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#21
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Why publish a plate for an OTS approach?
"KP" nospam@please wrote in message . .. It's not "apparent" the aircraft was "cleared for a deauthorized approach by ATC" at all. If the controller used the phraseology "CLEARED APPROACH" it was up to the pilot to select the instrument approach. That doesn't include an approach that was known (or should have been known through a proper pre-flight) to be OTS. It's apparent the controller did not use the phraseology "CLEARED APPROACH". From the NTSB report: "At 1145:15, the controller stated, "november seven four charlie charlie, cleared for the s d f approach to uh somerset, maintain four thousand until your established on the approach." The pilot replied, "ok maintain four till established (unintelligible), thank you four charlie charlie." The controller then repeated the approach clearance and this time specified the SDF RWY 4 approach, and the pilot again repeated that he was to maintain 4,000 feet until established and was cleared for the SDF RWY 4 approach at Somerset." http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...00FA067&rpt=fa |
#22
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Why publish a plate for an OTS approach?
"KP" nospam@please writes:
wrote I think if there is anything that is subject to criticism here it is that the pilot was apparently cleared for a deauthorized approach by ATC. It seems to me that they should have known of its status. It's not "apparent" the aircraft was "cleared for a deauthorized approach by ATC" at all. If the controller used the phraseology "CLEARED APPROACH" it was up to the pilot to select the instrument approach. That doesn't include an approach that was known (or should have been known through a proper pre-flight) to be OTS. Doesn't the standard clearance phraseology include the approach for which one is cleared? |
#23
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Why publish a plate for an OTS approach?
"Everett M. Greene" wrote in message ... Doesn't the standard clearance phraseology include the approach for which one is cleared? CLEARED APPROACH- ATC authorization for an aircraft to execute any standard or special instrument approach procedure for that airport. Normally, an aircraft will be cleared for a specific instrument approach procedure. |
#24
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Why publish a plate for an OTS approach?
you can no doubt answer a question I have long wondered about. What information does the controller have at his immediate disposal that an approach is not authorized? Are they just supposed to have an awareness, or is there some listing at their radar stations that show NA approaches? (I was once nipped by poor preflight planning when I was informed by the approach controller that an approach I wanted was FDC NOTAM'd "not authorized at night". Much scrambling. Never forgot to check FDC NOTAMS again after that) On Thu, 31 May 2007 17:49:03 GMT, "Steven P. McNicoll" wrote: "KP" nospam@please wrote in message ... It's not "apparent" the aircraft was "cleared for a deauthorized approach by ATC" at all. If the controller used the phraseology "CLEARED APPROACH" it was up to the pilot to select the instrument approach. That doesn't include an approach that was known (or should have been known through a proper pre-flight) to be OTS. It's apparent the controller did not use the phraseology "CLEARED APPROACH". From the NTSB report: "At 1145:15, the controller stated, "november seven four charlie charlie, cleared for the s d f approach to uh somerset, maintain four thousand until your established on the approach." The pilot replied, "ok maintain four till established (unintelligible), thank you four charlie charlie." The controller then repeated the approach clearance and this time specified the SDF RWY 4 approach, and the pilot again repeated that he was to maintain 4,000 feet until established and was cleared for the SDF RWY 4 approach at Somerset." http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/GenPDF.asp?...00FA067&rpt=fa |
#25
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Why publish a plate for an OTS approach?
wrote in message news you can no doubt answer a question I have long wondered about. What information does the controller have at his immediate disposal that an approach is not authorized? Are they just supposed to have an awareness, or is there some listing at their radar stations that show NA approaches? I don't believe there is no one-size-fits-all procedure. ARTCC air traffic managers are charged with coordinating with other air traffic facilities in their area to ensure that adequate procedures are established for NOTAM distribution. That gets the NOTAM to the terminal facility, it's up to that facility's management to ensure the controllers are aware of pertinent NOTAMs. |
#26
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Why publish a plate for an OTS approach?
On May 30, 11:31 am, wrote:
When you think about it a bit, there is no real difference between an approach deauthorized last week and one deauthorized last year or two years ago.. Of course if you think about it some more, you will realize you are wrong. First difference - an approach deauthorized last week will be under a current NOTAM, and you will get it as part of a standard briefing. Not so for an approach deauthorized last year. Second difference - approaches are deauthorized fairly infrequently, but can stay deauthorized a long time (sometimes years). Therefore, a pilot who does a normal preflight (including a preflight FSS briefing) will most likely know about an approach deauthorized last week, but not one that was deauthorized last year. If a pilot performs a PERFECT preflight preparation, including a review of all published NOTAM's for every possible place he may need to land, there is no problem. This is not going to happen every flight. Even with the best of intentions, things get missed. Controllers have procedures to prevent them from issuing OTS approaches, but that happens too - the way it did here. Proper safety systems are layered, like swiss cheese - every layer has holes in it (eliminating every possible hole is impractical) but when you overlay them the likelihood of holes lining up is very small. Intelligent analysis of accidents includes a review of the factors leading up to it, and a consideration of what sorts of simple, cheap, non-intrusive changes could have made a big difference. In this case, the simple, cheap, and non-intrusive change is to print a notice on the plate - approach OTS as of print date. It costs next to nothing, does not affect usability of the plate should the approach be returned to service prior to the next publication, and could easily prevent an accident (most probably would have in this case). I know of some close calls that resulted because this is not done - but in those situations, fortunately other layers in the safety system worked and nothing bad happened. I always knew something like this would happen eventually (we have discussed this topic on this newsgroup before) and now it has. Unintelligent analysis consists of blaming the PIC for not meeting some arbitrary standard of perfect preflight preparation, and insisting no system changes are needed because if the PIC acted perfectly, there would have been no accident. People are not perfect, and any safety system that relies primarily on people executing boring tasks perfectly every time is not very intelligently designed. We have all sorts of rules and processes in place to prevent accidents - and most are expensive and restrict the pilot's options. This proposed process (marking the plate) is extremely cheap and simple, and restricts nothing. Not adopting it is just dumb. Will it be executed perfectly every time? No. Eventually a plate for a decomissioned approach will get published without the notice. It's a given. But it makes this sort of accident dramatically less likely. Given that it's a rare event anyway, that's probably all that is necessary. Further, this peculiarity of the approach plate publishing system is not known to the majorty of IFR rated pilots (at least in my experience - but hey, I'm just and ATP and CFII, what do I know), is quite counter-intuitive, and is not covered in the standard IFR prep materials. It would probably cost more to cover it in the IFR prep materials than to fix it outright. Michael |
#27
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Why publish a plate for an OTS approach?
On Fri, 01 Jun 2007 15:05:10 -0700, Michael
wrote: On May 30, 11:31 am, wrote: When you think about it a bit, there is no real difference between an approach deauthorized last week and one deauthorized last year or two years ago.. Of course if you think about it some more, you will realize you are wrong. Actually, thge more I think about it the more I am convinced I am right. A proper preflight will consist of a review of (a) current charts, (b) DUATS (or briefing) recent NOTAMS and (c) a review of the NOTAM publication for published NOTAMS. This will reveal ALL NOTAMS, regardless of their age, and therefore makes no difference whether the NOTAM is 6 days or 6 years old. If it's in effect, it is current, regardless of its age. If you want a chart annotated for a NOTAM, why just go ahead and annotate it. Why depend on the FAA to perform this simple task? It's a simple three step system thayt anyone (excluding CFII's perhaps) can understand and follow. First difference - an approach deauthorized last week will be under a current NOTAM, and you will get it as part of a standard briefing. Not so for an approach deauthorized last year. Second difference - approaches are deauthorized fairly infrequently, but can stay deauthorized a long time (sometimes years). Therefore, a pilot who does a normal preflight (including a preflight FSS briefing) will most likely know about an approach deauthorized last week, but not one that was deauthorized last year. If a pilot performs a PERFECT preflight preparation, including a review of all published NOTAM's for every possible place he may need to land, there is no problem. This is not going to happen every flight. Even with the best of intentions, things get missed. Controllers have procedures to prevent them from issuing OTS approaches, but that happens too - the way it did here. Proper safety systems are layered, like swiss cheese - every layer has holes in it (eliminating every possible hole is impractical) but when you overlay them the likelihood of holes lining up is very small. Intelligent analysis of accidents includes a review of the factors leading up to it, and a consideration of what sorts of simple, cheap, non-intrusive changes could have made a big difference. In this case, the simple, cheap, and non-intrusive change is to print a notice on the plate - approach OTS as of print date. It costs next to nothing, does not affect usability of the plate should the approach be returned to service prior to the next publication, and could easily prevent an accident (most probably would have in this case). I know of some close calls that resulted because this is not done - but in those situations, fortunately other layers in the safety system worked and nothing bad happened. I always knew something like this would happen eventually (we have discussed this topic on this newsgroup before) and now it has. Unintelligent analysis consists of blaming the PIC for not meeting some arbitrary standard of perfect preflight preparation, and insisting no system changes are needed because if the PIC acted perfectly, there would have been no accident. People are not perfect, and any safety system that relies primarily on people executing boring tasks perfectly every time is not very intelligently designed. We have all sorts of rules and processes in place to prevent accidents - and most are expensive and restrict the pilot's options. This proposed process (marking the plate) is extremely cheap and simple, and restricts nothing. Not adopting it is just dumb. Will it be executed perfectly every time? No. Eventually a plate for a decomissioned approach will get published without the notice. It's a given. But it makes this sort of accident dramatically less likely. Given that it's a rare event anyway, that's probably all that is necessary. Further, this peculiarity of the approach plate publishing system is not known to the majorty of IFR rated pilots (at least in my experience - but hey, I'm just and ATP and CFII, what do I know) is quite counter-intuitive, and is not covered in the standard IFR prep materials. It would probably cost more to cover it in the IFR prep materials than to fix it outright. Michael |
#28
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Why publish a plate for an OTS approach?
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#29
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Why publish a plate for an OTS approach?
Actually, counting the time it took to key in the URL, the published NOTAM lookup took less than 30 seconds. Leaves about 1.5 minutes to check DUATs, to get under the 2-minute mark for all NOTAMS. On Sat, 02 Jun 2007 08:58:11 -0400, Dave Butler wrote: wrote: Actually, thge more I think about it the more I am convinced I am right. A proper preflight will consist of a review of (a) current charts, (b) DUATS (or briefing) recent NOTAMS and (c) a review of the NOTAM publication for published NOTAMS. Good, you're learning. So now you can admit you erred when you implied all that was required was a two-minute check: -- Here are all the kentucky NOTAMS. -- -- Looked them up in two minutes. Free. -- -- I'll say it again. Anyone who is not aware of a NOTAM deauthorizing -- an approach has not performed adequate preflight. |
#30
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Why publish a plate for an OTS approach?
On Jun 2, 5:04 am, wrote:
Actually, thge more I think about it the more I am convinced I am right. Of course you're convinced. Now answer me this question - do you always know where you are going to land (or can you always narrow it down to a short list, just a few airports) before you ever start the engines? If you say yes, you're not getting much capability out of the airplane. In the real world of flying GA IFR, things don't work that way. Headwinds and ATC delays force landings short of the intended destination (or fuel stop). Weather systems that turn out worse than forecasts or move differentl than forecast (thunderstorms, ice, widespread below-mins conditions) cause diversions around weather, and thus landings dozens (or even hundreds) of miles off the intended course. Landing sites in such cases are chosen by consulting printed publications in the cockpit to select appropriate facilities and consultation with FSS (by radio) to confirm weather. Time is at a premium because FSS frequencies in such weather tend to be tied up - everyone is doing this. Even if the first diversion landing is fine, planning for the next leg is done wherever you landed - not necessarily a place with internet access. So what are you suggesting now - what everyone who actually uses the airplane for transportation should have a printed copy of the published NOTAM's in the cockpit to deal with this issue? Michael |
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