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#61
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In article ,
(Michael) wrote: [snip] Why? FAA. [snip] Why are they a rartiy on airplanes? FAA. [snip] Why? FAA. [snip] In other words, FAA. [snip] it should be the correct systemic problem. The FAA. Michael, I sometimes feel like I must live in a parallel universe to you. In your universe, the FAA is the root of all evil, their employees are all bureaucrats without technical understanding, all accident investigations are worthless, WINGS and other safety seminars are useless, and CFIs are almost uniformly incompetent. In the world I live in, things aren't nearly so black-and-white. Cheers, Sydney |
#62
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"Richard Kaplan" wrote in message ...
"Snowbird" wrote in message om... I don't have great ideas, just the hunch a safety seminar may be a good and useful thing, but I don't think it's going to address the overall accident rate for our type (or any type) too much. This is true of most recurrent training. It can be extremely helpful to increase airplane utilization and/or improve safety for the self-selected group which chooses to attend, but that is probably not a large enough group from which to gather statistics. But addressing the overall accident rate would require addressing pilot attitudes and also would probably require a more realistic assessment by pilots of how much money they should spend on maintenance -- both are uphill battles not likely to be won in a safety seminar. For our type anyway, supposedly the accidents can be traced to pilot judgement. It's a pretty simple aircraft to maintain, anyway, Sen. Inhofe's propeller notwithstanding. That was a simple case of his A&Ps not following the maint. manual procedure, not of insufficient money on maint. Cheers, Sydney |
#63
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"Snowbird" wrote in message
om... For our type anyway, supposedly the accidents can be traced to pilot judgement. No doubt pilot judgment is a major cause of accidents. It's a pretty simple aircraft to maintain, anyway, Sen. Inhofe's propeller notwithstanding. That was a simple case of his A&Ps not following the maint. manual procedure, not of insufficient money on maint. It may be a simple airplane to maintain, but does that mean there are not accidents due to insufficient maintenance? Even something as simple as a worn tire can lead to an accident. Lots of "simple" airplanes are flown well beyond TBO or have pencil-whipped annuals or even pencil-whipped engine overhauls. -------------------- Richard Kaplan, CFII www.flyimc.com |
#64
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Michael wrote:
Andrew Gideon wrote When I intentionally choose the lowest local ceilings and visibilities for instrument training, is that about enjoying a bit of danger or providing the best, most challenging training available? And how do you separate the two? To my mind, easily. Then spell it out for me. Which am I doing, and why? I cannot tell you which you're doing laugh. I do that for the training (it's the model introduced by my CFII). Others may do it precisely for the "thrill". Yet we end up doing the same thing, which makes discerning the motive a little tough. Obviously, you've nothing but my word that I'm not a thrill seeker. And you can even believe that I'm insufficiently self-aware, and that I've merely hidden my thrill-seeking tendencies from myself. How could I argue with that? But I don't think it the case. Lacking the direct knowledge you had, I cannot say. Since the pilots didn't survive in the example I used, we all knew that some guesswork was involved on that side of things. But there's a difference between guesswork and outright twisting of the facts to support a point. John Galban posted an interesting story about how the latter happened with regard to an accident he was involved with. That's true. More, there've been a number of posts on rather...liberal descriptions in NTSB reports. Obviously, accuracy is important. I've been to a couple like that. There was one on flying over the Gulf and the Caribbean by a guy who does it every year. I can't in good conscience call it a safety seminar. I'm not clear on your point, here. What would you call it? Advanced training? Encouraging dangerous behavior? It all depends on your point of view. You'd call the talk given by that guy "encouraging dangerous behavior"? I'd agree that that would not be a "safety seminar". Could you also call it "advanced training"? That would imply that it's providing useful information, but information not applicable to safety. Okay...I can see that, and I can even see that such things are useful. Still...anything which helps one fly is going to aid safety, no? I mean, if you were planning to fly the Gulf anyway, wasn't the information provided - even if incomplete - useful? Or is the problem that he made it seem complete, which tempted you to do something you'd otherwise not? [...] Suppose I put on a seminar about how to scud run. I might include tips like not flying at the bases of the clouds, where the vis is worst. I might cover route planning - instead of the usual VFR-direct, how to choose roads to follow for supplemental nav, being prepared for obstructions, etc. I would likely cover low altitude diversions - how to get to a nearby airport in a hurry. I might cover emergency procedures - off field precautionary landings with power and how to choose a field, an emergency instrument climb and what to expect from ATC, etc. I might discuss various techniques for slowing the plane down - when a notch of flaps might be appropriate, for example. I've been there and done that, and if you're going to scud run, I assure you that you're way better off going to this seminar than just doing it cold and figuring it out as you go along. But would it be a safety seminar? I'd vote "yes". It's another tool in my belt. It's *my* choice whether or not to use it, but your seminar would sharpen that tool. I think of stall practice as similar to this. I've *no* intention of stalling while (for example) making a base-to-final turn. Practicing so that I can recover quickly from a stall isn't going to change that. Or health insurance. I've no plans to get sick, and I do certain things to preserve my health. Having insurance doesn't alter than behavior. - Andrew |
#65
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#66
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"Richard Kaplan" wrote
It may be a simple airplane to maintain, but does that mean there are not accidents due to insufficient maintenance? I think that's really the wrong question. The right question is - are the majority of the accidents due to insufficient maintenance? Is it the single biggest cause? Second biggest cause? Or is it down in the decimal dust? My experience suggests decimal dust. Michael |
#67
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Andrew Gideon wrote
I cannot tell you which you're doing laugh. I do that for the training (it's the model introduced by my CFII). Others may do it precisely for the "thrill". Yet we end up doing the same thing, which makes discerning the motive a little tough. Or maybe it calls into question the entire concept of "motive." Obviously, you've nothing but my word that I'm not a thrill seeker. And you can even believe that I'm insufficiently self-aware, and that I've merely hidden my thrill-seeking tendencies from myself. How could I argue with that? You can't. In reality, you don't know - and neither do I. Motivations are things that psychologists spend a lot of time arguing about, and they have yet to reach consensus. What chance do we have? That's true. More, there've been a number of posts on rather...liberal descriptions in NTSB reports. Obviously, accuracy is important. I would argue that accuracy is not only important but essential, and an inacurate report is worse than useless - it is actively dangerous. I would further argue that distorting the facts of an accident to advance an agenda is never justified. However, I know it happens - and therefore I distrust the reports. Given my experience and that of others, I consider the distrust justified. You'd call the talk given by that guy "encouraging dangerous behavior"? I'd agree that that would not be a "safety seminar". Well, isn't flying a light plane on a long overwater leg dangerous behavior? Or are you suggesting it's safe? See the problem here? Could you also call it "advanced training"? That would imply that it's providing useful information, but information not applicable to safety. Okay...I can see that, and I can even see that such things are useful. Think instrument rating. It gives you capability you didn't have and teaches you skills and (hopefully) knowledge new to you. But it also encourages you to operate in weather you would otherwise avoid. Is it safety training? Is it advanced training? Is it encouraging dangerous behavior? You will find many, many pilots who consider single engine IFR dangerous behavior. Still...anything which helps one fly is going to aid safety, no? I mean, if you were planning to fly the Gulf anyway, wasn't the information provided - even if incomplete - useful? Sure it was. But would I have flown the Gulf anyway? Or is the problem that he made it seem complete, which tempted you to do something you'd otherwise not? I'm not enough of a fool to believe a two hour seminar on anything of any complexity can ever be complete. And in truth, it was complete enough. Suppose I put on a seminar about how to scud run... would it be a safety seminar? I'd vote "yes". It's another tool in my belt. It's *my* choice whether or not to use it, but your seminar would sharpen that tool. Then by that definition, any skill/knowledge training is safety training. Michael |
#68
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"Michael" wrote in message om... My experience suggests decimal dust. I think it is hard to know how many accidents are due to maintenance issues by reading NTSB reports, just like they are inaccurate for other reasons you stated. It is one thing for the NTSB to determine that an airplane was "airworthy" and "in annual." It is another to hangar fly and hear stories of engine failures in an airplane where it is local knowledge that a given mechanic does pencil-whip annuals or that a given airplane owner often cut corners on maintenance. Anecdotally I hear about a lot less engine failures among people flying engines within TBO by hours and also under 10 years old than with older engines... it would be interesting to tabulate the data someday in a statistically valid manner. -------------------- Richard Kaplan, CFII www.flyimc.com |
#69
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"Richard Kaplan" wrote
My experience suggests decimal dust. I think it is hard to know how many accidents are due to maintenance issues by reading NTSB reports I concur, and do not base my opinion on NTSB reports. Anecdotally I hear about a lot less engine failures among people flying engines within TBO by hours and also under 10 years That's because few airplanes reach hourly TBO within 10 years. My experience indicates that those engines fail about as often - there are just fewer of them. it would be interesting to tabulate the data someday in a statistically valid manner. Yes it would. The very fact that the manufacturers COULD do it if they chose, and choose not to, indicates that they don't want the facts known. That suggests to me that the failures (a) happen far more often than is generally believed and (b) are not prevented by regular factory overhauls. Fundamentally, I think most failures are a design problem rather than a maintenance problem. So why are we still using clearly obsolete designs? FAA. Michael |
#70
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"Michael" wrote in message om... Fundamentally, I think most failures are a design problem rather than a maintenance problem. So why are we still using clearly obsolete designs? FAA. What piston engine design would be more reliable? (Economics make turbine engine comparisons unfair, even if turbines are more reliable -- and I am not certain that they are.) I have experienced a lot more engine problems driving cars than flying airplanes for sure. Experimental airplanes do not seem to have any lower incidence of engine failures anecdotally, nor do I recall reading any data to suggest there exists a more reliable experimental piston engine design. -------------------- Richard Kaplan www.flyimc.com |
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