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#21
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"F-35 Test Flight Deemed a Success"
On Sat, 23 Dec 2006 16:01:33 -0600, Jack wrote:
Ed Rasimus wrote: We've got no disagreement about putting a gun in every fighter that has any possibility of being engaged air-to-air. Careful wording, that. What matter the medium in which your target operates, to a true fighter pilot? We wouldn't want to give the impression of air-to-air arrogance. Would we? I'm hardly from the age of air-to-air arrogance. I was more in the Jack-of-too-many-trades era. As a true Neanderthal I vociferously protested against the idea of specialization--one in which the aircraft has more capabilities than the operator. Yet, that's the way we've gone and I'll freely admit that it has turned out to be a better AF. My contention has always been that air-to-air is something a fighter pilot does on the way to and from the target. "CAS is continuing to morph into a stand-off delivery game. The troops-in-contact provide accurate coordinates or laser- designation and the stand-off platform dumps iron on the cross-hairs. It isn't as glamorous as snake-n-nape at 50 feet, but it is much more accurate and effective." -- E. Rasimus Oh sure, very glamorous indeed, but not much use when bad guys are not only in the wire, but on your side of the wire. And that brings up the question of whether 30mm might not be a little too heavy for this particular scenario? Agreed, in principle, but rare in practice. We don't see fixed position fighting very much these days with the concomitant requirement for "danger close" employment. It might recur or might not. And, the gun will be available although not the first choice. Strafing as a mission may suck today, but it always did -- even when it was just too much damn fun to ignore. But as a capability and a skill, it must be respected and won't go away. You can do things with a gun you can't do without it, I'm sure you'll agree. And those are very important jobs -- CAS jobs -- the kind that keep our people fighting or bring them home when they can't. I'm not sure I agree if we are talking ground attack that there are things that can be done with a gun that can't be done better with another weapon--except for maybe writing your name in the snow. The new generation of small bombs are going to be very nice tools for killing Abdullah in the bedroom next door. T-I-C and SAR assets won't always have laser-designators and GPS. If they had all that stuff working they might not be in so much trouble in the first place. It will be a very rare detachment that doesn't have GPS or laser capability. When you can buy a Garmin to fit in your shirt pocket from Cabela's, there's no reason not to have one in the infantryman's kit. And, they do. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" www.thunderchief.org www.thundertales.blogspot.com |
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"F-35 Test Flight Deemed a Success"
Good discussion and I respect what Ed says immensely however gentlemen there
are some very critical differences being experienced in counter-insurgency warfare now underway in Iraq and Iran and for the moment I want you to stop looking around the world and realize that we must now bring an end to these hostilities and it will take a good measure of air power to return the third dimension to the fight simply because the Army failed to do that when its "boots on the ground efforts" recognized that the armed helicopter (mostly Apache and Kiawa) were now unrealiable against a ground sprinkled with armed insurgents shooting wildly at them from all directions (Cobra II Chapter 14 and Fiasco Chapter 6). The war, which again remmebr is costing billions every month and is taking nearly one hundred lives every month with many more wounded has gone on now for five years. So at the moment we are not looking at a conventional war with China or an invasion of North Korea, we are focused on Iraq and Afghanistan for this next budget cycle and for the next few years. We can not afford the new technology breakers that cannot be applied to these conflicts in good measure and something has to give. We no longer can deal with "nice to have" and starfing "may be stupid" in most fighter pilots eyes but our of necessity in this war because of the caveats of collateral damage and the vulnerability of the attack helicopters fighter aircart are being asked to come in and strafe - and they do. And note that just recently an F-16 killed itself either out of ground fixation or ground fire, but in essence it was close to the ground and firing on the enemy. A new F-15E or F-16C or F/A-18E coming off the production line is in no way an "old" aircraft when considering whether it can do a job or not. These machines have been continually maturing and continually improve to the point that now they are more capable in just about every category of fighter comparisons that you can think of except the materials and shapes that lend itself to so called stealth features. To say that the JSF has a mystical integrative advantage over the F-15E is simply a case of displays, antennas, and circuit boards because the ever changing software tapes are deliberately held up as different beasts in different models because we have long past the day when you could distinguish the difference between an F-16 or F-18 or F-15 or B-2 or JSF radar - it is just boards, components and software - all of which is grossly overpriced and enornmously over-paced to drag out the whole process as if we really were designing and developing something so critically different. Gentlemen - these wars are about reliable platforms that can duke it with a lightly armed but numerous ground threats that simply overwhelm the space around which our outnumbered and not-so mobile troops are forced to operate in environments that are not tactically smart yet forced because the mission implies a presence (boots on the ground), small units, and unfortulately for all the failures of the great technologists and IT'ists, and band width masters we find that in reality almost every one of the small unit patrols and convoys that venture out beyond their safe zone go without a direct linked eye-in-the-sky to support them for the duration of their mission. The technologists promised them this and it fell through and now we have to fill in gaps with everything we can use because we do not have a survivable Blitz fighter (cross between A-10 and AH-64) that can support the troops. We could argue this five years ago, but its 2 billion a week, 3000 lives, and still operations without a clear strategy and time is wasting - the JSF has to go and we will use the billions it is sucking up to flood into the war zones enough air power to do the job. I think it would be wise to extend the development of the JSF so that down the road it may merge with things that could better use its qualities - lasers, unmanned, etc., but to say it is the maneuveruing wonderdog of the next generation fighter force is like saying the the P-40 should replace the P-51's - no guys, we have all got to get out collective heads out of our asses and look to what is happening in COIN warfare and realize a step back for the moment may really be the case needed yet there are small diamonds of technoklogy that still need to be used - it is in that integration we can overcome the air needs of urban-COIN warfare. So as much as we like Ed and his writes, Ed also has to think about what is going on and come to grips with the mess that the air-ground efforts are in. Something went so wrong after Gulf War I and now the fixes I am saying may not again reflect the needs for a North Korea, but for OIF and OEF they certainly make a point. The direct manned ISR, the "shooter" with you, the "eye-in-the-sky" attached to every unit, the forcing of the enemy tyo recognize that day or night there are small aircraft and UAV's overhead watching and ready to shoot something and ground units that have a renewed offensiveness in capability to do their presence mission better. For the overall umbrella and border areas, the President then gets his "hammer" to change the course of any incursion any challenge from outside |
#23
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"F-35 Test Flight Deemed a Success"
Ed - for OIF and OEF the "morf" is back to close direct fire. Small calibre
guns and rockets without warheads may have more merit. Concrete bombs were considered but they skip and bounce sending a high speed hockey puck down streets. For another war it will go back to standoff and precision but we need to re-figure all this "Ed Rasimus" wrote in message ... On Sat, 23 Dec 2006 16:01:33 -0600, Jack wrote: Ed Rasimus wrote: We've got no disagreement about putting a gun in every fighter that has any possibility of being engaged air-to-air. Careful wording, that. What matter the medium in which your target operates, to a true fighter pilot? We wouldn't want to give the impression of air-to-air arrogance. Would we? I'm hardly from the age of air-to-air arrogance. I was more in the Jack-of-too-many-trades era. As a true Neanderthal I vociferously protested against the idea of specialization--one in which the aircraft has more capabilities than the operator. Yet, that's the way we've gone and I'll freely admit that it has turned out to be a better AF. My contention has always been that air-to-air is something a fighter pilot does on the way to and from the target. "CAS is continuing to morph into a stand-off delivery game. The troops-in-contact provide accurate coordinates or laser- designation and the stand-off platform dumps iron on the cross-hairs. It isn't as glamorous as snake-n-nape at 50 feet, but it is much more accurate and effective." -- E. Rasimus Oh sure, very glamorous indeed, but not much use when bad guys are not only in the wire, but on your side of the wire. And that brings up the question of whether 30mm might not be a little too heavy for this particular scenario? Agreed, in principle, but rare in practice. We don't see fixed position fighting very much these days with the concomitant requirement for "danger close" employment. It might recur or might not. And, the gun will be available although not the first choice. Strafing as a mission may suck today, but it always did -- even when it was just too much damn fun to ignore. But as a capability and a skill, it must be respected and won't go away. You can do things with a gun you can't do without it, I'm sure you'll agree. And those are very important jobs -- CAS jobs -- the kind that keep our people fighting or bring them home when they can't. I'm not sure I agree if we are talking ground attack that there are things that can be done with a gun that can't be done better with another weapon--except for maybe writing your name in the snow. The new generation of small bombs are going to be very nice tools for killing Abdullah in the bedroom next door. T-I-C and SAR assets won't always have laser-designators and GPS. If they had all that stuff working they might not be in so much trouble in the first place. It will be a very rare detachment that doesn't have GPS or laser capability. When you can buy a Garmin to fit in your shirt pocket from Cabela's, there's no reason not to have one in the infantryman's kit. And, they do. Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" www.thunderchief.org www.thundertales.blogspot.com |
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"F-35 Test Flight Deemed a Success"
On Mon, 01 Jan 2007 03:00:47 GMT, "Ski"
wrote: Ed - for OIF and OEF the "morf" is back to close direct fire. Small calibre guns and rockets without warheads may have more merit. Concrete bombs were considered but they skip and bounce sending a high speed hockey puck down streets. For another war it will go back to standoff and precision but we need to re-figure all this It's always good to get input from first-hand observers. The way things have evolved in the current unpleasantness there is a lot of unstructured urban close-quarters battle going on. That doesn't lend itself to CAS but does indeed respond to direct fire. And, particularly with organic rather than on-call assets. Having the weapon on the Hummer, Bradley or Abrams is what's going to be used. Only if the situation allows for a fall back do you get the opportunity to use the various indirect fire options. But, there's always the need to plan for the future engagement rather than the last and in the process to include sufficient adaptability to be responsive to changing requirements. (That's staff talk for having high tech, brute force, sophisticated and crude, large and small, precision and volume ordnance included in large enough numbers to be available at a small enough price tag to fit in the budget.) Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" www.thunderchief.org www.thundertales.blogspot.com |
#25
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"F-35 Test Flight Deemed a Success"
Hit it right on the head Ed - the situation is unique and it got that way
because we went in blind on the wishes of the politicals and not with a good plan - hence we are backed into a wall and bleeding for it. You caught on also that there is no doctrine for this, hardly any proper terms and as CAS was evolving to use the UAV's and the links the real situation on the ground just up and ran over the thinking and then again the split between the USAF and Army has not helped. How would you tackle this - seriously with all respect - how would you put this fire out or in the least what role would you see air power "Ed Rasimus" wrote in message ... On Mon, 01 Jan 2007 03:00:47 GMT, "Ski" wrote: Ed - for OIF and OEF the "morf" is back to close direct fire. Small calibre guns and rockets without warheads may have more merit. Concrete bombs were considered but they skip and bounce sending a high speed hockey puck down streets. For another war it will go back to standoff and precision but we need to re-figure all this It's always good to get input from first-hand observers. The way things have evolved in the current unpleasantness there is a lot of unstructured urban close-quarters battle going on. That doesn't lend itself to CAS but does indeed respond to direct fire. And, particularly with organic rather than on-call assets. Having the weapon on the Hummer, Bradley or Abrams is what's going to be used. Only if the situation allows for a fall back do you get the opportunity to use the various indirect fire options. But, there's always the need to plan for the future engagement rather than the last and in the process to include sufficient adaptability to be responsive to changing requirements. (That's staff talk for having high tech, brute force, sophisticated and crude, large and small, precision and volume ordnance included in large enough numbers to be available at a small enough price tag to fit in the budget.) Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" www.thunderchief.org www.thundertales.blogspot.com |
#26
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"F-35 Test Flight Deemed a Success"
On Mon, 01 Jan 2007 21:07:03 GMT, "Ski"
wrote: Hit it right on the head Ed - the situation is unique and it got that way because we went in blind on the wishes of the politicals and not with a good plan - hence we are backed into a wall and bleeding for it. You caught on also that there is no doctrine for this, hardly any proper terms and as CAS was evolving to use the UAV's and the links the real situation on the ground just up and ran over the thinking and then again the split between the USAF and Army has not helped. How would you tackle this - seriously with all respect - how would you put this fire out or in the least what role would you see air power First, recognize that asking a fighter pilot for an opinion is always dangerous. Second, if the fighter pilot also teaches political science and international relations, you're going to get nuance (i.e. gobbledegook) and bias (i.e. bias.) I'm a long distance outside of the area of operations and my picture is provided by the left-stream media. I get some very positive feedback through back-channel links to folks still in the business to gain a bit of balance. Let's start by stating my impression that the current hostilities are predominantly sectarian between Shia and Sunni, with the US getting nailed in the cross-fire and offering a convenient scapegoat for each side to point at as the cause. Not a good situation. Essential to the discussion is recognition of the need to acknowledge majority rule--that means mostly Shia, unfortunately. Balance and stability don't come without some compromise that guarantees input from the Kurds and Sunni, but they want sovereignty in their regions,not just a voice. Won't come easy, if at all. Our role is to get security forces trained (to whatever minimum standard is achievable) and then get out of the way. The underlying principle is that eventually the population will tire of the fighting and determine that their self-interest is better served by stability. Don't know if that is possible given the Arab mentality. For US operations model, I'd look to the Israeli. Build a strong intel system, both national tech (i.e. hardware) and HUMINT (i.e. wetware). Then stand off and apply the intel when required at points of decision. That allows selective application of firepower without getting your troops into indefensible and high vulnerability situations like house-to-house urban fighting. I'd get out of the patrolling business as much as possible and get into the conflict response mode. Wait for a 911 call from the local authorities before intervening. When major scale operations are required, do it with precision and supported by a well-managed PR campaign that clearly spells out that folks who allow insurgents to live next door, hide in the basement or shoot from their roofs will be subject to instant response. "We will not lie, cheat or steal--or support jihadists, or TOLERATE AMONG US those who do..." The important distinction is to mark that the military didn't lose any war here--they went in, cleaned house and kicked ass. The current "mission" is untraditional to say the least. If it fails, it isn't because of DOD, but because of using the wrong tools for a nation-building job. Yet, it is very much in our national interest to try to establish stability and if possible a republican form of government in the region. See what you get when you ask? Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" www.thunderchief.org www.thundertales.blogspot.com |
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"F-35 Test Flight Deemed a Success"
Ed , very well said - straight shooting and from the heart - thanks
I am working these issues and will carry these words with me - thanks again Ski "Ed Rasimus" wrote in message ... On Mon, 01 Jan 2007 21:07:03 GMT, "Ski" wrote: Hit it right on the head Ed - the situation is unique and it got that way because we went in blind on the wishes of the politicals and not with a good plan - hence we are backed into a wall and bleeding for it. You caught on also that there is no doctrine for this, hardly any proper terms and as CAS was evolving to use the UAV's and the links the real situation on the ground just up and ran over the thinking and then again the split between the USAF and Army has not helped. How would you tackle this - seriously with all respect - how would you put this fire out or in the least what role would you see air power First, recognize that asking a fighter pilot for an opinion is always dangerous. Second, if the fighter pilot also teaches political science and international relations, you're going to get nuance (i.e. gobbledegook) and bias (i.e. bias.) I'm a long distance outside of the area of operations and my picture is provided by the left-stream media. I get some very positive feedback through back-channel links to folks still in the business to gain a bit of balance. Let's start by stating my impression that the current hostilities are predominantly sectarian between Shia and Sunni, with the US getting nailed in the cross-fire and offering a convenient scapegoat for each side to point at as the cause. Not a good situation. Essential to the discussion is recognition of the need to acknowledge majority rule--that means mostly Shia, unfortunately. Balance and stability don't come without some compromise that guarantees input from the Kurds and Sunni, but they want sovereignty in their regions,not just a voice. Won't come easy, if at all. Our role is to get security forces trained (to whatever minimum standard is achievable) and then get out of the way. The underlying principle is that eventually the population will tire of the fighting and determine that their self-interest is better served by stability. Don't know if that is possible given the Arab mentality. For US operations model, I'd look to the Israeli. Build a strong intel system, both national tech (i.e. hardware) and HUMINT (i.e. wetware). Then stand off and apply the intel when required at points of decision. That allows selective application of firepower without getting your troops into indefensible and high vulnerability situations like house-to-house urban fighting. I'd get out of the patrolling business as much as possible and get into the conflict response mode. Wait for a 911 call from the local authorities before intervening. When major scale operations are required, do it with precision and supported by a well-managed PR campaign that clearly spells out that folks who allow insurgents to live next door, hide in the basement or shoot from their roofs will be subject to instant response. "We will not lie, cheat or steal--or support jihadists, or TOLERATE AMONG US those who do..." The important distinction is to mark that the military didn't lose any war here--they went in, cleaned house and kicked ass. The current "mission" is untraditional to say the least. If it fails, it isn't because of DOD, but because of using the wrong tools for a nation-building job. Yet, it is very much in our national interest to try to establish stability and if possible a republican form of government in the region. See what you get when you ask? Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" www.thunderchief.org www.thundertales.blogspot.com |
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"F-35 Test Flight Deemed a Success"
You are right, the whole cost issue is a big bag of swirling numbers and I used license to steal, yet the USAF pays much less for its Block 50 F-16's then FMS customers pay but that difference is not desired to be spread all around however it is significant and your new F-16 at a good production rate (say 10 / month) would be around $30 million each and the JSF started at a fixed $28 million a decade ago projected. The F-15E would also be around $50 million to the USAF with a production rate (say 8 / month) going (that's important). For instance the UAE paid over $4 billion to develop the AESA radar, Israel and Greece paid over $2 billion for the same work - not bad a deal for the USA, but if the USAF or another customer buys or sells the Block 60 it must pay the UAE a hefty royalty - that's why you are not seeing the Block 60 in the Guard or Reserves or anywhere and why the newer Block 50/52's are so advanced. The JSF gets the shaft (as all new aircraft do) because the loaded development costs start off the price tag so if a two billion program nets one aircraft it is a 2 billion machine - not fair of course, but the cost projections for a production set would drop things radicaly - however the problems with the JSF in weight and strength are causing design changes and that's millions in man hours and millions in delay of schedule. So the unit cost rises and if the production numbers shrink the numbers go out of sight. It seems past $80 million each now and we have to complete the aircraft and finish testing. But it still comes down to "what does it do better" - not much and what it should do better is not proven yet. I am saying give it a breather - pursue the development longer, but drop the STOVL and focus on a CTOL that has more meat down stream. Air Force Magazine (AFA) has an article this month "UAV's with a Bite" - a look at the X-47 concept that is looking to far - to me merge that with JSF and start with a set of manned and unmanned platforms so we can see how unmanned earns its way into the force structure and mission sets. It is possible to say to Lockheed for instance - how many F-16's would I need to produce to get a $25 million aircraft off the production line and there would be an answer - probably around 1000 at 50 / month, but it would be possible. This is the benefit of having a "line" and "tooling" and "venders" and "work force" etc... as the production lines dry up these small essentials fade away and hurt. Many of the original F-16's were produced with parts that are non-existent today, hence the great upgrade program for the F-16A that brought C model avionics and more to the European A and B models essentially died a natural death as the guts of the aircarft ran out of spares. On the other had, the A/B market "used" has continued so strongly (Portugal, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Indonesia, Thailand and C users for training machines etc.) commercial suppliers have stepped up and filled again the needs of the components - so you never know. Building 2000 F-35's would again bring the $28 million figure back to it - but still - what would it do better in the present wars at this time and down road for bigger nastier enemies, it does not have the performance or legs which brings on the F-22 growth "eponymous cowherd" wrote in message ... In article C22ih.954$Eo.367@trnddc08, "Ski" wrote: f the JSF did not cost three times an F-16 or twice a F-15E then you might say lets press with the F-35 and let the maturity build up fix all this, but with the F-35 is dragging dozens of billions of dollars in investment that goes into its employment - money i think we can not afford now. Where are you getting these numbers? The -35 will likely cost less than either the -16 or the -15. Anti-military types in the press and government like to quote the costs of the -16 and the -15 based on the last time the USA bought one. The price keeps going up since then. I think the last time the USA bought a -15 the cost was $50 million each, when Korea bought them in 01 the cost was $81 million each. A quick googling shows that the -16s bought by the UAE will cost an estimated $80 million each. If you use the cost of recent purchases of the -16 and the -15 you will see that the -35 will be competitive on cost alone. Since the -15 has two engines the chances of it being cheaper than any single engine plane are extremely low. http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/facts-...apon-costs.php |
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"F-35 Test Flight Deemed a Success"
On Tue, 02 Jan 2007 15:52:29 GMT, Ed Rasimus
wrote: [snip detailed & responsible analysis from Ed] Jumping in unbidden to pick on a couple of points just to expose my poor manners... The important distinction is to mark that the military didn't lose any war here--they went in, cleaned house and kicked ass. True, but only in so far as the first stage of operations. The war continues. The failure of the US forces (and British) to suppress the insurgency and sectarian conflict, despite all the cultural and operational factors outside their control, remains a failure. I think it's explicable, and understandable, but still a failure to adapt to changing operational conditions. The current "mission" is untraditional to say the least. On the contrary, I'd say it's similar to several historical examples, from the Philippines to numerous Latin American interventions, and that's simply from within the context of US military history. The supremacy of the US force's operational and technological capacity doesn't mean that every situation can be resolved by the blind application of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy. If it fails, it isn't because of DOD, but because of using the wrong tools for a nation-building job. Ah, but the wrong tool (the DoD) was used for the nation-building job. An ideological aversion to the term "nation-building" doesn't excuse the DoD and military for failing to engage with the neccessity for doing just that in order to win the war. At least to start with. Yet, it is very much in our national interest to try to establish stability and if possible a republican form of government in the region. See what you get when you ask? Please do not resort to such blatant examples of responsible and rational analysis in future. This is usenet; there are commonly-accepted standards of random abuse and infantile posturing to uphold. Gavin Bailey -- Now see message: "Boot sector corrupt. System halted. All data lost." Spend thousands of dollar on top grade windows system. Result better than expected. What your problem? - Bart Kwan En |
#30
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"F-35 Test Flight Deemed a Success"
On Thu, 04 Jan 2007 15:59:23 GMT, The Leslie Cheswick Soul Explosion
wrote: On Tue, 02 Jan 2007 15:52:29 GMT, Ed Rasimus wrote: [snip detailed & responsible analysis from Ed] Jumping in unbidden to pick on a couple of points just to expose my poor manners... The important distinction is to mark that the military didn't lose any war here--they went in, cleaned house and kicked ass. True, but only in so far as the first stage of operations. The war continues. The failure of the US forces (and British) to suppress the insurgency and sectarian conflict, despite all the cultural and operational factors outside their control, remains a failure. I think it's explicable, and understandable, but still a failure to adapt to changing operational conditions. If you are only happy by ascribing "failure" to the military operation, far be it from me to disabuse you of the notion. We aren't dealing here with changing operational conditions. This isn't fluidity of a front or unforeseen maneuvering of enemy forces. It isn't resistance efforts by an occupied nation to an imperialist force--it is cultural, tribal and ethnic dissonance very similar to the Balkans. Absent a unifying (and often oppressive) leader like Tito or even Sadaam, the underlying animosity resurfaces and the national construct fractures. If there is a failure involved, it is very similar to the failure of Vietnam for American foreign policy. That is, it is the failure to recognize the culture and the historic background of the regional strife. It is a tendency to ascribe Eurocentric values to Asian or Middle-eastern people. Fundamentalist Muslims may never accept the concept of Hobbesian rule by "consent of the governed" just as Southeast Asians may never subjugate family and relationship to the land to the dictates of the majority as expressed through an arguably corrupt government. The current "mission" is untraditional to say the least. On the contrary, I'd say it's similar to several historical examples, from the Philippines to numerous Latin American interventions, and that's simply from within the context of US military history. The supremacy of the US force's operational and technological capacity doesn't mean that every situation can be resolved by the blind application of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy. Without applying a shotgun historical approach to your "examples" let me simply suggest that neither the Philippines nor any recallable Latin American involvements had the overlay of: 1.) three divergent religious sects; 2.) an imposed national identity from British colonial rule; 3.) thirty years of minority control under a totalitarian, brutal dictatorship; 4) a distinct separatist movement seeking national identity in a third of the nation; 5.) a dozen or more competing warlords seeking ascendency to fill a perceived power vacuum and 6.) a recent history of application of weapons of mass destruction against national enemies and their own people. I'd also be hard pressed to label the flexibility demonstrated by the US military in approaches evolving from the collapse of the Soviet Union into Desert Storm into Afghanistan into Iraqi Freedom into the current referee for civil war and scapegoat role as "blind application of that doctrinal conventional operational supremacy"--whatever that means. If it fails, it isn't because of DOD, but because of using the wrong tools for a nation-building job. Ah, but the wrong tool (the DoD) was used for the nation-building job. An ideological aversion to the term "nation-building" doesn't excuse the DoD and military for failing to engage with the neccessity for doing just that in order to win the war. At least to start with. It isn't a case of ideological aversion. It is recognition of the fact that the essential function of a military is to kill people and break things--quicker and more efficiently than the opposition. Period. "Everything else is rubbish"...B. M. vR Yet, it is very much in our national interest to try to establish stability and if possible a republican form of government in the region. See what you get when you ask? Please do not resort to such blatant examples of responsible and rational analysis in future. This is usenet; there are commonly-accepted standards of random abuse and infantile posturing to uphold. Thanks...I needed that! ;-) Ed Rasimus Fighter Pilot (USAF-Ret) "When Thunder Rolled" www.thunderchief.org www.thundertales.blogspot.com |
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