses. So Doolittle decided to rely on his fighters, not his
bombers, to destroy the Luftwaffe and win air supremacy.
This worked much better, in part because the fighters were
quite effective at destroying enemy aircraft, but also because
the real weakness of the Luftwaffe was not aircraft but pilots
--- there were enough aircraft, even at the very end of the war,
despite all the bombing; but the shortage of trained pilots was
chronic.

But neither consideration implies that the Tuskegee Airmen
were 'wrong'. Even at the end of the war there was still a need
to provide a strong escort for the bomber formation; not all
fighters could roam freely over enemy territory. Especially
when the Me 262 appeared, numbers were really important --
the German interceptors had to run the gauntlet of escort fighters
diving on to them, on their way in and out.


See "Fighter Cover RAF Style" on my website.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

From: Stephen Harding


Saw the Tuskeegee Airmen movie earlier this week where intermission had
discussions with a couple fellows who were members of the real thing. Quite
interesting.

However, they mentioned the oft repeated accolade that they never lost a
bomber to enemy fighters that they escorted. One reason, according to one of
the actual "Airmen", was they *stuck with their charges* rather than follow the
German fighters to the ground as the 8th was doing by 1944.

History seems to say this was precisely the *wrong* thing to be doing! The
bombers served as much as "incentive" for the LW to come up to fight, as they
were in destroying German war fighting resources. The shift from "sticking
with the bombers" to "follow the enemy anywhere and
destroy him" seemed to do the trick for the 8th.

You are using the incorrect "history" in your assessment. The tactics of the
Tuskeegee Airmen derived from their mission. And WHAT was their mission?

Their mission was no less then the beginning of the racial integration of the
US Armed Forces......no small feat considering the state of US race relations
in the 1940's (a mere 75 years after the end of the Civil War) and the amount
of inherent inertia in a bureaucracy the size of the US Department of Defense.

The group was formed at the behest of social progressive Eleanor Roosevelt,
IIRC. They were not tasked with winning THE WAR against the Germans.....they
were tasked with winning A BATTLE with the (then) current (sad) state of racial
affairs back in the US.

As I am sure any of them will tell you, everything about the Tuskeegee Airmen
must be viewed through the prism of the racial context of the
times......including their strict adherence to following military ORDERS
governing their tactics while escorting the bomber fleets and engaging any
attackers.

They didn't follow enemy fighters to the ground because they had strict orders
directing them to stay with the bomber groups.....and the white guys in the
bombers loved them for staying in position (although the black TA's couldn't
even have a drink in the white base officer's club.....ask Art K.).

Getting the white guys in the bombers to respect the black Tuskeegee Airmen,
and having the TA develop a reputation for being very predictable and
dependable in battle (i.e., this respect was not misplaced) was a major goal of
the whole operation and a crucial first step in integrating the Armed Forces.

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen in particular,
following the wrong tactic? Is the reputation of this fine group of fighter
pilots somewhat over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?
SMH

Wrong questions. The Tuskeegee Airmen performed their assigned tasks in a
fashion consistent with high military discipline and efficiency and can be
proud of their service.
Dave

On Thu, 12 Feb 2004 12:46:20 -0500, Stephen Harding
wrote:

It's not yet clear to me that the tactic of "sticking with
the bombers" was not known as the *wrong* tactic by early 1944.

As I recall the Battle of Britain, the German fighters were difficult
to cope with because they did *not* stick with the bombers -- at least
in the sense that they flew nearby. Instead they flew at a much higher
altitude. That's what caused the Brits to adopt the strategy of
sending the Hurricanes after the bombers and the Spitfires after the
fighters.

Nichts?

all the best -- Dan Ford
email:

see the Warbird's Forum at www.warbirdforum.com
and the Piper Cub Forum at www.pipercubforum.com

ArtKramr wrote:

See "Fighter Cover RAF Style" on my website.

I think I've read all your stuff, but reread this article.

I wonder if the difference in escort "technique" reflected
the different escort experience of the two air forces?

The USAAF was flying deep escort and needed to have a looser
attachment to the bombers in order to maintain a tactical
edge as Emmanuel has described. This was "known" to the 8th
AF fighter command by early 1944 (and 9th AF as well).

The RAF didn't do deep penetration escort (the Spit didn't
have the range) and would be more inclined to stick close
to its escort charges. The fact that individuals would peel
off to go after AAA is probably a reflection of the confidence
of having air superiority and adequate numbers by mid/late '44.

I don't think the peel off would have been done in '43.

You're always a great read, even more than once!


SMH