Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?

Subject: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
From: Stephen Harding
Date: 2/12/04 5:39 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

ArtKramr wrote:

reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

Doesn't sound hollow to me. I guess you had to have been there.((:-))

If I had been there, I'd probably have been baking your bread!


SMH



Nice crisp crust please.


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

"Stephen Harding" wrote in message
...
Krztalizer wrote:

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

I know more revelevent people will chime in here, but that accolade is
not at
all hollow. Their tactics meant that they followed the tactical
definition of
Escort Fighter far more accurately than some of the other groups, who
were
somewhat famous among bomber crews for failing to show up to cover their
assignments. Bomber guys talk with literal dread when they mention
missions
where the escorts never arrived - the 303rd (?) BG was shredded after
one such
event and it happened to other heavy bomber groups as well. How could
'provided excellent coverage and defense against all enemy comers' be
considered a hollow accolade?

If you've come to the show to win the war, it's a "hollow accolade"
in pointing to being adept at using the wrong tactics.

It's one thing if you don't know better, like trying to dogfight
Zeros in early 1942, but by 1944, weren't "the right" tactics in
bomber "escort" known?

Have I jumped the gun on what was known in the context of the times?

Yes. Known as Monday morning quarterbacking.

Brooks



SMH

"Stephen Harding" wrote in message
...
George Z. Bush wrote:

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

12th AF was in Italy.....13th AF in the Pacific, I believe.

Knew that didn't quite sound right.

Thanks George. BTW, was that "your" AF?

12th, and before you have to ask, I was in Troop Carrier flying goonies, which
is why I stayed out of the discussion about the Tuskegee Airmen.

George Z.

"Stephen Harding" wrote in message
...
Keith Willshaw wrote:

"Stephen Harding" wrote in message

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

The command at the time seems to have been happy
with them else they doubtless have issued other orders.

No doubt true.

I will presume that other fighter groups in the 12th were
doing precisely the same thing (sticking with the bombers).

In this case, and assuming going after the fighters to destroy
them rather than sticking, *was the correct thing to do*, then
someone higher up was responsible for escort implementation
"error", at a time the 8th AF "knew better" (say early 1944).


Thats assuming it was an error. Depending on the relative
numbers of German versus Allied aircraft in the Italian theatre
and a host of other factors it may well have been that the correct
strategy was to stay with the bombers.

Guess this all boils down to "what did leadership know and
when did they know it?".

Just so

Keith

Subject: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
From: "Keith Willshaw"
Date: 2/12/04 6:38 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:


"Stephen Harding" wrote in message
...
Keith Willshaw wrote:

"Stephen Harding" wrote in message

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

The command at the time seems to have been happy
with them else they doubtless have issued other orders.

No doubt true.

I will presume that other fighter groups in the 12th were
doing precisely the same thing (sticking with the bombers).

In this case, and assuming going after the fighters to destroy
them rather than sticking, *was the correct thing to do*, then
someone higher up was responsible for escort implementation
"error", at a time the 8th AF "knew better" (say early 1944).


Thats assuming it was an error. Depending on the relative
numbers of German versus Allied aircraft in the Italian theatre
and a host of other factors it may well have been that the correct
strategy was to stay with the bombers.

Guess this all boils down to "what did leadership know and
when did they know it?".

Just so

Keith



As far as I know no other squadron in the ETO in WW II could make that claim.
And it is a claim that I personally find meritorious. Can anyone find anyone
who flew bombers in WW II that finds the claim "Hollow"?




Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

"Stephen Harding" wrote in message
...

Was B Davis the one who would dictate that fighters under his
command would implement bomber escort by sticking with the bombers
or was it an AF wide implementation order, done at a higher level
than Group or Wing?

Within general terms, I'd venture to say that it was from higher HQ. If
every unit CO were able to define his own taskings, some would be left out.
You can't have everyone doing the glamour missions.

8th AF, you do this
12th AF, you do that

Tactics evolve with experience, but the general instructions flow downward.

Pete

Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Stephen Harding" wrote in message

Have I jumped the gun on what was known in the context of the times?

Yes. Known as Monday morning quarterbacking.

I'll wait for some more opinions before I accept that.

It's not yet clear to me that the tactic of "sticking with
the bombers" was not known as the *wrong* tactic by early 1944.

I'm not even certain that "following the LW down and destroying
them" was considered the *right* tactic by the 8th AF at that
time either.

I *do* know that by 1944, the 8th had learned the tactic of
bombers "fighting their way to the target and back" without
escort was considered inappropriate.

Doesn't mean the crews that implemented that tactic during 1942/43
were somehow inferior by any measure, to those implementing the
more appropriate tactic (paradigm) later.


SMH

Stephen Harding wrote:

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

None other than ace Robert S. Johnson spoke about how they
made sure they were not drawn away from escort position in order to
chase easy kills. In many instances the 56th FG would dispatch a
single squadron or pair of flights in order to engage targets of
opportunity (Luftwaffe fighters) while the rest of the group continued
escorting the bombers along their route.

The key is really not to get drawn away from the bombers you
are charged with escorting, since catching up is sometimes not
possible, and other times may be too late.

ONLY after significant numbers of long range fighters were
available were tactics changed to a roaming cover (Zemke fan, or
Roving High Cover are two of the names used for this technique). All
the first-hand accounts I have read stated that the suggestion was put
forth by squadrons & groups, but was made policy by the major AF
command. I don't know if their particular AF implemented it, or merely
the 8th AF.

I'd say that the Tuskeegee Airmen sacrificed their personal
scores (only one pilot made ace, IIRC) in order to protect the
bombers. Ultimately, it was the strategic bomber that made the
difference instead of the fighter escort mission.

I'd say it was the right move, although not a choice that was
correct by a huge and obvious margin. Credit to them for their
devotion.



----== Posted via Newsfeed.Com - Unlimited-Uncensored-Secure Usenet News==----
http://www.newsfeed.com The #1 Newsgroup Service in the World! 100,000 Newsgroups
---= 19 East/West-Coast Specialized Servers - Total Privacy via Encryption =---

Subject: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
From: Stephen Harding
Date: 2/12/04 9:46 AM Pacific Standard Time

*do* know that by 1944, the 8th had learned the tactic of
bombers "fighting their way to the target and back" without
escort was considered inappropriate.

Inappropriate? Now there is an interesting word choice. (sigh)


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

Subject: Were the Tuskeegee Airmen Wrong?
From: (John S. Shinal)
Date: 2/12/04 9:49 AM Pacific Standard Time
Message-id:

Stephen Harding wrote:

Was the 13th (??) AF in Italy, and the Tuskeegee Airmen
in particular, following the wrong tactic? Is the
reputation of this fine group of fighter pilots somewhat
over-embellished with hollow accolade over the issue of
"never losing a bomber"?

None other than ace Robert S. Johnson spoke about how they
made sure they were not drawn away from escort position in order to
chase easy kills. In many instances the 56th FG would dispatch a
single squadron or pair of flights in order to engage targets of
opportunity (Luftwaffe fighters) while the rest of the group continued
escorting the bombers along their route.

The key is really not to get drawn away from the bombers you
are charged with escorting, since catching up is sometimes not
possible, and other times may be too late.

ONLY after significant numbers of long range fighters were
available were tactics changed to a roaming cover (Zemke fan, or
Roving High Cover are two of the names used for this technique). All
the first-hand accounts I have read stated that the suggestion was put
forth by squadrons & groups, but was made policy by the major AF
command. I don't know if their particular AF implemented it, or merely
the 8th AF.

I'd say that the Tuskeegee Airmen sacrificed their personal
scores (only one pilot made ace, IIRC) in order to protect the
bombers. Ultimately, it was the strategic bomber that made the
difference instead of the fighter escort mission.

I'd say it was the right move, although not a choice that was
correct by a huge and obvious margin. Credit to them for their
devotion.


Ah a voice of reason at last. Thank you.
As Churchill said," The fighters are our salvation, but the bombers alone
provide the means of victory".


Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer