What about the AIM-54 Pheonix Missile?

Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Tom Cooper" wrote in message ...
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"Tom Cooper" wrote in message
...

snip

Besides, the main threat from the Chinese are not dozens of bombers, but
hundreds of multi-role fighters, each of which is far more flexible and
superior to the F/A-18s in anything but avionics.

They have *hundreds* that are unquestionably superior to the Hornet?
Come on now--they have their Su-27's,

You're simply underinformed, and that's all. By 2006, the PLAAF and the
PLANAF will have around 400 Su-27/J-11s, Su-30MKKs and similar planes -
supported by A-50s - in service. Go and check the orders they issued in the
last six years to Russia, and the numbers they're receiving each year.

LOL! A-50's? How much of a threat are those
candidates-for-museum-membership?

I think you're confusing the A-50 Mainstay with the A-5 Fantan. The A-50 is their AWACS:

http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/a50/

Originally China ordered it with the Israeli Phalcon radar system, but the U.S. put heavy pressure
on Israel to nix the deal, so the Chinese ordered the a/c with the standard Russian radar system.

snip

and again the
recent experiences with the PAC-3 show that this is not the case.

PAC-3 is not a naval missile, for one thing.

So what? Is it equipped with a system that makes it capable of VID over
BVR-ranges? Is it making its users better able to safely identify distant
targets than any (manned) interceptor can do?

But your F-14 with Phoenix supposedly *is* capable of making a VID of
an aircraft some 100+ miles away?

See below.

snip

I get the idea that you are focusing on the fratricide issue as the sole
factor applied to determining the effectiveness of the SAM
systems--but that is only a part of the equation. You think your
F-14's tossing Phoenix missiles about over 100 nm away are not going
to be subject to the same kind of frat incidents?

No. But, at least the F-14 has had the TCS, which was enabling it to VID
bogeys from serious distances. This is something no SAM can do - and
especially no SAM-site or an AAW-warship.

BZZZ! Sorry, that does not compute. You are arguing that we are making
a serious mistake in giving up the extended BVR range capability of
the F-14/AIM-54 combination, and then you segue into this
fratricide-at-long-range rant, but the faxct is that your pet pair are
just as susceptable as any SAM to that same problem. If you are going
to argue that VID is required, then you have to give up on the "AIM-54
is vital" argument.

see below.

Snip

The identification systems are obviously not sophisticated
enough, and the USN - especially not in its "new", "litoral"
environment -
also obviously can't hope to have a situation where the Aegis can have a
free field of fire.

But hey, those same systems are apparently quite capable of handling
waaay beyond VR IFF in the case of Phoenix?! Do you not see the
disconnect in your reasoning between the two here?

Such things like TCS are. Don't you notice that you permanently forget at
least one factor that makes the difference?

If you are referring to blade counts, I believe the ability of the
Aegis to do this has been in evidence (and is likely better now than
it was back in the 80's). Now, again, how is your Tomcat going to
positively VID these targets to allow your AIM-54 engagement at over
100 naut miles?

snip

Kevin, TCS is the Television Camera System fitted to some F-14As (and probably Bs, I forget) in
lieu of an IRSTS. The F-14D has both IRSTS and TCS. AFAIK no IIRAF F-14s had TCS or its
predecessor (on the F-4E), TISEO. They didn't have them at the time of delivery, and it's
unlikely that they would have received them since (but given Iran-Contra and the Israeli
connection, who knows). The production contract for TCS was let in 1981, although F-14s used in
AIMVAL/ACEVAL in 1977 had TISEO fitted for that. To my knowledge, range of TCS has never been
officially stated, although there have been unofficial claims of ID on a fighter at 10-20 miles,
with max. ID range on a bomber perhaps as much as 60nm. This assumes ideal conditions, i.e low
humidity, no clouds in the way and no temperature distortions. At least the first two conditions
would be more likely over desert than in a maritime environment. The video of armed Libyan
MiG-23s back in the late '80s just before they were shot down was from the TCS, IIRR.

In short, if the unofficial accounts are in the ballpark, in clear weather TCS would allow a shot
at a decent fraction of the AIM-120's max. head-on range if VID is required, but nowhere near max.
head-on range for the AIM-54. To take a head-on max. range shot with either would almost
certainly require an EID. To take a no-escape-zone shot might be another matter, as TCS range
could well be adequate for that. In the latter case, the AIM-120 is more maneuverable, but the
AIM-54 will probably get there faster. both were designed to be able to hit targets at low
latitudes in LD/SD conditions. One of the successful AIM-54A test shots was on a BQM-34A at M0.75
and 50 feet, with the F-14A firing from 22nm away @ M0.72 and 10kft.

Re the Yakhont's 300 km (162nm) max. range, SOP for navy CAPs is (or was, in the 70s and 80s)
orbit at 150nm out, with the E-2s 200nm out. The latter can add another 180-250nm of warning
radius with radar (depending on target altitude and assuming RCS isn't an issue), more with
passive systems. Radar upgrades now in progress may boost that further. In the case of Taiwan,
it can be expected that E-3s would also be used, and the carriers themselves would most likely be
operating on the far side of the island from the mainland (this has been stated in various
official and semi-official pubs), at least initially.

Guy

Guy Alcala wrote in message t...
Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Tom Cooper" wrote in message ...
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"Tom Cooper" wrote in message
...

snip

Besides, the main threat from the Chinese are not dozens of bombers, but
hundreds of multi-role fighters, each of which is far more flexible and
superior to the F/A-18s in anything but avionics.

They have *hundreds* that are unquestionably superior to the Hornet?
Come on now--they have their Su-27's,

You're simply underinformed, and that's all. By 2006, the PLAAF and the
PLANAF will have around 400 Su-27/J-11s, Su-30MKKs and similar planes -
supported by A-50s - in service. Go and check the orders they issued in the
last six years to Russia, and the numbers they're receiving each year.

LOL! A-50's? How much of a threat are those
candidates-for-museum-membership?

I think you're confusing the A-50 Mainstay with the A-5 Fantan. The A-50 is their AWACS:

http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/a50/

Originally China ordered it with the Israeli Phalcon radar system, but the U.S. put heavy pressure
on Israel to nix the deal, so the Chinese ordered the a/c with the standard Russian radar system.

You are correct; I happened to read an article yesterday about the
F-7MPG which mentioned the A-5 and the lightbulb went off in my head
(a bit late).


snip

and again the
recent experiences with the PAC-3 show that this is not the case.

PAC-3 is not a naval missile, for one thing.

So what? Is it equipped with a system that makes it capable of VID over
BVR-ranges? Is it making its users better able to safely identify distant
targets than any (manned) interceptor can do?

But your F-14 with Phoenix supposedly *is* capable of making a VID of
an aircraft some 100+ miles away?

See below.

snip

I get the idea that you are focusing on the fratricide issue as the sole
factor applied to determining the effectiveness of the SAM
systems--but that is only a part of the equation. You think your
F-14's tossing Phoenix missiles about over 100 nm away are not going
to be subject to the same kind of frat incidents?

No. But, at least the F-14 has had the TCS, which was enabling it to VID
bogeys from serious distances. This is something no SAM can do - and
especially no SAM-site or an AAW-warship.

BZZZ! Sorry, that does not compute. You are arguing that we are making
a serious mistake in giving up the extended BVR range capability of
the F-14/AIM-54 combination, and then you segue into this
fratricide-at-long-range rant, but the faxct is that your pet pair are
just as susceptable as any SAM to that same problem. If you are going
to argue that VID is required, then you have to give up on the "AIM-54
is vital" argument.

see below.

Snip

The identification systems are obviously not sophisticated
enough, and the USN - especially not in its "new", "litoral"
environment -
also obviously can't hope to have a situation where the Aegis can have a
free field of fire.

But hey, those same systems are apparently quite capable of handling
waaay beyond VR IFF in the case of Phoenix?! Do you not see the
disconnect in your reasoning between the two here?

Such things like TCS are. Don't you notice that you permanently forget at
least one factor that makes the difference?

If you are referring to blade counts, I believe the ability of the
Aegis to do this has been in evidence (and is likely better now than
it was back in the 80's). Now, again, how is your Tomcat going to
positively VID these targets to allow your AIM-54 engagement at over
100 naut miles?

snip

Kevin, TCS is the Television Camera System fitted to some F-14As (and probably Bs, I forget) in
lieu of an IRSTS. The F-14D has both IRSTS and TCS. AFAIK no IIRAF F-14s had TCS or its
predecessor (on the F-4E), TISEO. They didn't have them at the time of delivery, and it's
unlikely that they would have received them since (but given Iran-Contra and the Israeli
connection, who knows). The production contract for TCS was let in 1981, although F-14s used in
AIMVAL/ACEVAL in 1977 had TISEO fitted for that. To my knowledge, range of TCS has never been
officially stated, although there have been unofficial claims of ID on a fighter at 10-20 miles,
with max. ID range on a bomber perhaps as much as 60nm. This assumes ideal conditions, i.e low
humidity, no clouds in the way and no temperature distortions. At least the first two conditions
would be more likely over desert than in a maritime environment. The video of armed Libyan
MiG-23s back in the late '80s just before they were shot down was from the TCS, IIRR.

In short, if the unofficial accounts are in the ballpark, in clear weather TCS would allow a shot
at a decent fraction of the AIM-120's max. head-on range if VID is required, but nowhere near max.
head-on range for the AIM-54.

Exactly. If the argument is that VID is required, the AIM-54 cannot
take advantage of its greater range capability. If EID is allowed,
then the poster's disdain for that capability inherent in the Aegis
system is also reflected in any such capability included in the
(older) AWG-9 system.

To take a head-on max. range shot with either would almost
certainly require an EID. To take a no-escape-zone shot might be another matter, as TCS range
could well be adequate for that. In the latter case, the AIM-120 is more maneuverable, but the
AIM-54 will probably get there faster. both were designed to be able to hit targets at low
latitudes in LD/SD conditions. One of the successful AIM-54A test shots was on a BQM-34A at M0.75
and 50 feet, with the F-14A firing from 22nm away @ M0.72 and 10kft.

Re the Yakhont's 300 km (162nm) max. range, SOP for navy CAPs is (or was, in the 70s and 80s)
orbit at 150nm out, with the E-2s 200nm out. The latter can add another 180-250nm of warning
radius with radar (depending on target altitude and assuming RCS isn't an issue), more with
passive systems. Radar upgrades now in progress may boost that further. In the case of Taiwan,
it can be expected that E-3s would also be used, and the carriers themselves would most likely be
operating on the far side of the island from the mainland (this has been stated in various
official and semi-official pubs), at least initially.

Agreed; trying to maneuver into the Straits would be downright
suicidal with *any* level of CAP, since you grant the PLAN/PLAAF/PLA
the privilege of engaging with a goodly chunk of the weapons in their
arsenal, and disposing of the need for a lot of air tanking support
(not their strong suit as yet), etc.

Brooks


Guy

Well, since Guy answered, I think I can post a quick little follow up
opinion. Kevin and Tom seem to be mostly arguing about the utility of the
Super Bug vs. the Tomcat against Chinese Flankers. Most of the talk has
been about BVR. I think I can safely say that modern BVR is most heavily
influenced by avionics (including radar). Stealth and supercruise are not
relevant here (although the F-18E/F is much more stealthy than either the
Flanker or Tomcat, the barn-sized radar-returns of the fighter world). From
this point of view, the latest radars/avionics in the F-18E/F are
generations ahead of anything in baseline Tomcats or Flankers (F-14A,
Su-27B- comparable to current Chinese models), and further ahead of the
F-14D -71/advanced Flankers?? (E/F is probably closer to the V2 equipping
some F-15Cs).
No one here can argue precisely about NCTR because it's so classified,
no one with accurate knowledge would (or should) post it here. However, I
think again we can assume that the much more modern Super Bug has better
NCTR than the F-14D, and MUCH better NCTR than the baseline Tomcat and most
Flanker models (even "advanced" Flankers avionics are not likely much better
than a -14D).
As far as missile technology, the AMRAAM probably has better ECCM,
especially considering how the Russians had access to early versions of the
Phoenix from the Iranians (don't know about the AIM-54C - Tom?). Plus, you
can only carry a couple of Phoenix missiles and still maintain any sort of
credible aircraft performance (heck, a typical fighter vs. fighter load for
the USN doesn't include AIM-54's!). Most crews even doubt the ability to
perform the magic six-missile launch, especially against low-level,
fighter-sized, maneuvering, targets. Plus, the Phoenix has a minimum
engagement range (classified, so I don't know exact range) that is much
larger (i.e., it is less effective) than the AMRAAMs. Roughly around the
range of the Sparrow (F-14 pilots have said that with no Sparrow, there is
an uncomfortable time when you are within minimum -54 range, but beyond the
maximum AIM-9 range!). So, at the reasonably close ranges that are probably
required for NCTR, you'd be within the range of AMRAAMs, which have as good
Fire and Forget performance as AIM-54C. Plus, they are more agile, and have
a closer minimum range. Plus, an F-18E/F can carry far more AIM-120's than
a F-14 can realistically carry "buffaloes" (nicknamed that for a reason!).
So, it looks like unless you are trying to tap multiple targets at
extreme long ranges (and picking up a fighter contact at low level at such
long ranges is highly suspect), it looks like the F-18E/F is the superior
bird (except for perhaps gas/range). As for the overall Chinese threat, the
USN would have to be silly to get close enough for its carriers to be within
easy strike range of Chinese flankers (as Guy mentioned), and certainly in
any wider conflict, the balance of power would rest with the U.S. and its
allies. Furthermore, as Chuck has said, "It's the man, not the machine",
and I'd bet on USN pilots over Chinese pilots any day. So while I think the
Chinese are a credible threat, I don't think they are on par with the USSR
circa 1980s, nor do I think that the Tomcat (especially early models) is a
more effective fighter in this case than Super Bugs. Cheers,

Tony

p.s.- references for this post include Tomcat- Shipborne Superfighter (Jon
Lake), WAPJ (15, 27, 28), and IAPR (1, 7- wish I had the latest one on the
Flanker!)

"Guy Alcala" wrote in message
...
Kevin Brooks wrote:

"Tom Cooper" wrote in message
...
"Kevin Brooks" wrote in message
om...
"Tom Cooper" wrote in message
...

snip

Besides, the main threat from the Chinese are not dozens of
bombers, but
hundreds of multi-role fighters, each of which is far more
flexible and
superior to the F/A-18s in anything but avionics.

They have *hundreds* that are unquestionably superior to the Hornet?
Come on now--they have their Su-27's,

You're simply underinformed, and that's all. By 2006, the PLAAF and
the
PLANAF will have around 400 Su-27/J-11s, Su-30MKKs and similar
planes -
supported by A-50s - in service. Go and check the orders they issued
in the
last six years to Russia, and the numbers they're receiving each year.

LOL! A-50's? How much of a threat are those
candidates-for-museum-membership?

I think you're confusing the A-50 Mainstay with the A-5 Fantan. The A-50
is their AWACS:

http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/a50/

Originally China ordered it with the Israeli Phalcon radar system, but the
U.S. put heavy pressure
on Israel to nix the deal, so the Chinese ordered the a/c with the
standard Russian radar system.

snip

and again the
recent experiences with the PAC-3 show that this is not the case.

PAC-3 is not a naval missile, for one thing.

So what? Is it equipped with a system that makes it capable of VID
over
BVR-ranges? Is it making its users better able to safely identify
distant
targets than any (manned) interceptor can do?

But your F-14 with Phoenix supposedly *is* capable of making a VID of
an aircraft some 100+ miles away?

See below.

snip

I get the idea that you are focusing on the fratricide issue as the
sole
factor applied to determining the effectiveness of the SAM
systems--but that is only a part of the equation. You think your
F-14's tossing Phoenix missiles about over 100 nm away are not going
to be subject to the same kind of frat incidents?

No. But, at least the F-14 has had the TCS, which was enabling it to
VID
bogeys from serious distances. This is something no SAM can do - and
especially no SAM-site or an AAW-warship.

BZZZ! Sorry, that does not compute. You are arguing that we are making
a serious mistake in giving up the extended BVR range capability of
the F-14/AIM-54 combination, and then you segue into this
fratricide-at-long-range rant, but the faxct is that your pet pair are
just as susceptable as any SAM to that same problem. If you are going
to argue that VID is required, then you have to give up on the "AIM-54
is vital" argument.

see below.

Snip

The identification systems are obviously not sophisticated
enough, and the USN - especially not in its "new", "litoral"
environment -
also obviously can't hope to have a situation where the Aegis can
have a
free field of fire.

But hey, those same systems are apparently quite capable of handling
waaay beyond VR IFF in the case of Phoenix?! Do you not see the
disconnect in your reasoning between the two here?

Such things like TCS are. Don't you notice that you permanently forget
at
least one factor that makes the difference?

If you are referring to blade counts, I believe the ability of the
Aegis to do this has been in evidence (and is likely better now than
it was back in the 80's). Now, again, how is your Tomcat going to
positively VID these targets to allow your AIM-54 engagement at over
100 naut miles?

snip

Kevin, TCS is the Television Camera System fitted to some F-14As (and
probably Bs, I forget) in
lieu of an IRSTS. The F-14D has both IRSTS and TCS. AFAIK no IIRAF F-14s
had TCS or its
predecessor (on the F-4E), TISEO. They didn't have them at the time of
delivery, and it's
unlikely that they would have received them since (but given Iran-Contra
and the Israeli
connection, who knows). The production contract for TCS was let in 1981,
although F-14s used in
AIMVAL/ACEVAL in 1977 had TISEO fitted for that. To my knowledge, range
of TCS has never been
officially stated, although there have been unofficial claims of ID on a
fighter at 10-20 miles,
with max. ID range on a bomber perhaps as much as 60nm. This assumes
ideal conditions, i.e low
humidity, no clouds in the way and no temperature distortions. At least
the first two conditions
would be more likely over desert than in a maritime environment. The
video of armed Libyan
MiG-23s back in the late '80s just before they were shot down was from the
TCS, IIRR.

In short, if the unofficial accounts are in the ballpark, in clear weather
TCS would allow a shot
at a decent fraction of the AIM-120's max. head-on range if VID is
required, but nowhere near max.
head-on range for the AIM-54. To take a head-on max. range shot with
either would almost
certainly require an EID. To take a no-escape-zone shot might be another
matter, as TCS range
could well be adequate for that. In the latter case, the AIM-120 is more
maneuverable, but the
AIM-54 will probably get there faster. both were designed to be able to
hit targets at low
latitudes in LD/SD conditions. One of the successful AIM-54A test shots
was on a BQM-34A at M0.75
and 50 feet, with the F-14A firing from 22nm away @ M0.72 and 10kft.

Re the Yakhont's 300 km (162nm) max. range, SOP for navy CAPs is (or was,
in the 70s and 80s)
orbit at 150nm out, with the E-2s 200nm out. The latter can add another
180-250nm of warning
radius with radar (depending on target altitude and assuming RCS isn't an
issue), more with
passive systems. Radar upgrades now in progress may boost that further.
In the case of Taiwan,
it can be expected that E-3s would also be used, and the carriers
themselves would most likely be
operating on the far side of the island from the mainland (this has been
stated in various
official and semi-official pubs), at least initially.

Guy

"Tony Volk" wrote in message ...

Well, since Guy answered, I think I can post a quick little follow up
opinion. Kevin and Tom seem to be mostly arguing about the utility of the
Super Bug vs. the Tomcat against Chinese Flankers. Most of the talk has
been about BVR. I think I can safely say that modern BVR is most heavily
influenced by avionics (including radar). Stealth and supercruise are not
relevant here (although the F-18E/F is much more stealthy than either the
Flanker or Tomcat, the barn-sized radar-returns of the fighter world).

Good point.

From
this point of view, the latest radars/avionics in the F-18E/F are
generations ahead of anything in baseline Tomcats or Flankers (F-14A,
Su-27B- comparable to current Chinese models), and further ahead of the
F-14D -71/advanced Flankers?? (E/F is probably closer to the V2 equipping
some F-15Cs).
No one here can argue precisely about NCTR because it's so classified,
no one with accurate knowledge would (or should) post it here. However, I
think again we can assume that the much more modern Super Bug has better
NCTR than the F-14D, and MUCH better NCTR than the baseline Tomcat and most
Flanker models (even "advanced" Flankers avionics are not likely much better
than a -14D).
As far as missile technology, the AMRAAM probably has better ECCM,
especially considering how the Russians had access to early versions of the
Phoenix from the Iranians (don't know about the AIM-54C - Tom?).

I believe the "improved" ECCM capabilities of the C model are dated
around 1988, so the nod would likely go to AMRAAM in this category.

Plus, you
can only carry a couple of Phoenix missiles and still maintain any sort of
credible aircraft performance (heck, a typical fighter vs. fighter load for
the USN doesn't include AIM-54's!). Most crews even doubt the ability to
perform the magic six-missile launch, especially against low-level,
fighter-sized, maneuvering, targets. Plus, the Phoenix has a minimum
engagement range (classified, so I don't know exact range) that is much
larger (i.e., it is less effective) than the AMRAAMs. Roughly around the
range of the Sparrow (F-14 pilots have said that with no Sparrow, there is
an uncomfortable time when you are within minimum -54 range, but beyond the
maximum AIM-9 range!). So, at the reasonably close ranges that are probably
required for NCTR, you'd be within the range of AMRAAMs, which have as good
Fire and Forget performance as AIM-54C. Plus, they are more agile, and have
a closer minimum range. Plus, an F-18E/F can carry far more AIM-120's than
a F-14 can realistically carry "buffaloes" (nicknamed that for a reason!).
So, it looks like unless you are trying to tap multiple targets at
extreme long ranges (and picking up a fighter contact at low level at such
long ranges is highly suspect), it looks like the F-18E/F is the superior
bird (except for perhaps gas/range). As for the overall Chinese threat, the
USN would have to be silly to get close enough for its carriers to be within
easy strike range of Chinese flankers (as Guy mentioned), and certainly in
any wider conflict, the balance of power would rest with the U.S. and its
allies. Furthermore, as Chuck has said, "It's the man, not the machine",
and I'd bet on USN pilots over Chinese pilots any day. So while I think the
Chinese are a credible threat, I don't think they are on par with the USSR
circa 1980s, nor do I think that the Tomcat (especially early models) is a
more effective fighter in this case than Super Bugs. Cheers,

Good summary of the situation.

Brooks


Tony

snip old stuff

Guy,
the data about the TCS you posted is OK, and there is no dispute about it. I
can only add, that the IIAF turned down the offer from Pentagon for the sale
of the ALR-23 IRST, and was waiting for the TCS. Given that the revolution
in Iran came in between, in the end none were delivered.

It surprises me, however, that you did not come to the idea that one can
also combine TISEO-equipped F-4Es with F-14s - if this is needed, Guy?

Nevermind, the question I was talking about, however, was not that of the
F-14 having or not having the TCS in the first place, but that of an
interceptor in general - regardless if F-14 or F/A-18, or F-15, or MiG-31 -
being able _contrary to a SAM_ to go out and take a look if this is needed
and there are any kind of uncertainities about the target-ID. The SAMs can't
do that, and SAM-sites or AAW-ships even less. They lack this flexibility.

Given the frequently clogged air traffic in littoral warfare, this is
definitely a point AGAINST using Aegis ships as the first line of air
defence in any kind of such scenarios - like the USN is currently doing.
Especially as during the OIF/IIIPGW recently, they showed again as failable:
the Silkworm that hit a mal in Kuwait City passed peacefully by the two
Aegis-equipped warships of the USN, that were on the northern AAW-station
24/7, half-way down the Silkworms route....

This is bringing me back to what I tried to explain to Kevin already, and he
never understood: a "non-existing threat" did something to US forces that
was
not expected. I.e. a surface-to-ship missile, Silkworm, was used in
surface-to-surface role. It flew along a relatively high trajectory (between
100 and 250m), and it was not prevented from hitting the target.

And, again it was so that this should have been nothing new to the USN
(again something Kevin failed to understand): the use of the Silkworm in
surface-to-surface mode by the Iraqis is well known already since the IPGW
(Iraq-Iran War).

Given such US experiences (which are obviously repeating through the
history), there is nobody who can tell me that such stuff like Yakhonts are
anything but a VERY serious threat for the US forces, especially early
during some potential future conflicts, and especially due to the
capabilities of these new weapons, as well as the predilection of US
skippers and similars to let themselves be taken by surprise.


Regarding this:

One of the successful AIM-54A test shots was on a BQM-34A at M0.75
and 50 feet, with the F-14A firing from 22nm away @ M0.72 and 10kft.

As said above: one of the successful wartime AIM-54A-shots was a C.601
(air-launched Silkworm), shot down shortly after released from a
(low-flying) H-6D (Chinese Tu-16s, in Iraqi service) bomber (the bomber was
shot down by the other AIM-54). Two other successful shots were against
sea-skimming AM.39 Exocets (one of these was undertaken simultaneously with
a shot against the Super Etendard that launched the Exocet, and that was
shot down too). I hope we need not quarrel around what kind of challenge
such shots are in wartime, using AWG-9 and AIM-54s downgraded so not to be
entirely able to tackle Western-built ECM/ECCM, and without such support
like that from an E-2C...

Re the Yakhont's 300 km (162nm) max. range, SOP for navy CAPs is (or
was, in the 70s and 80s) orbit at 150nm out, with the E-2s 200nm out.

While the E-2Cs were considerably improved, no doubt, and your data about
the Yakhont is basically OK too, the F/A-18s can't stand CAP for any useful
time in armed configuration at a distance of 150nm from the carrier, so this
aspect changed. With other words: the USN would still have no problems in
detecting the incoming threat (except this catches the USS Kitty Hawk during
underway-replenishment, or somebody else, somewhere else, during the "steel
beach party"), but would have a considerable problem intercepting it.


"Tony Volk" wrote in message
...
Well, since Guy answered, I think I can post a quick little follow up
opinion. Kevin and Tom seem to be mostly arguing about the utility of the
Super Bug vs. the Tomcat against Chinese Flankers.

This is how Kevin and you understood it: I understood is as a discussion
about the usefulness of such platforms like F/A-18 in the naval interceptor
role, and, most of all, the need - especially for the USN - to increase the
effective range of its interceptors and their weapons.

Most of the talk has
been about BVR. I think I can safely say that modern BVR is most heavily
influenced by avionics (including radar). Stealth and supercruise are not
relevant here (although the F-18E/F is much more stealthy than either the
Flanker or Tomcat, the barn-sized radar-returns of the fighter world).
From
this point of view, the latest radars/avionics in the F-18E/F are
generations ahead of anything in baseline Tomcats or Flankers (F-14A,
Su-27B- comparable to current Chinese models), and further ahead of the
F-14D -71/advanced Flankers?? (E/F is probably closer to the V2 equipping
some F-15Cs).

The E/F will be closer to the APG-63(V)-3 equipped F-15C MSIP-IIs once it
gets its new radar. That radar will enter service around 2005, and - due to
the low initial production rate - will not be widespread in fleet-wide
service before 2008 at best.

Re. _current_ Chinese Su-27-models:

The Chinese have approx 78 Russian made Su-27SKs and Su-27UBKs, approx 76
Su-30MKKs, and more than 100 localy assembled J-11s (Chinese-made Su-27SKs).
So, we're looking at something like 250 _now_, in service with at least
eight regiments, each between 30 and 40 aircraft, and frequently training
the BVR and the use of stand-off PGMs, as well as deployments away from
their main bases. Approx 200 additional airframes are to be added within the
next two or three years, including enough for no less but three regiments of
naval fighters. (for more details, see he
http://www.china-military.org/units/...y_aircraft.htm )

What many people - you included, Tony - think, is that most of these
aircraft are the "baseline/vanilla" Su-27s. Theoretically, and on the basis
of their original standards as delivered, and their designations, this is
OK. On a closer look, however, it is not. The PLAAF is well underway with
the SU-27SM program, and already more than 100 kits for this upgrade were
delivered to China in the last two years, enabling the upgrade of all SKs,
UBKs, and J-11s with digital cockpits, R-77-capability, and
PGM-compatibility, with payloads up to 8.000kg (i.e. capability to carry
three Yakhonts per plane) etc. So, regardless if Chinese Su-27s, or
Su-30MKKs, or Su-30MKK-2s, they are a completely different threat than
usually expected.

Furthermore, the topic of the pilot and total force quality was mentioned by
somebody at some point (I think it was you, Tony), with a - pretty
"standard" - conclusion that the Soviets were more dangerous than the
Chinese. I have little doubts that the Soviets are still considered as "the"
air-to-air threat of the 1970s and 1980s in the West (especially the USA),
with the usual explanation for their (Soviet) clients suffering so heavily
on the hand of different smaller - Western-equipped and trained - air forces
in different "local/bush" wars being that their clients "can't fly". A
closer look at the combat performance of Soviet pilots involved in different
local conflicts shows, however, that it's them who "can't fly": I hope
recalling 30 July 1970 is not needed, but I guess that the loss of two
Soviet-flown MiG-25BMs, at least two Tu-22B/KDPs, and no less but three
Soviet-flown MiG-27s (not MiG-23BNs or whatever, but MiG-27s), as well as
quite a number of Soviet-flown MiG-21s and MiG-23s to Iranian F-14s and F-4s
is completely unknown in the public. Perhaps new will also be the fact that
in return the Soviets haven't shot down even a single Iranian fighter.

Quite on the contrary. Worst of all was that during the combat-testing on
the side of Iraq in the war against Iran, also most of their weapons and
ECM-systems proved unable to cope with Western-produced threats. The Kh-22s
(AS-4) just for example: one in 12 would properly function upon launch; the
effective max range of the anti-radar version against such targets like
MIM-23B was less than 20km; even worse was that the top search equipment
mounted on the Tu-22KDPs was not functioning, so that these actually had to
fly deep within the envelope of the I-HAWK in order to find these. The
situation with the ECM-systems on (Soviet, not Iraqi) MiG-25s tested against
Iran was not much different: the RWR was the only one capable of detecting
AWG-9 from safe distances, just for example, but the ECM-systems - not even
those on the MiG-25BM - could do anything against the AWG-9 or the AIM-54. I
hope there is no need to discuss their AAMs from the time, because the list
of problems is much longer...

Certainly, this throws a thick shade over such modern systems like R-77,
Yakhont, etc. But, given the amount of French and Indian high-tech alredy
included in these, they could work, after all. If nothing else, the fact
that the Indians are purchasing the Yakhont and R-77s confirms that at least
these work (the Indian quality standards were increased by a magnitude in
the last ten years, and they're not buying any more everything they can get,
but only the stuff they are ready to accept). My conclusion is: the modern
threat from the combination of Su-27SM/30MKK/MKK-2, R-77, and Yakhont is far
more serious than any threat coming from Soviet AV-MF bomber threat even at
its best times, in early 1980s.

As I'm talking about the example of the Chinese threat (bear in mind I said
the number of similar threats is likely to increase, not decrease in the
following years, given that a number of countries is also purchasing
land-based Moskits and Yakhonts), let me continue developing this thought:
the Chinese are lagging behind in the quality of training and equipment, no
dispute, but they are rapidly advancing too. After many initial problems,
the PLAAF is continuously increasing the number of hours flown and the
intensity as well as reality of pilot training. They regularly fire live
ammo, they regularly do DACM (that's why there is also some attrition in
their Su-27/30-fleet), they regularly conduct out-of-area exercises with
their Flanker-units.

No one here can argue precisely about NCTR because it's so classified,

There is no real need to argue about the NCTR: in 1991 and 1999 it showed
that it's still not 100% functioning, and can be tricksed by any pilot with
some clue about the basics of BVR, even those with less than 20 hours on the
stick annually. This makes one wondering a lot why are such systems like
advanced Combat Tree/Clear Horizont/Second Look equipment not used any more?
If nothing else, these were functioning 100%, and would do so especially in
the case of Iraqi and Yug MiG-29s.

Indeed, it is interesting that you like to explain about the NCTR, and the
super-turbo radar of the F/A-18E/F etc., but do not even came to the idea to
mention the US-made enemy-IFF-interrogators in use on tactical fighters like
F-4E, F-14, and F-15 of the 1970s and 1980s. How comes this? Is this - right
from the start well-proved and highly successful - technology so much "out"
in the USA today?

However, I think again we can assume that the much more modern Super
Bug has better NCTR than the F-14D, and MUCH better NCTR than the
baseline Tomcat and most Flanker models (even "advanced" Flankers avionics
are not likely much better than a -14D).

In fact, the AWG-9 was capable of supplying data needed for NCTR processing,
but lacked processors capable of computing the stuff. Consequently, the
F-14A, A+/Bs have got this capability only in the mid-1990s, when better
processors were installed instead. The First fighter with NCTR capability
was the F-15C MSIP-II, introduced in the mid-1980s. The F-14D has got the
NCTR right since introduction in the fleet, while the F/A-18C should have
lacked it until few years back (to be honest, I doubt they have it even
now). Otherwise, the only other fighters that have got the NCTR were the
Tornado F.Mk.3A and the latest Mirage 2000s - both of these in the last few
years.

As far as missile technology, the AMRAAM probably has better ECCM,
especially considering how the Russians had access to early versions of
the Phoenix from the Iranians (don't know about the AIM-54C - Tom?).

No AIM-54s were delivered to Soviets/Russians by Iran. Not a single round.

The former chief of the Iraqi Directorate of Military Intelligence is
babbling something about pieces of a wreck of an Iranian F-14, and a badly
damaged AIM-54 being supplied to the Soviets by Iraqis, in 1983. After 15
years of research to this and related topics and learning about every single
loss of an Iranian F-14, however, I simply can't imagine where could they
have got anything of this kind.

Of course, one Iranian F-14 was flown out by a defecting pilot - but to
Iraq, not to the USSR. And, the people who waited there for it, and took the
plane over were neither speaking Russian, or Arabic, but US-English - with a
light Virginian accent: the operation was called "Night Harvest", and the
wreck of that Tomcat ended burried somewhere in the Saudi Arabian desert...

Plus, you can only carry a couple of Phoenix missiles and still maintain
any sort of credible aircraft performance (heck, a typical fighter vs.
fighter load for the USN doesn't include AIM-54's!).

We're actually moving away from the topic (or back to the original topic),
but the warloads depend heavily on the threat assessment. In the case of
Iranians, a pair consisting of one F-14A armed with two AIM-54s, two or
three Sparrows and two Sidewinders, and the other armed either with Six
Sparrows and two Sidewinders, or "four each", was usually enough to
completely spoil strikes by up to 14 Iraqi fighters (regardless Mirage or
MiGs), and not only send them back home "express & free on delivery", but
also shot down two or three. There were several cases where a single F-14
battled six or eight Mirage F.1s in a dogfight, shot down two, and came away
undamaged...

Most crews even doubt the ability to
perform the magic six-missile launch, especially against low-level,
fighter-sized, maneuvering, targets.

Well, the two claims about this being done over the Persian Gulf were not
yet completely researched (one is particularly problematic, as it seems some
Kuwaiti Mirages got involved too, which neither side likes to talk about),
but a capability of simultaneous engagement of two, three, or four targets
was confirmed. Especially as in one case a single AIM-54A shot down three
MiG-23s flying in a tight formation... ;-))

Plus, the Phoenix has a minimum
engagement range (classified, so I don't know exact range) that is much
larger (i.e., it is less effective) than the AMRAAMs.

It was tested (successfully) down to 4km: the shortest range it crossed in
combat before detonating 4m over the target was 6.500m (there is a nice
TISEO shot from the escorting F-4E, showing a fireball directly over the
MiG-23).

Roughly around the
range of the Sparrow (F-14 pilots have said that with no Sparrow, there is
an uncomfortable time when you are within minimum -54 range, but beyond
the
maximum AIM-9 range!).

Actually, according to USN, USAF, and IIAF pilots I talked with, one can
fire the AIM-9s from F-14 from a slightly longer range than this is the case
with F-15 or F-16.... The exact reason should be one of the "dogfight" modes
of the AWG-9 - can't recall exactly right now (and I'm too lazy to search in
my files). My guess - repeat: guess - is, however, that the USN F-14-crews
are trained differently (i.e. conservativelly) in employment of the AIM-54
than the Iranian, and so they - just for example - do not expect to use
Phoenix from less than a certain range (should be approx 25-30km). I don't
know the exact reason, but it could be the sole fact that right from the
start of the "Persian King" project, the IIAF considered the AIM-54 as its
"primary air combat" - not "anti-bomber" - weapon, and that this remains the
fact very much right until today with the IRIAF as well.

So, at the reasonably close ranges that are probably
required for NCTR, you'd be within the range of AMRAAMs, which have as
good
Fire and Forget performance as AIM-54C. Plus, they are more agile, and
have
a closer minimum range. Plus, an F-18E/F can carry far more AIM-120's
than
a F-14 can realistically carry "buffaloes" (nicknamed that for a reason!).

Clear. Agreed. All of this especially if you don't use any of the Combat
Tree technologies any more...

So, it looks like unless you are trying to tap multiple targets at
extreme long ranges (and picking up a fighter contact at low level at such
long ranges is highly suspect), it looks like the F-18E/F is the superior
bird (except for perhaps gas/range).

No way. Sorry. I tried to explain this in my post above: this is so _only_
if the requirement is VID, and - in any case where the F/A-18 is used you'll
end overrun by multiple targets, because you can't open fire from the same
range like with the help of the AIM-54, plus you lack the speed and fuel to
maneuver.

Somebody above said that in the BVR it's the radar/avionics that counts.
They certainly do count, as otherwise you can't shot down the enemy: you can
intimade him at best. But the speed and endurance - and even stealth - count
even more, especially as they are effective factors in decreasing the
enemie's engagement envelope, or - even more important - approaching
undetected and firing the first shot in the battle (which is decisive in 80%
of the cases right since the WWI).

Take Iraqi MiG-25s as example: surely, their avionics and weapons suck, so
they haven't hit much but a - what a surprise and coincidence - USN F/A-18C
(oh, and a USAF RQ-1B Predator, in December last year). But, in turn, thanks
to their speed and endurance they also suffered lighter losses to USAF F-15s
(only two were shot down). If nothing else they could run and they could
avoid. The - "much more modern", and definitely equipped with better
avionics & weapons - Mirage F.1s and MiG-29s were shot down in larger
numbers, and for nothing to show in exchange. I hope nobody here is going to
deny that an exchange ratio of 1:2 (or 2:2 if a Stinger-armed Predator -
that fired back - counts?) is better than 1:6 or 8... Hell, the Iraqis even
retired their MiG-29s from service and put them into storage by 1996, but
kept the MiG-25s. Guess why...

As for the overall Chinese threat, the
USN would have to be silly to get close enough for its carriers to be
within
easy strike range of Chinese flankers (as Guy mentioned), and certainly in
any wider conflict, the balance of power would rest with the U.S. and its
allies.

Surely. Yet, the problem with the Hornets is that you _have_ to approach
closer in order to hit the enemy (or need an armada of USAF tankers) as the
plane is short-ranged compared to its predecessors. So, you're not really of
any use if you play somewhere behind Taiwan in such scenario...

Furthermore, as Chuck has said, "It's the man, not the machine",
and I'd bet on USN pilots over Chinese pilots any day.

See above.

So while I think the
Chinese are a credible threat, I don't think they are on par with the USSR
circa 1980s, nor do I think that the Tomcat (especially early models) is a
more effective fighter in this case than Super Bugs.

See above.

Tom Cooper
Co-Author:
Iran-Iraq War in the Air, 1980-1988:
http://www.acig.org/pg1/content.php
and,
Iranian F-4 Phantom II Units in Combat:
http://www.osprey-publishing.co.uk/t...hp/title=S6585

Tom Cooper wrote:

Guy,
the data about the TCS you posted is OK, and there is no dispute about it. I
can only add, that the IIAF turned down the offer from Pentagon for the sale
of the ALR-23 IRST, and was waiting for the TCS. Given that the revolution
in Iran came in between, in the end none were delivered.

It surprises me, however, that you did not come to the idea that one can
also combine TISEO-equipped F-4Es with F-14s - if this is needed, Guy?

Mainly because I couldn't remember if any of Iran's F-4s had TISEO, and I didn't
have a reference here which would answer the question. OTOH, as I mentioned
before a visual sensor like TISEO or TCS tends to be far more useful as an A/A
sensor in dry air over desert, than in humid climates with lots of cloud. USAFE
F-4s didn't find it to be particularly useful over Europe for A/A IDs (all those
clouds got in the way), and mainly used it for A/G work. I suspect the Taiwan
Straits would (on average) fall in between desert and northwest Europe as far as
usefulness goes.

Nevermind, the question I was talking about, however, was not that of the
F-14 having or not having the TCS in the first place, but that of an
interceptor in general - regardless if F-14 or F/A-18, or F-15, or MiG-31 -
being able _contrary to a SAM_ to go out and take a look if this is needed
and there are any kind of uncertainities about the target-ID. The SAMs can't
do that, and SAM-sites or AAW-ships even less. They lack this flexibility.

True, but at least my understanding was that the premise on which you're basing
all this is a major PRC attack on Taiwan. See below.

Given the frequently clogged air traffic in littoral warfare, this is
definitely a point AGAINST using Aegis ships as the first line of air
defence in any kind of such scenarios - like the USN is currently doing.

But that's not going to be an issue in a major war that the PRC launches against
Taiwan. There will be no civil air traffic through that area once the war
starts, and determining who is and is not a threat can be as simple a matter as
drawing a line down the middle of the strait and allowing weapons-free on any
air traffic on the far side of the line. No need for VID or EID, just kill
anything 'over there'. If the E-2s or E-3s spot it, it can be engaged no
questions asked. If they want to make it a bit more encompassing, then the RoC
(and/or US) can declare an active war zone in the area bounded by, say, 16 and
30 north, and 114 and 130 east, or whatever is appropriate. Later (once we
start to attack) the situation will get more complex, but Taiwan facing an air
attack from the PRC is about as simple an ID problem as the British faced in the
Falklands TEZ. It's too bad for the Brits that they lacked BVR A/A missiles,
AEW and LD/SD capability, because the Argentine side wouldn't have had a chance
if they had.

Currently AIM-120 outranges the R-77 (per an article in AvLeak earlier this?
year, quoting the chief designer at Vympel who said that the R-77 currently
lacked an up and over capability like the AIM-54 or AIM-120 to maximise its
range, but they were working to add it, along with a motor with reprofiled
burn), and the F-18E/F has a lower frontal RCS than the Su-27, as well as a
better weapons system as a whole. As you noted in your reply to Tony, the
Chinese are upgrading the radar and FCS systems, but then so are we.

Especially as during the OIF/IIIPGW recently, they showed again as failable:
the Silkworm that hit a mal in Kuwait City passed peacefully by the two
Aegis-equipped warships of the USN, that were on the northern AAW-station
24/7, half-way down the Silkworms route....

This is bringing me back to what I tried to explain to Kevin already, and he
never understood: a "non-existing threat" did something to US forces that
was
not expected. I.e. a surface-to-ship missile, Silkworm, was used in
surface-to-surface role. It flew along a relatively high trajectory (between
100 and 250m), and it was not prevented from hitting the target.

And, again it was so that this should have been nothing new to the USN
(again something Kevin failed to understand): the use of the Silkworm in
surface-to-surface mode by the Iraqis is well known already since the IPGW
(Iraq-Iran War).

Given such US experiences (which are obviously repeating through the
history), there is nobody who can tell me that such stuff like Yakhonts are
anything but a VERY serious threat for the US forces, especially early
during some potential future conflicts, and especially due to the
capabilities of these new weapons, as well as the predilection of US
skippers and similars to let themselves be taken by surprise.

Only if the US acts stupidly. In the case of defending Taiwan, we'd have to be
really stupid to enter the strait before we'd knocked down PRC capability
considerably. We don't need to, with a large unsinkable aircraft carrier
(Taiwan) already in place. Of course, when we did enter the strait, it wouldn't
be with a single CVBG.

Regarding this:

One of the successful AIM-54A test shots was on a BQM-34A at M0.75
and 50 feet, with the F-14A firing from 22nm away @ M0.72 and 10kft.

As said above: one of the successful wartime AIM-54A-shots was a C.601
(air-launched Silkworm), shot down shortly after released from a
(low-flying) H-6D (Chinese Tu-16s, in Iraqi service) bomber (the bomber was
shot down by the other AIM-54). Two other successful shots were against
sea-skimming AM.39 Exocets (one of these was undertaken simultaneously with
a shot against the Super Etendard that launched the Exocet, and that was
shot down too). I hope we need not quarrel around what kind of challenge
such shots are in wartime, using AWG-9 and AIM-54s downgraded so not to be
entirely able to tackle Western-built ECM/ECCM, and without such support
like that from an E-2C...

Re the Yakhont's 300 km (162nm) max. range, SOP for navy CAPs is (or
was, in the 70s and 80s) orbit at 150nm out, with the E-2s 200nm out.

While the E-2Cs were considerably improved, no doubt, and your data about
the Yakhont is basically OK too, the F/A-18s can't stand CAP for any useful
time in armed configuration at a distance of 150nm from the carrier, so this
aspect changed.

SOP is for BARCAPs to be tanked on station when necessary to extend station
time, and to make sure they always have a 'combat package' of fuel on board; in
Vietnam, IIRR this was 2 or 3,000 lb. for F-4s. They can stay as long as
needed. But at a minimum they can stay out for one launch/recovery cycle (1.5
or 1.75 hours, whatever it is now), unrefueled. After all, on BARCAP they're
flying at max. endurance airspeed, rather than some higher, thirstier tactical
speed. Figure at least an hour on station. Hell, the SAC charts for the
original AV-8B with 4 AIM-9s and gun but NO external fuel, show an on-station
loiter time of 89 minutes @ 150nm. Add a couple of 300 gallon tanks and the
loiter time increases to 2.59 hours. So, if we're going to talk about an F-18C
or E, figuring 4 or 6 x AIM-120 and 2 x AIM-9 plus two or three tanks, there
should be more than adequate time on station plus fuel to intercept, provided
that the carriers are staying back well behind the island.

With other words: the USN would still have no problems in
detecting the incoming threat (except this catches the USS Kitty Hawk during
underway-replenishment, or somebody else, somewhere else, during the "steel
beach party"), but would have a considerable problem intercepting it.

snip

Not in/around Taiwan, they wouldn't. We'd have AWACS and F-15s (or F-22s/F-35s)
in the area plus USAF tankers, as well as E-2Cs and EA-6Bs up along with the
F-18s. If the Sukhois are trying to hit the CVBG, they've got to come to it,
and they've got to come over/around Taiwan to do it. If they just want to pound
Taiwan itself, there's no need to use a/c, as you've already pointed out. But
that assumes that the PRC would be willing to not only lose virtually their
entire foreign trade, but also the damage to its own facilities that would
result (not to mention the potential political upheavals).

Guy

My newsreader is acting up, so I'll reply to you here Tom. That will
hopefully save space too! I'll try to limit my response to points of major
contention. If I don't bring it up, it's either because I think we're
roughly arguing the same thing or that there isn't enough information
available to make a strong claim.

1- First, let me say that I agree with your assessment that China is a
serious threat. As for how serious, I think that without classified data,
we can only make a rough guess at best, and even with classified data, we
could probably make only a slightly rougher guess. So my opinion about
China 2003 vs. USSR ~1987 is just an opinion, and not really worth arguing
in depth given my lack of data.

2- I agree that interceptors are much more flexible and accurate than
shipborne SAMs. However, they lack perseverance, range (other than -54),
and persistence. I think each has its place, and in the case of a mass
attack, were flexibility and accurate NCTR isn't critical, I think shipborne
SAMs have an extremely important role to play in defending the carrier group
(if not the most important role to play). I think you are underestimating
the importance of the Aegis system based on a few events that are not very
similar to the all-out attack on a carrier group we are discussing (at
least, that's what I THINK we are discussing!).

3- I actually am (was) a big advocate of the Super Tomact airframe because
it does offer substantial range improvements over the Hornets' airframe
(Navy gives Tomcat a flat 1600nm range, SuperBug 1200nm combat range, 1600nm
ferrying, so take your pick, and take some salt with it!). I've been kind
of playing devil's advocate here. However, one SERIOUS limitation of early
Tomcat models is their awful engines (BTW, I would love to know how the
TF-30s performed for the Iranians). We both seem to agree that as far as
avionics goes, the SuperBug has the edge.

4- My concerns about China's Flanker quality comes from International Air
Power Review Vol.1, pg. 86-88 (2001). It states that at that point, Chinese
Flankers were flying with R-40s and -73s, no mention of other missiles being
operationally used (so I would be concerned about their familiarity with
newer weapons). It is also mentioned that the Chinese manufacturing of
Flankers hit substantial technical snags that stopped production and
required Russian engineers to be flown in (because the Chinese manufacturing
was not sophisticated enough). If they have access to better technology
(e.g., India, who incidentally, hasn't always been exactly friendly with
China!), I would love to hear details about it (sources would be great-
where did you hear/read about the Flanker upgrades- I should probably ask
Ken Duffey about this!). This thread would've been even more interesting if
it had been India vs. USN!

5- I am not surprised that once their WWII veterans moved on, Soviet pilot
quality decreased dramatically (Balenko's book, and others, doesn't paint a
pretty picture). My comments about Chinese pilots was drawn from their
clashes with Taiwan and Vietnam, none of which were not very flattering for
the Chinese pilots (nor was their performance in Korea). The recent
incident with the USN Orion also doesn't bolster my confidence in Chinese
pilot quality. However, if they are training, then they can certainly
become a much more credible threat.

6- Pheonix vs. Amraam. Thanks for the info about the Iranians and the
Soviets info about the -54. My book Tupelov Bombers (AIRtime Publishing, a
generally very good source) has a discussion of the Backfire (Tu-22M) and
its missiles (k-22) and how they are used to defeat the Tomcat's weapon
systems (specifically, the Pheonix). The author states: "After the fall of
the Shah of Iran in 1979, the Soviet Union managed to obtain one or more
F-14 Tomcat fighters and Pheonix missiles. This gave them a better
appreciation of the strengths and limitations of this element of the
defence, and provided the final evidence of the need for a more modern
missile to arm the Backfire [the k-15]." So you would categorically state
that this was not the case (not that I doubt you, I honestly would like to
get your opinion in the face of such a flat-out contrary statement).
Moving on from that sidenote, we have a couple of other issues to
compare. How many targets can the SuperBug simultaneously engage with its
AMRAAMs? If it's comparable to the F-14/Pheonix combo (and I believe it
is), than that's an equal draw. The AMRAAM has the edge in more modern
ECCM, and better maneuverability. Furthermore, the range advantage enjoyed
by the Tomcat airframe is sharply limited by carrying multiple Pheonix
missiles (ending up towards SuperBug range, especially if you're lugging 4+
Pheonix!). So the Pheonix has range, the AMRAAM probably has better pk.
Just about a draw for me.
As for the minimum range issue, it was a direct, printed quote, so there
certainly is a gap between the -54 and -9 for the USN. It could be that
they train more conservatively. As for the -9, I'd agree with your guess
(would the IRST make a difference too?). I could check this out further,
but this is already turning into a mini-essay!

7- BVR and avionics vs. performance. I still hold to my statement that
avionics dictate BVR. A gun-armed, no radar Mig-25 will lose every time to
a Sopwith Camel that has a spiffy lightweight radar/computer and a single
AMRAAM (to use an absurd example). Being able to see first, and see more
clearly, is the essence of BVR. Performance is surely important, and in
terms of supersonic speed and acceleration, the Tomcat wins here. But, it
is MUCH less stealthy than the low-observeable E/F. So I'd give 2 pts for
avionics to E/F, 1 to -14 for performance, .5 to E/F for stealth. The Su's
can't run away from the oncoming interceptors in this scenario without
letting the interceptors win (as well all know, it's just about the same
thing to get them to turn away and not attack as it is to shoot them down).
So the ability to engage/disengage is kind of moot (also the interceptors
can't turn back or they won't have a carrier to land on!). The situation
with Iraq's Mig-25 is quite different, in that it's used in limited,
surprise hit and runs, something that maximizes its performance advantage
while minimizing its avionics disadvantage (about the only good move Iraq
ever did with its air force against the US!).

8- Something that hasn't been discussed is the overall SA of the two
different forces. With the better US avionics, intelligence (tactical and
strategical assets), shore-based radars on Taiwan, I would give the USN the
edge in SA, which is perhaps the most important aspect of any fight, and
certainly a critical ingredient in a successful BVR operation.

9- So, I stand by my final conclusion that China seems less scary now than
does the USSR in the late 80's, and that the SuperBug is just about as good,
if not better, than the Tomcat. But again, I'll issue the caveat that I'm
an armchair hobbyist with no direct access to hard data, and that this is a
bloody long post that probably has an accidental error or two in it.

10-I'd like to add that I really enjoyed all of the non-attacking posts in
this thread, it is nice to see civil discussion of interesting theoretical
topics (cue Kumbaya about now). I'd also like to add that as this took me
3/4 of an hour to research and write (!!!), I don't think I can keep up a
long-running argument on this, so this'll be my last big reply. I'd welcome
any replies for me (us) to read, but I'd suggest that if you want to get
more replies from me, please email me (just be sure to remove the
removeables in my reply email). It's been fun!

Tony