VX-4 phantom loads

On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 10:04:08 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Tex Houston wrote:

Guy and Ed,

If you are interested in all things Weasel, Ed Rock's book is now available
at http://www.authorhouse.com/BookStore...x?bookid=28149 .

Thanks for the link. The preview is very interesting, as the date shows that
it is describing the first attack on SAM sites after the first US a/c, an F-4
(or maybe it was an RF-4), had been downed by an SA-2 on 24 July 1965. A real
cluster**** by all accounts, and now we've got the details that explain why.

Guy

I saw some galley's of Ed Rock's anthology of Weaseling two years ago
at River Rats in Las Vegas. It should have some interesting stories in
the package--a lot like Don Shepard's "Misty" on the F-100 Fast-FAC
business.

For some more details on the mission in the preview, take a look
around p. 90 of Tom Clancy/Chuck Horner's collaborative work, "Every
Man a Tiger". Horner and Roger Myhrum were on the mission.

Ed Rock was an instructor of mine at Nellis in '65-66 and arrived at
Korat in June of '66 as one of the first contingent of F-105F Wild
Weasels. (He wasn't on that mission that is excerpted for the book.)
He flew his 100 mission tour in the summer and fall of '66 and became
one of the first Weasels to survive the experience.

Ed was back at Korat in '72 when I returned in the F-4. At that time
he was commander of the 17th Wild Weasel Squadron (combined with the
561st WWS). He flew in both Linebacker I and II and we shared the
experience on a couple of trips North together.

He is probably one of the most unlikely looking fighter pilots you
would ever meet.



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Phormer Phighter Phlyer wrote:



Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com


For Ed-I'm reading 'To Hanoi and back, the USAF and North VietNam,
1966-1973, Wayne Thompson, and in the first chapter he mentions that the
late model F-4E had a rudimentary fly by wire back up for pitch control,
for emergencies when PC-1/2 were gone...ever heard of this?

Can ya try again Ed, I got an 'error' for your answer-you can email direct.

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 00:48:11 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:


Whew, what a load off my senile mind! That's consistent with my
recollection of Korat in '72-3. I don't recall the big ALQ-101 until I
arrived at Torrejon and we had them with the F-4Cs that we received in
October of '73 when the E-models were realigned at Bitburg.

Not sure what you mean by the "big ALQ-101". Are you referring to the longer versions starting with the
(V)3, as opposed to the original short versions like the ones shown in Davis? I've got a shot of a 4th
TFS bird carrying an ALQ-101(V)-3 according to the caption, on the left I/B. It's got the strip lights
but the short gun fairing. It may have one on the right I/B as well, but the angle is wrong. Oddly, the
a/c has three tanks, but apparently no weapons. BTW, most of the photos of 388th F-4Es I have are in the
Warbird Tech series book titled "F-4 Gun Nosed Phantoms".

By "big" I mean relative to the much shorter ALQ-87. The 101 was
almost twice as long.

The original one wasn't; it was the (V)-3 et. seq. that were the size you describe.

I'm not familiar with that book, but hope that it has good
documentation regarding dates and conditions to accompany the
pictures.

It does, with photos from first arrival at Korat up through1972, as well as shots of other units over the
years. But there are more of the 388th in that era than any other unit or time.

While descriptions of block numbers, munition loads, etc.
are helpful, it's also necessary to relate it to time and place. If
you haven't had the chance, take a look at Don Logan's book on the
388th TFW. He managed to get pix of nearly all the aircraft at Korat
during his time there, both on the ground and inflight. He couples it
with some good descriptive text and, since he did the picture taking
it pretty well aligns with some fixed dates.

I'll try and find a copy.

I've only got a single shot of a Combat Martin a/c, a 357th a/c, and it's carrying what appears to be an
ALQ-71 on the left O/B (and probably on the right I/B also), but the shot is from the left wing so it
can't be seen. Ryan's Raiders', I don't know. I'd think they'd want to keep the jammers turned off (ISTR
that the Vark pilots normally kept their's off, even though they were loaded with a pair of -87s in
Vietnam). The idea was to give the minimum warning that they were coming, and rely on terrain masking to
beak any locks. Although at least one 'Vark pilot from that era has said that coming in under the radar
was a joke, and that the RWR was lit up solid for several minutes prior to the target and on the way out.

Whether or not a pod would be on for a mission would be a tactical
choice. If single-ship, the pods of the period would be a good means
of waking up the bad guys that you were inbound. OTOH, if in a
formation, the pods could be used to mask the number as well as to
deny range/azimuth info to the defenses.

If low-level on ingress, it would be a good plan to run silent, but
you might want to light up the pods for the target area, particularly
if popping up fdor weapon delivery.

That's when they were most vulnerable, all right. They especially hated carrying Mk.84s, as they weren't
available with Snakeye fins and the ballute was at most a gleam in the eye of the designers. So they had to
pop to 2,500 feet or so for the delivery owing to the frag envelope, making them the sole attraction and star
of the show.

By "one 'Vark pilot from that era" are you talking about the first
deployment in '68 or the second deployment in '72?

'72 IIRR. Thornborough's F-111 book (the first, small one, not the later big one, although it's probably in
there also) has the comments by some of the crews, including that particular one. He also talked to some of the
'68 crews so I could be confusing things, but I think not.

Coming in under
the radar certainly wouldn't mean all radars--there were simply too
many. But, it most assuredly could mean avoiding Fan Song radars,
denying SA-2 guidance, breaking lock, creating intermittent returns,
etc.

And, as for the RWR being lit up solid for several minutes--all I can
say is, "poor baby"! What was lit up solid? It was common to be
pinged by EW on the tanker. Fan Song and Firecans, along with Barlocks
and other radars would be painting consistently from the border to the
target and back. Was it radar pings, or Activity Light, or LAUNCH, or
AS (Azimuth-Sector)?

I don't remember. IIRC, his point was that sneaking in under the radar was a practical impossibility; the NVN
were always aware they were coming. ISTR there were also claims that the North Vietnamese fired chaff to make
the TFR see 'terrain' and command a pullup, which could put them at 10,000 feet within seconds. Whether there
was any independent proof of this or this is just one of those myths that the crews believed, I don't know;
there were plenty of TFR auto-pullups for unknown reasons. Monsoon rain was a problem in '68, but they
apparently figured that one out.


Knowing what the situation was and what the RWR was telling you was

definitely an acquired skill--one which calmed the nerves after first
encounters with real RWR indications in combat.

From what I recall most of the '72 crews had BTDT in prior tours, so I don't think that was an issue.


Thornborough, in his F-4 book, interviewed several members of the 67th, and IIRR they described their
pre-emptive tasking. This was largely during LB II. I've also got a statement from a contemporary
briefing (quoted in the SAAS Thesis "Planting the Seeds of SEAD: The Wild Weasel in vietnam", by Maj.
William Hewitt, 1993) which describes the use of pre-emptive firings beginning in about April 1972,
accompanied by a chart which breaks down the firings by missile type, number fired, type of firing, and
results for the April-October 1972 period. For the USAF it shows 320/678 Shrike launches were pre-emptive
in that period, while the Standard was 0/230. USN usage was 254/1,257, and 0/165 in the same period.
IIRR, pre-emptive firing had been a navy tactic for some time before the USAF started to use it.

My recollection was that we never had Shrikes in sufficient quantity
for pre-emptive application. We didn't do it with F-100F Weasels; we
didn't do it with F-105F Weasels in '66, we didn't do it with F-105G
Weasels in LB I/II and I never saw it done with F-4C Weasels.

I pulled Thornborough off the shelf to see if I had missed something.
In discussion of the 67th deployment to Korat, starting on 25 Sept '72
(shortly before suspension of bombing N. of 20 degrees), they don't
mention pre-empting. And, most of their missions would have been flown
in areas of low defensive density and hence not very productive for
pre-emptive firing.

When LB II started, the 67th augmented the F-105G Weasels primarily at
night. The mission descriptions track with my recollection of
"detached support" for the night Hunter/Killer mission. F-4C Weasels
separated from F-4E killer elements and roamed, mostly single-ship,
engaging emitters as they were detected. But, no coordinated or
preplanned pre-emptions.

Which Thornborough book are you referring to, the F-4 book or the Iron Hand one? I think this info was in the
(revised) second edition of the F-4 book, but am not certain; it might have been in the Iron Hand book.

It would be good to define "pre-emptive firing" before going much
further. My definition is firing without an emitter targetted.

That
is, lobbing or lofting the Shrike into an area of known defensive
radar but without a specific target for the purpose of keeping an ARM
airborne over the emitter and thereby keeping him shut down.
Time-of-flight for a pre-empt would be on the order of 2-3 minutes
maximum. Probability of detecting, tracking and engaging a radar
during such a tactic would be very low and the only effect would be as
a deterrent, not as a radar kill mechanism.

That's the definition.

Hewitt may be using "pre-emptive" as meaning firing at an emitter
before the emitter has had an opportunity to launch its own weapon.
That would be a common application of the Shrike. (But, if that is the
definition, it doesn't account for the Standard numbers--Standard
required some in-flight programming for most launches and would be a
poor choice for pre-emption by my definition.)

No, your first definition was the correct one. Lofting them into an area where SAMs were known to be (or had
been), to keep the Fan Songsoff the air.

Guy

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Thu, 17 Mar 2005 10:04:08 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Tex Houston wrote:

Guy and Ed,

If you are interested in all things Weasel, Ed Rock's book is now available
at http://www.authorhouse.com/BookStore...x?bookid=28149 .

Thanks for the link. The preview is very interesting, as the date shows that
it is describing the first attack on SAM sites after the first US a/c, an F-4
(or maybe it was an RF-4), had been downed by an SA-2 on 24 July 1965. A real
cluster**** by all accounts, and now we've got the details that explain why.

Guy

I saw some galley's of Ed Rock's anthology of Weaseling two years ago
at River Rats in Las Vegas. It should have some interesting stories in
the package--a lot like Don Shepard's "Misty" on the F-100 Fast-FAC
business.

For some more details on the mission in the preview, take a look
around p. 90 of Tom Clancy/Chuck Horner's collaborative work, "Every
Man a Tiger". Horner and Roger Myhrum were on the mission.

Yeah, now that you mention it, I remember reading that.

snip

Guy

On Sun, 20 Mar 2005 15:15:52 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

And, as for the RWR being lit up solid for several minutes--all I can
say is, "poor baby"! What was lit up solid? It was common to be
pinged by EW on the tanker. Fan Song and Firecans, along with Barlocks
and other radars would be painting consistently from the border to the
target and back. Was it radar pings, or Activity Light, or LAUNCH, or
AS (Azimuth-Sector)?

I don't remember. IIRC, his point was that sneaking in under the radar was a practical impossibility; the NVN
were always aware they were coming. ISTR there were also claims that the North Vietnamese fired chaff to make
the TFR see 'terrain' and command a pullup, which could put them at 10,000 feet within seconds. Whether there
was any independent proof of this or this is just one of those myths that the crews believed, I don't know;
there were plenty of TFR auto-pullups for unknown reasons. Monsoon rain was a problem in '68, but they
apparently figured that one out.

The whole point of terrain masking was to hide or interfere with
weapon guidance. Breaking the lock of the tracking radar by getting
below the antenna depression minimum or putting something solid
between the airplane and the defender.

Coming in undetected was not on the table for consideration. Everyone
pretty much knew we were coming and when. Simple HUMINT reports from
the Thailand bases or ground observers under the refueling tracks
would cover the TOT windows +/- 20 minutes or so.



Knowing what the situation was and what the RWR was telling you was
definitely an acquired skill--one which calmed the nerves after first
encounters with real RWR indications in combat.

From what I recall most of the '72 crews had BTDT in prior tours, so I don't think that was an issue.

Just looked at Hobson. He reports six F-111s lost during Linebacker
I/II.

28 Sept 72--Major AC and 1/Lt WSO
16 Oct --Capt AC and 1/Lt WSO
7 Nov-- Maj AC and Maj WSO
20 Nov-- Capt and Capt
18 Dec-- Lt Col and Major
22 Dec--Capt and 1/Lt

So, we've got at least three first-timers and three more probable (the
Captains.)

Certainly at Korat in the F-105 community, the force was split 50/50
with experience and FNGs. In the F-4 side of the house we had probably
25% with previous tours and the rest were first timers (including,
unbelievably, a couple of Majors with as much as 9 years experience in
the F-4 and no previous combat!)

Consider also that only BTDT crews who had participated in Rolling
Thunder would be SAM and radar-guided defense experienced. Lots of
previous tour guys had flown in S. Vietnam or during protracted
bombing pauses and had never seen a real-world RWR indication.

We actually had a half-dozen brand new 1/Lt arrivals both front and
back cockpit, straight out of training in the F-4 going to RP VI on
their first combat missions. Mike Stevens, squadron Ops Officer in the
34th went to Pack VI as a R/C/P flight lead/instructor pilot for some
of the Linebacker II sorties. (That was something I flat refused to
do!)

My recollection was that we never had Shrikes in sufficient quantity
for pre-emptive application. We didn't do it with F-100F Weasels; we
didn't do it with F-105F Weasels in '66, we didn't do it with F-105G
Weasels in LB I/II and I never saw it done with F-4C Weasels.

I pulled Thornborough off the shelf to see if I had missed something.
In discussion of the 67th deployment to Korat, starting on 25 Sept '72
(shortly before suspension of bombing N. of 20 degrees), they don't
mention pre-empting. And, most of their missions would have been flown
in areas of low defensive density and hence not very productive for
pre-emptive firing.

When LB II started, the 67th augmented the F-105G Weasels primarily at
night. The mission descriptions track with my recollection of
"detached support" for the night Hunter/Killer mission. F-4C Weasels
separated from F-4E killer elements and roamed, mostly single-ship,
engaging emitters as they were detected. But, no coordinated or
preplanned pre-emptions.

Which Thornborough book are you referring to, the F-4 book or the Iron Hand one? I think this info was in the
(revised) second edition of the F-4 book, but am not certain; it might have been in the Iron Hand book.

"Iron Hand"

It would be good to define "pre-emptive firing" before going much
further. My definition is firing without an emitter targetted.

That
is, lobbing or lofting the Shrike into an area of known defensive
radar but without a specific target for the purpose of keeping an ARM
airborne over the emitter and thereby keeping him shut down.
Time-of-flight for a pre-empt would be on the order of 2-3 minutes
maximum. Probability of detecting, tracking and engaging a radar
during such a tactic would be very low and the only effect would be as
a deterrent, not as a radar kill mechanism.

That's the definition.

If that's the definition, I categorically state that I never saw it
done. Never. Not even considered in discussions of how to improve our
tactics. First time I ever heard it suggested was around '74-'75 when
we were going to use it (simulated) in missions against CVBG forces in
the Mediterranean. (I discuss the tactic in my Air Command/Staff
College paper, "Sink the Kiev" as a means of rolling back the defenses
and providing suppression during an attack against a Soviet battle
group.)

Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Sun, 20 Mar 2005 15:15:52 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

And, as for the RWR being lit up solid for several minutes--all I can
say is, "poor baby"! What was lit up solid? It was common to be
pinged by EW on the tanker. Fan Song and Firecans, along with Barlocks
and other radars would be painting consistently from the border to the
target and back. Was it radar pings, or Activity Light, or LAUNCH, or
AS (Azimuth-Sector)?

I don't remember. IIRC, his point was that sneaking in under the radar was a practical impossibility; the NVN
were always aware they were coming. ISTR there were also claims that the North Vietnamese fired chaff to make
the TFR see 'terrain' and command a pullup, which could put them at 10,000 feet within seconds. Whether there
was any independent proof of this or this is just one of those myths that the crews believed, I don't know;
there were plenty of TFR auto-pullups for unknown reasons. Monsoon rain was a problem in '68, but they
apparently figured that one out.

The whole point of terrain masking was to hide or interfere with
weapon guidance. Breaking the lock of the tracking radar by getting
below the antenna depression minimum or putting something solid
between the airplane and the defender.

Coming in undetected was not on the table for consideration. Everyone
pretty much knew we were coming and when. Simple HUMINT reports from
the Thailand bases or ground observers under the refueling tracks
would cover the TOT windows +/- 20 minutes or so.

Sorry for the delayed reply; I've been waiting to get Thornborough's 2nd Ed. "thePhantom Story" from the library,
so I could check my memory against it. AFAIR the Varks didn't need to tank on the way in, and they were usually
operating at night (on solo missions to RP VI) in any case, so I don't think the warning time was anywhere near
what it was for the typical Alpha Strike.

My recollection was that we never had Shrikes in sufficient quantity
for pre-emptive application. We didn't do it with F-100F Weasels; we
didn't do it with F-105F Weasels in '66, we didn't do it with F-105G
Weasels in LB I/II and I never saw it done with F-4C Weasels.

I pulled Thornborough off the shelf to see if I had missed something.
In discussion of the 67th deployment to Korat, starting on 25 Sept '72
(shortly before suspension of bombing N. of 20 degrees), they don't
mention pre-empting. And, most of their missions would have been flown
in areas of low defensive density and hence not very productive for
pre-emptive firing.

When LB II started, the 67th augmented the F-105G Weasels primarily at
night. The mission descriptions track with my recollection of
"detached support" for the night Hunter/Killer mission. F-4C Weasels
separated from F-4E killer elements and roamed, mostly single-ship,
engaging emitters as they were detected. But, no coordinated or
preplanned pre-emptions.

Which Thornborough book are you referring to, the F-4 book or the Iron Hand one? I think this info was in the
(revised) second edition of the F-4 book, but am not certain; it might have been in the Iron Hand book.

"Iron Hand"

It would be good to define "pre-emptive firing" before going much
further. My definition is firing without an emitter targetted.

That
is, lobbing or lofting the Shrike into an area of known defensive
radar but without a specific target for the purpose of keeping an ARM
airborne over the emitter and thereby keeping him shut down.
Time-of-flight for a pre-empt would be on the order of 2-3 minutes
maximum. Probability of detecting, tracking and engaging a radar
during such a tactic would be very low and the only effect would be as
a deterrent, not as a radar kill mechanism.

That's the definition.

If that's the definition, I categorically state that I never saw it
done. Never. Not even considered in discussions of how to improve our
tactics. First time I ever heard it suggested was around '74-'75 when
we were going to use it (simulated) in missions against CVBG forces in
the Mediterranean. (I discuss the tactic in my Air Command/Staff
College paper, "Sink the Kiev" as a means of rolling back the defenses
and providing suppression during an attack against a Soviet battle
group.)

As it turns out, my memory was off; "The Phantom Story" doesn't include any accounts of pre-emptive firing by the
67th TFS in 1972. Knowing that I hadn't dreamed reading an account bya participant who stated they did so, I went
looking on googlegroups and lo and behold found this in a past discussion involving you, Dweezil, Kurt Plummer and
several others on the same subject. You had stated that you were unaware of any, and then we got these posts:
----------------------------------------------------------------

matheson
Feb 6 1999, 12:00 am show options


Ed Rasimus wrote in message et...
Kurt Plummer wrote:

snippage

I NEVER heard of pre-emptive lofting of Shrikes either in early Weasel
days as a 105-driver or during Linebacker as a Phantom Pilot in H/K
teams. The first consideration of pre-emptive ARM firing that I can
recall was in tactics manuals that I researched while at Command &
Staff in '77-78 writing about anti-ship operations.

That's funny, as the Israelis used pre-emptive shrikes at high altitude and
absolute max range (and time of flight) to great advantage in 1967 attacks
on Egyptian SAM sites. Again in '73.

When I started flying C model F-4 Weasels in '78 the pre-emptive shot was
dogma, especially in PACAF, and every check ride we were expected to
calculate a point in space from which to preempt a -45 so as to impact just
prior to strike force bombs on target (supposedly they would unmask and get
the trons on the air and the -45 would hit before reaction time of the
system.

Les
--------------------------------------
Even more relevant was this one:
--------------------------------------

Robert W. King
Feb 6 1999, 12:00 am show options


Hi Ed!

Ed Rasimus wrote in message

t...

[stuff snipped]

I NEVER heard of pre-emptive lofting of Shrikes either in early Weasel
days as a 105-driver or during Linebacker as a Phantom Pilot in H/K
teams. The first consideration of pre-emptive ARM firing that I can
recall was in tactics manuals that I researched while at Command &
Staff in '77-78 writing about anti-ship operations.

In the 561st TFS flying from Khorat RTAFB in 1972, we lofted pre-emptive
Shrikes on a fairly regular basis on force goes to high threat areas. We
also briefed this tactic to the the non-Weasel guys because we had a couple
of incidents where the MIGCAP or strike guys saw the Shrike in flight,
yelled "SAM" and called for a break.

I vaguely recall it being discussed as a possible tactic among the Weasel
crews as early as my tour with the 333rd at Takhli in 1968, but I don't
recall ever actually deliberately launching in that mode on that tour. Of
course, there was the day that Bob Beckpre-empted a Shrike from level flight
on a "patrol the border" mission over Laos after the bombing pause was
ordered by the President in November 68.

(Bob was Major Robert J. Beck, Command Bar-Stooler and highly experienced
Thud driver previously stationed at Spangdahlem AB. He was a sierra hotel
dive bomber.)

It was a couple of months later when that happened. My memory says it was in
Feb 1969 but I'm too lazy to dig out my log book. It was mid-morning. We
were crusing at altitude southbound over Laos a few miles west of the west
end of the DMZ. I had my head down in the cockpit updating the Doppler when
from the corner of my eye, I saw the Shrike come off the outboard station.
Being the Wild Weasel bear of our little crew and in charge of listening for
enemy radar signals (There were none.) and being an all-around alert chap, I
said "What the hell was that!" and then asked Bob what he was shooting at.
He mumbled a bit and then said "We'll talk about it at the debrief." So I
held my water until we got on the ground.

In the step-van on the way in from the flight line to debrief, I got the
whole story. As you know, there aren't a lot of suitable locations to stash
loose items such as checklists, maps and what-not in the cockpit of the
Thud. Bob's solution for map storage when it was not in use was to stick it
under his left thigh. In the course of stretching, he had shifted his weight
on the seat and the map had slid off the seat to the left between the seat
and left console. He tried picking it up with his left hand. He could only
touch the edge of the map with his fingertips.

So in an effort to force his left hand a bit further into the narrow space
between the seat and the console and recapture the map, he moved his right
hand from its normal position on the stick and re-gripped it with his right
wrist rotated so that the thumb was pointed down instead of up. In that
unfamiliar configuration -- while fishing for a map near the cockpit floor
with his left hand -- his right pinkie came in contact with the pickle
button on the stick. The Shrike, ever obedient to its electrical signals,
launched on a independent search and destroy mission over southern Laos.

It was astonishing how much attention we garnered after landing back at
Takhli without that AGM-45 hanging on the outboard. With the bombing halt
still in progress, the Weasels hadn't expended a Shrike in months. As Bob
put it later that night at the bar, "I've been on this base nine months but
I had to debrief guys I'd never seen or heard of before this afternoon."

--
Robert W. King
I'm an ingenieur, NOT a bloody locomotive driver!
------------------------------------------------------

So it appears that it was common at least among the 67th TFS guys, and you were unaware of it at the time. This
suggests that it might also have been happening among the F-105G crews in the April-December period, since the 67th
crews flew with the105Gs at first (as theater indoctrination and to bone up on the latest techniques before they
started flying separate missions).

Guy

On Sun, 27 Mar 2005 09:02:41 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

On Sun, 20 Mar 2005 15:15:52 GMT, Guy Alcala
wrote:

Ed Rasimus wrote:

Sorry for the delayed reply; I've been waiting to get Thornborough's 2nd Ed. "thePhantom Story" from the library,
so I could check my memory against it. AFAIR the Varks didn't need to tank on the way in, and they were usually
operating at night (on solo missions to RP VI) in any case, so I don't think the warning time was anywhere near
what it was for the typical Alpha Strike.

You are correct, the -111s didn't tank routinely and they preferred
night solo. But, my point was that even given that you weren't at high
altitude, the HUMINT reports for the bad guys from the bases as well
as ground observers along the rather limited route options would be
more than enough to let the target area know someone was coming.


If that's the definition, I categorically state that I never saw it
done. Never. Not even considered in discussions of how to improve our
tactics. First time I ever heard it suggested was around '74-'75 when
we were going to use it (simulated) in missions against CVBG forces in
the Mediterranean. (I discuss the tactic in my Air Command/Staff
College paper, "Sink the Kiev" as a means of rolling back the defenses
and providing suppression during an attack against a Soviet battle
group.)

As it turns out, my memory was off; "The Phantom Story" doesn't include any accounts of pre-emptive firing by the
67th TFS in 1972. Knowing that I hadn't dreamed reading an account bya participant who stated they did so, I went
looking on googlegroups and lo and behold found this in a past discussion involving you, Dweezil, Kurt Plummer and
several others on the same subject. You had stated that you were unaware of any, and then we got these posts:
----------------------------------------------------------------

matheson
Feb 6 1999, 12:00 am show options


Ed Rasimus wrote in message et...
Kurt Plummer wrote:

snippage

I NEVER heard of pre-emptive lofting of Shrikes either in early Weasel
days as a 105-driver or during Linebacker as a Phantom Pilot in H/K
teams. The first consideration of pre-emptive ARM firing that I can
recall was in tactics manuals that I researched while at Command &
Staff in '77-78 writing about anti-ship operations.

That's funny, as the Israelis used pre-emptive shrikes at high altitude and
absolute max range (and time of flight) to great advantage in 1967 attacks
on Egyptian SAM sites. Again in '73.

That demonstrates that my statements have been consistent for lo these
many years. And, it also points out that the IAF had a better concept
of tactics as well as a better supply chain than we did. Since their
wars tended to be of the week or less variety, they probably could
expend a bit more aggressively. (I know, the week or less comment is a
bit of exaggeration.)

When I started flying C model F-4 Weasels in '78 the pre-emptive shot was
dogma, especially in PACAF, and every check ride we were expected to
calculate a point in space from which to preempt a -45 so as to impact just
prior to strike force bombs on target (supposedly they would unmask and get
the trons on the air and the -45 would hit before reaction time of the
system.

Les

You might note that '78 is a mere six years after the end of LB II.
And, I mention writing about it in '77 at ACSC.
--------------------------------------
Even more relevant was this one:
--------------------------------------

Robert W. King
Feb 6 1999, 12:00 am show options


Hi Ed!

Ed Rasimus wrote in message

t...

[stuff snipped]


In the 561st TFS flying from Khorat RTAFB in 1972, we lofted pre-emptive
Shrikes on a fairly regular basis on force goes to high threat areas. We
also briefed this tactic to the the non-Weasel guys because we had a couple
of incidents where the MIGCAP or strike guys saw the Shrike in flight,
yelled "SAM" and called for a break.

While I've got great respect for Bear King's experience, I've got to
say that as one of about eight crews of H/K specialists in the F-4
squadron at the time, I would have seen it done or at least briefed
during the summer and fall of '72.

And, while the AGM-78 "Standard ARM" often got a SAM call from newbies
in the area, a Shrike shot was way too short in duration and too small
for most folks to see. If someone did see it, the greater probability
would be an "Atoll" call. (The Standard sightings were enough of a
problem that Weasels began to alert the force with a call of "Shotgun"
prior to firing the big brute.)

I vaguely recall it being discussed as a possible tactic among the Weasel
crews as early as my tour with the 333rd at Takhli in 1968, but I don't
recall ever actually deliberately launching in that mode on that tour. Of
course, there was the day that Bob Beckpre-empted a Shrike from level flight
on a "patrol the border" mission over Laos after the bombing pause was
ordered by the President in November 68.

So, an inadvertent firing recount and a confirmation that it wasn't
done in '68.


So it appears that it was common at least among the 67th TFS guys, and you were unaware of it at the time. This
suggests that it might also have been happening among the F-105G crews in the April-December period, since the 67th
crews flew with the105Gs at first (as theater indoctrination and to bone up on the latest techniques before they
started flying separate missions).

Guy

The 67th deployment was late in the year. (I'm too lazy to look it up
this AM, but I'd say Oct-Nov of '72). They did some pairings with the
561st/17th F-105G guys for local orientation, but that was mostly to
lower Route Packs and very brief.

When they finally got thrown into LB II, there was so much activity
upon arrival in RP-VI that pre-empting would have been virtually
impossible. And, if you're going to have all sort of hot sites on the
scope, why not target specific ones?


Ed Rasimus
Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret)
"When Thunder Rolled"
www.thunderchief.org
www.thundertales.blogspot.com