Question about the F-22 and it's radar.

"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message ...
Whoever you are, you silly little cretin...go back and read the
thread. The
E-8 was 100 klicks away, and has been credited with a maximum
effective GMTI
range of some 200 plus klicks in an open source (FAS). Now where does
that
require the E-8 to journey into a zone of "undue risk"? It can loiter
fifty
klicks to the rear of the FLOT and still support engagements 150
klicks the
other side of the FLOT, you idiotic ninny.

Sorry to disturb your cozy little world of "facts(?)" brooks...Well,
on second thought, no I'm not.
Ever hear of the S-300PMU brooks? S-400? What are their ranges brooks?
No wait, let me answer that for you brooks since I don't want reality
clouded by your "facts(?):
200km for the S-300 PMU and the S-400 400km. Thats f-o-u-r
h-u-n-d-r-e-d kilometers brooks.
How about the FT-2000 brooks?
Your head is too locked up in the Cold War set-piece scenarios of the
last century brooks. Your Korean Glory Days are H-I-S-T-O-R-Y brooks.
A more plausible-and troubling scenario is outlined below...Learn
something new brooks:
http://www.uscc.gov/researchreports/...leandspace.htm

If your artery-hardened peabrain absorbed that material. Try this one:
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publicati...the_Anti-A.pdf
[T]he more worrisome challenge lies in so-called double-digit SAMs
such as the Russian S-300PMU-2 Favorit (the export version of the SAM
NATO codenamed the SA-10) and S-400 Triumph (codenamed the SA-20).12
To give a sense of the area-denial potential of these systems, the
S-300PMU-2 (or SA-10D) is credited with a maximum range of some 109
nautical miles (nm) (200 kilometers) using the 48N6E2 missile, and the
Russians have advertised that, with a new missile, the S-400 will have
a reach approaching 400 kilometers.

A related operational risk is that double-digit SAMs such as the SA-20
are designed for rapid relocation. In 1999 the Serbs, drawing on Iraqi
experiences in 1991, had considerable success using periodic
relocation of their SAMs over short distance to deny
precision-targeting information to NATO aircraft. In a full-blown AD
contingency involving advanced SAMs, one would expect that the use of
such tactics could result in F/A-22 pilots suddenly finding themselves
inside the burn-through distances of individual sites that had moved
while they were en route to their target areas. Without precise,
real-time surveillance of all existing SAM sites, which may well be
difficult to achieve, pop-up SA-10s or SA-20s could lead to unexpected
attrition, even of F/A-22s.

This prospect raises the broader issue of achieving persistent,
wide-area surveillance—especially against deep targets beyond the
range of the E-8C Joint Surveillance and Target Attack System
(JSTARS). Because JSTARS is hosted on a Boeing 707 airframe, it cannot
risk operating inside hostile or denied airspace. Using a standard
racetrack pattern located some 90 kilometers inside
friendly airspace, JSTARS can track moving targets to maximum depth of
less than 100 nm inside enemy territory.57 There is no reason,
however, why mobile launchers for ballistic missiles designed for AD
against US power-projection capabilities cannot be located deeper in
enemy territory. Further, combat experience in Iraq as well as
analytic simulations since 1991 have argued that near-continuous
surveillance over large areas is essential to have much chance of
targeting mobile-missile launchers after they have fired a missile,
much less of destroying them before they have fired at least once.