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#31
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"Matt Whiting" wrote in message ... Mike Rapoport wrote: "Matt Whiting" wrote in message ... Mike Rapoport wrote: What you are proposing is totally different from what I understand happened at HPN. Flying LIFR with a passenger is OK whether the passenger is a student pilot, astronaut, or garden varierty human. This is totally different from either flying an approach from the right seat with no copilot instruments or letting a student pilot fly the approach and you trying to save it from the right seat (with no copilot instuments). I'm an ATP with 1500hrs in an airplane with full CAT II ILS equipment and I would not let a student pilot fly it to 200 and a half. How much can you let him get off centerline or GS before you take it away from him? If you do take it away, how out of trim is he? Learning is incremental and a pre-solo student pilot is not going to learn much from trying to fly a low approach. An instrument student might learn something. Are you a CFII? Matt No but I don't think that CFIIs are qualified to fly the approach that was attempted at HPN. I don't think anyone is.really qualified to fly an approach cross-cockpit to minimiums with WX below minimiums, particularly if they let a student pilot begin the approach. It is certain that the CFI in question wasn't I'm not a CFII either so I can't say for sure. My primary instructor could certainly do anything from the right seat that he could do from the left, and more than most pilots could do from the left (he's now in his 80s and has more than 50,000 hours of flight time, a good part of that in the right seat). I'd hope the same from a competent CFII, including approaches to minimums, but maybe the instrument layout in most light airplanes makes that impractical. I doubt anybody can fly instruments as well from across the cockpit as they can when they are in front of them. I agree that the CFI in question wasn't up to the task on this particular day in this particular airplane, but then isn't that true of any pilot involved in an accident? The hard part is knowing this is going to happen before it happens! :-) Easier said than done. It isn't really that hard..simply don't take risks for nothing. There was nothing to gain from taking this pre-solo student up to fly low approaches. The student *can't even fly visually yet* and he probably hasn't learned about tracking a VOR yet. It isn't in the syllabus, it isn't going to be on the checkride.. The first rule of practicing anything is not to create a real emergency. Ski schools don't teach beginning skiers on slope ending with cliffs. Bull riding schools don't start you out on champion superbulls. Martial arts students don't train with steel swords. I could go on but you get the point. These things may all be appropriate for advanced students but not beginning ones. However, I still don't think that one accident such as this proves that all such operations are faulty, hazardous, irresponsible, etc. It simply shows that this particular operation went terribly awry. If we legislate or sue out of existence every operation that results in an accident, then we'll soon have a very small envelope in which to fly. That would be as dumb as increasing the required fuel reserve every time a pilot miscalculates and runs out of fuel. The reality is that this pilot busted minimums ... period. The fact that he was an instructor and had a student along is not relevant. If we want to keep the decision making freedoms that we have, we have to show that we are responsible. This student pilot probably had no idea of the risk that he was exposed to. He probably didn't even know what the minimiums were. I don't think that we need new rules but the flight school will probably lose the lawsuit and rightfully so IMO. This was not a tragic accident, it was a stupid one. Mike MU-2 |
#32
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Matt Whiting wrote in
: snip I don't, assuming that you are proficient in making approaches. However, it seems that many here do. There have been claims that the American Flyers instructor flew an approach in weather than was below minimums. I haven't seen any official data that proves or disproves that. Even so, I've flown a number of approaches into conditions Unfortunately, the history will be eradicated from this free site soon, but for a few hours more you can get it at: http://www.uswx.com/us/stn/?code=c&n=999&stn=Khpn Here's a clip in case you missed it: METAR KHPN 231456Z 19010KT 1/2SM FG VV002 12/12 A2955 RMK AO2 RAE11 SLP008 P0000 60008 T01220122 56013 METAR KHPN 231556Z 18006KT 1/4SM -RA FG VV002 12/12 A2954 RMK AO2 RAB07 SLP004 P0002 T01220122 METAR KHPN 231656Z 19013KT 1/2SM FG VV002 13/13 A2952 RMK AO2 RAE55 SLP998 P0004 T01280128 SPECI KHPN 231743Z 17016G22KT 1/8SM FG OVC002 12/12 A2951 RMK AO2 METAR KHPN 231756Z 18013G19KT 1/8SM FG OVC002 12/12 A2952 RMK AO2 SLP996 60014 T01220122 10128 20100 56012 METAR KHPN 231856Z 19012G16KT 1/2SM FG OVC002 12/12 A2951 RMK AO2 SLP993 T01220122 METAR KHPN 231956Z 18012G20KT 3/4SM -RA BR OVC002 13/13 A2948 RMK AO2 RAB12 SLP985 P0003 T01280128 SPECI KHPN 232018Z 19012G20KT 160V220 1/2SM -RA FG OVC002 13/13 A2948 RMK AO2 P0001 METAR KHPN 232056Z 19014G20KT 1/4SM FG OVC002 13/13 A2947 RMK AO2 RAE43 SLP981 P0002 60005 T01280128 58015 SPECI KHPN 232118Z 19013G19KT 3/4SM -RA BR OVC002 13/13 A2947 RMK AO2 RAB01 P0000 The accident report can be found he http://www.ntsb.gov/NTSB/brief.asp?e...28X00521&key=1 According to the report, "According to initial information obtained from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the pilot and student pilot departed HPN, at 1209, under an IFR flight plan, and flew to ALB. They then departed ALB at 1348, to return to HPN." At 1209 local, 1609UTC, the last reported weather was METAR KHPN 231556Z 18006KT 1/4SM -RA FG VV002 12/12 A2954 RMK AO2 RAB07 SLP004 P0002 T01220122 At 1348 local, 1748 UTC, the last reported weather was METAR KHPN 231656Z 19013KT 1/2SM FG VV002 13/13 A2952 RMK AO2 RAE55 SLP998 P0004 T01280128 SPECI KHPN 231743Z 17016G22KT 1/8SM FG OVC002 12/12 A2951 RMK AO2 You can download the approach plate from AOPA's web site if you are a member: http://download.aopa.org/iap/2005051...ils_rwy_16.pdf And you will see that minimums on the ILS-16 for all four categories of aircraft is 200-1/2. It would seem clear that the pilot took off in weather that was below minimums - if some sort of problem arose, it might not be safe to return to the airport. Basically, he was commited to a trip shortly after leaving the runway, whether the problem was equipment related, or even if his student pilot passenger decided he wanted to abort the mission and just go home. I don't think you'll find an official report of the status of the MALSRS. The reason that I know that it was out was because I was there that morning, planning a trip to the AVP area, and heard it on the ATIS. That doesn't necessarily imply that it wasn't corrected by then. Incidentally, as a moderately experienced instrument rated pilot, I don't feel comfortable flying in weather that low unless I am at my sharpest - both with respect to recent flying experience (ie: when's the last time I practiced (or flew) a low approach?) and overall health and concentration level (did I get enough sleep last night? Am I feeling 100%?). I chose to drive that day. According to the report, "The CFI reported 168 hours of total flight experience on his most recent application for an FAA second class medical certificate, which was issued on March 7, 2003. According to the flight school, at the time of the accident, the CFI had accumulated about 900 hours, and the student pilot had accumulated 31.9 hours of total flight experience." snip It is hardly irresponsible for a competent and proficient instrument pilot to fly an approach in conditions reported at, or even below, mininums. It is only irresponsible to continue the approach below the published minimums. To me, that is what the American Flyers instructor did wrong. It wasn't making the flight itself, it was descending below minimums without having the appropriate ground facility references in sight. He failed to go missed when the plane got about 200' low and hit a bank of 75' tall trees that extend up to 591' MSL (about 150' AGL). He failed to do this even after getting a Low Altitude alert from Tower. Not only did he continue his approach significantly below 639' (the Decision Height), but I believe he would have had a fully deflected low glideslope indication at the time. And the final piece of evidence, of course, is the expired medical, which is also listed in the Landings Airmen database as having expired in March of 2004 - over a year ago. It's easy to Monday Morning Quarterback, but it would seem that this particular instructor's focus was not on the safe outcome of the flight but instead on something else. There's no question that there are pilots and instructors who could have flown this approach safely and without incident. But there seems to be a plethora of evidence that would indicate that this instructor had a pattern of not acting responsibly and shouldn't have taken that student up in those conditions. |
#33
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"Neil Gould" wrote in news:AlPme.1172$4u.380
@newssvr33.news.prodigy.com: snip Just to be clear, I was "Disregarding whether or not the instructor...", IOW, I was asking about the lawyers' statement, not the instructor's actions. Hi Neil, The lawyer's statements, as quoted by your own post, are "There is no defensible or logical reason for a primary flight student who was still learning how to fly in visual conditions to be receiving training in weather conditions that were at or below those minimally required for instrument flying. Doing so is simply reckless and irresponsible." Just to be clear, I believe that getting some actual IMC during primary VFR flight training is a wonderful idea. But I don't believe it is appropriate for said IMC exposure to be during "weather conditions that were at or below those minimally required for instrument flying." IMC exposure for a VFR pilot at altitude offers a great learning experience for a scenario that the VFR pilot might one day get himself into, even if he is a mostly responsible pilot. IMC exposure at 200' AGL is not a situation I would expect any responsible VFR pilot to get himself into, and offers no benefit toward VFR training. As to whether it is reckless and irresponsible, I can't say for sure. I'm not a CFII, and I don't know how much experience this particular instructor has flying approaches into LIFR from the right seat. Nor do I know how proficient of a pilot the student was, or if he had any training on scanning technique. Was this his first flight "under the hood" or did he have an hour already? If it's any indication of where I stand on this issue, I had an opportunity a couple of years ago to get some LIFR exposure before I got my Instrument Rating. (I had my VFR, though, and about 150 hours IIRC.) I was flying home from Maine and got stuck in Bridgeport because the ceilings were dropping. After waiting a couple of hours and realizing it was getting worse, I called the flight school that I was renting from, and they sent an instructor (the Chief Instructor, actually) out to get me. By the time he got there, it was LIFR at HPN. By mutual decision, I sat right seat, and let the instructor fly the plane. The instructor told me later that I probably was proficient enough to be able to hold altitude and headings to handle it. But my flight was not about getting hours, it was about getting home safely. |
#34
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"Judah" wrote in message
. .. "Gary Drescher" wrote in : "Judah" wrote in message . .. Getting IMC exposure is not the problem. Do you believe it is responsible to take a 32-hour, non-soloed student pilot into weather that is BELOW IFR MINIMUMS? I have a friend who's a lapsed student pilot (I don't recall if he's soloed yet). He'd like to come along sometime when I shoot approaches in LIFR, so he can see what it's like. (I'm not an instructor.) I don't think it'd be irresponsible to take him along. Do you? Will you sit right seat? Will you take off if the weather is BELOW MINIMUMS? No, you're right, I wouldn't take off then. I'd want to be able to approach and land if a mechanical problem became apparent shortly after takeoff. On the other hand, their takeoff was uneventful, so that danger didn't materialize. When they flew the approach, in the absence of any mechanical problem, below-minimum visibility should not have been dangerous; it should just have prompted a missed approach. In fact, though, they crashed a mile or two from the field--long before below-minimum visibility should have been a factor at all. So even if taking off under those conditions was irresponsible, that particular irresponsibility was arguably not contributory to the accident, as things turned out. And no, admittedly I'm not going to sit in the right seat or let my friend fly. I have no experience giving instruction or flying from the right seat. I don't know how if that would be particularly difficult for an experienced instructor to do. But from the reports I've seen, we don't know if the student was flying the approach at all; the NTSB report doesn't even say who was sitting where. It's conceivable that for the return leg, the instructor was sitting in the left seat and the student was just along for the ride. --Gary |
#35
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In article . net,
"Mike Rapoport" wrote: I doubt anybody can fly instruments as well from across the cockpit as they can when they are in front of them. hmmm, I don't doubt that flying instruments from the left seat is easier than flying instruments from the right seat. However, that doesn't matter if one can safely fly instruments from the right seat. A CFII friend always flys from the right seat. He's done that for decades. It would be interesting to see you two discuss this. -- Bob Noel no one likes an educated mule |
#36
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Recently, Judah posted:
"Neil Gould" wrote in news:AlPme.1172$4u.380 @newssvr33.news.prodigy.com: snip Just to be clear, I was "Disregarding whether or not the instructor...", IOW, I was asking about the lawyers' statement, not the instructor's actions. Hi Neil, The lawyer's statements, as quoted by your own post, are "There is no defensible or logical reason for a primary flight student who was still learning how to fly in visual conditions to be receiving training in weather conditions that were at or below those minimally required for instrument flying. Doing so is simply reckless and irresponsible." Just to be clear, I believe that getting some actual IMC during primary VFR flight training is a wonderful idea. But I don't believe it is appropriate for said IMC exposure to be during "weather conditions that were at or below those minimally required for instrument flying." I agree with you. IMO, the conditions under wich this particular flight was undertaken were unarguably unreasonable. Instructors sometimes make bad decisions, and this is clearly an example. But, that doesn't mean that flying in all IMC situations would be so. For example, a clear, moonless night is also loggable as IMC, and goes all the way to the ground. ;-) I was objecting to a global statement that could establish a precedence that could render any aspect of flying in IMC with a primary student automatically "reckless and irresponsible". Regards, Neil |
#37
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"Bob Noel" wrote in message ... In article . net, "Mike Rapoport" wrote: I doubt anybody can fly instruments as well from across the cockpit as they can when they are in front of them. hmmm, I don't doubt that flying instruments from the left seat is easier than flying instruments from the right seat. However, that doesn't matter if one can safely fly instruments from the right seat. A CFII friend always flys from the right seat. He's done that for decades. It would be interesting to see you two discuss this. -- Bob Noel no one likes an educated mule I can't dispute any of what you say but I'd point out that this CFI couldn't fly well enough from whatever seat he was in and also that a CFI with around 1000hrs, 900 of which were gained while employed as a CFI, has very minimial time actually flyiing instruments, perhaps under 50hrs. If we just do the math and consider that almost all of his time was sitting in the right seat instructing, and that most of his students were probably not instrument students, that most of his time with instrument students was in VMC, we are left with *very* little time where this CFI was actually flying IMC and it may have been his first time trying to fly IMC from the right seat. Admittedly all this is somewhat conjecture but this guy sure as hell wasn't some 30,000hr retired airline captain, this had to be one of the few times that he had done this and he was doing it in very low conditions. I don't think that it was reckless for him to go out and do this on his own but to do it as part of a lesson was criminal. My basic belief is that a student (of anything) need to be able to make mistakes and learn in a protected enviornment. We must also provide more protection to those unable to assess the risk of what they are doing. You can see this in how the FAA regulates for hire operations more stringently than Part 91 operations. I agree with most on this thread that exposure to IMC is beneficial but I think that the CFI in this case went way over the line. In fact, I suspect that he undertook this final flight for himself rather than his student. Mike MU-2 |
#38
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But, that doesn't mean that
flying in all IMC situations would be so. For example, a clear, moonless night is also loggable as IMC, and goes all the way to the ground. ;-) Well, it only goes all the way to the ground if you are crashing. If you are landing at a lighted runway, then the runway lights should give you enough visual cues that you are not flying "on instruments". Not all moonless nights are IMC. Jose -- The price of freedom is... well... freedom. for Email, make the obvious change in the address. |
#39
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Matt Barrow wrote:
I certainly don't, and I've let primary students fly my plane in IMC. Primary private, or primary IR? Private primary, student pilot certificate only. Less than 50 hours total time, and more than half of that in gliders. He did fine in the cruise portion, needed some coaching in the descent, and in the approach phase I had to take it away from him. Michael |
#40
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Yes, instructors have been known to behave quite similarly to normal
people. ;-) Yes, and they've also been known to behave quite differently. The issue here is that an instrument-rated private pilot who isn't actually proficient enough to handle hard IFR (and knows it) simply won't fly it. I've actually met a Cessna 421 owner like that - won't fly solid IMC, won't fly to anything close to mins, etc. He doesn't need to. A commercial pilot with a job that involves flying IFR is at a different level. Under Part 135, single pilot IFR with pax takes 1200 hours, 100 in make and model, and a checkride every six months to a year. Corporate flight departments don't have to do it that way - but insurance forces them to do it anyway. ANd then there's the CFI. He is under pressure to fly IMC even if he's not comfortable. Pressure from his student who wants to experience IMC and doesn't see what the big deal is - after all, the instructor is instrument rated. Pressure from his finances - he needs the money (seems to have been a factor here) and the flight time - airlines want to see actual IMC time. If one makes bad decisions, one is likely to have consequences. But, differs from a blanket notion that primary students should not be exposed to any kind of IMC, which is where these lawyers are heading. If we're dealing with that exposure being provided by the average CFI working at the average flight school, I don't think the lawyers are wrong. My experience has been that the average CFI is not up to the task. Let's not lose sight of the fact that there's IMC and there's below-VFR minimums. Let's not forget that in this case, it was 200 and 1/2. Michael |
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