Why was the Fokker D VII A Good Plane?

Given that the oil campaign didnt happen until late summer 1944 that's a
remarkable claim.

The 15th AF hit Ploesti repeatedly in April.

The 8th AF reduced German avgas production by 50% in May -- with just three
days of raids.

Look what Galland said:

"As early as June, 1944, the month the invasion started, we felt very badly the
effects of the consolidated offensive. Fuel production suddenly sank so low
that it could no longer satisfy the urgent demands. Speer, when interrogated
by the Allies stated that from June on, it had been impossible to get enough
aviation fuel. While it was possible with the greatest effort to keep up at
least a minimum production of motor and diesel fuel, the repair work on the
plants where normal fuel was converted to octane constituted difficulties which
were impossible to overcome. The enemy soon found out how much time we needed
for reconstruction and for resuming production. Shortly before this date was
reached under tremendous strain came the next devastating raid."

-- "The First and the Last" p. 210 by Adof Galland

If not for the USAAF operating by day, it would have been impossible for the
RAF to operate by night over Germany after the invasion. Bomber Command was
defeated by the Germans in the Spring of 1944. It was only the situation
created by "American Air Policy", that allowed Bomber Command to return to "the
night blitzing of cities."

All this occured before the RAF dropped any bombs at all on Oil targets as part
of the "Oil Campaign".

Again, to return to the WSJ review of "A Long Way to Bombs Away", -- that
review didn't show what really happened. Maybe the book was as badly flawed.
I haven't seen it and don't plan to.



Walt

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
Given that the oil campaign didnt happen until late summer 1944 that's a
remarkable claim.

The 15th AF hit Ploesti repeatedly in April.


By which point Ploesti was far less important than the
German synthetic plants

The 8th AF reduced German avgas production by 50% in May -- with just
three
days of raids.


Yet even before that date the RAF were fully operational
In April 1944 Bomber command flew 9700 sorties with
a loss rate of 2.7%. In fact far from facing destruction in
the spring of 1944 the RAF was flying almost twice as
many sorties as it had in spring 43 and seeing lower loss
rates.

The so called 'Battle of Berlin' was indeed a costly failure for
the RAF and clearly it should have been curtailed earlier
but to describe the RAF as defeated at this point is a
grave error as the German in Normandy would find as
bomber command turned its attention to transportation and
troop targets.

During 1944 of around 525,000 sorties flown by the RAF
180,000 were against industrial towns, 93,000 against troop
concentrations, 100,000 against transportation targets and
around 48,000 against oil targets


Look what Galland said:

"As early as June, 1944, the month the invasion started, we felt very
badly the
effects of the consolidated offensive. Fuel production suddenly sank so
low
that it could no longer satisfy the urgent demands. Speer, when
interrogated
by the Allies stated that from June on, it had been impossible to get
enough
aviation fuel. While it was possible with the greatest effort to keep up
at
least a minimum production of motor and diesel fuel, the repair work on
the
plants where normal fuel was converted to octane constituted difficulties
which
were impossible to overcome. The enemy soon found out how much time we
needed
for reconstruction and for resuming production. Shortly before this date
was
reached under tremendous strain came the next devastating raid."

-- "The First and the Last" p. 210 by Adof Galland

If not for the USAAF operating by day, it would have been impossible for
the
RAF to operate by night over Germany after the invasion. Bomber Command
was
defeated by the Germans in the Spring of 1944. It was only the situation
created by "American Air Policy", that allowed Bomber Command to return to
"the
night blitzing of cities."

All this occured before the RAF dropped any bombs at all on Oil targets as
part
of the "Oil Campaign".


The RAF conducted its first raids on German oil targets
as early as 1941. This however is not the point. The
German night fighters were NOT grounded by lack of
fuel, indeed they continued to fly well into 1945.

Their real problem was that by late 1944 there were
more Mosquito NF's hunting Luftwaffe planes than
the Germans out in the skies over the Reich

Again, to return to the WSJ review of "A Long Way to Bombs Away", -- that
review didn't show what really happened. Maybe the book was as badly
flawed.
I haven't seen it and don't plan to.

So you are criticisng something you
havent seen, hmmm.

Keith

but to describe the RAF as defeated at this point is a
grave error as the German in Normandy would find as
bomber command turned its attention to transportation and
troop targets.

Last I heard, France wasn't Germany.

It sort of, at this point, comes down to your word or the word of Charles
Portal.

Walt

The point I was making was that the "Fortress" was unable to protect
its crews as the USAAC (and other air forces) had fondly believed
before the war, and that aerial bombardment in WWII by and large failed to
live up to the hopes and fears of the generals, at least
until Little Boy made accuracy irrelevant.

When noting that at one point 63% of bomber crews failed to complete their
tours, you could have added that towards the end of the campaign -many-
completed their tours and never even saw a German fighter.

But you didn't do that.

Walt

Sure we could. But why bother? Just destroy the oil and no matter what the
factory turns out it isn't going anywhere.


Bomber Command leadership never did figure that out, Art.

Walt

Subject: B-17's and Strategic Bombing (Was:Was D VII a good plane)
From: (WalterM140)
Date: 4/17/04 1:34 PM Pacific Daylight Time
Message-id:

Sure we could. But why bother? Just destroy the oil and no matter what the
factory turns out it isn't going anywhere.


Bomber Command leadership never did figure that out, Art.

Walt


I think they were too focused on hitting cities to break the Gerrnan will to
fight



Arthur Kramer
344th BG 494th BS
England, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany
Visit my WW II B-26 website at:
http://www.coastcomp.com/artkramer

And over 1/3 of those bombs landed within 1,000 feet of the aiming point during
1944. The USAAF was capable of some pretty fair accuracy for the time

Gosh, Walt, that's *terrible* accuracy! So two-thirds landed a mile or
fifty miles away, or in another country altogether?


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

When noting that at one point 63% of bomber crews failed to complete their
tours, you could have added that towards the end of the campaign -many-
completed their tours and never even saw a German fighter.

But what did this have to do with the Fortress's ability to protect
itself? Toward the end of the campaign, that job was done by fighter
pilots in P-51 Mustangs.

Actually, I didn't say that of one sample, 63 percent failed to
complete their tours. I said that 63 percent of the men were killed or
captured before completing 25 missions. Crikey, we might as well have
sent them to war in yellow school busses.

You also seem to misunderstand the purpose of a book review. I
reviewed the book that was written. If you write a different one, and
if it is as good as Air Power, maybe I'll be given the assignment to
review it.

www.warbirdforum.com/airpower.htm


all the best -- Dan Ford
email: (put Cubdriver in subject line)

The Warbird's Forum www.warbirdforum.com
The Piper Cub Forum www.pipercubforum.com
Viva Bush! blog www.vivabush.org

When noting that at one point 63% of bomber crews failed to complete their
tours, you could have added that towards the end of the campaign -many-
completed their tours and never even saw a German fighter.


But what did this have to do with the Fortress's ability to protect
itself?

Wow.

I thought you were a lot more knowledgeable than that.

After a period in which the B-17 formations stumped the Germans to a degree,
the Germans adapted and were pretty much able to pierce, break up and destroy
the bomber boxes at will. The self defending bomber idea was broken.

To do this, the Germans heavily modified their single engine fighters to have
more punch and more protection. They added the twin engine ME-110's into the
mix. They adopted new tactics; especially the head on attack was adopted and
the attacks from the tail was discouraged. The ME-110's used heavy cannon and
rockets and stayed beyond the range of the .50 cal MG's of the bombers.

Perhaps providentially, just as the Germans perfected these additions to the
equation, the P-51B's began to arrive in numbers. The equation changed again.

Starting in about January, 1944, the heavily armed German single and twin
engine fighters were more and more overmatched by Mustangs (and also the
Thunderbolt).

Here's the thing: If the Germans up-armed and up-armored to kill B-17's, they
were dead meat for the escorts. if they slimmed down to deal with the escorts
they were basically back where they started -- too lightly armed to kill B-17's
at a favorable ratio. A B-17 bomber box was a pretty damned tough and
dangerous opponent.

The Germans never solved that conundrum -- it was built on two pillars -- 1)
the very tough structure of the B-17 and its heavy, punshing armament and 2)
the high technical achievements of the US fighters.

That, and a lot of guts by both bomber and fighter crewmen.

I'm very surprised that you seem unfamiliar with this pretty much common and
undisputable interpretation.

Walt

"WalterM140" wrote in message
...
but to describe the RAF as defeated at this point is a
grave error as the German in Normandy would find as
bomber command turned its attention to transportation and
troop targets.

Last I heard, France wasn't Germany.


I guess nobody ever told you the Germans
were in control of France at the time. Perhaps
you should read a little history.

It sort of, at this point, comes down to your word or the word of Charles
Portal.


No sir it does not.

Keith