Great moments in Commercial Aviation

Amazing to think that this kind of crap goes on. Between lack of
regulation of commercial buses and too many egos in the cockpit I
think driving IS safer.

Take a look at #2 below:

Fuel and CRM Problems
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/gener... e&channel=bca

ASRS Report #724197 involves fuel issues as well as CRM problems. The
MD-80 F/O voices his concern about the fuel load prior to departure,
but the captain assures him it is a "reasonable fuel load."
Subsequently, the aircraft is not able to climb to planned cruise
altitude due to weather, and the captain then elects to fly faster
than planned Mach although the F/O protests. Only when planned
tailwinds do not materialize does the captain listen to the F/O, who
estimates arrival fuel will be around 4,000 pounds. At that point the
captain diverts to alternate to refuel.

In ASRS Report #657354, the F/O is not only ignored, but when he
reports a fuel situation to his safety manager, she tells him that his
job is ". . . to protect the ego of the captain and not speak up
unless I am about to die." During the flight the captain has two
altitude excursions and the flight lands with less than 25 minutes of
fuel on board.

A Learjet 55 crew mismanages fuel and lands with less than 500 pounds
in the wings and 1,400 pounds in the fuselage tank. For reasons not
explained in the ASRS, the crew does not open the transfer switch and
on landing when tower asks the Learjet to expedite clearing the
runway, the captain uses hard braking that causes both engines to
flame out with the aircraft still on the runway (ASRS Report #077107).

I like tip no 10 in the summary: "Expect a High Workload" Gee, do ya think?
wrote in message
...
Amazing to think that this kind of crap goes on. Between lack of
regulation of commercial buses and too many egos in the cockpit I
think driving IS safer.

Take a look at #2 below:

Fuel and CRM Problems
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/gener... e&channel=bca

ASRS Report #724197 involves fuel issues as well as CRM problems. The
MD-80 F/O voices his concern about the fuel load prior to departure,
but the captain assures him it is a "reasonable fuel load."
Subsequently, the aircraft is not able to climb to planned cruise
altitude due to weather, and the captain then elects to fly faster
than planned Mach although the F/O protests. Only when planned
tailwinds do not materialize does the captain listen to the F/O, who
estimates arrival fuel will be around 4,000 pounds. At that point the
captain diverts to alternate to refuel.

In ASRS Report #657354, the F/O is not only ignored, but when he
reports a fuel situation to his safety manager, she tells him that his
job is ". . . to protect the ego of the captain and not speak up
unless I am about to die." During the flight the captain has two
altitude excursions and the flight lands with less than 25 minutes of
fuel on board.

A Learjet 55 crew mismanages fuel and lands with less than 500 pounds
in the wings and 1,400 pounds in the fuselage tank. For reasons not
explained in the ASRS, the crew does not open the transfer switch and
on landing when tower asks the Learjet to expedite clearing the
runway, the captain uses hard braking that causes both engines to
flame out with the aircraft still on the runway (ASRS Report #077107).

What about the time this retard with a big truck got it into his head that
if he fueled it up with jet fuel, he would be able to fly the truck around
like in Top Gun, so he decided that was all the motivation he needed, so he
took the fuel hose (which was fueling an airliner) and filled up his gas
tank.
The airliner took off, and quickly ran out of fuel & had to land in a field.
The truck never did fly around like in Top Gun.

wrote in message
...
Amazing to think that this kind of crap goes on. Between lack of
regulation of commercial buses and too many egos in the cockpit I
think driving IS safer.

Take a look at #2 below:

Fuel and CRM Problems

http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/gener... e&channel=bca

ASRS Report #724197 involves fuel issues as well as CRM problems. The
MD-80 F/O voices his concern about the fuel load prior to departure,
but the captain assures him it is a "reasonable fuel load."
Subsequently, the aircraft is not able to climb to planned cruise
altitude due to weather, and the captain then elects to fly faster
than planned Mach although the F/O protests. Only when planned
tailwinds do not materialize does the captain listen to the F/O, who
estimates arrival fuel will be around 4,000 pounds. At that point the
captain diverts to alternate to refuel.

In ASRS Report #657354, the F/O is not only ignored, but when he
reports a fuel situation to his safety manager, she tells him that his
job is ". . . to protect the ego of the captain and not speak up
unless I am about to die." During the flight the captain has two
altitude excursions and the flight lands with less than 25 minutes of
fuel on board.

A Learjet 55 crew mismanages fuel and lands with less than 500 pounds
in the wings and 1,400 pounds in the fuselage tank. For reasons not
explained in the ASRS, the crew does not open the transfer switch and
on landing when tower asks the Learjet to expedite clearing the
runway, the captain uses hard braking that causes both engines to
flame out with the aircraft still on the runway (ASRS Report #077107).