Federal Aviation Administration to cut more air traffic controllers

"John Mazor" wrote in message
...
"Steve Foley" wrote in message
news:P%RRg.366$8U2.342@trndny08...
"Mxsmanic" wrote in message
...
The air regulations are a double-edged sword: if a competent pilot
feels he needs to do something for the sake of safety, he can do it,
no matter what anyone else says, and the regulations will protect him.

You're a funny guy!

I'd like to see how far he gets in defending himself against an FAA
citation
using that argument - "I can do anything I see fit as PIC for the safe
operation of my aircraft, and the FARs protect me so you can't touch me."

It is a starting point for a defense, but as we see, he is rather weak on
where such discussions go after laying down a basic principle or two.
Ditto
on his simplistic, tunnel-vision view of aviation safety.



The Feds will never come after Mxsmanic. He's never touched the controls of
an airplane. He plays with Microsoft Flight Simulator somewhere in France,
but know more than all the pilots here combined.

John Mazor writes:

It starts there, but if it stopped there, then aviation still would be an
extremely hazardous form of transportation.

It depends on who's sitting in the seat. And with some pilots,
aviation still _is_ an extremely hazardous form of transportation.

--
Transpose mxsmanic and gmail to reach me by e-mail.

"Steve Foley" wrote in message
news:P%RRg.366$8U2.342@trndny08...
"Mxsmanic" wrote in message
...
The air regulations are a double-edged sword: if a competent pilot
feels he needs to do something for the sake of safety, he can do it,
no matter what anyone else says, and the regulations will protect him.

You're a funny guy!


Stupid, but funny.

"Steve Foley" wrote in message
news:4CWRg.3916$SD5.2126@trndny01...
"John Mazor" wrote in message
...
"Steve Foley" wrote in message
news:P%RRg.366$8U2.342@trndny08...
"Mxsmanic" wrote in message
...
The air regulations are a double-edged sword: if a competent pilot
feels he needs to do something for the sake of safety, he can do it,
no matter what anyone else says, and the regulations will protect him.

You're a funny guy!

I'd like to see how far he gets in defending himself against an FAA
citation
using that argument - "I can do anything I see fit as PIC for the safe
operation of my aircraft, and the FARs protect me so you can't touch me."

It is a starting point for a defense, but as we see, he is rather weak on
where such discussions go after laying down a basic principle or two.
Ditto
on his simplistic, tunnel-vision view of aviation safety.

The Feds will never come after Mxsmanic. He's never touched the controls
of
an airplane. He plays with Microsoft Flight Simulator somewhere in France,
but know more than all the pilots here combined.

Thanks, that's about what I figured.

SNIP
You can't deny that the crew missed it, but is that as far as your
understanding of aviation safety goes? "The crew screwed up, end of
discussion"?

It is for those narrow minded idiots who can't see the
importance of integrity of the entire National Airspace
System. It's the "We don't need **** but the 2 guys in the
Cockpit" fallacy.

In 1994 the FAA started full speed ahead Kissing the Black
Ass and promoting secretaries into key safety positions for
Diversity numbers without proper training or background
knowledge.

Senior Managers in the FAA were even brainwashed by Bull
Dike edicts from inside the Lesbian controlled Beltway in
D.C. FAA Hdq. that you do not need a aviation background to
manage Controllers or Technicians so the need for a
"Background" was eliminated so more Blacks and Women could
be promoted into FAA Management

Now, the FAA has a big bucket of DOG **** that will get
worse as more WHITE MALE HETEROSEXUAL experienced
controllers and technicians retire or quit in disgust.

More people will die across America in aviation disasters
like KLEX unless the FAA returns to the business model of
Air Safety first rather than "Kissing the Black Ass"

See FAA TAX FUNDED BOONDOGGLE

http://www.nbcfae.org/2006AnnualTraining.htm

Or, unless in their(FAA)current sick twisted HR Diversity
Matrix it's OK to kill a few people as long as the Black and
Female FAA Employees remain HAPPY. Sorta like the we don't
need a red light until more people die at the intersection
mentality. That is why they call the FAA the "Tombstone"
agency. People must die before they get off their ass and do
something.

The current FAA Administrator would rather blame the Air
Traffic controllers for funding shortfalls and beat up on
NATCA and abuse their key safety employees with benefit cuts
rather than look at the MILLIONS wasted each year Kissing
the Black Ass in Civil Rights and EEO Empires that have
NOTHING to do with day to day Air Safety or operation of the
FAA.

In other words, it's FUBAR in the FAA with their Air Safety
priorities

But, remember, we are racist and bigots for bringing you
these hard but true facts of the organization entrusted with
American Air Safety. The hard words help the FAA and their
PC Minions deflect and shield themselves from public scrutiny.

It's all sick and wrong

"Political Correctness is Tyranny with Manners"

"AlbertSnore" wrote in message
. ..

SNIP

And further snip the sock puppet's bull**** racist spin that at this point
is, well, making me snore, Albert.

Your amusement value here has just about played out.

Zzzzzzzz...

"John Mazor" wrote in message
...

And the tower? Might they be perching controllers so high up, in
windowed cabs, so they can see what's happening on the ground there? Such
as airplanes deviating from their clearances? If not, you don't need a
tower, any darkened room on the ground will do.


The tower provides runway separation. You can't do that from a darkened
room on the ground, you have to see the runways and be able to scan the sky
in the immediate vicinity to establish a sequence.



Stephen, I'm not going to get out in front of the investigation. If
you're truly interested in safety and not just in beating up on pilots,
please follow it as it unfolds. Yes, confusing airport layout and
markings and notices can play a role in an accident and may very well do
so here.


Jon, you got out in front of the investigation when you concluded that
anomalies in airport markings and notices and layout played a role in this
accident.



Meanwhile, ponder the significance of this portion of the probable cause
statement in the 1990 runway collision in Detroit. Part of the accident
chain was one of the crews becoming confused in low viz weather by a taxi
intersection known colloquially to pilots as "spaghetti junction."

CONTRIBUING TO CAUSE OF ACDNT WERE (1) DEFICIENCIES IN ATC SVCS PROVIDED
BY DETROIT TWR, INCLUDING FAILURE OF GND CTLR TO TAKE TIMELY ACTN TO ALERT
LCL CTLR TO PSBL RWY INCURSION, INADQT VIS OBS, FAILURE TO USE PROGRESSIVE
TAXI INSTRNS IN LOW-VIS CONDS, & ISSUANCE OF INAPPROPRIATE & CONFUSING
TAXI INSTRNS COMPOUNDED BY INADQ BACKUP SUPERVISION FOR LEVEL OF
EXPERIENCE OF STAFF ON DUTY; (2) DEFICIENCIES IN SURFACE MARKINGS, SIGNAGE
& LGTG AT ARPT & FAILURE OF FAA SURVEILLANCE TO DETECT OR CORRECT ANY OF
THESE DEFICIENCIES;

Not all of that applies here, but yes, airport and ATC issues can play a
role in an accident. The intersection was closed and the taxiways were
revamped after the accident.


Does any of it apply here?



And what else, pray tell, would the controller who cleared the accident
aircraft from the gate have been doing? Controlling and monitoring ground
movement was his responsibiity - until he turned away to do another task
that related to movement of aircraft in the air, not ground movement.


What was there for him to monitor? Was there another aircraft or vehicle
moving on the airport? It's been reported that he turned to some
administrative tasks after clearing Comair for takeoff, I've heard no
mention of any other aircraft in the air or on the ground.



There's no guarantee that he would have noticed the erroneous movement if
he hadn't been required to turn to other tasks because of the lack of the
second controller, but it's a pretty sure bet that once he turned from
that area of responsibility (control and monitoring of ground movement),
he wasn't going to notice anything happening on the runway. Thus, his
potential role to provide redundancy and prevent an accident was negated
by FAA's violation of its own staffing rules.


He had not been required to turn to other tasks because of the lack of the
second controller. Nothing to date suggests any error on the part of the
controller or any failure to meet any of his responsibilities.



That's exactly my point. What's yours?


That a second controller would not ensure the chain was broken.



Care to guess how many times a day that two pilots (never mind just one)
miss something and a warning system or a controller (that's all part of
redundancy, you now) prevents a mishap? Get out your calculator, your
fingers and toes aren't sufficient to the task. The system depends in
part on redundancy to keep us all safe. When it fails, we're all less
safe.


These pilots didn't miss one thing, they missed MANY indicators that they
were on the wrong runway.



You can't deny that the crew missed it, but is that as far as your
understanding of aviation safety goes? "The crew screwed up, end of
discussion"?


Nobody's denying that the crew missed it. The cause of the crash is already
known, they attempted to takeoff on the wrong runway, a runway that was too
short. The only purpose of the investigation is to attempt to determine why
they did so.

"Steven P. McNicoll" wrote in message
ink.net...

"John Mazor" wrote in message
...

And the tower? Might they be perching controllers so high up, in
windowed cabs, so they can see what's happening on the ground there?
Such
as airplanes deviating from their clearances? If not, you don't need a
tower, any darkened room on the ground will do.

The tower provides runway separation. You can't do that from a darkened
room on the ground, you have to see the runways and be able to scan the
sky in the immediate vicinity to establish a sequence.

And in order to do that, they have to watch the airplanes on the taxiways
and runways, don't they? Which was my point.

Stephen, I'm not going to get out in front of the investigation. If
you're truly interested in safety and not just in beating up on pilots,
please follow it as it unfolds. Yes, confusing airport layout and
markings and notices can play a role in an accident and may very well do
so here.

Jon, you got out in front of the investigation when you concluded that
anomalies in airport markings and notices and layout played a role in this
accident.

What I said was "Of course the crew had primary responsibility, although the
anomalies in airport markings and notices and layout will play a role, too."
So yes, I did get a bit ahead here, but I wasn't specific as to what the
"role" was, and the NTSB already has said that it is looking at those
factors, so I didn't just make it up.

Meanwhile, ponder the significance of this portion of the probable cause
statement in the 1990 runway collision in Detroit. Part of the accident
chain was one of the crews becoming confused in low viz weather by a taxi
intersection known colloquially to pilots as "spaghetti junction."

CONTRIBUING TO CAUSE OF ACDNT WERE (1) DEFICIENCIES IN ATC SVCS PROVIDED
BY DETROIT TWR, INCLUDING FAILURE OF GND CTLR TO TAKE TIMELY ACTN TO
ALERT
LCL CTLR TO PSBL RWY INCURSION, INADQT VIS OBS, FAILURE TO USE
PROGRESSIVE
TAXI INSTRNS IN LOW-VIS CONDS, & ISSUANCE OF INAPPROPRIATE & CONFUSING
TAXI INSTRNS COMPOUNDED BY INADQ BACKUP SUPERVISION FOR LEVEL OF
EXPERIENCE OF STAFF ON DUTY; (2) DEFICIENCIES IN SURFACE MARKINGS,
SIGNAGE
& LGTG AT ARPT & FAILURE OF FAA SURVEILLANCE TO DETECT OR CORRECT ANY OF
THESE DEFICIENCIES;

Not all of that applies here, but yes, airport and ATC issues can play a
role in an accident. The intersection was closed and the taxiways were
revamped after the accident.

Does any of it apply here?

What I wwas doing here was responding to the narrow-minded views expressed
here, to the effect that since the pilot has the primary responsibility for
everything that happens, then runway, taxiway, and controller
responsibilities had nothing to do with the accident in KY. I wasn't
drawing a direct, exact connection regarding the conditions at the two
airports.

And what else, pray tell, would the controller who cleared the accident
aircraft from the gate have been doing? Controlling and monitoring
ground
movement was his responsibiity - until he turned away to do another task
that related to movement of aircraft in the air, not ground movement.

What was there for him to monitor? Was there another aircraft or vehicle
moving on the airport? It's been reported that he turned to some
administrative tasks after clearing Comair for takeoff, I've heard no
mention of any other aircraft in the air or on the ground.

He would have been watching the accident aircraft. If those "administrative
tasks" normally should have been performed by the controller at the other
position, then the working controller was prevented from sticking to his
position. I don't know what those tasks were, so we'll have to wait and
see.

There's no guarantee that he would have noticed the erroneous movement if
he hadn't been required to turn to other tasks because of the lack of the
second controller, but it's a pretty sure bet that once he turned from
that area of responsibility (control and monitoring of ground movement),
he wasn't going to notice anything happening on the runway. Thus, his
potential role to provide redundancy and prevent an accident was negated
by FAA's violation of its own staffing rules.

He had not been required to turn to other tasks because of the lack of the
second controller. Nothing to date suggests any error on the part of the
controller or any failure to meet any of his responsibilities.

See previous.

That's exactly my point. What's yours?

That a second controller would not ensure the chain was broken.

I already said that, just above: "There's no guarantee that he would have
noticed the erroneous movement if he hadn't been required to turn to other
tasks because of the lack of the second controller."

So yes, the working controller may not have noticed the aircraft even if
there were a second contoller. OTOH, he might have done so, just as the
controller (and crew) noticed the exact same error, same airport, same
runways, 13 years ago, and warned the crew..

Care to guess how many times a day that two pilots (never mind just one)
miss something and a warning system or a controller (that's all part of
redundancy, you now) prevents a mishap? Get out your calculator, your
fingers and toes aren't sufficient to the task. The system depends in
part on redundancy to keep us all safe. When it fails, we're all less
safe.

These pilots didn't miss one thing, they missed MANY indicators that they
were on the wrong runway.

And redundancy has prevented many accidents where the crew "missed MANY
indicators." Try reading some ASRS reports.

You can't deny that the crew missed it, but is that as far as your
understanding of aviation safety goes? "The crew screwed up, end of
discussion"?

Nobody's denying that the crew missed it. The cause of the crash is
already known, they attempted to takeoff on the wrong runway, a runway
that was too short. The only purpose of the investigation is to attempt
to determine why they did so.

I think we're getting bogged down in semantics when we really aren't that
far apart. You also got caught in some crossfire with another poster, where
a lot of my vehemence was directed at him.

That's what the probable cause statement probably will start out with - the
crew took the wrong runway. Then there will be contributing factors, which
might include airport issues. There also will be a list of findings, a list
of recommendations, and a lengthy report.

Accident investigators and other safety experts view all this as a whole.
The probable cause statement, in itself, does not convey an true
understanding of the accident, which is necessary for taking steps to
prevent another one like it. Unfortunately, that's what most of the media -
and some posters - focus on.

"TheNPC" wrote in message
.. .
SNIP
There's no guarantee that he would have noticed the erroneous movement if
he hadn't been required to turn to other tasks because of the lack of the
second controller, but it's a pretty sure bet that once he turned from
that area of responsibility (control and monitoring of ground movement),
he wasn't going to notice anything happening on the runway. Thus, his
potential role to provide redundancy and prevent an accident was negated
by FAA's violation of its own staffing rules.



Looking at all the comments and chatter regarding the subject of the
Lexington crash this paragraph best hits the nail on the head. We will
never know the hypothetical out come because the FAA violated their own
staffing orders at Lexington that night. The hypothetical scenario of two
controllers on duty and the related safety matrix was made impossible by
the FAA's refusal to staff their ATCT IAW their own orders.


Following the order doesn't put another controller in the tower cab.

John Mazor wrote:


The tower provides runway separation. You can't do that from a darkened
room on the ground, you have to see the runways and be able to scan the
sky in the immediate vicinity to establish a sequence.


And in order to do that, they have to watch the airplanes on the taxiways
and runways, don't they? Which was my point.

There was only one airplane. The controller had no obligation to
continue to watch this, the only aircraft, once takeoff clearance had
been issued.


What I wwas doing here was responding to the narrow-minded views expressed
here, to the effect that since the pilot has the primary responsibility for
everything that happens, then runway, taxiway, and controller
responsibilities had nothing to do with the accident in KY. I wasn't
drawing a direct, exact connection regarding the conditions at the two
airports.

Narrow-minded views?

For a Part 121 flight crew to takeoff during nighttime on a runway
without operating runway edge lights rises to the level of criminal
negligence. At that point ambiguous or even misleading airport signage
became irrelevant.

Had the signs caused them to end up on a dead-end taxiway, well, ok,
shame on the signs. But, for them to take an unlighted runway, and
diregard their heading bug or FMS runway display, well, gee..."Honest
officer, I wouldn't have driven 90 the wrong way on this one way street
and collided with the school bus, had only the one-way signs had been
more visible."