Observations on the War

The most objective and comprehensive single article I've seen recently.

--
OBSERVATIONS ON THE WAR by Harvey Sicherman

March 12, 2004

Harvey Sicherman, Ph.D., is President of the Foreign Policy Research
Institute. A former aide to three U.S. secretaries of state, he is
co-editor, with John Lehman, of "America the Vulnerable" (FPRI, 2002).

OBSERVATIONS ON THE WAR

by Harvey Sicherman

The War on Terrorism is now two-and-a-half years old. As the candidates
prepare for the 2004 Presidential election, the fog of partisanship will
soon obscure much of what has been done, and not done. That in mind, a
few observations may be made about the military, intelligence,
diplomatic, and homeland security aspects of the struggle.

MILITARY: THE "NEW-OLD" WAR
Recent changes in military technology, on ample view in both Afghanistan
and Iraq, seem to have a very clear implication: less can be more. Fewer
forces, acting through combined air and ground units, more accurate and
lethal, can equal or exceed the firepower previously available only in
much larger units. We should be wary of drawing too neat a conclusion,
however, given Afghan and Iraqi deficiencies in training, air power, and
equipment. Still, it is safe to say that the American "new way of war"
dominates most of the "conflict spectrum."

Most, but not all. Three divisions were enough to defeat Saddam just as
the rented infantry of the Northern Front, joined to Special Forces and
airpower, broke the Taliban. But neither sufficed to harness the
military victory to the political objectives which, in both countries,
demanded a security available only through a full military occupation.
New technology notwithstanding, sometimes there can be no substitute for
"boots on the ground" to succeed. And the outcome reflected an old
American problem, the perils of the endgame, when the military strategy
does not entirely support the post-war political objectives. Thus the
lessons: more firepower for fewer forces to defeat the enemy; more
forces with different skills to secure the victory once the enemy is
defeated. The Pentagon has acknowledged this obliquely by boosting its
end strengths 30,000 beyond those authorized in order to ease the strain
on both regular forces and the Reserves -- both much stressed by
shortages, especially in the "post combat," political reconstruction
skills. Clearly, the United State must adapt its military to
"nation-building" if the war on terrorism is to leave in its wake decent
government instead of a new chaos.

INTELLIGENCE: WHAT IS KNOWN AND WHAT IS NOT KNOWN
Both Prime Minister Blair and President Bush have lost some public
confidence in their leadership because of intelligence controversies.
Blair was cleared of the "sexing up" charge but not before considerable
damage was done. Bush has now undergone a similar trial following the
Kay Report that the CIA had erred about Saddam's WMD stockpiles.
Alongside the error, however, stand these correct judgments: Saddam
wanted such weapons; he retained a residual capability to make them,
more so in biological and chemical than nuclear; and he had already
obtained a new missile system to deliver them.

These conclusions should be put in the perspective of the "Saddam watch"
over the past two decades. Saddam had been seriously underestimated
before 1991 on his nuclear efforts, and before 1995 on his biological
program, when his defecting son-in-law spilled the goods. More recently,
he seems to have been seriously overestimated on his residual weapons
stocks.

This record does not inspire much confidence in the accuracy of either
the intelligence agencies or the international inspectors. Bush's
description of Saddam as a "grave and gathering danger" reflected the
consensus of the record already available to his predecessor who, in
1999, used it to justify a brief bombing campaign when the U.N.
inspectors were forced to leave. The only thing standing between Saddam
and a fuller rearmament was the increasingly shaky international
sanctions regime already widely violated and denounced for impoverishing
Iraq's citizens. The issue therefore is not whether the President lied
or exaggerated the intelligence; he did not. The question should be
whether the CIA's longstanding lack of human sources of intelligence --a
point Kay emphasized -- made a difference to the October 2002 National
Intelligence Estimate of "high confidence" that Iraq had WMD.

An intelligence agency that errs is not necessarily inept or corrupted
by politics. Sergei Khrushchev relates that at the height of the Cuban
Missile Crisis, his father, Premier Nikita Khrushchev, revealed that the
United States had grossly overestimated Soviet ICBMs. "We have nothing
to hide," Khrushchev said, "We have nothing. And we must hide it."
(Sheldon M. Stern, "Averting the Final Failure," Stanford University
Press, 2003, pp. 28-29). This hardly meant that Kennedy's CIA was
incompetent, only that the Soviets had successfully concealed the truth
for awhile. That the U.K., French, German (and Israeli) intelligence
joined the U.N. inspectors in concluding that Saddam had WMDs in larger
stocks than discovered may mean simply that he had less and disposed of
it, or was running a bluff that he himself may not have realized given
the lies characterizing the regime.

Nonetheless, it must be dismaying to learn that the CIA is still
struggling with the lack of "people on the ground." The Agency has not
overcome its infatuation with technical means rather than human
intelligence, including specialists in Arabic, Persian, Pashto, and Urdu
(the Joint Congressional Committee established last year that U.S. spy
agencies had only 30% of the capacity needed in these languages). Yet,
before the investigatory commissions warn once more about these
deficiencies, including lack of operatives, the Congress should recall
its own history on this score. The likely sources for CIA spies --
indeed the spies themselves -- are not likely to be of spotless
character. Unless the agency is freed of fears that lawyers and
committee hearings will expose the seamy side as they did in the 1970's,
recruitment and sources will be scarce.

DIPLOMACY: REAPING THE BENEFITS
The United States is now reaping diplomatic benefits from the Afghan and
Iraqi operations. The so-called rogue states are reappraising the risks
they run in either sponsoring terrorism or seeking WMD. Libya wants out
of the risks; Iran wants to reduce them; so does Syria. No doubt fears
of American action stimulated this new willingness to negotiate. But
fear will wear off, possibly sooner rather than later, especially if it
looks like a new President will ease the pressure. Even so, all of the
WMD-terrorist states will try to negotiate some variation of the
excruciatingly difficult North Korean deal. They will offer to give up,
or freeze, weapons the United States does not like; in return, they want
Washington to assure their survival. The United States may be asked to
choose between the elimination of weapons and "regime change."

This issue overhangs the political part of the war on terrorism. The
short-term objectives of preventing or containing proliferation must
somehow be accommodated to the longer-term objective of ridding the
world of dictatorships dangerous to their own people and others.

The war on terrorism is also forcing decisions by American allies with
dubious records. President Bush's argument that "you're either with us
or against us" omitted important governments that are simultaneously
with us AND against us. Two of these -- Saudi Arabia and Pakistan --
have now decided that the previously tolerated Jihadists threaten their
survival. Should the Saudi princes and the Pakistani general prevail
over their enemies, their countries will cease to be centers for the
religious propaganda and technological leakage that, together, offer
such devastating potential for terrorists.

Another set of much closer allies also changing course can be found in
Europe. Despite the heated quarrel at the U.N. over Iraq, both France
and, especially Germany, facilitated the movement of coalition forces to
the battlefield. This was quite unlike earlier crises over the Middle
East when, for example, overflight rights were denied to the U.S. and
arms embargoes enforced, not to speak of the still remembered 1956 Suez
disaster. The Schroeder government, in particular, wants out of any
long-term quarrel with the Americans. Berlin (and Paris) are trying to
mend the rift whether through NATO, the U.N., or the "Group of Seven"
industrialized nations (G-7). There are opportunities here, too, for a
reconciling American diplomacy. Together, the allies must find a formula
that moves the Middle East out of its current violence and economic
stagnation without harming necessary U.S. allies in the process.

A STILL BITTER HARVEST
All plans to change the Middle East for the better will necessarily
involve a fresh effort to ease the Israeli- Palestinian conflict, the
very same conflict that was supposed to be the major beneficiary of the
Iraq war. Thus far, however, the harvest has been bitter. The June 2003
Aqaba Summit, where Bush embraced then-Palestinian Prime Minister Abu
Mazen as the alternative to Arafat, proved premature. Palestinian
security forces were still largely in Arafat's hands, ultimately making
it impossible to crack down on terrorism. The President had moved too
quickly; Israeli Prime Minister Sharon then moved too slowly, helping
Abu Mazen only grudgingly. Ultimately, Abu Mazen proved unable to act at
all. Arafat quickly exploited these blunders and by Fall had regained
much of his authority.

This offered no way out. Both Israel and the United States regarded the
Palestinian leader as an incorrigible terrorist unwilling or unable to
act as partner for peace. But the Israeli public, fed up with three
years of terrorism and no change in sight, suddenly seemed to lose
patience with Sharon's policy. The Prime Minister, already in political
trouble over scandal, detected a seismic political shift and promptly
took the initiative. Borrowing some Labour Party ideas, the veteran
former general declared that better short-term security against suicide
attacks and long-term security against the Palestinian birthrate could
be achieved if Israel withdrew settlements and soldiers from much (or
all of) Gaza, and some from the West Bank, too. Meanwhile, the
construction of Israel's controversial barrier, some of it lying beyond
the pre-1967 War "green line," would be rushed to completion. This new
deal could only be executed with U.S. support and some local Palestinian
cooperation if it was not to make Gaza a province of Hamas, the Islamic
terrorist group. Bush's vision of a democratic Palestinian state at
peace with Israel still seemed a mirage.

THE THREE NEGATIVES
Meanwhile, in Iraq itself the Americans were also discovering the
pitfalls between democratic rhetoric and less than democratic reality.
The Shiite Grand Ayatollah Sistani, heretofore not distinguished for his
interest in political philosophy, demanded direct elections to a new
Iraqi government in opposition to Washington's plan for self-selecting
caucuses. The embarrassed American occupiers retreated under cover of
the U.N. to allow a postponement of this transparent attempt to put Iraq
at the behest of a Shiite majority.

The reality is that the new Iraq can only be built on three fundamental
negatives. (1) the Shiites and Kurds do not want Sunni rule; (2) the
Kurds and Sunnis do not want Shiite rule; and (3) the Sunnis and Shiites
do not want an independent Kurdistan. Any constitution that reflects
these "red lines" will have grudging acceptance. Anything else will
threaten civil strife, a point that seems to have registered with
Sistani himself in the argument over the interim Iraqi Basic Law. The
longer-term will then depend upon sharing the oil wealth and an army
determined to preserve the agreed upon constitution as the only antidote
to disastrous civil war. Until then coalition forces will have to
provide the backbone. Not an easy formula but a workable one.

REMOBILIZING THE HOME FRONT
In America, homeland defense is the necessary partner to a forward
deployed war against the terrorists. Indeed, the more effective the
United States and its allies become in places like Afghanistan or Iraq,
the more attractive "soft targets" may become in the United States. A
large action that seriously disrupts the United States, especially its
economy, tells the world that the terrorists are still in business
notwithstanding all of the Bush Administration's efforts.

Nothing on this scale has happened since 9/11, although the accidental
blackout of 2003 illustrated that essential U.S. infrastructure remains
highly vulnerable. The public does not know how many attempts have been
frustrated, making an overall evaluation of the homeland defense effort
very difficult. We do know, however, that a year after the Department of
Homeland Defense was established, the JRIES Program (Joint Regional
Information Exchange System) for sharing intelligence at local, state,
and national levels has just been adopted; that many holes remain in the
immigration procedures; and that the legalities of the war on terrorism
are receiving their first tests in the courts. Progress, such as it is,
seems very slow.

To this incomplete picture we must add another feature. Homeland
security in the United States is determined more by state, local, and
private entities than the Federal government. Electricity, power plants,
chemical factories, mines, railroads, supply chains, communications,
etc. are owned, run, or regulated by those entities. But few of them can
evaluate threats or gauge when and how to spend their money on meeting
them. Thus, homeland defense for many has become an extra ambulance or
better training for "first responders" to an incident rather than a
defense against an incident in the first place.

Moreover, two-and-a-half years after the event, the war itself has not
led to significant change in American domestic life save perhaps for
airport security procedures and security checks on certain public or
private sites. The American people have had little mobilization to match
past national emergencies and almost no outlet for patriotic energies.

Certainly, the war against terrorism is a different kind of struggle,
one that does not require "a nation in arms" to pursue successfully.
"Act normal but keep your eyes open" would seem good advice -- yet it
does not go far enough. For the war to succeed abroad, there must be
arrangements on the homefront to protect vital facilities; education
about the struggle; and a sustained effort to stay alert. Some new
balance must be found between peacetime liberties and wartime restrictions.

The American people are on the edge of understanding, as they did in
1951, that this conflict, like the Cold War, will be protracted. Costs,
burdens, and sacrifices are here to stay. It will be an immense
disservice if the election campaign leaves the impression in America and
abroad that the war on terrorism is a short-term affair that can be
quickly concluded. Many things can soon go wrong. The United States
could suffer another attack at home on the scale of the Madrid massacre
or larger. American reinforcements patrolling the Iraqi borders could
clash with Syrian and Iranian infiltrators. The Saudi government might
be crippled by a terrorist strike. All of this or any of it might try an
American public misled by expectations of swift victory. Woe to the
politician thought to be concealing the costs and duration of the war.

CONCLUSION
After September 11, 2001, the obvious question was whether the United
States had the skill and persistence to defeat the terrorists, even if
it meant taking on the states that helped or harbored them. The answer
must be "yes" in the most egregious cases: both al-Qaeda in Afghanistan
and Saddam's Iraq were poster examples of violent action and violent
ambition. But in the wake of those campaigns the job remains incomplete.
Four areas demand movement: (1) reform of the military and intelligence
to prosecute the war; (2) exploitation of U.S. military victories to win
lasting change from the WMD states while reconciling allies; (3)
stimulating beneficial political and economic change in the Middle East;
and (4) creating at home a private-public partnership that protects
vital facilities while a legal balance is established that protects
security and liberty. These are big and lasting demands on the American
people and their leadership. The War on Terrorism, like the Cold War,
will test America's capacity to persist until victory.

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"No SPAM, Please" wrote in message
...
The most objective and comprehensive single article I've seen recently.

...except that the writer blithely fails to explore the very tenuous
connection between the war on terrorism and the war on Iraq.

Vaughn

"Vaughn" wrote in message
...

"No SPAM, Please" wrote in message
...
The most objective and comprehensive single article I've seen recently.

...except that the writer blithely fails to explore the very tenuous
connection between the war on terrorism and the war on Iraq.

It wouldn't be objective if he did


Vaughn