3 lives lost

How does something like this happen? Was it the pressure of not wanting to
deprive the young girl of her Christmas present? Not having to say come
back another time?

Awful, awful news.

As a newly minted private pilot, I had a similar opportunity to give a young
lad and his father their first airplane ride. As we pulled the rental plane
out of the hangar, the wind began to pick up substantially, and the sky
became covered with a low, scuddy layer.

Looking at the excited kid and his dad, the pressure to fly was tremendous.
The airport's single-runway was 90 degrees offset from the wind direction,
and the scud was clearly moving in off of Lake Michigan. If we were even
going to get to fly the pattern, it was now or never...

....and I chose never. As we pushed the plane back into the hangar, their
disappointment was palpable. Sadly, I never did get that kid in the air.

But I made the right choice. A man has got to know his limitations.

My condolences to the families.
--
Jay Honeck
Iowa City, IA
Pathfinder N56993
www.AlexisParkInn.com
"Your Aviation Destination"

"nrp" wrote in message
oups.com...

It has really bugged me that Kennedy, who I understand was nearly
complete with his instrument rating, couldn't even make the transition
in a slowly deteriorating situation. I know another case some years
ago of a fellow that was working on an instrument that also lost a
Mooney and three other guys in a similar situation with ground fog and
a night departure, and 5 hours of fuel on board.


If you read the accident reports you'll see plenty of instrument pilots lose
it in the soup too.

Good question...

A 1954 study (Stonecipher, et al) found that of 20 private pilots, of
varying levels of experience, exactly 0 'survived' a simulated
encounter with IFR conditions. 19 did graveyard spirals, and 1 was
going to do a whip stall when the data-taker/safety pilot said "I've
got it."

My experience on BFR's may not be representative, as I am considered a
'tough; insturctor and that reputation precedes me to the point that
most of the people who call me are pretty good pilots to begin with and
probably perform better than the average. Given that, my experience is
such that I think that in excess of 70% of private pilots would 'buy
it' if they wandered into instrument conditions. The real numbers may
be higher.

One of the problems we have (but is not well discussed) is that in
training the stress level (even on a BFR) is a tiny fraction of what
the pilot will experience if he runs into these conditions solo.
Stress degrades performance in every area, so I think that what we see
on the BFR is something of a best case scenario. I try to make the
hood work a little more demanding than the average CFI, to simulate
some of the stress that may occur in the real situation, but I think I
am still an order of magnitutde or two below what a
non-instrument-rated private pilot experiences in a real (solo) IMC
encounter. A clue can be had by listening to the video presentation
"17 Ways to Fall Out of the Sky"; there is an audio tape in that video
of a real life VFR-into-IMC encounter involving a VFR C310 pilot trying
to get down through an overcast. Noteably, when he first gets into
trouble his voice goes up at least two octaves. (He did not make it.)

Unlike some CFIs, I aggressively seek out actual instrument condtions
in which to take up not only my instrument students but also my private
students. I figure if they have proven to themselves that they can
indeed hold it right side up in turbulence in IMC, then their stress
will be (a little) lower if it ever happens for real. I like to train
them well beyond the PTS in this area, but not all students are willing
to do that (those that aren't have to go somewhere else--I sleep really
well at night and want to keep it that way.)

I have unique methods for teaching flight by reference to instruments,
and I have at least one known 'save' of a student pilot who got into
IMC on his first solo, and flew there for 20 min successfully before
breaking out and landing--using the methods he heard me present in a
Wings Seminar. (Please don't try this at home...!)

I think most pilots are grossly unaware of how insidious spatial
disorientation can be for the non-IMC-experienced pilot. Most people
seem to think that the accident pilot is unaware of his improper flight
attitude, and would correct to level if he or she knew; I think this is
a dangerous idea. I have personally observed a student pilot in IMC as
she rolled into a left spiral while literally screaming at me for help
because 'it's rolling to the left and I can't stop it.' Her conscious
mind could read the instruments and correctly deduce our real attitude,
but it had lost the battle for control of her hands to her unconscious,
which was following the (erroneous) inner ear indications into the left
spiral. To her it felt as if the controls were jammed, and she could
not get it to roll to the right. (I had her let go and then I rolled
out with two fingers.)

I think a major portion of the spatial disorientation accidents are of
this ilk; i.e. fully aware of the nature of the problem but unable to
move their hands to recover. JFK, for example; needle slap indicated
he had applied maximum takeoff power before he hit the water... I
suspect he knew fully well what was going on but could not stop it.

This is the difference between an instrument rated pilot and an
instrument competent pilot; the competent instrument pilot has enough
IMC experience that he has been able to condition his unconscious to
let go and let the conscious mind take control of the hands.

I think most VFR-rate pilots are nowhere near this level of IMC
experience, and when the stress maxes out, they are toast. All the
more reason to avoid situations that get anywhere close to the edge.
Gene

On 1-Jan-2005, wrote:

I think you are close to the answer. Every time I hear about one of
these, I silently ask myself "Where was the time pressure coming from?"

To me, this is one of the more perplexing questions arising from this tragic
story. As I understand it, the young girl was having a Christmas gift
fulfilled by the ill-fated flight. Why would you "treat" someone to a
flight with 1/4 mi visibility? For most non-pilots, flight in IMC in a
light airplane is boring at best and uncomfortable at worst. The primary
splendor of fight at low elevations is in the sightseeing. For this reason,
a "joyride" should always be conducted in good VFR even if the pilot and
airplane are fully capable of safe operation in less favorable weather. It
seems to me that "Jean" thus had a perfectly good reason to postpone or
cancel this flight without feeling any pressure.


Your passengers deserve better, and so did the little girl in this
accident.

Absolutely correct!! What we as pilots need to remember is that most
passengers do not have any basis on which to form their own judgments as to
the safety of a flight, and are thus forced to rely fully on us for that
call. This is an AWESOME responsibility -- by far the most significant
"right and privilege" granted with a pilot's license.

--
-Elliott Drucker

JFK Jr.

As I understand it, JFK Jr. was reported to be "50%" through his
instrument rating. By that point one should in theory have no
difficulty managing the conditions he encountered. But, the record
shows that when the windows went grey he did not have or could not
apply the required skills.

A grocery store clerk asked me, shortly after that accident, "Doesn't
it worry you, training people to go off and then maybe crash like
that?"

I had a simple answer: "If he'd been my student he wouldn't be dead
now and we wouldn't be having this converstation."

It really hurts me to see this kind of stuff happen; it is needless.
contrary to one of the other posters here, I am of the opinion that
light aircraft flying can be much safer than driving a car (ok I live
in LA and driving here is a lot more crazy, but still...) if you
properly manage the risk. In my car, I am at the mercy of every
testosterone-poisoned teenager who decides to weave through traffic at
120 mph. I cannot control his studpidity. In the airplane, I HAVE
CONTROL OF HOW MUCH RISK I TAKE.

When I go up to see my mom in San Jose, I feel MUCH safer when I fly
than when I drive up I-5. I know what the risk factors are in the
airplane, and how to mitigate them. I cannot control these idiots in
their 'hot' cars!

I wish I could just grab on to some people (pilots) and just shake them
until they hear me. YOU CAN MAKE THIS AS SAFE AS YOU WANT! STOP BEING
STUPID!

OK, sorry, off my soapbox...

Gene

Yes!!!!!!!

*You*... are a *pilot!*

Gene

The pressure is tremendous--it's human nature. Just think about when you
offer to take someone up that you see on a regular basis for the first
time--you talk about it. A lot. When that day comes where the schedules fall
into place, there's usually a lot of leading up to that day.

Saying "no" is hard. It get's harder when you have a couple of attempted
flights in recent memory that were cancelled due to iffy weather and the
weather turned out to be better than forecast. But as a "good" pilot, you
need to say no. It's your responsibility.

For this reason, I find myself not going out of my way anymore to offer
"new" flyers flights. If it works out due to last-minute
circumstances--great. The absence of a long-term plan for the trip makes
cancelling for any reason easy.

If you fly long enough, the weather will eventually throw you a curve. It's
unfortunate Jean wasn't ready when it threw her one and terrible that she
had a young passenger on board. I consider myself lucky that my curve ball
(and a deep respect for weather) came when I was had not one but two CFIIs
on board. A fog rolled in from the south shore of Long Island, NY and
covered the island within minutes. We had to divert and shoot an ILS to
minimums at another airport and wait it out a couple of hours.

God bless their souls and families.

Marco Leon

"Jay Honeck" wrote in message:
[snip]
Looking at the excited kid and his dad, the pressure to fly was
tremendous. The airport's single-runway was 90 degrees offset from the
wind direction, and the scud was clearly moving in off of Lake Michigan.
If we were even going to get to fly the pattern, it was now or never...

...and I chose never. As we pushed the plane back into the hangar, their
disappointment was palpable. Sadly, I never did get that kid in the air.

But I made the right choice. A man has got to know his limitations.

My condolences to the families.
--
Jay Honeck
Iowa City, IA
Pathfinder N56993
www.AlexisParkInn.com
"Your Aviation Destination"




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Good question...

A 1954 study (Stonecipher, et al) found that of 20 private pilots, of
varying levels of experience, exactly 0 'survived' a simulated
encounter with IFR conditions. 19 did graveyard spirals, and 1 was
going to do a whip stall when the data-taker/safety pilot said "I've
got it."

My experience on BFR's may not be representative, as I am considered a
'tough; insturctor and that reputation precedes me to the point that
most of the people who call me are pretty good pilots to begin with and
probably perform better than the average. Given that, my experience is
such that I think that in excess of 70% of private pilots would 'buy
it' if they wandered into instrument conditions. The real numbers may
be higher.

One of the problems we have (but is not well discussed) is that in
training the stress level (even on a BFR) is a tiny fraction of what
the pilot will experience if he runs into these conditions solo.
Stress degrades performance in every area, so I think that what we see
on the BFR is something of a best case scenario. I try to make the
hood work a little more demanding than the average CFI, to simulate
some of the stress that may occur in the real situation, but I think I
am still an order of magnitutde or two below what a
non-instrument-rated private pilot experiences in a real (solo) IMC
encounter. A clue can be had by listening to the video presentation
"17 Ways to Fall Out of the Sky"; there is an audio tape in that video
of a real life VFR-into-IMC encounter involving a VFR C310 pilot trying
to get down through an overcast. Noteably, when he first gets into
trouble his voice goes up at least two octaves. (He did not make it.)

Unlike some CFIs, I aggressively seek out actual instrument condtions
in which to take up not only my instrument students but also my private
students. I figure if they have proven to themselves that they can
indeed hold it right side up in turbulence in IMC, then their stress
will be (a little) lower if it ever happens for real. I like to train
them well beyond the PTS in this area, but not all students are willing
to do that (those that aren't have to go somewhere else--I sleep really
well at night and want to keep it that way.)

I have unique methods for teaching flight by reference to instruments,
and I have at least one known 'save' of a student pilot who got into
IMC on his first solo, and flew there for 20 min successfully before
breaking out and landing--using the methods he heard me present in a
Wings Seminar. (Please don't try this at home...!)

I think most pilots are grossly unaware of how insidious spatial
disorientation can be for the non-IMC-experienced pilot. Most people
seem to think that the accident pilot is unaware of his improper flight
attitude, and would correct to level if he or she knew; I think this is
a dangerous idea. I have personally observed a student pilot in IMC as
she rolled into a left spiral while literally screaming at me for help
because 'it's rolling to the left and I can't stop it.' Her conscious
mind could read the instruments and correctly deduce our real attitude,
but it had lost the battle for control of her hands to her unconscious,
which was following the (erroneous) inner ear indications into the left
spiral. To her it felt as if the controls were jammed, and she could
not get it to roll to the right. (I had her let go and then I rolled
out with two fingers.)

I think a major portion of the spatial disorientation accidents are of
this ilk; i.e. fully aware of the nature of the problem but unable to
move their hands to recover. JFK, for example; needle slap indicated
he had applied maximum takeoff power before he hit the water... I
suspect he knew fully well what was going on but could not stop it.

This is the difference between an instrument rated pilot and an
instrument competent pilot; the competent instrument pilot has enough
IMC experience that he has been able to condition his unconscious to
let go and let the conscious mind take control of the hands.

I think most VFR-rate pilots are nowhere near this level of IMC
experience, and when the stress maxes out, they are toast. All the
more reason to avoid situations that get anywhere close to the edge.
Gene

Marco,

I offer you an alternative method of dealing with that pressure.
Instead of not offering, properly set the expectations up front. That
is, explain to them that you want them to have a really good
experience, and in order for that to happen you have to have good,
clear, smooth conditions. Set up and 'out,' ie and alternative planned
activity if the weather turns out to be not just right. You can also
set a rain date; "if the weather does not cooperate on that weekend,
how bout a 'rain date' on the 25th?"

This communicates to your prospective passenger that you are reallly
concerned for their feelings (almost all of them are at least a little
scared). They are usually delighted that you are going to say no if it
is not perfect.

By having the expectation set that a cancellation/reschedule is likely,
and the reschedule date already agreed upon, the dissappointment about
not flying on the appointed day is greatly mitigated.

All of this makes it easeir for you to say no when that is the right
thing to do.

Gene

("Marco Leon" mleon(at)optonline.net) wrote:

The pressure is tremendous--it's human nature. Just think about when you
offer to take someone up that you see on a regular basis for the first
time--you talk about it. A lot. When that day comes where the schedules fall
into place, there's usually a lot of leading up to that day.

I have taken up several "first flight" people and in every conversation
we have, from day one right up to the drive to the airport, I discuss
the possibility that we might no be able to make the flight due to
weather or an unexpected maintenance issue.

--
Peter